Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003341

First-tier Tribunal No: EA/04399/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

KANEEZ BATOOL
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
UKVI
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Tajamil Zia (Sponsor)
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard in Edinburgh on 4 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction & Background

1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. The appellant appeals against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) given on 22 December 2023 and promulgated on 3 January 2024 (“the FtT Decision”) to dismiss the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of her application dated 25 August 2021 for a family permit under Appendix EU (family permit).

2. The appellant is the mother of the sponsor, her son, an Italian national. The appellant argues that she meets the requirements of Appendix EU (family permit) on the basis she is dependent on the sponsor. The respondent refused her application as the respondent was not satisfied that the appellant and the sponsor were related as claimed and further was not satisfied that dependency had been established. The appellant appealed that refusal to the FtT.

3. The case came before the FtT as a CVP case management hearing on 30 November 2023. The sponsor was present at that hearing. The FtT decided to deal with the case on the papers and the sponsor submitted some further documents for consideration by the FtT. The FtT thereafter dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The FtT was satisfied that there was a relationship as claimed between the appellant and the sponsor. The FtT was not satisfied that dependency had been established on the evidence.

4. The appellant appealed the FtT Decision. In the written grounds of appeal (completed by the sponsor) the appellant argues that the FtT essentially failed to understand the evidence of dependency that was placed before it. However, in granting permission FtT Judge Gibbs raises as an issue – procedural fairness, in that arguably the case should not have been dealt with on the papers.

5. On behalf of the appellant the sponsor has also produced (assisted by his daughter) before this Tribunal a 7 page Skeleton Argument setting out essentially three grounds of appeal – (a) that the FtT applied too narrow a test of dependency; (b) the FtT failed to assess all the evidence and (c) that the FtT misunderstood or misinterpreted “material date”.

6. The case called before me for an in-person appeal hearing in Edinburgh on 4 December 2025. The appellant was represented by the sponsor with the support of his daughter, Ms Zanab Chatia. The respondent was represented by Mr Wain. I heard submissions from the sponsor and Ms Chatia and from Mr Wain. I reserved my decision. For the reasons set out below, I find that there was no material error of law sufficient to allow the appeal and I dismiss the appeal.

7. No Anonymity order was sought in either the FtT or here. I have not made any such order.

Grounds of Appeal, Discussion and Conclusions

8. There were two grounds of appeal that were before me that were covered by the Grant of Permission to Appeal dated 8 July 2024. The first ground was the procedural fairness issue. The second ground was the failure to understand the evidence of dependency. I will deal with these first but will also deal with the grounds of appeal set out in the Skeleton Argument.

9. The first ground of appeal relates to procedural fairness. This is the ground of appeal identified by FtT Judge Gibbs. FtT Judge Gibbs identified the following concern “Although not raised by the sponsor what concerns me is the judge’s decision to proceed with the matter by way of a paper disposal because there “is no factual dispute as such.” However, it appears that notwithstanding this initial assessment the judge went on to refuse the appeal because of a lack of evidence regarding the appellant’s circumstances. Arguably, in my view, this could have been remedied by oral evidence and consequently the judge’s decision to suggest to the sponsor that the matter could be fairly disposed of on the papers led to procedural unfairness.”

10. I explained the basis of this ground of appeal to the sponsor. The starting point is a consideration of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 (“the Rules”). Rule 25(1) of the Rules provides “The Tribunal must hold a hearing before making a decision which disposes of proceedings except where” and there then follows a list of specific exceptions, the first one of which is “— (a) each party has consented to, or has not objected to, the matter being decided without a hearing;”. Accordingly, 25(1)(a) does give a basis, where there is consent (or no objection), to a case being dealt with on the papers. Mr Wain drew my attention to the authority of SSGA (Disposal without considering merits; R25) Iraq 2023 UKUT 00012. In that case the Upper Tribunal considered the circumstances where it was appropriate to proceed to deal with a case without a hearing. Relevant to this case the following guidance was provided in SSGA [at headnote 4(iii) and (iv)] :-

“If a judge decides that one or more of the exceptions in rule 25(1) is satisfied and therefore decides an appeal without a hearing, the judge’s written decision must explain which exception is satisfied and why by engaging with the pre-requisites specified in the relevant provision and giving reasons for how any discretion conferred by the relevant exception has been exercised and/or how any judgment required to be made is made.”

“A hearing should be held whenever credibility is disputed on any material issue or fact. Cases in which it would be appropriate to determine an appeal without a hearing if credibility is materially in issue would be rare indeed. In almost all cases, the appropriate course of action would be to list the case for a hearing and decide the case on such material as is before the Tribunal.”

11. I have also had regard to the Upper Tribunal decision in the case of Ghira [2025] UKUT 00350 (IAC) where at paragraph 37 Judge Plimmer stated:-

“It is clear from the wording of rule 25 and the guidance in SSGA that the FTT ‘must’ hold a hearing, unless one of the exceptions apply. Even where an exception applies, there is an overarching requirement to consider whether fairness requires a hearing. What fairness requires is informed by the circumstances of the particular case, the basic requirements of common law fairness and the overriding objective. It follows that even where each party has consented to, or has not objected to, the matter being decided without a hearing, and the exception in rule 25(1)(a) applies, the FTT must still consider whether the appeal can be disposed of fairly and justly without a hearing, in accordance with the overriding objective and common law fairness.”

12. Ghira is a case that was decided in early 2025 so would not have been available to the FtT in this case – in making a decision in December 2023. However, it does not establish any “new” law but rather clarifies what was always the position that it is incumbent upon a Tribunal to have regard to the requirements of common law fairness and the overriding objective when considering the position under Rule 25 of the Rules in relation to dealing with a hearing on the papers.

13. It is clear from paragraph 4 of the FtT Decision that the FtT in this case proceed on the basis that there is consent from both parties. There is a specific reference to “I asked the sponsor whether he was content for the appeal to be dealt with on the papers and he confirmed that he was.” Although the FtT do not expressly mention Rule 25(1)(a) of the Rules it is very clear from paragraph 4 that the FtT are proceeding on the basis of consent. I also note the reference to the fact that the FtT explained the position to the sponsor. I also note that the sponsor was specifically asked if there was any further evidence that he wished to provide and that further documentary evidence was provided by the sponsor. The concern identified by FtT Judge Gibbs is that there was a lack of evidence that could have been remedied by oral evidence at an in person hearing. Mr Wain made the point that the issue in this case was about a lack of evidence rather than credibility. SSGA clearly makes the point that a hearing should be held whenever credibility is disputed on any material issue.

14. Based upon SSGA I have no doubt that it would be an error of law to proceed to deal with a case on the papers where credibility was a material issue. However, that is not the situation here. The position here is about a lack of evidence to establish a particular proposition. That is different from credibility. There will be many instances where an appellant’s case will fail where they are unable to produce the necessary evidence to overcome the burden of proof. Indeed, that is likely to be an issue in many cases. I do not think that you can say that it is always an error of law for a Tribunal to proceed and deal with a case on the papers where there is a risk that the appellant may have provided insufficient evidence to establish the case and there is a possibility that oral evidence might cure that defect. However, what is clear from Ghira is that there is an overarching requirement to consider whether fairness requires a hearing. Each case must be considered on its own merits. It is relevant here that the issues in dispute were clear from the respondent’s decision letter of 18 January 2022 and I consider that it is also relevant here that the sponsor was given an opportunity to provide further documentary evidence and did in fact provide that. The FtT identified exactly what the issue was at paragraph 4 of the FtT Decision where they state “I am satisfied that the appeal can properly be dealt with by way of paper disposal, there being no factual dispute as such; the respondents refusal is not on the basis that the appellant’s case is not credible but rather that insufficient evidence has been provided to support the claim of dependency.” Further the FtT did have before it as part of the appellants bundle a document that was effectively a statement from the sponsor (now at 27 of the Bundle). This document was considered by the FtT in reaching their decision. It is not clear that further oral evidence would necessarily have supplied the further evidence (and I think it is important to bear in mind that this whole issue must be assessed based upon what was before the FtT at the time – rather than by taking into consideration material that may have subsequently been produced.)

15. I accept that the reasoning from the FtT at paragraph 4 is brief – but note that in Ghira the guidance provided at paragraph 55 “Address whether it is appropriate in the circumstances to decide the appeal without a hearing by determining whether the case can be dealt with fairly and justly in that manner, in the light of the available evidence and the PCIs. This is likely to be a straightforward assessment, capable of concise (and often highly concise) reasoning.”

16. I note that in Ghira there was found to be an error of law in circumstances where there was a dispute about the veracity of the appellant’s account and credibility was in issue. In addition, there was a failure by the tribunal in that case to consider part of the evidence submitted.

17. Although the FtT do not in the FtT Decision expressly reference consideration of fairness or the overriding objective I am satisfied that the FtT have given due consideration to the appropriateness of proceeding without a hearing taking into account the issues in dispute, the explanation provided to the sponsor and the request for any further information. There is nothing to suggest that there has been a failure to consider the overriding objective and although concise in its reasoning I am satisfied that the FtT in deciding to proceed to deal with the case on the papers have had regard to whether it would be fair to do so and have come to a view that it is.

18. In the circumstances I do not consider that there is any error of law on the first ground of appeal.

19. In relation to the second ground of appeal it was necessary first of all to establish exactly what documents had been before the FtT and what additional documents were being presented by the appellant now before this Tribunal. I discussed this in some detail with the sponsor, Ms Chatia and Mr Wain. I understand the position to be as follows. Before the FtT the appellant had lodged the documents that are now at pages 27 to 43 of the Bundle lodged for this appeal. In addition, the 8 additional pages that the sponsor is referenced to have sent by e mail on 30 November 2023 (see paragraph 4 of the FtT Decision) are at pages 44 to 51 of the Bundle. The documents at pages 11 to 23 of the Bundle were lodged with the appeal form IAFT 4 dated 9 January 2024 which is at pages 7 to 10 of the Bundle. All this is relevant because it is clear that the appellant has provided additional evidence within pages 11 to 23 that was not before the FtT.

20. It is also worth setting out the test for dependency that is within the Immigration Rules. Dependency is defined in Annex 1 to Appendix EU/(FP) as follows:

“‘dependent’ means here that:
(a) having regard to their financial and social conditions, or health, the applicant cannot, or (as the case may be) for the relevant period could not, meet their essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, of the qualifying British citizen or of the relevant sponsor) or of their spouse or civil partner; and (b) such support is, or (as the case may be) was, being provided to the applicant by the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, by the qualifying British citizen or by the relevant sponsor) or by their spouse or civil partner; and (c) there is no need to determine the reasons for that dependence or for the recourse to that support.”

21. The second ground of appeal was that the FtT had failed to understand the evidence of dependency. As referenced above the evidence that was before the FtT was set out in pages 27 to 51 of the Bundle before me. The FtT dealt with that evidence at paragraph 11 of the FtT Decision. It is clear from paragraph 11 that the FtT did consider all of that evidence. The FtT take into consideration the sponsor statement at page 27 of the Bundle. They take into account the evidence of payments between March 2021 and April 2022. They take into account the assertions that the appellant lives alone and that the sponsor takes her money when he visits. It appears that the primary difficulty that the FtT had was that, as they state at paragraph 11 “The difficulty with the evidence is that, beyond the barest assertion (namely that she lives alone) her circumstances are not set out in any detail at all.” The FtT then go on to set out in the rest of paragraph 11 the evidence that is missing. As Mr Wain submitted there was not an inadequate consideration of the evidence – the problem was that there was insufficient evidence provided.

22. The appellant is now providing additional evidence – both in the documents attached to the IAFT 4 (at pages 11 to 23 and specifically records of money transfers from June 2022 to March 2023) and further information in the Skeleton Argument. But those documents and that information was not before the FtT and it is not competent for me to consider it in the context of determining how the FtT dealt with the evidence that it did have before it. I am conscious that it is for the FtT to consider the evidence that it has in front of it. In my opinion they have done that and arrived at a decision based upon the lack of evidence to support the position of the appellant. The onus is on the appellant to establish dependency on a balance of probabilities. From the appellant’s position it may be regrettable that fuller evidence was not submitted at the time – but I cannot say that there was any error of law in the way that the FtT dealt with the evidence that was before it.

23. In the circumstances I do not consider that there is any error of law on the second ground of appeal.

24. I turn then to consider the other grounds of appeal referenced by the appellant in the Skeleton Argument. Three distinct grounds were raised. One of the grounds was a failure to assess the evidence (although this appears as two separate grounds in the Skeleton Argument it is really just the one ground). That is a repeat of the ground of appeal that I have dealt with already as the second ground of appeal.

25. The two new grounds of appeal were that the FtT applied too narrow a test of dependency and that the FtT misunderstood or misinterpreted “material date”. These are new grounds that did not appear in the original grounds of appeal. There was no reason given as to why these grounds were not raised earlier. However, I do take into account that the appellant and sponsor are not legally represented. I also take into account that both of these grounds relate to the legal test applied by the FtT and if there is any obvious failure to apply the correct legal test then it would be appropriate for me to take that into consideration. Mr Wain did not seek or require any additional time to consider both of these points as his position was that there was no merit in either ground. In the circumstances I have considered both of these additional grounds.

26. On the issue of whether too narrow a test of dependency has been applied I do not consider that there is any merit in this ground of appeal. The test is whether the appellant cannot meet their essential living needs without the financial or other material support of the sponsor. That does require evidence regarding the position of the appellant – and it was the lack of that evidence that led to the refusal of the appeal. There is nothing to suggest that an incorrect test was applied. I accordingly reject this ground of appeal.

27. On the ground of appeal that the FtT misunderstood or misapplied the “material date” it is suggested by the appellant that this led to the FtT limiting the amount of reliable evidence. The FtT correctly stated at paragraph 7 of the FtT Decision that the “material date for my assessment is the date of application”. The appellant argues that evidence from both before and after this date may be relevant to determine the position at that date. That is correct but the decision from the FtT does not exclude any evidence on this basis. The problem lies not in an exclusion of evidence but in a lack of evidence. I accordingly reject this ground of appeal.

Conclusion

28. For the reasons set out above I find that there is no material error of law and the appeal is refused.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the FtT did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
21.01.26