Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003339

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59594/2023
LP/02375/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

16th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILSON

Between

VA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 19 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the Judge’) dated 16 May 2024 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claim.

2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville. He identified from the grounds, drafted by the appellant in person, the following alleged arguable errors of law:

a. The Judge erred in considering the appellant’s medical conditions when assessing Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR, as he failed to take into account that the appellant and her husband would not be able to afford necessary medical treatment. The appellant has fibroids and mental health difficulties, and her husband has kidney problems, that would make return difficult.
b. The Judge erred in concluding that return would not be contrary to Article 8 ECHR, failing to take into account that the couple have spent nearly two decades in the United Kingdom, made contributions to their community, retain no ongoing ties with Nigeria, and would face very significant obstacles on return.

3. However, in his analysis of those grounds, Judge Neville also identified at paragraph 4 of his grant the following arguable errors: the Judge arguably failed to address the appellant’s mental health problems in his assessment of very significant obstacles to reintegration, failed to mention at all her physical health problems, and considered her partner’s kidney problems only in the context of Article 3 ECHR. Consequently, he concluded at paragraph 5, it was arguable that the Judge had failed to assess all the obstacles relied upon to decide if they were very significant.

4. Judge Neville considered that it was also arguable that the Judge had failed to give adequate reasons for concluding that the appellant would face no very significant obstacles to reintegration into Nigeria. He does however, record there being no renewed application for permission to appeal against the Judge’s dismissal of the appellant’s protection claim.

5. The Judge noted that the respondent did not have any questions for the appellant and agreed for the appellant’s evidence to be taken ‘at its highest’. It was agreed that we would do the same, if we found the Judge to have made a material error of law, and remake the decision without further hearing.

6. The appellant’s submissions were focussed on the substantive merits of her human rights claim and not on any alleged error of the Judge. Ms Rushforth relied on the decision as being safe on its face. The Judge had not recorded any submissions on the affordability of medical treatment. He clearly had in mind the appellant’s physical as well as mental health problems, as well as those of her partner. The Judge clearly had in mind the length of time spent by the appellant in the United Kingdom. Read as a whole the judgment gave adequate reasons for the Judge’s conclusions.

Consideration

7. According to the appellant’s appeal skeleton argument, the appellant’s case was that she would face very significant obstacles due to the same factors which gave rise to her protection claim (see paragraphs 25 and 26). Those factors are confusingly described merely as a risk of being exploited/trafficked, whereas the appellant’s witness statement makes clear that she also claimed to fear stigmatisation because of childlessness (paragraph 4); and being attacked by Boko Haram (paragraph 5). Moreover, whilst the appeal skeleton argument submitted that internal relocation was not available because the risk was not confined to any locality, the appellant asserted in her witness statement that internal relocation was unreasonable because of her mental health and her husband’s kidney problems (paragraph 8).

8. The Judge recited the appellant’s witness statement in full, and so we would need some persuasion that he then did not take everything said in it into account. Merely failing to refer back to every factor relied upon would not be enough. Certainly, we have not had drawn to our attention any finding of the judge which is necessarily contrary to his having taken all of the appellant’s evidence into account. The Judge’s reference at [21] to ‘any obstacles’ rather than ‘any very significant obstacles’ we conclude was just an infelicitous typographical omission. It is clear from the judgment as a whole that the Judge was aware of the test to be applied.

9. As it is, the Judge expressly considered the appellant’s mental health at [19], considering not just the appellant’s claim of consequent stigmatisation but also the availability of treatment as well. Judge Neville understood the appellant to be arguing that this consideration was made solely within the context of Article 3. However, we find that that cannot be the case; the Judge had noted earlier at [9] that this was not an Article 3 case. Therefore, the judge could only have been undertaking the assessment of availability of treatment in the context of Article 8.

10. Whilst the appellant might be arguing that the Judge failed to take into account the affordability of that treatment, the fact remains that no mention of the point is made in the appeal skeleton argument, no evidence led, nor any oral submissions recorded in the decision. The Judge cannot be criticised for not considering a point not taken before him by the appellant.

11. To the extent that the appellant argues that her partner’s health should have been taken into account in assessing whether she would face very significant obstacles to reintegration, we are not persuaded that it is a consideration strictly relevant to that test. In any event, the Judge does deal (albeit briefly) with the point at [22]. In our judgment, to suggest that the point was left out of account simply because it is in the paragraph following, and not within the same paragraph as, the start of the Judge’s assessment of obstacles, is setting too demanding a standard for the Judge. Reading the judgment as a whole, we are satisfied that the Judge took into account the appellant’s evidence of her partner’s health as well as her own.

12. The Judge noted the appellant’s immigration history at [3]. There is nothing in the decision to suggest that he then disregarded the length of time she had spent in the United Kingdom when reaching his decision. Indeed, his reference in [21] to the appellant having ‘had no permission and no leave to be in the UK for a number of years’ suggests that he did in fact have it clearly in mind. The appellant’s witness evidence made no reference to her contributions to or ties in the United Kingdom beyond her relationship with her partner, with which the Judge expressly deals. Neither does it deal with the alleged lack of ties to Nigeria. There can be no error in the Judge failing to take into account matters only raised on subsequent appeal.

13. Having rejected the substantive alleged errors in the Judge’s decision, and having read his decision holistically, we are satisfied that his reasons, whilst concise, are sufficient for the appellant to understand why she lost (certainly on the case she put before the Judge).

14. For these reasons, the appeal fails.

15. We should add that, even if we had accepted that the Judge had erred in any of the ways alleged, we would have been satisfied that any such error was immaterial. The appellant’s case in a nutshell is that she has mental health difficulties and fibroids which cause heavy menstrual bleeding and severe pain, and that her partner has kidney problems for which he needs constant monitoring. In fact, her partner has Hepitatis B, a liver disease. In any event, she had led no evidence that treatment was unavailable in Nigeria (and had not argued that it would be unaffordable). Even today, she has provided no evidence to substantiate that assertion, and Ms Rushforth countered in any event that the appellant could avail herself of a voluntary return grant. Taking those matters together with the appellant’s time in the United Kingdom and outside Nigeria, regarding which little detail had been given in evidence, we are satisfied that the Judge would have inevitably dismissed the appeal.

Notice of Decision

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law.
3. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal therefore stands.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 May 2025