Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-003177
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52560/2023
LP/01478/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEVILLE

Between

A M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Mair, counsel instructed by GMAIU
For the Respondent: Ms S Mackenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The following is how the appellant’s circumstances are described in the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal: (I have redacted the name of the small town where the appellant was born)
2. The Appellant was born in [T] where he lived with his parents and two younger brothers until he left Chad in 2020. He did not attend school but studied Arabic and Islamic method at home with his father. The Appellant is from the Gorane tribe and grew up in poverty. His parents did not have work but his father helped on a farm and was paid in millet. The Appellant fled Chad in 2020 when he was just 14 years old due to problems he was facing locally on the basis of his ethnicity/ tribe. He travelled to Libya where he was subjected to serious harm/trafficking before escaping and traveling to Italy and then France.
3. The Appellant entered the UK on 21 July 2021 at the age of 15 and claimed asylum on 7 September 2021.The Appellant’s asylum claim was refused on 30 March 2023 but he was granted leave to remain as an unaccompanied asylum seeking child. That leave had come to an end by the time of his appeal hearing but there is an outstanding application to renew that leave.
2. That appeal hearing was before First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant (“the Judge”) on 25 April 2024. In his decision dated 15 May 2024, the Judge’s principal findings were that:
a. The appellant had told the truth about his experiences in Chad and his journey to the UK. In particular, he had given a consistent and credible account that included being beaten by and forced to work for militia in a camp in Libya, and witnessing others being tortured and killed.
b. The appellant’s experiences during his journey to the UK amounted to human trafficking and modern slavery.
c. He is now 17 and has received limited education. He is suffering from “a moderate major depressive disorder and anxiety centred around fears for his family and having to return to Chad”, and meets the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD.
d. The appellant was not presently in contact with his parents:
“Whilst to the best of his knowledge his mother and brothers are still living in [T], he says he last spoke to them in April 2022 through a neighbour who contacted him on Facebook. He has not spoken to his father since January 2021 and at that time his father told him he was going N’Djamena but did not say why. The Appellant believes he may have been threatened as he would not otherwise have left his family.”
e. There was nonetheless insufficient evidence to show that he could not avoid persecution on account of his Gorane ethnicity, and any risk of re-trafficking, by seeking out the protection of one or both of his parents. Their support also rendered removal a proportionate interference with the right to respect for his private life in the UK.
f. The appellant was therefore not a refugee or eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection, and his removal would not be contrary to Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The appeal was dismissed.
3. The appellant now pursues two grounds of appeal in the Upper Tribunal: first, that the Judge’s conclusion that provision of family support would obviate risk on return was not properly open to him; and second, that the appellant’s removal would be unlawful and could not therefore be justified under Article 8(2).
Ground 1 – Family support
The appellant’s case
4. Ms Mair began her submissions by asserting that the Judge must be taken as having accepted all the appellant’s evidence that was material to his decision. In the circumstances of this particular appeal, I agree. While the respondent did not formally concede credibility, the Judge conducted a detailed and critical analysis of the appellant’s case and could be expected to highlight where any relevant assertion should not be accepted, and why. This was especially important where the presenting officer had confirmed that he had no questions to put in cross-examination: see Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.
5. Of that evidence, the following is relevant to this onward appeal. In his witness statement, the appellant stated as follows:
9. My mother and brothers are still living in [T] to the best of my knowledge and belief. The last time I spoke to my family was April 2022 during Ramadan. They don’t have their own telephone, so I spoke to them through a neighbour. We spoke using Facebook messenger. My neighbour rarely checks his Facebook, but he must have checked it during Ramadan in 2022, so he said hello to me. I told him that I wanted to speak to my family. I don’t think that he cares about social media and won’t have access to the internet easily, so he doesn’t check it very often. Getting data to check the internet is also something that most people are not able to afford in Chad.
10. I didn't speak to my father in Ramadan April 2022, he had left for the capital city before this. I last spoke to my dad when I was in Calais at the beginning of 2021 and he was still at home at that time. During the call he told me that he was going to go to the capital city, but he didn’t disclose to me why he was going there. It was a short call and we didn’t talk about any problems. I know that he wouldn’t have wanted to worry me.
11. I did not speak to my mother in Eid or Ramadan in 2023. I have left messages for my neighbour on Messenger, but he hasn’t replied to me.
12. I don’t know what has happened to my dad, but for him to have left our home, I fear that it was something bad because he wouldn’t have left my mum and siblings. It is my fear that his life was threatened and I think that this is why he went to the Capital city. Before I left Chad, I heard him saying to my mum that he wasn’t safe and that he was worried for us, his children.
6. This discloses that the appellant tried to re-establish contact with his family but failed. This is consistent with what he told practitioner psychologist Ms Catrin Lewis, who produced a psychological report under the supervision of a consultant clinical psychologist Dr Sarah Heke. At paragraphs 6.3.2-6.3.3 she describes the appellant’s strong belief that he would be harmed or killed if returned to Chad and the resulting effect on his mental health. She opines that his recovery from PTSD would also be negatively affected, and that due to his mistrust of people and lack of social support systems he would struggle to socially integrate in Chad, his past experiences and current mental state making it difficult for him to establish supportive social networks and secure financial stability, and that by reference to public guidance this increases his risk of exploitation. She concludes that removing him to Chad is “likely to both remove him from supportive experiences of safety and treatment in the UK and to exacerbate his anxiety and threat awareness, causing distress and suffering.”
7. A country report was provided by Professor Lori Leonard, chair of the Department of Global Development at Cornell University. She has worked in Chad for over 35 years, conducting both public health and ethnographic research. The Judge accepted her expertise. Its detail could not be quickly summarised, but it suffices to say that Professor Leonard explains the cultural, linguistic and economic obstacles that the appellant would face settling anywhere other than his home town of [T]. She specifically refuted the respondent’s claim that government support and protection would be available to the appellant as a former victim of trafficking. In relation to the appellant’s origins within Chad, she describes those of Goran ethnicity as Arab semi-nomadic pastoralists and describes their long-standing tensions and conflicts with non-Arab sedentary agriculturists, and continues:
[…] Because of these conflicts, which simmer and intermittently explode, the region has been described as a “powder keg.” Hundreds of people have been killed in the Ouaddai and in Sila provinces – including farmers and pastoralists, Arabs and non-Arabs – in inter-communal violence in the last five years. The height of the violence was in 2019, just before [the appellant] left Chad. [The appellant] seems to have been aware of these conflicts, and that is not surprising as they were felt throughout the country. […]
[…]
In my opinion, his vagueness about the nature of the threats and the participants in the conflicts is not surprising, but that does not diminish or detract from the real risks he faced of having those conflicts lead to some form of harm.
8. Professor Leonard describes present tensions nationally as giving rise to “a high probability of violence and unrest in the near future”. She considers that the appellant’s age, lack of education and mental health problems increase the risk of exploitation and re-trafficking. The risk of violence and re-trafficking would be highest in N’Djamena.
Consideration
9. The focus of this ground is the Judge’s finding that the appellant could avoid the difficulties summarised above, and to which the Judge had certainly paid careful attention, by accessing support from family members. He held at [35] that:
“His mother and brothers are still living in the same location to the best of his knowledge and whilst his father left for N’Djamena there is no evidence to suggest this was because he had been threatened in [T]. The Appellant’s fear in this regard is entirely speculative. I find there is insufficient evidence before me to establish he would not be able to re-establish contact with his family and turn to them for emotional and practical support on return to Chad. Further, there is no evidence to suggest he would be unable to travel safely from N’Djamena to [T]”.
10. I agree that these three findings were essential to the Judge’s overall conclusion that the appellant would not be at risk of serious harm or re-trafficking on return. Ms Mair argued that they each disclose an error of law.
11. Consideration of that argument must begin with the Upper Tribunal’s role when confronted with a challenge to a finding of fact. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2], the following principles were summarised:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
12. The judgment of Carr LJ (as she then was) in Clin v Walter Lilly & Co Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 136 gives similar guidance, from the opposite perspective:
“85. In essence the finding of fact must be plainly wrong if it is to be overturned. A simple distillation of the circumstances in which appellate interference may be justified, so far as material for present purposes, can be set out uncontroversially as follows:
i) Where the trial judge fundamentally misunderstood the issue or the evidence, plainly failed to take evidence into account, or arrived at a conclusion which the evidence could not on any view support;
ii) Where the finding is infected by some identifiable error, such as a material error of law;
iii) Where the finding lies outside the bounds within which reasonable disagreement is possible.
86. An evaluation of the facts is often a matter of degree upon which different judges can legitimately differ. Such cases may be closely analogous to the exercise of a discretion and appellate courts should approach them in a similar way. The appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the trial judge’s treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion.”
13. Anxious application of the above principles leads to the following conclusions. First, it was wrong to describe the appellant’s belief that his father had left [T] for the capital due to fear of conflict as “entirely” speculative. The appellant had given evidence that he had heard his parents talk about the subject and that such fears had been behind his own calamitous decision to take up with those who trafficked him. While, inevitably, a child in the appellant’s circumstances would not have been fully abreast of the situation, Professor Leonard’s evidence explained why his fears were plausible, by reference to a social context on conflict and movement of people that was consistent with the appellant’s (as were accepted to be genuine) beliefs. While those beliefs necessarily included a strong degree of speculation, contrary to the Judge’s remarks there was circumstantial evidence to support them.
14. Second, the finding that there was “insufficient evidence” to establish that the appellant “would not be able to re-establish contact with his family and turn to them for emotional and practical support on return” did require some engagement with the appellant’s evidence on the point. The issue of return to [T] being raised in the refusal decision, the appellant had described the efforts he had made to get in touch with his parents, that he came from a very poor background, and his father worked for food. He had further stated that his parents had no telephone and that the only way of contacting them was through a neighbour who had access to Facebook, and that he had tried to contact them using that method in March or April 2023 and was unsuccessful. His account was clearly that he could not presently contact his parents in [T], or on return, and had no apparent means of contacting his father in N’Djamena. This was all evidence in support of the appellant being unable to seek the support of his family, and no reasons are provided for rejecting it. While there is no requirement that every piece of evidence be considered, or every step in reasoning be set out, the outcome of the appellant’s case has turned on a finding that comes with no explanation as to why his evidence of failure to re-establish contact should be rejected. Nor, just as fundamentally, is there any indication that the insufficiency of his evidence, or the practicality of re-establishing contact in general, was ever put to the appellant for comment; applying the law set out in Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 [28]-[33], this was procedurally unfair.
15. That latter error also applies to return to [T]. There was no evidential void as to the ability to travel 300km from N’Djamena to [T]; the evidence provided and the appellant’s characteristics, as recorded above, were instead capable (and I leave it at that) of showing that this would be impracticable.
16. If only one of the first or third of those errors were established, then this might be insufficient to undermine the overall assessment; I make clear that the decision is otherwise very careful and detailed. The second error by itself is of sufficient gravity in the context of this appeal to establish a material error of law, and the three taken together undoubtedly so. I should stress that the outcome was well within the range of those that might be rationally reached on the evidence, but so was the contrary outcome. That decision will have be re-taken with regard to all the relevant evidence.
Ground 2 – Article 8
17. The appellant was found to have formed a private life in the UK capable of protection, the subsequent conclusion that removal was proportionate being premised on the findings of fact that have now been set aside. The decision on Article 8 must therefore also be re-made.
18. Given that consequence, it seems to me that the appellant’s principal argument under this ground need not be addressed. The correct basis upon which to approach whether the refusal decision is contrary to Article 8 can be determined alongside the substantive issues.
Remaking the decision
19. The above reasons were sent to the parties together with a direction that the FtT’s decision would be set aside and remade in the Upper Tribunal following a further hearing. The Judge’s findings of fact that the appellant is credible as to the reasons why he decided to leave Chad and has a genuine subjective fear on return were preserved. Directions were made for updating evidence on what, if any, support will be available to the appellant on return, country conditions and the appellant’s personal circumstances.
20. To avoid further delay, and as only limited oral evidence from the appellant would be necessary, I directed a video hearing with all participants connecting remotely. It is therefore unfortunate that some months went by before it took place, and that there has been further delay in producing this decision.
21. On 27 November 2025, the respondent implemented her previous decision on human trafficking by granting the appellant temporary permission to stay in the UK so that he could continue to receive treatment for the mental health consequences of his exploitation. That grant automatically engages section 104(4A) of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002. As the appellant gave notice under section 104(4B) and rule 17A(3) of the Procedure Rules, the net effect is that the appeal must be treated as abandoned on all grounds save that removing him from the UK would be contrary to the Refugee Convention. The Article 8 claim cannot therefore be decided.
Updated evidence on re-making
22. The evidential position has developed since the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. First, the appellant has now received a positive Conclusive Grounds decision recognising him as a victim of trafficking involving forced labour in Chad and Libya.
23. Second, there is an updated psychological report diagnosing him with complex PTSD together with severe major depressive disorder and severe anxiety. That report records a clear deterioration in the appellant’s mental health since 2023, attributes his condition to his prior trauma (including trafficking), and expresses the opinion that removal to Chad would likely overwhelm his coping capacity, lead to psychological decompensation and place him at risk of homelessness, exploitation and further harm. It further assesses him as vulnerable with limited functional ability to live independently. Vulnerability is identified that accords with risk factors for re-trafficking. No basis was advanced for attaching reduced weight to this careful and comprehensive report, nor is any apparent. In particular, I note the following extract:
6.2 While [the appellant] will be unable to control the presence of involuntary re-experiencing symptoms, he was emphatic about the lengths he goes to manage his distress as best he can via avoidance, a core symptom of PTSD. Accordingly, it is my strong clinical opinion that [the appellant] has likely considerably understated the nature and impact of what he has experienced and that the psychological impact of his experiences of being trafficked and of forced labour may be yet to be fully understood. In my opinion, [the appellant] remains vulnerable to being re-trafficked, particularly if he were to be returned to an environment where he lacks stable family support or robust protection. Specifically, [the appellant’s] ongoing mental health difficulties, including symptoms of PTSD and depression, will affect his ability to assess risk, seek help, or advocate for himself. His previous exploitation was facilitated by his youth and associated naivete, isolation from supportive guidance from a parental figure/other caregiver, and desperation, all of which could recur in the absence of robust safeguarding measures.
24. Third, the appellant has provided updated statements confirming that he has had no contact with his family since 2022, has been unable to trace them, and remains dependent on supported living arrangements in the United Kingdom; he expresses an ongoing fear of return, inability to support himself, and concern that he would be unable to function if returned.
25. Fourth, the updated country expert evidence (July 2025) indicates that inter-communal violence affecting Gorane populations has intensified since 2023, reaching “unprecedented” levels with large-scale clashes, deaths and ongoing instability, particularly in regions proximate to the appellant’s home area. That evidence also maintains that state protection is ineffective, that internal relocation would not provide a reliable solution, and that the appellant’s personal characteristics, such as his youth, lack of education, absence of family links and mental ill health, would significantly impair his ability to secure accommodation or employment.
26. Fifth, the same expert evidence indicates that adequate mental health treatment is effectively unavailable in Chad, with extremely limited services and prohibitive cost barriers, and that support for victims of trafficking is minimal, inconsistent, and largely inaccessible to individuals in the appellant’s circumstances.
27. The appellant gave evidence at the hearing and was capably but sensitively cross-examined by Ms Mackenzie in accordance with the measures suggested by Dr Lewis in her updated psychological report. In her closing submissions, Ms Mackenzie took issue with the credibility of the appellant’s account of not being in contact with his family. While I recognise that the appellant expressed reticence and what can be described as an economy of expression in his evidence, this is consistent with the expected presentation described in the psychological report. I accept the appellant’s evidence on this point, which has remained consistent throughout the various occasions on which it has been repeated and tested.
Consideration
28. The representatives provided detailed and helpful skeleton arguments that they were able to supplement in oral submissions. I mean no disrespect to their quality by only setting them out where necessary to explain my conclusions.
29. Neither do I repeat the preserved findings, but likewise take them carefully into account. The appellant’s credibility and subjective fear of return are established, as is his status as a victim of trafficking.
30. In my view, whether the appellant faces a reasonable likelihood of risk on return depends on the interaction between the country conditions in Chad and his individual vulnerabilities.
31. I accept the appellant’s updated evidence that he has been unable to re‑establish contact with his family despite attempts to do so, and that he does not know their present whereabouts or whether they remain alive. That account has been consistently maintained and is supported by the practical steps he has described, including attempts to make contact through an intermediary and his attendance at the Red Cross to enquire about family tracing, which he did not pursue further after an initial unsuccessful encounter. I further accept that his ability to re‑establish contact and to seek or obtain support is materially affected by his psychological condition as described in the expert evidence. In particular, his symptoms of depression, anxiety and avoidance, together with the distress associated with engaging with his past and family circumstances, have hindered his capacity to pursue tracing efforts. In those circumstances, I find not only that there is no realistic prospect of the appellant re‑establishing contact, but also that in any event he would not, in practice, be able to take the steps necessary to secure meaningful support from family members on return to Chad.
32. I likewise find that the appellant’s psychological condition would have a significant adverse impact on his ability to operate independently in Chad. The expert evidence demonstrates that his symptoms of severe depression, PTSD and anxiety impair his energy levels, concentration, decision‑making and ability to manage stress, directly relevant to his ability to secure accommodation, employment and basic subsistence. His reliance on avoidance as a coping mechanism, together with his limited experience of independent living and diminished capacity to engage with others or seek assistance, would in practical terms leave him unable to navigate everyday life without support.
33. That conclusion can be carried forward into the assessment of the country conditions with which the appellant would have to cope. The respondent does not in terms challenge Professor Leonard’s expertise but rather takes issue with the weight she attaches to the underlying evidence in forming her opinion. I reject this. First, her acknowledgement that assessing individualised risk can be complex is not a concession that the evidence underlying her conclusions is inherently weak, but rather expresses the evidently cautious and balanced approach taken in the report. This reinforces rather than undermines the reliance that can be placed on her opinion, grounded in long-standing expertise, that the level of inter-communal violence has escalated and that individuals of Gorane ethnicity in affected regions face a real and increasing risk. Nor do I accept the submission that her conclusions are insufficiently sourced; the report engages with recognised background material and is consistent with the wider objective evidence.
34. Second, I reject that the report fails to engage with internal relocation or sufficiency of protection in any material sense. Professor Leonard addresses the limitations of both and her conclusions are consistent with the other evidence. The respondent’s criticisms in this regard amount, in substance, to disagreement with her evaluative assessment. Similarly, I am not persuaded that her conclusions are improperly dependent upon the appellant’s account, such as a lack of family support, but even if they were then that factual account has been established. I am satisfied that Professor Leonard’s report is careful, balanced and properly reasoned, and I attach significant weight to its central conclusions.
35. Taking all the evidence into account I find that the appellant would face a real risk of serious harm on return to Chad by reason of the combined effect of his personal circumstances and the prevailing country conditions. As to the latter, I accept the expert evidence that inter‑communal and inter‑ethnic violence in central and southern Chad has increased in intensity and remains ongoing, including in areas proximate to the appellant’s home region, creating a volatile and insecure environment in which civilians may be exposed to harm. Against that background, I find that the appellant’s individual profile is such as to place him at particular risk. He is a young man of limited education with no experience of independent living, significant and chronic mental health difficulties, and a confirmed history of trafficking. I have found that he has no realistic prospect of re‑establishing contact with his family or securing their support, and that his psychological condition materially impairs his ability to take steps to protect himself.
36. In those circumstances, the appellant would be required to attempt to survive in an unfamiliar and insecure environment without support, whilst suffering from conditions that affect his capacity to function, to assess risk, and to seek or utilise assistance. The expert evidence establishes that such characteristics, in particular his severe depression, PTSD, and history of prior exploitation, render him vulnerable to homelessness, exploitation and further harm, including re‑trafficking, in the absence of protective structures. I find that it is the interaction between those vulnerabilities and the current country conditions, rather than either factor viewed in isolation, which gives rise to the real risk. On the evidence as a whole, that cumulative position clearly crosses the threshold required to establish a well‑founded fear of persecution and/or a real risk of serious harm on return. For the same reasons, the appellant would be unable to avoid such risk by reasonable internal relocation.
Is the Refugee Convention engaged?
37. The appellant argues that he forms part of a ‘particular social group’ (“PSG”) such as to attract the protection of the Refugee Convention by reason of race, or alternatively his mental health problems and/or his status as a victim of trafficking.
38. I am satisfied that the appellant faces a risk of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. In the first instance, I accept that his Gorane ethnicity engages the Convention ground of race. The country evidence supports the conclusion that current patterns of inter‑communal violence involve targeting along ethnic lines and that individuals of Gorane background may be exposed to harm in that context. I am satisfied that the risk I have identified arises, at least in part, by reason of that protected characteristic.
39. I would in the alternative accept that the appellant falls within a particular social group. Applying DH (Particular Social Group: Mental Health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223, the requirement for a PSG is that:
a) members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, or
b) that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society
40. The appellant is a recognised victim of trafficking, which is an immutable feature of his history and which continues to inform his present vulnerability. In addition, I accept on the medical evidence that he suffers from severe and enduring mental health conditions that significantly impair his capacity to function. The country evidence demonstrates that individuals in such circumstances face stigma, lack of treatment, and limited ability to access protection or support. This is material to the risk he would face on return.
Conclusion
41. The appellant is a refugee and the appeal falls to be allowed.
42. I continue the anonymity direction, the integrity of the UK asylum outweighing the principle of open justice.
Notice of Decision
(i) The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
(ii) The Upper Tribunal remakes the decision as follows:
The appeal against the refusal of the appellant’s protection claim is allowed on the ground that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.

J Neville
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 May 2026