Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003435

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00484/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JOSHI

Between

HH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Samra (Solicitor, Harbans Singh & Co)
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 2 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a citizen of Iraq, appealed under ss82 and 84 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the respondent’s decision of the 21st of December 2023 refusing his protection claim made on the 29th of July 2020.
Anonymity Order
2. We have continued the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. We have considered the public interest in open justice, but we consider it is outweighed by the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations to those claiming international protection because of the need for confidentiality.
Background
3. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed by a Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal in a determination promulgated on the 21st of June 2024. The appellant’s challenge against this decision came before us on the 4th of February 2025. A full copy of our error of law decision is annexed to this decision.
4. We found that there was no error of law in relation to the Judge’s decision dismissing the appeal insofar as it relates to his asylum grounds and that part of the decision stood. However, we did find that there was a material error of law in the decision relating to his humanitarian protection grounds and the associated grounds under Article 3 of the ECHR. That part of the decision was set aside.
5. Whilst the Judge found that the appellant was in contact with his family, the Judge should have considered SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC) and continued to make findings about what documentation the appellant had (CSID or INID), where it was and whether his family could get his documents to him before return or on return to the airport. Whilst the Judge found that the appellant could redocument with the assistance of his family, on Home Office policy as at the date of decision, if the appellant had never been issued with an INID and could not obtain his CSID before return, or directly on return, then the appellant would be at risk of serious harm.
6. The following findings of the First-Tier Tribunal were preserved:
i. lack of satisfaction that the appellant was not in contact with his family as at the date of decision [18] [23];
ii. the appellant’s family were in Iraq at the date of decision including his parents and siblings as well as his aunt and paternal uncle [19];
iii. the appellant’s account of events in Iraq was not credible [22].
7. The only issue before us related to the remaking of the humanitarian protection/Article 3 decision in respect of the outstanding issue as to the appellant’s possession of his identity document(s) or his ability to obtain identity document(s)/redocument himself.
The hearing before us
8. The appellant attended in person and had the benefit of an interpreter in Kurdish Sorani. He was represented by Mr Samra. Ms Simbi appeared on behalf of the respondent.
9. The appellant adopted his witness statement. He stated in his oral evidence that when he was in Iraq he had his citizenship certificate, his CSID, and his passport. He stated he had never had an INID and if he had mentioned it before it was a mistake and he meant CSID. He stated he was not in Iraq when they began to issue INIDs. When he lived in Iraq he used to keep it on him or at home.
10. He was asked about why his family could not provide his CSID to him at the airport in Sulaymaniyah and he stated that he did not have it anymore because it was lost – he did not know where it was. He was asked how he knew this and he stated he was told this by his brother about ten days after the error of law hearing. His brother told him that they tried to find it but they were unable to locate it.
11. He confirmed his brother was still in Iraq. He stated when he lived there he stayed downstairs with his parents and he had his own room. His brother lived on the top floor in a separate section of the house. He stated his brother did not know the family identification number. He stated the number was with the government and they would not provide it to his brother and he would have to be there himself. He stated he believed that the family identification number was different from his brother’s.
12. He stated he visited the Iraqi embassy in the United Kingdom to ask for his citizenship certificate and his CSID, however, they could not assist him because he was unaware of his family identification number.
13. We heard oral submissions from both representatives. In brief, Ms Simbi submitted that the starting point was the preserved findings of fact and the appellant’s account was found not to be credible. She submitted that despite maintaining that he had no contact with his family he stated in his oral evidence that he contacted his brother in Iraq in February 2025.
14. She submitted that little weight should be placed on his photographs outside of the Iraqi Embassy because they do not evidence what engagement he had with them. She submitted that his evidence about his brother not being able to obtain the family identification number should not be accepted – his brother was a male relative and would have access to the number. She submitted that it should not be accepted that his CSID was lost and he could obtain it from his family. Alternatively, she submitted that he could also be redocumented in the United Kingdom or within a reasonable time period on return to Iraq.
15. Mr Samra submitted that if it was accepted that the appellant had lost his CSID and does not have a copy of it then he would not be able to redocument himself and the appeal should be allowed. He submitted that as at the date of hearing the respondent’s evidence on the possibility to redocument from the United Kingdom was not clear.
16. He submitted the fact that the appellant was found not credible in relation to his asylum claim should not be determinative of whether he had lost his CSID. He submitted that the appellant explained in his oral evidence that he would keep his CSID in his pocket or on a table when he was home. He submitted that it could have been misplaced especially given his length of absence from Iraq.
17. We reserved our decision which we give now.
Discussion and conclusions
18. In making our decision we have considered all the evidence in the round and at the lower standard of proof. We have to be satisfied that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood and / or substantial grounds for believing that the appellant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden rests on the appellant.
19. In the circumstances we are not satisfied that the appellant’s account of his CSID being misplaced / lost in Iraq is credible.
20. The appellant does not dispute that he had his CSID prior to leaving Iraq. Whilst we agree with Mr Samra that the adverse credibility findings in respect of his asylum claim are not determinative of his account to have misplaced his CSID we find that it is a significant factor that we attach weight to.
21. Further, we noted that the appellant had previously maintained to the First-Tier Tribunal that he was not in contact with his family [12] and last had contact with his brother on the 22nd of August 2020 [12]. He stated his family were in Turkey [16]. However, in his oral evidence he stated that he did speak to his brother who was in Iraq about ten days after the error of law hearing. We noted that this evidence was given in cross examination and he did not mention in his witness statement signed on the 24th of February 2025 that he had spoken to his brother or that his brother tried to find his CSID for him in Iraq. We also noted that no additional questions were asked of him regarding this in examination in chief or re-examination. The failure by the appellant to mention, before cross-examination, that he had spoken to his brother and discussed the whereabouts of his CSID, significantly damages the appellant’s credibility on this issue.
22. We also found that the appellant’s evidence regarding his brother not being able to provide him with his family identification number was not credible. We find that the appellant was being evasive regarding this. The country guidance of SMO explains that Family Book information may also be obtained from family members on the father’s side.
23. Given that the appellant has not been found to be generally credible in respect of his asylum claim, we consider that if his brother had really informed him recently that the family could not find his CSID he would have mentioned it at an earlier stage, and that we find that the appellant was being evasive about his brother’s inability to obtain the family identification number, we are not satisfied even to the low standard applicable that the appellant is telling the truth about the loss of his CSID. We find that the appellant’s CSID is in Iraq in his home. We find that the appellant’s family would be able to collect it for him and provide it to him either prior to his return to Iraq or on arrival at the airport. We, therefore, find that when considering SMO the appellant with his CSID would be able to both live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.
24. We would have found in the appellant’s favour – on the evidence before us – that he would not have been able to redocument himself from the United Kingdom. However, given that we have found that the appellant has his CSID the issue of whether he could be redocumented is no longer material.
Notice of decision
On remaking, the appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds and the associated grounds under Article 3 of the ECHR.

M D JOSHI

Judge M D Joshi
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

07 July 2025
Annex (error of law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003435

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00484/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12 February 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JOSHI

Between

H H
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Samra (Solicitor, Harbans Singh & Co)
For the Respondent: Mr Lawson (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 4 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a citizen of Iraq, appeals, with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Meah, against the dismissal by Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal Taylor of his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 21 December 2023 refusing his international protection claim made on 29 July 2020.
2. We maintain the anonymity order made in the First-Tier Tribunal. The appellant is seeking international protection, and we bear in mind the public interest in maintaining confidence in that system by ensuring that vulnerable people are willing to provide confidential and complete information in support of their applications. We consider that interest outweighs the public interest in open justice.
3. Although the grant of permission was not limited, the reason for granting permission was the arguable inadequacy of the judge’s approach to assessing the appellant’s ability to obtain documentation and to return safely to his home in Iraq bearing in mind SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC).
4. Mr Lawson informed us that the respondent agreed that there was an error of law in relation to [23] of the judge’s decision and the documentation point. He said that the judge did not make findings on what documents the appellant had, where they were, or how, following SMO, the appellant could redocument. He pointed out to us that it was recorded that the appellant had said in asylum interview that he had an INID [12] which potentially made a difference as to his ability to redocument.
5. We agree that the judge did err. Whilst she found that the appellant was in contact with his family, she should have considered SMO (whether explicitly or implicitly) and continued to make findings about what documentation the appellant had (CSID or INID), where it was and whether his family could get his documents to him before return or on return to the airport (specifying where the appellant would be returned to). Whilst she found the appellant could redocument with the assistance of his family, on Home Office policy as at the date of decision, if the appellant had never been issued with an INID and could not obtain his CSID before return or directly on return, then the appellant would be at risk of serious harm.
6. We have considered the other aspects of the grounds. Mr Samra agreed that the point about the Shia militia would only be relevant to relocation. We see nothing in the decision to suggest that the judge did not apply the standard of proof or the principle of the benefit of the doubt properly and the grounds do not condescend to detail. The grounds say that the judge does not explain why she rejects the evidence from the Red Cross to support the appellant’s claim that he is not in contact with his family, but the evidence from the Red Cross only confirmed that the appellant had contacted them to help with family tracing. Mr Samra tried to argue that the judge’s decision could be attacked on the basis she had not made any findings about whether the appellant’s sister was in a relationship involving domestic violence, but the grounds simply do not raise that or the lack of sufficient findings as an issue. We do not consider that there is any other error of law in the grounds than that conceded by Mr Lawson about whether the appellant would be able to obtain the necessary documents so that he could travel safely to his home area upon return.
7. The representatives agreed that given the narrow nature of the issue, the decision should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
8. We discussed the preserved facts with the parties. Mr Samra argued that it was not clear from the judge’s findings with what family in Iraq the appellant was in contact, and we should not preserve the judge’s findings that the appellant was in contact with his parents and siblings in Iraq. He said the judge was confused about whether the appellant’s parents were in Turkey or Iraq, and it was unclear why the judge rejected the appellant’s evidence about their being in Turkey. Mr Lawson submitted that the judge did consider their location at length and gave a sensible explanation of why they were not still in Iraq.
9. We consider that the judge did find, giving clear and sustainable reasons, that she was not satisfied that the appellant had lost contact with his parents and siblings in Iraq. She explained that the appellant had given different reasons for not attempting to contact his family (in particular initially saying that if he contacted his family it might put their life at risk, but at the time the appellant had stated he was aware they were in Turkey) and she found these inconsistencies to be significant and unexplained [16] – [18]. In addition, the judge did not accept the appellant’s explanation for the apparent inconsistency in interview about which of his family were in Iraq [19]. Putting that together with [22] where the judge refers to the different accounts the appellant has given and finds the appellant’s account not to be credible, it is apparent that the judge was finding that the appellant’s parents and siblings, as well as his aunt and paternal uncle, remained in Iraq and she was not satisfied that the appellant had lost contact with his parents and siblings in Iraq. We will therefore preserve the finding about contact although only of course as at the date of decision.
10. We discussed whether the decision could be remade immediately, but Mr Samra had only recently been reinstructed and he wanted to put in evidence clarifying what identity documents the appellant had and where they were. The respondent wanted the opportunity to put in evidence, as she was now submitting, that the current position was that first-time INIDs could be obtained from the Iraqi embassy in the UK. That would or might be relevant depending on the evidence submitted on behalf of the appellant. We discussed a timetable for evidence and that we considered the provision of a skeleton argument by the appellant would be helpful so it could be seen how the documentation point was being argued.
Notice of Decision
There is no error of law in relation to the judge’s decision dismissing the appeal insofar as it relates to asylum grounds and that part of the decision stands.
There is a material error of law in the judge’s decision relating to humanitarian protection grounds and the associated grounds under Article 3 ECHR and that part of the decision is set aside.
The judge’s findings as to:
(i) lack of satisfaction that the appellant is not in contact with his family as at the date of decision [18] [23];
(ii) the appellant’s family in Iraq at the date of decision including his parents and siblings as well as his aunt and paternal uncle [19];
(iii) the appellant’s account of events in Iraq being incredible [22]
are preserved.
Remaking of the humanitarian protection/article 3 decision in respect of the outstanding issue as to the appellant’s possession of identity documents/ability to obtain identity documents/redocument will take place in the Upper Tribunal.
Directions
1) The appellant is to file and serve a witness statement within 14 days of the date this decision is issued dealing with the issue of documentation;
2) The respondent is to file and serve any evidence on which she wishes to rely in relation to the documentation issue within 14 days of the date of service of the appellant’s evidence;
3) The remaking hearing is to be listed not before 18 March for a face-to-face hearing at Birmingham; time estimate 2 hours; a Kurdish Sorani interpreter is to be provided for the appellant;
4) The appellant is to file a skeleton argument at least a week before the remaking hearing setting out the issues the appellant contends arise on the documentation point.

A-R Landes
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 February 2025