Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-003389
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53611/2023
LP/02808/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22nd of September 2026

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
RUPINDERJIT SINGH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the appellant: Mr S Bellara, Counsel, instructed by Talal & Co Solicitors
For the respondent: Ms A Jones, Counsel, instructed by the GLD

Heard at Field House on 16 September 2026

RE-MAKING DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is the re-making decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusals of his protection and human rights claims. Those claims arose in the context of the appellant seeking revocation of a deportation order made on 23 June 2009 and at the same time making an asylum claim. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s refusals and the appeal was allowed on Article 8 grounds only. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) was challenged, but the respondent’s onward appeal was dismissed by the Upper Tribunal (UT) by a decision dated 6 December 2024, it being concluded that the FTT had not made a material error of law when concluding that there were very compelling circumstances in the appellant’s case. The respondent sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal and, by an order dated 8 August 2025, Laing LJ granted permission. In so doing, she observed that the “outcome appears contrary to the public interest which Part 5A of the [Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 – the 2002 Act] was enacted to secure.” The appeal was subsequently allowed by consent and the case remitted to the UT on the basis that the FTT had committed a material error of law.

2. At the outset, I wish to express my gratitude to Counsel for the professional approach taken in advance of, and at, the resumed hearing before me. The UT often has cause to bemoan the conduct of representatives in this jurisdiction. It is important to also recognise the benefit of high quality representation. Mr Bellara and Ms Jones presented their respective cases in a conspicuously fair and realistic manner.

Summary factual background
3. The appellant, a citizen of India, entered the United Kingdom in 1998. He married his wife, KK (a British citizen) in 1999 and he was given indefinite leave to remain in 2001. The couple’s daughter, T, was born in 2013.

4. Following a contested trial, on 26 June 2004 the appellant was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent and on 28 June of that year he was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment with an extended licence of 3 years. A deportation order was made on 23 June 2009 and on 27 June 2009 the FTT dismissed an appeal against the respondent’s refusals of protection and human rights claims which had been made previously. For reasons unknown, it then took the respondent a further seven years to actually deport the appellant to India. In breach of the deportation order, the appellant re-entered the United Kingdom in May 2020, having unsuccessfully attempting to do so in August the previous year. The appellant made further submissions which the respondent treated as fresh protection and human rights claims. As set out previously, the refusals of those claims eventually led to the appeal with which I am now concerned.

The appellant’s offence
5. The offence was, on any view, extreme in its brutality. The sentencing remarks of Hunt J bear quotation in full:
“… you, with the assistance of others who I am quite satisfied did your bidding, systematically tortured a young 30-year-old woman because you believed she let someone into the house where you were staying and that person had stolen £7000 of your cash from your girlfriend’s handbag.

That young woman had boiling water poured over her by you after one of your men boiled the kettle. She was screaming and in great pain. You set light to her. You had the kettle boiled again and poured more boiling water over her. Not content with that, you beat her with your belt.

She was inventing stories of people who had come who might have had your money in order to try to persuade you to stop.

On any view this took place over a period of many hours. She spent some weeks in hospital. The photographs we have seen speak for themselves. She is now left with permanent scarring and may have to have further surgery. She has said that the pain she has had could not be described.

This sort of behaviour by one human being to another requires a particularly callous character and that I assess you to be.

You plainly thought you could get away with it. You have lied to the police, to this jury in a bare faced way. You have fully contested the case. You can have none of the credit which a plea of guilty would have brought you.

Such serious offending requires a serious custodial sentence for this section 18 offence, rightly described by all involved in the case as torturing.”

6. These remarks speak for themselves. I note that when allowing the appellant’s appeal, the FTT stated that the offence was “incredibly serious as the torture of another human being is an horrific offence and falls at the very highest level of the offending scale.”

The issues and preserved findings
7. The legal framework in this case is narrow. In order to succeed, the appellant must demonstrate that there are very compelling circumstances in his case which go above and beyond the considerations set out in the exceptions: sections 117C(4)-(6) of the 2002 Act. I must also consider relevant considerations under section 117B of the 2002.

8. No protection issues are in play. The FTT’s wholesale rejection of the protection claim has never been the subject of challenge by the appellant.

9. There are a large number of findings preserved from the FTT’s decision, notwithstanding that that decision has now been set aside. Those findings relate to the position as at June 2024.

10. As stated in my directions notice of 5 May 2026, the preserved findings relevant for the purposes of this appeal are as follows:
(a) T has been diagnosed with autism;

(b) T has significant communication and interaction problems, speech delay, and consequent behavioural issues;

(c) T was attending a mainstream school and was progressing;

(d) T was not so severely disabled by her autism that she was unable to be accommodated in a mainstream school;

(e) The Independent Social Worker’s report was based on an account provided by the appellant and KK which was not credible - the appellant and KK had, to an extent, misled the social worker and the FTT as regards the severity of T’s behavioural problems;

(f) T struggles with change;

(g) The appellant played an important role in T’s life;

(h) KK’s family in United Kingdom were able to offer some support, albeit limited;

(i) The appellant’s separation from T would have a negative effect on the latter’s behaviour and emotional well-being.

The documentary evidence
11. I have before me a consolidated bundle from the appellant, indexed and paginated 1-1305, together with relevant materials relating to the Court of Appeal proceedings.

Oral evidence
12. The appellant and KK gave evidence before me. They adopted their latest witness statements and answered questions from Mr Bellara and Ms Jones. I was entirely satisfied that they understood the questions put and were able to fully participate in the proceedings. Their evidence as a matter of record and I shall refer to it in appropriate detail when setting out my findings and conclusions, below.

The parties’ submissions
13. Ms Jones relied on her skeleton argument and the preserved findings. She submitted that the appellant and KK had not been truthful on material matters, specifically the extent of T’s behavioural difficulties now and the assertion that she required two adults to be with her in order to ensure the safety of herself and others. The appellant had displayed a distinct lack of knowledge about T’s educational circumstances. The appellant’s involvement in T’s life was in fact very limited. Both the appellant and KK had exaggerated her evidence in this regard. Ms Jones submitted that it was clear that KK is T’s primary carer. It was accepted that T could not return to India, but it would not be unduly harsh for her to be separated from the appellant. Beyond that, and having regard to the appellant’s offence and all other relevant considerations, there were no very compelling circumstances in the case.

14. Mr Bellara relied on his skeleton argument and urged me to place significant weight on the oral evidence. He submitted that the appellant played a “vital” role in T’s life and that without the appellant, KK could not cope with T. T was at a “critical stage” of her education and the appellant’s deportation would be significantly detrimental to her well-being.

15. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Legal framework
16. The provisions of Part 5A of the 2002 Act are well-known and need not be set out here. There is now a plethora of authorities on the deportation provisions within section 117C and again I need not rehearse these in any detail. Suffice it to say that I have had regard to, amongst others, the recent judgment in SSHD v Ojaleye [2026] EWCA Civ 950, SSHD v Lewis [2026] EWCA Civ 879, and Kapinkanya v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 987, together with the leading authorities of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 and NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2017] 1 WLR 707.

17. In summary, I direct myself that:
(a) The public interest in deporting foreign criminals is significant and the seriousness of an individual’s offending is relevant to the assessment of that public interest;

(b) The public interest represents a starting point for the consideration of whether an individual can demonstrate circumstances which outweigh it. Section 117C is not simply one aspect of a general proportionality exercise;

(c) It is often sensible to consider the two exceptions set out in sections 117C(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act before turning to an assessment of whether there are very compelling circumstances under section 117C;

(d) The very compelling circumstances test is very demanding indeed.

Findings of fact
18. The preserved findings represent a strong starting point for my assessment of the evidence, but they are not a ‘straitjacket’.

19. I confirm the preserved findings set out at [11], above, insofar as they relate to the position as at June 2024. As will be apparent from what follows, I find that in general T’s overall situation has in many respects improved since 2024. On the evidence I do have, I make the following findings as to T’s current circumstances.

20. I find that T is now in Year 8 of a mainstream school. I find that she still has an Educational and Healthcare Plan (EHCP) and that the plan contained in the appellant’s bundle is the latest version (having been updated following a review in January 2026 whilst T was in Year 7). There is no evidence from the school which post-dates the revised EHCP. The absence of any more recent evidence has not been satisfactory explained by the appellant or KK. Before me, the appellant appeared to have no real knowledge about T’s educational circumstances and KK’s evidence on this point was, to say the least, poor. She told me that the school had not sent anything and that she had not asked it for any updating information. In light of my generally adverse view of important aspects of T’s current circumstances (as to which, see below), I find that the absence of such evidence is due to the appellant and KK being aware that evidence from the school would not have supported their claim that T’s current educational circumstances were highly restricted and her behaviour so severe as to require significant input to ensure her safety and that of others.

21. I find that T does attends school on a full-time basis. I find that T has expressed her enjoyment of school, notwithstanding her challenges, and this is confirmed by KK’s input to the EHCP. KK the school that T has made “tremendous progress”. This is reflected in the school’s own assessment of T’s educational progress, as stated in the EHCP. It is notable that a number of difficulties set out in the previous version of the EHCP were deleted when the document was revised in January 2026.

22. I find that T has been discharged from the Speech and Language Therapy service.

23. I find that whilst T has fairly significant assistance from the school’s SEN unit, she is not educated solely within that setting on a full-time 1:1 basis, contrary to what KK told me. The “Education” section of the EHCP expressly states that T is attending “whole class, mainstream Phonics, Literacy and Foundation lessons”, with certain interventions, and is enjoying the subjects and showing progress. Art and PE are currently on a 1:1 basis. This is in direct contradiction to what KK and the appellant told me, namely that T was always within the SEN unit and always had 1:1 support. It might be that KK was not entirely sure about the specific arrangements within school, but in any event the true position is that T is making good progress and is, to a relatively significant extent, able to function within a mainstream setting.

24. As regards the challenges consequent on her autism, I find that T is being provided with tailored support by the school and that her needs have been clearly identified in the EHCP. There is no reliable evidence to indicate that she has had to miss a significant amount of schooling.

25. I find that there are still difficulties with communication and focus, but these are being addressed as part of the EHCP’s support package.

26. I turn to a core aspect of the appellant’s case. The appellant and KK have asserted that, as result of her behavioural challenges, T requires the constant, or near constant, supervision of two adults in order to ensure her safety and that of others. For the following reasons, I reject their evidence on this and find that they have both been untruthful.

27. It was readily apparent from the appellant’s evidence that he has nothing more than a cursory knowledge of the EHCP and its contents. His assertion that the school is aware of the risk of harm is quite clearly not borne out by the EHCP. In view of the appellant’s previous lies and his distinct lack of knowledge, I find that his evidence on this particular point is wholly unreliable.

28. KK’s evidence was in general more detailed and indicative of a better appreciation of T’s circumstances in school, subject to what I have said about the SEN unit and 1:1 support, above. However, there was a marked change in her oral evidence when Ms Jones asked about the claimed risks of harm and the need for support and supervision by two adults. KK immediately became more reticent in her answers and it was apparent that she was aware of the significant problems in what she was saying. When asked why there was no reference in the EHCP to violence or a significant risk of harm to T or others, KK referred to behaviour outside of school and asserted that the school had been told of the consequent risks. KK stated that perhaps she had not understood what was in the EHCP and that the school had been concerned “more about silly behaviour” than violence. She suggested that the term “challenging behaviour” in the EHCP was to her mind a reference to violence. When pressed further, KK suggested that violent episodes tended to happen “towards the end of the school year”, implying that these would not have been recorded in the EHCP, which was revised in January 2026. She accepted that there was no 2:1 support in place at school.

29. In light of the detail provided in the EHCP and the duty to safeguard pupils under their care, it is inconceivable that the school would have failed to mention any reports made by KK as to violent outbursts by T requiring adult supervision to prevent harm if such information had in fact been provided by KK.

30. In terms of what the appellant and KK have said about T’s behaviour outside of school, there has been a degree of consistency to the extent that they have both claimed that outbursts have occurred at home. However, the evidence comes nowhere near demonstrating a consistent pattern of severe behavioural challenges involving potential or actual violence. The appellant’s evidence was generally vague and pointed to only a single incident in which T had lashed out when he attempted to take away her iPad. KK stated that T has “bitten her” and that she “can be violent”, but no specific examples were provided. KK told me that T is unaware of dangers and will run across the road without warning. No further details as to the frequency of such claimed events was provided and, in any event, even if true, there is nothing to suggest that the supervision of two adults is required.

31. I note that there is no evidence from other sources, such as the GP, of risks to T from herself or to others.

32. Having regard to KK’s previous willingness to give untruthful evidence to the FTT and the Independent Social Worker, and taking into account all of the evidence now before me, I find that KK has deliberately sought to exaggerate T’s behavioural challenges. I do not accept that T requires the supervision of two adults, whether at home or school, to keep her safe or to prevent harm to others.

33. The appellant told me that T has a social worker. This was directly contradicted by KK, who confirmed that she does not. This is yet another example of the appellant’s lack of knowledge as to T’s circumstances, or a deliberate attempt to exaggerate the severity of her overall needs.

34. I now turn to T’s domestic circumstances. It is quite clear that KK is T’s primary carer in all respects. Aside from the educational sphere (in respect of which the appellant has virtually no real understanding), the evidence undoubtedly shows that it is KK who takes charge of homework supervision, the general practicalities of ensuring that T self-cares, gets to school, and almost all other aspects of day-to-day care. At its highest, the combined evidence of the appellant and KK demonstrates that the former goes out for walks with T and sometimes sits with her when she is drawing at home.

35. Having said that, I accept, as did the FTT, that the appellant nonetheless plays an important role in T’s emotional well-being. I find that there is a close bond between the two which is to be seen in the context of the challenges presented by T’s autism. I accept that T’s emotional well-being was adversely affected when the appellant was deported to India, albeit that she was very young at the time. In all the circumstances, it stands to reason that a second separation would have an adverse impact on her well-being.

36. That adverse impact must however be seen in the overall context of my findings on the evidence. Despite what would be obvious challenges to KK and T, I do not accept the appellant’s evidence that the former would be unable to cope if he were again deported. I say this having regard to KK’s unquestionable role as T’s primary carer, her ability to continue with present employment (which does not in any way interfere with her ability to be with T before and after school - she is a part-time lunchtime supervisor), the availability of some support from her family in this country, her ability to have coped with T when the appellant was in India, the good support which T is receiving at school, and the absence of any current evidence from independent sources relating to the potential impact on T and/or KK if deportation were to take place.

37. In reaching these findings I have not left out of account the Independent Social Worker’s report. Certain aspects of the report are the subject of preserved findings. Beyond that, the date of the report (January 2024) and the fact that it was based in part on unreliable evidence provided by the appellant and KK, lead me to place reduced weight on it as a whole.

38. In respect of the appellant’s own circumstances, I do not accept that he is suffering from any material mental health difficulties. I find, as did the FTT, that the appellant’s protection claim was a complete fabrication.

Conclusions
39. I now bring to bear the preserved findings and my own to the legal framework.

40. I accept that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with KK and a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with T.

41. The appellant is obviously a foreign criminal.

42. The public interest in deporting the appellant is particularly strong in this case. The circumstances of the appellant’s offence are extreme and there is no need to repeat what is said in the sentencing remarks. I rely on those remarks for the purposes of section 117C(2) of the 2002 Act. On any rational view, the importance of deterrence and the public’s legitimate concern (not to say, revulsion) in respect of those who have committed the most serious crimes, are deserving of very significant weight indeed.

43. The public interest is also very strong in respect of the need to maintain effective immigration control, with reference to section 117B(1) of the 2002 Act. The appellant’s re-entry to this country and 2020 in breach of the deportation order was a manifestation of his blatant disregard for the entire process of controlling who should and should not be permitted entry. The fact that the appellant had already made an unsuccessful attempt to re-enter in 2019 only enhances his culpability.

44. It has not been suggested that exception 1 is satisfied, to the extent that it might be relevant to the assessment of very compelling circumstances. It is plain that it is not.

45. Seen in isolation from T’s circumstances, I conclude that it would be unduly harsh to expect KK to follow the appellant to India, but I also conclude that it would not be unduly harsh for KK to be separated from him. Whilst the couple have been married for a considerable period of time, they were apart for a not insignificant amount of that time whilst the appellant was serving his custodial sentence and then whilst he was in India. Beyond that, KK has been, and will continue to be, able to cope with T on her own. She has the possibility of support from her own family members. She does not suffer from any material mental health difficulties. She is in employment and will be able to rely on benefits sufficient to ensure an adequate financial position, as is the case now. In addition, she has been aware of the distinct possibility that the appellant will be deported again since his re-entry to this country in 2020.

46. Even if I were to conclude that it would be unduly harsh for KK to be separated from the appellant, on any view it would only be by a very narrow margin: in other words, a “bare case”.

47. I conclude that T’s best interests lie in her continuing to live with both of her parents. However, contrary to what is said in Mr Bellara’s skeleton argument, those best interests are not overwhelming. On my findings, the appellant’s overall role in her life is not of vital importance. On one view, they may be described as somewhat marginal. However, I am prepared to accept that the emotional aspect of those interests is significant in light of T’s autism and the associated challenges she faces.

48. I conclude that it would be unduly harsh on T for her to leave the United Kingdom and follow the appellant to India. I conclude that whilst it would be harsh on T to be separated from her father, it would not be unduly so. The threshold is high and, on the facts of this case, the combined effect of what I have said at [36], above, strongly points towards her being able to re-adjust in time to the appellant’s absence without that occurrence engaging the adverb “unduly”.

49. As with KK, if in the alternative I were to conclude that separation would be unduly harsh, it would only represent a “bare” case.

50. On that basis, there is plainly nothing which takes the appellant’s case “well beyond” the satisfaction of exception 2 for the purposes of section 117C(6).

51. Further, there is plainly nothing else in the appellant’s case which, even combined with a satisfaction of exception 2, comes close to demonstrating very compelling circumstances over and above those relevant to that exception which could outweigh the particularly strong public interest.

52. There is no private life capable of having any material impact in this case.

53. Rehabilitation has no material bearing in this case. The simple fact that the appellant has not re-offended since his release from prison carries no weight. In fact, the sentencing remarks and the comments of the FTT go to show that the appellant displayed no real appreciation or remorse for what he had done. There is no reliable evidence before me to indicate the contrary. His unlawful re-entry to this country is indicative of a disregard of the law, which in turn does nothing to suggest a rehabilitated mindset. I note also his use of various aliases, which is a further indication of his concerted attempts over time to do all that he can to avoid proper compliance with the law. I consider that the applicant still represents a medium risk of harm to others. Even if I were wrong as to the medium level of risk, it makes no difference whatsoever to my overall assessment.

54. Bringing all of the above together, I have no hesitation in concluding that the appellant has failed to demonstrate very compelling circumstances which outweigh the very strong public interest and that his deportation from the United Kingdom would be entirely proportionate.

Anonymity
55. Thus far, an anonymity direction has been in place. The direction was made by the FTT on the basis that the case concerned the appellant’s minor child, T. The Court of Appeal indicated that the question of anonymity should be reconsidered by the UT.

56. At the hearing before me, Mr Bellara realistically accepted that there was no basis for the anonymity direction to be maintained. There was no longer a protection claim in play and the fact that the case concerned a minor child was not of itself sufficient to justify anonymity.

57. It is clear to me that anonymity should not be maintained. T as not been referred to by name and there is a strong public interest in identifying the appellant. The anonymity direction previously made is discharged.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision has been set aside.
The decision in this appeal is re-made and the appeal is dismissed.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 17 September 2026