UI-2024-003441

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 28 Nov 2025
• Promulgation date: 18 Feb 2026
• Publication date: 6 Mar 2026
• Last updated on: 6 Mar 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2024-003441
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02064/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Issued:
On 18 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MALIK KC

Between

LD
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation

For the Appellant: Mr Huzefa Broachwalla, Counsel, instructed by Direct Access
For the Respondent: Ms Sandra Mckenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them or any member of their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the remaking of the decision in the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to revoke his refugee status, refuse his protection and human rights claims, and to make a decision to deport him from the United Kingdom in light of his criminal offending.
Factual background
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Zimbabwe, born in 1976. He arrived in the United Kingdom in 1999 as a visitor and claimed asylum in 2000. He asserted that he faced a risk of persecution in Zimbabwe on account of his political opinion. He stated that he was an active member and supporter of the Movement for Democratic Change (“MDC”), formed as an opposition party to the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (“ZANU–PF”). The Secretary of State refused his asylum claim in 2001. However, in 2002, following an appeal, the decision was withdrawn, and he was formally recognised as a refugee and granted indefinite leave to remain.
3. On 9 August 2022, at Kirkcaldy Sheriff Court and Justice of the Peace Court, the Appellant was convicted of sexual penetration and sexual assault. His victim was a 16‑year‑old girl. She was under the influence of alcohol when he picked her up in his car and supplied her with further alcohol before sexually assaulting her. He infected her with two highly transmissible sexually transmitted diseases. On 5 September 2023, he was sentenced to two years and eight months’ imprisonment. This is not the Appellant’s only criminal conviction. Since his arrival in the United Kingdom, he has accrued six convictions for thirteen offences, including five sexual offences. On 2 April 2004, he was convicted of two offences of intercourse with a girl aged between 13 and 16. On that occasion, he was sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment, with a further concurrent sentence of six months’ imprisonment. He received a range of non‑custodial and suspended sentences for his remaining offences.
4.  Following the Appellant’s most recent conviction, on 18 January 2023, the Secretary of State made a decision to make a deportation order against him. On 28 June 2023, the Secretary of State served him with a notice of intention to cease his refugee status. On 21 September 2023, the Secretary of State made a decision formally ceasing that status. On 3 October 2023, the Secretary of State signed the deportation order. On 20 October 2023, the Secretary of State made a decision refusing his protection and human rights claim, which included a certificate under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”).
5. The Appellant appealed against the Secretary of State’s decision to the First‑tier Tribunal. The First‑tier Tribunal (Judge Fox) heard his appeal on 22 April 2024. By a decision promulgated on 3 May 2024, the Judge dismissed the appeal. The First‑tier Tribunal held that the Appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention due to his offending, and that he had failed to rebut the presumption under section 72 of the 2002 Act that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. The First‑tier Tribunal further rejected the Appellant’s claim to possess a political profile and found that there was no real risk to him on return to Zimbabwe. The Appellant is HIV‑positive, has Hepatitis B, and suffers from ongoing medical issues. The First‑tier Tribunal held that his deportation would not be incompatible with Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”). It also concluded that the exceptions to deportation under section 117C of the 2002 Act did not apply, and that his deportation would not be incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR.
6. The Appellant appealed against the Judge’s decision to the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal (Upper Tribunal Judge Lane and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Malik KC) heard the appeal on 19 May 2025. Mr Zainul Jafferji, who appeared on behalf of the Appellant at that hearing, made it clear that there was no challenge to the First‑tier Tribunal’s conclusion that the Appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention by reference to section 72 of the 2002 Act. Mr Jafferji advanced three grounds of appeal. First, he submitted that the First‑tier Tribunal had failed to apply the guidance given in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 [2020] 2 WLR 1152, and had erred in its assessment of the claim based on the Appellant’s medical condition. Second, he submitted that the First‑tier Tribunal had failed to take into account relevant matters when concluding that the Appellant was at no real risk in Zimbabwe on account of his political opinion. Third, he submitted that the Judge’s approach to the Article 8 claim was legally flawed. Ms Sandra McKenzie, who appeared on behalf of the Secretary of State, opposed the appeal and submitted that there was no error of law in the Judge’s decision.
7. By a decision promulgated on 2 July 2025, which is attached as an Annex to this decision, the Upper Tribunal found that the First‑tier Tribunal’s decision was wrong in law on the basis of the three grounds of appeal advanced by Mr Jafferji. The Upper Tribunal therefore set aside the First‑tier Tribunal’s decision, but preserved its unchallenged findings that the Appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention because of his offending, and that he had failed to rebut the presumption under section 72 of the 2002 Act that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. The Upper Tribunal retained the appeal for the purpose of re‑making the decision and issued further case management directions.
Appeal hearing
8. At the hearing before us, Mr Huzefa Broachwalla appeared on behalf of the Appellant, whereas the Secretary of State was represented by Ms McKenzie. We are grateful to both representatives for their assistance.
9. The Appellant provided a composite hearing bundle, which contained all the evidence adduced by the parties before the First‑tier Tribunal together with further updated material. He also provided an authorities bundle containing the key authorities relied upon. Mr Broachwalla provided a skeleton argument and a list of issues in the appeal. Ms McKenzie also provided a skeleton argument.
10. Mr Broachwalla called the Appellant to give oral evidence. The Appellant adopted his witness statements dated 5 February 2024 and 7 November 2024 in examination‑in‑chief. Ms McKenzie cross‑examined him. We then heard detailed closing submissions from Ms McKenzie and Mr Broachwalla respectively.
11. In short, Ms McKenzie submitted that the preserved finding under section 72 of the 2002 Act remained determinative, and she relied on the reasons set out in the Secretary of State’s decision. She submitted that the cessation of the Appellant’s refugee status was lawfully effected and that there is no real risk to him on return to Zimbabwe on account of his political opinion. She further submitted that his deportation would not be incompatible with Article 3 on account of his health, and that any interference with his Article 8 rights would be proportionate. She invited us to dismiss the appeal.
12. In short, Mr Broachwalla invited us to revisit the finding under section 72 of the 2002 Act and submitted that the Secretary of State had not discharged the burden upon her in relation to the cessation of the Appellant’s refugee status. He further submitted that the Appellant’s refugee status, in any event, remained relevant to the assessment under Article 3. He argued that the Appellant’s deportation would be incompatible with Article 3 both on account of his political opinion and his health. He also submitted that deportation would amount to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s Article 8 rights.
Legislative framework
13. Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”) concerns automatic deportation of certain foreign criminals and, so far as relevant, provides:
“(1) In this section 'foreign criminal' means a person –
(a) who is not a British Citizen,
(b) who is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, and
(c) to whom Condition 1 or 2 applies.
(2) Condition 1 is that the person is sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months. …
(4) For the purpose of section 3(5)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77), the deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good.
(5) The Secretary of State must make a deportation order in respect of a foreign criminal (subject to s.33).
(6) The Secretary of State may not revoke a deportation order made in accordance with subsection (5) unless—
(a) he thinks that an exception under section 33 applies,
(b) the application for revocation is made while the foreign criminal is outside the United Kingdom, or
(c) section 34(4) applies.”
14. Section 33 of the 2007 Act concerns exceptions to automatic deportation and, so far as relevant, provides:
“(1) Sections 32(4) and (5) –
(a) do not apply where an exception in this section applies (subject to subsection (7) below), …
(2) Exception 1 is where removal of a foreign criminal in pursuance of the deportation order would breach –
(a) a person’s Convention rights, or
(b) the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention. …”
15. As is well known, “Convention rights” include the right protected under Articles 3 and 8.
16. Article 3 provides:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
17. Article 8 provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
18. Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention defines the term “refugee” as any person who:
“.. owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or whom, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
19. Article 1C, so far as relevant, provides:
“This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if …
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality ….”
20. Article 32, headed “expulsion”, provides:
“(1) The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.
(2) The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.”
21. Article 33, headed “prohibition of expulsion or return ('refoulement')”, provides
“(1) No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
(2) The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”
22. Section 72 of the 2002 Act, so far as relevant, provides:
“(1) This section applies for the purpose of the construction and application of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention (exclusion from prohibition of expulsion or return).
(2) A person is convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime ... if he is—
(a) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, and
(b) sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months.
…
(5A) A person convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime (whether within or outside the United Kingdom) is to be presumed to constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom.
…
(6) A presumption under subsection (5ZA) or (5ZB) that a person has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime or under subsection (5A) or (5B) that a person constitutes a danger to the community is rebuttable by that person.”
23. Section 117A of the 2002 Act requires judicial decision-makers to “have regard” “in all cases, to the considerations listed in section 117B” and “in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations listed in section 117C” “in considering the public interest question”. The “public interest question” is, in turn, defined in section 117A(3) of the 2002 Act as being “the question of whether an interference with a person’s right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2)”.
24. Section 117C of the 2002 Act, so far as relevant, provides:
“(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where,
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. …”
Burden and standard of proof
25. In protection appeals, the burden of proof generally rests on the appellant, but the standard of proof is lower than the balance of probabilities.
26.  In order to qualify under the Refugee Convention, an appellant must demonstrate a reasonable degree of likelihood that they would be persecuted in the country of return.
27. In order to qualify for humanitarian protection, an appellant must show that there are substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm.
28. The lower standard of proof also applies in relation to human rights claims under Article 3.
29. For the purposes of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, the onus is on the Secretary of State to demonstrate, in relation to a person previously recognised by her as a refugee under Article 1A, that there has been a relevant change of circumstances such that the Refugee Convention ceases to apply to them.
30. So far as Article 8 is concerned, if it is engaged, the Secretary of State bears the burden of demonstrating that the interference with the protected right is proportionate.
The Appellant’s evidence
31. In considering the Appellant’s evidence, we follow the guidance in the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010, Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance. We make our findings having carefully taken into account his health issues, as discussed below, and the effect that these may have on the quality of both his written and oral evidence.
32. We are also mindful that an individual may exaggerate or fabricate aspects of their evidence in an effort to reduce the risk of their appeal being wrongly dismissed. There may be many reasons why a person lies—for example, to bolster their case or to avoid embarrassment—and such behaviour is not necessarily inconsistent with their telling the truth about the central issue of fact that must be determined.
33. We recognise that corroboration is not required for a person’s evidence to be accepted. We can therefore accept that there is a real possibility that the Appellant’s account is true on the basis of his oral evidence alone.
34.  Given the sensitive context of the protection and human rights claims, we are mindful of the need for the most anxious scrutiny. Our findings are reached on the basis of a holistic assessment of the totality of the evidence.
35. Having considered all the evidence in the round, we find the Appellant to be an unimpressive and unreliable witness. He was vague and evasive in cross‑examination. His evidence is riddled with inconsistencies and implausibilities. We are satisfied that he is not a witness of truth and that he sought to mislead us. His evidence on key issues is not credible. We discuss his evidence in detail in our findings below.
Exclusion from the Refugee Convention
36. The Appellant, as noted above, has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom and sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months. Section 72 of the 2002 Act therefore creates a rebuttable presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom.
37. The First‑tier Tribunal, after a careful review of the Appellant’s evidence and circumstances, made the following finding at [81]:
“Upon the available evidence considered in the round it is reasonable to conclude that the appellant is unable and unwilling to recognise the consequences of his actions. For all the reasons stated herein he has failed to rebut the presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community of the UK.”
38. The Appellant did not appeal against this finding to the Upper Tribunal. We have identified above the grounds on which he challenged the First‑tier Tribunal’s decision. Further, the Upper Tribunal’s error of law decision records at [3]:
“Mr Zainul Jafferji, who appeared on behalf of the Appellant, made it clear that there was no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention by reference to section 72 of the 2002 Act.”
39. At [12], the Upper Tribunal stated:
“Mr Jafferji, as noted above, stated that there was no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant was excluded from protection of the Refugee Convention because of his offending and that he had failed to rebut the presumption under section 72 of the 2002 Act that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the finding made by the Judge at [81] shall stand and is preserved. It is not vitiated by the errors of law we have identified in the Judge’s decision.”
40. In the circumstances, we are baffled by Mr Broachwalla’s invitation to revisit the First‑tier Tribunal’s finding on this issue. The Appellant could have challenged that finding as part of his appeal to the Upper Tribunal. However, he advanced no such challenge. His grounds of appeal, and the submissions made on his behalf, were not directed to this issue. The First‑tier Tribunal’s conclusion that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom is not vitiated by the errors of law in its decision. When we asked Mr Broachwalla why, in those circumstances, we were being invited to revisit the First‑tier Tribunal’s findings, he was unable to offer any meaningful response.
41. Further, in his skeleton argument at [3], Mr Broachwalla acknowledged that the First‑tier Tribunal’s finding on exclusion is preserved and, at [4], added:
“Accordingly, the preserved issue of exclusion is not in dispute.”
42. As he had expressly stated that there was no dispute as to the issue of exclusion, he made no submission in his skeleton argument seeking to justify any revisiting of the First‑tier Tribunal’s finding. In his oral submissions, without identifying a good reason, he sought to depart from his skeleton argument, giving no prior notice either to us or to Ms McKenzie. It is neither appropriate nor consistent with the overriding objective to reopen an unchallenged and preserved finding.
43. In a document entitled “Issues in the appeal”, provided to us and to Ms McKenzie on the day of the hearing, Mr Broachwalla submitted at [3]:
“The Appellant would also submit that whilst the finding in relation to section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is preserved, the Appellant has provided evidence in the form of a letter from the probation officer which shows that he is no longer a danger to the community. We would invite the Tribunal to consider the matter regarding danger to the community as at the date of the hearing.
44. This is, with respect, a misconceived submission. In her letter dated 20 June 2025, Ms Hannah Slowley, Probation Officer, states:
“[The Appellant] started his licence period in South Essex being hostile towards his licence conditions and staff, with the development of a professional rapport, [he] became less argumentative towards staff and was able to actively engage with intervention work and external partnership agencies. [He] made good progress during his licence period especially in regards to his mental health and attitudes. [He] remains restricted in which pro-social activities he can engage with due to his Home Office and SOR restrictions.”
45. The letter then sets out the interventions and services with which the Appellant engaged, aimed at reducing his risk, and then adds:
“[He] has made the most of his time on licence, engaging with his sentence plan objectives. He has developed his social capital and has benefitted from counselling sessions. There was no evidence to suggest that [he] was not compliant with his Sex Offender Notification Requirements at the time when his licence expired. Overall, [he] exhibited a good level of compliance and actively engaged in supervision session, he had 5 recorded unacceptable absences since the start of his licence period on 05/09/2022; these absences were primarily with partnership agencies.”
46. It is simply impossible to see how it can realistically be suggested that this letter, in Mr Broachwalla’s words, “shows that the Appellant is no longer a danger to the community”.
47. In cross‑examination, Ms McKenzie questioned the Appellant about this letter and asked why he had been hostile towards his licence conditions and staff. In response, he sought to evade responsibility for his behaviour and placed the blame on staff within the Prison and Probation Service. He suggested that the staff were not good enough for him and that he was merely challenging them. He came across to us as someone who does not take responsibility for his actions.
48. When Ms McKenzie asked him why there had been five unacceptable absences since the start of his licence period, he was taken to the Probation Officer’s letter. His reply was surprising. He stated that he knew nothing about these five absences or the letter, and that he was seeing it for the first time. In our judgment, this was an opportunistic, but hopeless, attempt to mislead us. The letter was addressed to him personally. It was included in his bundle. In his second witness statement, which he adopted as his evidence‑in‑chief, he referred at [11] to the letter provided by the Probation Officer. When this part of his witness statement was put to him, he suggested that it might be this letter. He also floated the idea in cross‑examination that his legal representative could have inserted the letter into the bundle and referred to it in his witness statement without showing it to him. We have no reason whatsoever to suspect that his legal representative would do any such thing. He came across as someone prepared to say whatever he thought might serve his purpose.
49. Accordingly, we reject his evidence and find that he had indeed been hostile towards his licence conditions and towards staff at the Probation Service. We also find that there were five unacceptable absences since the start of his licence period, and that he was aware of those absences and of the Probation Officer’s letter.
50. The Appellant’s criminal behaviour, as outlined above, is very serious indeed. His criminal justice social work report dated 2 September 2022 records a suggested pattern of risky sexual behaviour. It further notes that his behaviour was predatory in nature and demonstrated a level of planning and forethought. He targeted a young, lone, vulnerable female. The report also records that he demonstrated little insight into the seriousness of his behaviour or its long‑lasting impact. It is further noted that his offending evidences a pattern of sexual behaviour with the propensity to cause physical and emotional harm. The report concluded that he posed a risk of sexual harm to young females and requires a robust risk‑management plan to be effectively managed in the community. Having considered all the evidence in the round, including the updated evidence provided to us, we are satisfied that the assessment in this report remains valid.
51. In his second witness statement, the Appellant explained that he had been unable to obtain a forensic psychologist’s report because of financial difficulties. He also stated that the social worker who had prepared the earlier report had informed him that she would not be able to provide an updated report. Remarkably, his second witness statement contains no evidence of any steps he has taken to address his criminal behaviour or the findings made by the First‑tier Tribunal. His first witness statement likewise contains no evidence capable of beginning to rebut the presumption under section 72 of the 2002 Act.
52. In the circumstances, in our judgment, there is no basis whatsoever to go beyond the First‑tier Tribunal’s preserved finding on this issue. Indeed, we agree entirely with the First‑tier Tribunal’s conclusion. On the evidence before us, we also find that the Appellant is unable or unwilling to recognise the consequences of his actions. We acknowledge that he has committed no further offences following his latest conviction and has engaged in rehabilitative activities. However, taking the evidence in its totality, we conclude that he has failed, by a wide margin, to rebut the presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom.
53. It follows that the Refugee Convention does not prevent the Appellant’s deportation from the United Kingdom.
Cessation of refugee status
54. It is common ground that the correct approach to the cessation of refugee status is summarised by the Upper Tribunal’s Presidential Panel in PS (cessation principles) Zimbabwe [2021] UKUT 00283 (IAC), at [1], as follows:
“(1) There is a requirement of symmetry between the grant and cessation of refugee status because the cessation decision is the mirror image of a decision determining refugee status i.e. the grounds for cessation do not go beyond verifying whether the grounds for recognition of refugee status continue to exist …
(2) ‘The circumstances in connection with which [a person] has been recognised as a refugee’ are likely to be a combination of the general political conditions in that person's home country and some aspect of that person's personal characteristics. Accordingly, a relevant change in circumstances might in a particular case also arise from a combination of changes in the general political conditions in the home country and in the individual’s personal characteristics, or even from a change just in the individual's personal characteristics, if that change means that she now falls outside a group likely to be persecuted by the authorities of the home state. The relevant change must in each case be durable in nature and the burden is upon the respondent to prove it …
(3) The reference … to a ‘change in circumstances of such a significant and non-temporary nature’ will have occurred when the factors which formed the basis of the refugee’s fear of persecution have been “permanently eradicated” … not only must the relevant circumstances have ceased to exist but that the individual has no other reason to fear being persecuted.
(4) The relevant test is not change in circumstances, but whether circumstances in which status was granted have ‘ceased to exist’ and this involves a wider examination …
(5) The views of the UNHCR are of considerable importance …., but can be departed from.”
55. At [2], the Presidential Panel added:
“It is therefore for the SSHD to demonstrate that the circumstances which justified the grant of refugee status have ceased to exist and that there are no other circumstances which would now give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons covered by the Refugee Convention. The focus of the assessment must be on: (i) the personal circumstances and relevant country background evidence including the country guidance (‘CG’) case-law appertaining at the time that refugee status was granted and; (ii) the current personal circumstances together with the current country background evidence including the applicable CG.”
56. We respectfully adopt these principles and apply them in making our findings.
57. In the evidence before us, we have a document written by Ms Sonal Dave, Presenting Officer, in connection with the Appellant’s asylum appeal that was due to be heard on 1 May 2002. The document stated as follows:
“Having read the Home Office papers and consultation with Bill Gale 02086044373, this is a case which should be granted refugee status. I refer the file to you for action
Membership and supporter of MDC
Association with high profile members of MDC.”
58.  On the basis of this document—following which the Appellant was recognised as a refugee and granted indefinite leave to remain—Mr Broachwalla submitted that his political affiliation was accepted. Although the document is somewhat ambiguous, we are prepared to accept that the Appellant was recognised as a refugee in 2002 on the basis that he was a member and supporter of the MDC and had associations with high‑profile members of the MDC. We make our assessment on that basis.
59. In his two witness statements, the Appellant provided no details of involvement in any political activity since 2002. In cross‑examination, when probed about the absence of any political activity over the last 23 years, he stated that he had attended political gatherings in the United Kingdom. When Ms McKenzie challenged him on the fact that he had made no mention of such attendances in his witness statements, he asserted that he had provided physical evidence. If the Appellant had indeed attended any political gatherings over the last 23 years, he would have included evidence of them in his witness statements. The fact that this assertion emerged only during cross‑examination undermines his credibility. In our judgment, he was fabricating evidence in response to questioning. We also note that Mr Broachwalla’s skeleton argument advanced no submission relating to these alleged attendances at political gatherings.
60. The Appellant adduced an expert report from Mr John Birchall. Mr Birchall was asked to comment on the Appellant’s risk on return to Zimbabwe in light of the grant of refugee status in the United Kingdom. There is no suggestion in the report that the Appellant continues to be politically active or remains a member or supporter of the MDC. Mr Birchall began his answer to that question by observing that “the passage of time involved in this case makes this question difficult to answer”. He then referred to the possibility of a “loyalty test” on return and suggested that the Appellant “should not show his dislike of the ruling party”.
61. In PS, at [28], the Presidential Panel summarised developments in the country conditions as follows:
“We begin with the general political conditions in Zimbabwe when the appellant was granted asylum in February 2008. At that time, SM and others (MDC – Internal Flight – risk categories) Zimbabwe CG [2005] UKIAT 0010, as adopted, affirmed and supplemented in AA (Risk for involuntary returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2006] UKAIT 00061 (‘AA2’), was the applicable CG. This was made clear in HS (returning asylum seekers) Zimbabwe CG [2007] UKIAT 00094, which adopted and reaffirmed the CG in SM and AA2. The focus of HS was upon the risk to failed asylum seekers with no prior political involvement. SM concluded that those who are or are perceived to be politically active in opposition were at real risk of persecution. Although at [51] SM identified specific categories at obvious risk, it emphasised that each case must be looked at on its own individual facts. Some categories were said to be more likely to be at risk than others, such as MDC activists and campaigners, but supporters or those with very limited political involvement might in exceptional cases be at real risk. Returnees, particularly those who claimed asylum in the UK, were said to be regarded with suspicion upon return albeit that was insufficient alone to justify asylum.”
62. At [29], the Presidential Panel added:
“The upsurge of violence from the March 2008 elections underpinned the conclusions in RN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2008] UKAIT 00083, which held that the risk of persecution was no longer restricted to those with actual links to the MDC, but included anyone unable to demonstrate loyalty to the ZANU-PF regime. It is important to note at this stage that …, the appellant was not granted asylum on the basis of RN, but due to her risk as a result of being an MDC activist, applying the CG in SM.”
63. The Presidential Panel summarised subsequent developments, at [30], as follows:
“After RN the political situation in Zimbabwe improved, resulting in EM and others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC), later modified by CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC), promulgated on 31 January 2013. CM concluded inter alia that as at the end of January 2011 there was significantly less politically motivated violence and the return of a failed asylum seeker from the UK, having no significant MD profile, would not result in that person facing a real risk of having to demonstrate loyalty to the ZANU-PF, albeit the position was otherwise for those returning to some rural areas. Even during this period of reduced violence, the Tribunal emphasised that the situation is different in the case of a person without ZANUPF connections returning to a rural area other than Matabeleland North or South. Such a person may well find it difficult to avoid adverse attention, amounting to serious ill-treatment, from ZANU-PF authority figures and those they control.”
64. The country guidance given in CM, which was referred to in PS, included the following:
“(1) As a general matter, there is significantly less politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe, compared with the situation considered by the AIT in RN. In particular, the evidence does not show that, as a general matter, the return of a failed asylum seeker from the United Kingdom, having no significant MDC profile, would result in that person facing a real risk of having to demonstrate loyalty to the ZANU-PF.
(1) As a general matter, there is significantly less politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe, compared with the situation considered by the AIT in RN. In particular, the evidence does not show that, as a general matter, the return of a failed asylum seeker from the United Kingdom, having no significant MDC profile, would result in that person facing a real risk of having to demonstrate loyalty to the ZANU-PF.
(2) The position is, however, likely to be otherwise in the case of a person without ZANU-PF connections, returning from the United Kingdom after a significant absence to a rural area of Zimbabwe, other than Matabeleland North or Matabeleland South. Such a person may well find it difficult to avoid adverse attention, amounting to serious ill-treatment, from ZANU-PF authority figures and those they control. The adverse attention may well involve a requirement to demonstrate loyalty to ZANU-PF, with the prospect of serious harm in the event of failure. Persons who have shown themselves not to be favourably disposed to ZANU-PF are entitled to international protection, whether or not they could and would do whatever might be necessary to demonstrate such loyalty (RT (Zimbabwe)).
(3) The situation is not uniform across the relevant rural areas and there may be reasons why a particular individual, although at first sight appearing to fall within the category described in the preceding paragraph, in reality does not do so. For example, the evidence might disclose that, in the home village, ZANU-PF power structures or other means of coercion are weak or absent.
(4) In general, a returnee from the United Kingdom to rural Matabeleland North or Matabeleland South is highly unlikely to face significant difficulty from ZANU-PF elements, including the security forces, even if the returnee is a MDC member or supporter. A person may, however, be able to show that his or her village or area is one that, unusually, is under the sway of a ZANU-PF chief, or the like.
(5) A returnee to Harare will in general face no significant difficulties, if going to a low-density or medium-density area. Whilst the socio-economic situation in high-density areas is more challenging, in general a person without ZANU-PF connections will not face significant problems there (including a "loyalty test"), unless he or she has a significant MDC profile, which might cause him or her to feature on a list of those targeted for harassment, or would otherwise engage in political activities likely to attract the adverse attention of ZANU-PF, or would be reasonably likely to engage in such activities, but for a fear of thereby coming to the adverse attention of ZANU-PF.
(6) A returnee to Bulawayo will in general not suffer the adverse attention of ZANU-PF, including the security forces, even if he or she has a significant MDC profile. …”
65. Mr Broachwalla did not take us to any other country evidence or suggest that we should depart from CM and PS. In any event, alongside CM and PS, we have considered the objective evidence referred to in the Country Policy and Information Note, Zimbabwe – Opposition to Government (version 5.0, September 2021). We note that paragraph 2.4.18 states that “the risk of being a victim of a violation based solely upon being a supporter or member of the MDC is very low”. We have also taken into account Mr Birchall’s report and all other objective evidence included in the Appellant’s bundle, particularly the US State Department country report, reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and relevant media articles.
66. We regard the views of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) as being of considerable importance. In its letter of 4 August 2023, the UNHCR provided comments on the principles and standards relating to the interpretation and application of international refugee law relevant to the issues raised in this case. As the letter reminds us, we are mindful of the importance of not introducing substantive modifications to the cessation clauses. We also take into account the consequences of the cessation of refugee status. The UNHCR has expressed the following concern:
“UNHCR is concerned with the HO’s application of Article 1C(5) to this case as the HO has also presented information which indicates that affiliates to the MDC are at risk of persecution in some parts of Zimbabwe.”
67. Further, the UNHCR’s letter emphasises that the Secretary of State must demonstrate two matters. First, that the situation in Zimbabwe has fundamentally and durably changed in a manner that would permit a reasonable and well‑justified application of Article 1C(5). Second, that there is a clear connection between the fundamental and durable changes relied upon by the Secretary of State for the purposes of Article 1C(5) and the circumstances of this case. We have also taken careful account of the UNHCR’s views on these two matters, as well as the objective evidence referred to in the UNHCR’s letter concerning the political situation in Zimbabwe, the treatment of MDC supporters, and the general human rights situation. Finally, under the heading “Summary and UNHCR recommendations”, the letter states that there should be:
“A comprehensive assessment of whether there has been a fundamental and durable change in Zimbabwe since [the Appellant] was recognised as a refugee within the meaning of Article 1C(5) of the 1951 Convention.
A thorough assessment of whether the fundamental and durable change in Zimbabwe removes [the Appellant’s] fear of being persecuted.”
68. The Appellant was recognised as a refugee in 2002 on the basis that he was a member and supporter of the MDC and had associations with high‑profile members of the party. However, he is no longer a member or supporter of the MDC, nor does he continue to have associations with high‑profile MDC figures. We reject his evidence—raised for the first time only in cross‑examination—that he has been attending political gatherings in the United Kingdom. He has not been politically active and no longer has any interest in the politics of Zimbabwe. We therefore find that his individual personal circumstances have changed.
69. Further, following a holistic assessment of all the evidence, we find that general country conditions in Zimbabwe have changed. The position now is that, as a general matter, the return of a failed asylum seeker from the United Kingdom who has no significant MDC profile would not place that person at real risk of being required to demonstrate loyalty to ZANU‑PF. There is now significantly less politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe, and the risk of being subjected to harm solely on account of being a supporter or member of the MDC is very low.
70. The Appellant does not have any—nor any significant—MDC profile. He will return to an urban area, and there is no real risk of him being required to demonstrate loyalty to ZANU‑PF. He will be of no interest to the authorities or to ZANU‑PF elements in Zimbabwe. The change in circumstances in this case arises from a combination of changes in the Appellant’s personal circumstances and in conditions in Zimbabwe. He now falls outside the group likely to be persecuted by the authorities. We find that these changes are durable in nature, significant, and non‑temporary. The basis of the Appellant’s fear of persecution has been permanently eradicated, and he has no other reason to fear persecution.
71. In the circumstances, we find that the Secretary of State has demonstrated that the conditions which justified the grant of refugee status have ceased to exist, and that there are no other circumstances which would now give rise to a well‑founded fear of persecution for any reason covered by the Refugee Convention. In our judgment, for the purposes of Article 1C of the Refugee Convention, the Appellant can no longer, given that the circumstances in connection with which he was recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of his country of nationality, Zimbabwe.
72. It follows that the Refugee Convention has ceased to apply to the Appellant.
Risk on return based on political opinion
73. Taking all these considerations and the evidence cumulatively, we find that there is no reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted in Zimbabwe on account of his political opinion. There are no substantial grounds for believing that he would, for reasons of political opinion, face a real risk of serious harm or treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3.
Article 3 claim based on ill-health
74. The judgment of the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 [2020] 2 WLR 1152, adopting the approach in Paposhvili v Belgium [2016] ECHR 1113 [2017] Imm AR 867, establishes that, in order to succeed on Article 3 grounds based on ill-health, an applicant must provide evidence demonstrating that:
(1) they are seriously ill,
(2) they have provided substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that, if returned to the receiving country,
(i) appropriate treatment would either be absent (i.e., unavailable to anyone) or inaccessible to them in particular; and
(ii) this absence or lack of access to appropriate treatment would expose them either,
(a) to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
(b) to a significant (i.e., substantial) reduction in life expectancy.
75. In AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC), at [1], the Upper Tribunal noted that, for the purpose of limb (1) above, the burden of establishing that an applicant is seriously ill rests upon the applicant. For the purpose of limb (2), it is likewise for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the proscribed consequences. The Upper Tribunal, at [3], clarified that, for the purpose of limb (2)(ii)(a), it is insufficient for an appellant merely to show that their condition will worsen upon removal or that there would be serious or detrimental effects; what is required is intense suffering. Generally, while medical experts based in the United Kingdom may assist in this assessment, many cases will turn on the availability of and access to treatment in the receiving state. Such evidence is more likely to be found in reports from reputable organisations, clinicians, and country experts with contemporary knowledge or expertise regarding medical treatment and related country conditions in the receiving state. Clinicians directly involved in providing relevant treatment and services in the country of return, and who have knowledge of treatment options in both the public and private sectors, are likely to be particularly helpful. The Upper Tribunal, at [4], added that it is only once the threshold test has been met, and Article 3 is therefore engaged, that the returning state’s obligations as summarised in Savran v Denmark [2021] ECHR 1025 become relevant.
76. The Appellant has provided a letter from Ms Laura Hilton, HIV Nurse Consultant, dated 29 October 2025, stating that:
“[He] was diagnosed HIV positive in London in 2001 and has moved around the UK to various clinics since then, he has been under the care of my clinic since October 2021. As well as his HIV infection he is also living with Hepatitis B infection.”
77. Ms Hilton sets out the Appellant’s medication as follows:
“[He] has taken various combinations of medication in the UK but currently takes Symtuza one tablet once a day which treats both his HIV and his Hepatitis B infection and he has been taking this since August 2019, he has been on previous regimes but unfortunately due to moving around a lot we do not have a full HIV drug history. Whatever treatment he receives in the future will need to be able to treat both infections at once.”
78. So far as the Appellant’s current condition is concerned, Ms Hilton states:
“When we last saw [him] on 29th April 2025 his HIV virus was well controlled, he also had an undetectable Hepatitis B viral load which means that his Hepatitis B is also well controlled. His immune system is strong with a CD4 count of 734 which means that his immune system is operating exactly as it should.”
79. On the basis of this updated evidence, we find that the Appellant’s condition is currently well controlled. However, given that he is HIV‑positive and also has a Hepatitis B infection, we regard him as seriously ill for the purposes of our assessment.
80. The Country Policy and Information Note, Zimbabwe – Medical treatment and healthcare (version 2.0, April 2021), at paragraph 3.13.1, provides:
“The Avert report, HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe, updated on 20 August 2020, stated: ‘Zimbabwe has 1.4 million people living with HIV. AIDS-related deaths, however, have dropped from 61,000 in 2013 to 40,000 in 2019.’ A total of 40,000 new infections were recorded in 2019 (UNAIDS data 2020). A total of 86% of people with HIV/AIDS were receiving ARV treatment in 2019 (UNAIDS data 2020).”
81. Paragraph 3.13.2 identifies the drugs used in the treatment of HIV that are available in Zimbabwe. These include darunavir, emtricitabine, tenofovir alafenamide, ritonavir, cobicistat, dolutegravir, rezolsta, abacavir, atazanavir, lamivudine, epzicom, atazanavir/ritonavir, elvitegravir, genvoya and descovy. Paragraph 3.18.1 identifies the drugs used in the treatment of Hepatitis B that are available in Zimbabwe, including entecavir, tenofovir alafenamide and tenofovir disoproxil.
82. In AM, at [79], the Upper Tribunal held as follows regarding the management and care of HIV in Zimbabwe:
“… we record the evidence demonstrating that notwithstanding many economic and political challenges over time (as recorded in the country guidance cases on Zimbabwe that we have reminded ourselves of), Zimbabwe has made enormous strides in the management and care of HIV/AIDS.  The NAC report for 2020 (at [ABS/8-40]) as produced by Professor Nyazema, records that 84.7% of those living with HIV are receiving ARV. In some areas, notably for our purposes, testing, the results are not as encouraging.  The report notes that only 57.2% of those on ARV are tested for viral load suppression.  Nonetheless, the figures in that report and the other reports in that bundle show encouraging progress.” 
83. Although Symtuza is not listed as one of the medications available in Zimbabwe, we find that the Appellant would be able to switch to one of the alternative medications identified above. As recorded in the Country Policy and Information Note, Zimbabwe – Medical treatment and healthcare (version 2.0, April 2021) and as found in AM, alternative medication is available in the public sector. There is no evidence before us to suggest that a switch would not be possible or that it would lead to adverse side effects. We note, however, that the Upper Tribunal in AM, at [125], observed that the main side effects of switching from Symtuza could be sleep disturbance and weight gain. Even if the Appellant were to experience such side effects, they would not meet the threshold for a breach of Article 3, nor would they be likely to cause him to cease taking the medication. Likewise, on the evidence, monitoring and testing for the Appellant’s condition are also available in the public sector in Zimbabwe.
84. In her letter, Ms Hilton further states:
If [he] were returned to his country of origin and was unable to receive any antiretrovirals then it is very likely that he would become ill very quickly and therefore die within five or so years, however as long as he is able to receive a steady supply of a medication that is able to treat both HIV and Hepatitis B then he would remain well without any ongoing problems. As well as a steady supply of his antiretrovirals, [he] requires blood monitoring and clinical review every 6 months, if this was not to happen, he could become very unwell if the drugs stopped working. I am unsure as to whether if this level of monitoring would be available in his country of origin.”
85. In our judgment, for the reasons set out above, the Appellant would be able to obtain antiretroviral medication in Zimbabwe. He would also have access to blood monitoring and clinical reviews. Such medication and treatment are available in Zimbabwe and would be accessible to the Appellant within the public healthcare sector.
86. Mr Birchall’s report also addresses the Appellant’s health and his potential return to Zimbabwe. He outlines the difficulties the Appellant would face on return, particularly in relation to his reintegration into Zimbabwean society, noting that “many Zimbabweans can speak some English”. He considers that the Appellant would encounter difficulties in securing employment, obtaining housing, and accessing medical treatment, although he immediately qualifies this by acknowledging that he has “little knowledge” of the Appellant’s employment skills. In response to the question of whether the Appellant would be able to access medication and treatment for HIV and Hepatitis B, he stated, “Yes”, but added that “drugs are not distributed free of charge” and that “if he decides to stay in Harare, then he may be assisted by one of the charities based there”. He also comments on the impact of the prevailing political and economic situation in the country.
87. Mr Birchall is a Development Economist; he is not a clinician or medical practitioner. We therefore approach his comments on medication and medical treatment with caution. However, even taking his report at its highest, he does not suggest that the Appellant would be unable to access alternatives to Symtuza or related treatment within the public sector. Indeed, he does not address the availability of any such alternatives in his report.
88. We recognise that the Appellant has been absent from Zimbabwe since 1999. He suffers from anxiety and depression. If required, he would be able to receive treatment for these conditions in Zimbabwe. In the United Kingdom, as he explained in his first witness statement, he worked for over ten years in the health‑care sector, stating that he excelled in his role and received very positive feedback. He will be able to utilise the skills he has acquired over the years to obtain employment and accommodation in Zimbabwe. His physical and mental health conditions would not present a barrier to doing so. In his criminal justice social work report, under the heading “Significant relationship/background”, it is stated that:
“… He has a 26-year-old son from a previous relationship who resides in Zimbabwe. He maintains contact with him through WhatsApp messenger.”
89. When Ms McKenzie asked the Appellant about his son in Zimbabwe, he stated that he had had no contact with him since 2015. This is inconsistent with the information he provided in preparation for the criminal justice social work report and undermines his credibility. We prefer the account contained in that report and find that he does have a son in Zimbabwe, with whom he maintained contact at least until recent years. On return, he could seek to re‑establish contact with his son, although we note his evidence that this individual is not his biological son.
90. In the circumstances, we find that even if the Appellant is required to pay for his medication in Zimbabwe, he will be able to obtain employment, secure accommodation, and meet the associated costs.
91. Looking at all the evidence in the round, we find that there are no substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that, if returned to Zimbabwe, appropriate treatment would be either absent (that is, unavailable to anyone) or inaccessible to the Appellant. Accordingly, there are no substantial grounds for believing that, on return to Zimbabwe, the Appellant would be exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant (i.e., substantial) reduction in life expectancy.
92. It follows that the Appellant’s deportation from the United Kingdom would not be incompatible with Article 3 on account of his health or his particular circumstances.

Article 8 claim
(i) Exception 1 (private life) in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act
(a) The first limb: residence in the United Kingdom
93. The first limb in section 117C(4)(a) of the 2002 Act raises the question of whether the Appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life.
94. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v SC (Jamaica) [2017] EWCA Civ 2112 [2018] 1 WLR 4004, at [53], the Court of Appeal held that the phrase most of his life in this provision means more than half of a person’s life. The Court of Appeal, at [56], held that the word lawfully in this provision means permitted by law. It is not limited to residence pursuant to leave to enter or remain but can also include time spent on temporary admission in the United Kingdom. This interpretation was not disturbed by the Supreme Court on appeal in SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15 [2023] 1 All ER 193.
95. The Appellant, as noted above, was born in 1976 and is now around 50 years old. When he arrived in the United Kingdom in 1999, he was approximately 23. He has therefore lived in the United Kingdom for around 27 years, which is more than half of his life. It is common ground that he held indefinite leave to remain from 2002 until 2023, when a deportation order was made against him, a period of around 21 years. Unfortunately, the parties have adduced no evidence as to the Appellant’s immigration status between 1999 and 2002 and made no submissions on this issue. As contemplated in SC (Jamaica), it is possible that the Appellant was on temporary admission during that period. Likewise, there is a potential argument—though not advanced by Mr Broachwalla—that the deportation order did not invalidate the Appellant’s indefinite leave to remain pending the final resolution of these appeal proceedings.
96. Accordingly, in light of the prevailing uncertainty, we proceed on the basis that the Appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life and, therefore, meets the requirement in section 117C(4)(a) of the 2002 Act.
(b) The second limb: social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom
97. The second limb in section 117C(4)(b) of the 2002 Act raises the question of whether the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom.
98. In Binbuga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 551 [2019] Imm AR 1026, at [56], the Court of Appeal held that social integration in this provision refers to the extent to which a person has become incorporated within the lawful social structure of the United Kingdom. The Court of Appeal, at [57], added that, similarly, cultural integration refers to the acceptance and assumption by a person of the culture of the United Kingdom, its core values, ideas, customs and social behaviour. This includes acceptance of the principle of the rule of law.
99. In SC (Jamaica), at [77], the Supreme Court approved the formulation in CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 [2020] Imm AR 503 and held that the decision-maker should simply ask whether, having regard to their upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors, the individual was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom.
100. The crimes committed by the Appellant demonstrate a disregard for the rule of law and undermine his claim to be socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, he arrived in the United Kingdom at the age of 23 and has lived here for 27 years, holding indefinite leave to remain for a substantial period. He studied and worked in this country. His mother, brother and extended family are in the United Kingdom, although he no longer maintains regular contact with them. He speaks English and has developed roots here, forming friendships over the years.
101. In our judgment, having regard to all these matters, the Appellant is a person who is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. He therefore meets the requirement in section 117C(4)(b) of the 2002 Act.
(c) The third limb: very significant obstacles to integration into Zimbabwe
102.  The third limb in section 117C(4)(c) of the 2002 Act raises the question of whether there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into Zimbabwe.
103. In Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 [2016] 4 WLR 152, at [14], the Court of Appeal held that the idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life. The Supreme Court approved this approach in Sanambar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 30 [2021] 4 All ER 873, at [55], and in SC (Jamaica), at [52].
104. In Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932, at [9], the Court of Appeal noted that the phrase “very significant” connotes an elevated threshold and that the test will not be met by mere inconvenience or upheaval. The test contemplates something which would prevent or seriously inhibit a person from integrating into the country of return. There must be something more than obstacles.
105. The Appellant, as noted above, left Zimbabwe in 1999 at the age of 23. On his account, which was accepted by the Secretary of State, he fled Zimbabwe because he had a well‑founded fear of persecution. Since his arrival in the United Kingdom, he has lived here continuously, was granted refugee status and indefinite leave to remain, and established a life with a range of relationships and connections. He has become accustomed to the freedoms he has enjoyed in this country over many years, freedoms that are unlikely to be readily available in Zimbabwe. He is HIV‑positive and has a Hepatitis B infection.
106. On the other hand, as we have found above, the circumstances that justified the grant of refugee status have ceased to exist, and there are no other circumstances that would now give rise to a well‑founded fear of persecution for reasons covered by the Refugee Convention. There is no reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted in Zimbabwe or face a real risk of suffering serious harm or ill‑treatment. Although he is HIV‑positive and has a Hepatitis B infection, his condition is currently well controlled. He would be able to receive antiretroviral medication, blood monitoring and clinical reviews in Zimbabwe. Utilising the skills he has acquired over the years, he would be able to obtain work and accommodation there. His son resides in Zimbabwe, with whom he had previously been in contact, and he could seek to re‑establish that relationship and obtain assistance. Even if he is required to pay for his medication in Zimbabwe, he will be able to secure employment, accommodation and meet the associated costs.
107. In his evidence, the Appellant presented himself as someone able to think clearly and articulate himself appropriately. This is not a case of an individual returning to a country with which he has no familiarity. The Appellant spent his childhood and part of his adult life in Zimbabwe. He is not wholly disconnected from life there. He may face some difficulty in securing employment immediately upon return, but he will not encounter any serious linguistic, cultural or security barriers. He has the mental and physical capacity to obtain an income. Although he has anxiety and depression, in all the circumstances these conditions would not present a significant challenge on return. If required, he would be able to receive treatment for them in Zimbabwe. Ultimately, despite some difficulties, he will be able to establish himself in Zimbabwe within a reasonable period of time.
108. Looking at all these matters in the round, we exercise a broad evaluative judgment. We find that the Appellant will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life is conducted in Zimbabwe. He has the capacity to participate in that life and a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there. He will be able to operate on a day‑to‑day basis in Zimbabwe and, within a reasonable period, build a range of human relationships that give substance to his private and family life. There is nothing that would prevent or seriously inhibit his integration into Zimbabwe.
109. Accordingly, we find that there would be no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into Zimbabwe. He therefore does not meet the requirement in section 117C(4)(c) of the 2002 Act.
110. In the circumstances, we find that Exception 1 in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act does not apply in this case.
(ii) Exception 2 (family life) in section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act
111. Exception 1 in section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act concerns a person who has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child. The Appellant has neither a qualifying partner nor a qualifying child. Accordingly, we find that this Exception does not apply in this case.
(iii) Very compelling circumstances test in section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act
112. On the Court of Appeal’s analysis in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662 [2017] 1 WLR 207, at [27], as adopted by the Supreme Court, in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 [2022] 1 WLR 3784, section 117C(6) of the 2002 applies to this case too. Accordingly, the public interest requires the Appellant’s deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. We have found above that Exceptions 1 and 2 do not apply in this case.
113. In HA (Iraq), the Supreme Court gave guidance as to the very compelling circumstances test in section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act. The Supreme Court, at [49], referred to Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 [2016] 1 WLR 4799 and noted that great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of qualifying offenders, but it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words, by a very strong claim indeed. The countervailing considerations must be very compelling in order to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders, as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State.
114. The Supreme Court, at [50], referred to NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662 [2017] WLR 207 and noted that if a serious offender could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 and 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an Article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, they could in principle constitute very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of Article 8. The Supreme Court further noted that although there is no exceptionality requirement, it inexorably follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient.
115. The Supreme Court, at [51], held that when considering whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation. The Supreme Court referred to Boultif v Switzerland [2001] ECHR 497 (2001) 33 EHRR 50, Üner v The Netherlands   [2007] INLR 273 (2007) 45 EHRR 14 and  Unuane v United Kingdom [2020] ECHR 832 (2021) 72 EHRR 24 and stated that the relevant factors include the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant, the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled, the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period, the nationalities of the various persons concerned, the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life, whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship, whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age, the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled, the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled, and the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination. This is consistent with Maslov v Austria [2008] ECHR 546 [2009] INLR 47.
116. The Supreme Court, at [53], [58] and [119], clarified that rehabilitation is a relevant factor in the assessment of whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. The weight to be given to it is a matter for the fact-finding tribunal. In a case where the only evidence of rehabilitation is the fact that no further offences have been committed then, in general, that is likely to be of little or no material weight in the proportionality balance. If, on the other hand, there is evidence of positive rehabilitation which reduces the risk of further offending then that may have some weight as it bears on one element of the public interest in deportation, namely the protection of the public from further offending.
117. The Supreme Court, at [60], held that seriousness of the offence is a matter which the decision-maker is required to take into account when carrying out a proportionality assessment for the purposes of the very compelling circumstances test. The length of the sentence, the Supreme Court added, at [67], will be the surest guide to the seriousness of the offence. The Supreme Court further noted, at [70], that whilst care must be taken to avoid double counting, in principle, the nature of the offending in addition to the sentence can be a relevant consideration.
118. For the reasons set out above, we find that the Appellant has established private life in the United Kingdom. He does not, however, have family life here. There is no qualifying partner or child, and in his oral evidence he made clear that he is no longer in regular contact with his mother or brother in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the Appellant’s deportation from the United Kingdom will amount to an interference with his right to respect for private life. That interference will have consequences of such gravity as to engage the operation of Article 8. The ultimate question for us is whether the interference caused by the Secretary of State’s decision with the Appellant’s private and family life is proportionate, applying the test in section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act. In approaching that question, we bear in mind that the Appellant is a “medium” offender who has not been sentenced to four years or more, and we make allowance for that fact.
119. In the Appellant’s favour, we take into account the fact that he has lived in the United Kingdom for around 27 years and attach substantial weight to this. As noted above, we assess the case on the basis that he has lived in the United Kingdom for most of his life. He is socially and culturally integrated here. He left Zimbabwe at the age of 23 because of a well‑founded fear of persecution, was recognised as a refugee, and was granted indefinite leave to remain. We are also mindful that he is HIV‑positive, has a Hepatitis B infection, and suffers from anxiety and depression, and that, as we have found above, he would face difficulties and challenges on return to Zimbabwe. He has committed no further offences following his latest conviction and has engaged in rehabilitative activities.
120. On the other hand, the Appellant has committed serious sexual offences and constitutes a danger to the community in the United Kingdom. He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he was recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of Zimbabwe, his country of nationality. There is no reasonable degree of likelihood that he would face persecution or a real risk of serious harm or ill‑treatment in Zimbabwe. He would be able to receive antiretroviral medication, blood monitoring and clinical reviews there, and his condition is currently well controlled. There would be no very significant obstacles to his integration into Zimbabwe. We adopt the findings we have made above in relation to these matters in the proportionality balance.
121. Ultimately, Parliament has determined that offenders such as the Appellant, who do not meet either of the two Exceptions, should be deported from the United Kingdom unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. Taking all the evidence cumulatively, we conclude that the countervailing considerations are not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the strong public interest in the Appellant’s deportation. There are no very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. We therefore find that the Appellant’s deportation is justified and proportionate. It is not incompatible with Article 8.

Conclusion
122. For all these reasons, we find that neither the cessation of the Appellant’s refugee status nor his deportation would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention or in relation to persons eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection. His deportation would not breach his Convention rights.
123. Accordingly, we re‑make the decision by dismissing the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.

Notice of decision
124. The appeal is dismissed.

Zane Malik KC
Deputy Judge of Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Date: 5 February 2026

Fee award
125. We make no fee award in the light of our decision to dismiss the appeal.

Zane Malik KC
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Date: 5 February 2026



ANNEX: ERROR OF LAW DECISION



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2024-003441
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02064/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Issued:

………………………………….

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MALIK KC

Between

LD
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation

For the Appellant: Mr Zainul Jafferji, Counsel, instructed by Direct Access
For the Respondent: Ms Sandra Mckenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them or any member of their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Zimbabwe, born in 1976. He arrived in the United Kingdom in 1999 and claimed asylum in 2000. He was granted indefinite leave to remain in 2002. Thereafter, he accrued a number of criminal convictions. In 2023, in light of his conduct and the change in circumstances in Zimbabwe, the Secretary of State revoked his refugee status, refused his protection and human rights claims, and made a decision to deport him from the United Kingdom. By a decision promulgated on 3 May 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Fox (“the Judge”) dismissed his appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision. He appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the Judge’s decision.
2. The Judge held that the Appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention due to his offending, and that he had failed to rebut the presumption under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. The Judge further rejected the Appellant’s claim to have a political profile and found that there was no real risk to him on return to Zimbabwe. The Appellant is HIV positive and suffers from ongoing medical issues. The Judge held that his deportation would not be incompatible with Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”). The Judge also concluded that the exceptions to deportation under section 117C of the 2002 Act did not apply, and that his deportation would not be incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR.
3. Mr Zainul Jafferji, who appeared on behalf of the Appellant, made it clear that there was no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant was excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention by reference to section 72 of the 2002 Act. He advanced three grounds of appeal. First, he submitted that the Judge failed to apply the guidance given in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 [2020] 2 WLR 1152 and erred in respect of the claim based on the Appellant’s medical condition. Second, he submitted that the Judge failed to take into account relevant matters in concluding that the Appellant was at no real risk in Zimbabwe on account of his political opinion. Third, he submitted that the Judge’s approach to the Article 8 claim was legally flawed. Ms Sandra McKenzie, who appeared on behalf of the Secretary of State, opposed the appeal and submitted that there was no error of law in the Judge’s decision.
4. The applicable legal principles are well-settled. The First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law in its decisions simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed itself differently, as the appeal is available only on a point of law: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678, at [30]. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 [2011] 2 All ER 65, at [45]. When it comes to the reasons given by the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the First-tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see Jones v First-tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 [2013] 2 All ER 625, at [25]. The issues that the First-tier Tribunal is deciding and the basis on which the First-tier Tribunal reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [27]. Judges sitting in the First-tier Tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 [2020] 4 WLR 145, at [34]. It is the nature of the fact-finding exercise that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case and the mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 [2017] WLR 1260, at [107].
5. The reasons given by the First-tier Tribunal for its findings on the principal controversial issues must be adequate. The reasons must explain to the parties why they have won and lost on those issues: see English v Emery Reimbold and Strick [2002] EWCA Civ 605 [2002] 1 WLR 2409, at [16]. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute: see South Bucks District Council and Anor v Porter [2004] UKHL 33 [2004] 4 All ER 775, at [36]. A challenge based on the adequacy of reasons should only succeed when the appellate body cannot understand the fact-finder’s thought process in making material findings: see R (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 [2005] Imm AR 535, at [15].
6. With these principles in mind, we consider each of the three grounds of appeal in turn.
7. The first ground concerns the Article 3 claim based on ill-health. The judgment of the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe), adopting the approach in Paposhvili v Belgium [2016] ECHR 1113 [2017] Imm AR 867, establishes that, in order to succeed on Article 3 grounds based on ill-health, an applicant must provide evidence demonstrating that:
(1) they are seriously ill,
(2) they have provided substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that, if returned to the receiving country,
(i) appropriate treatment would either be absent (i.e., unavailable to anyone) or inaccessible to them in particular; and
(ii) this absence or lack of access to appropriate treatment would expose them either,
(a) to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or
(b) to a significant (i.e., substantial) reduction in life expectancy.
8. The Judge considered the Appellant’s claim based on his health conditions at [92]-[95] and concluded, at [96], that “there is no reliable evidence to demonstrate that adequate medical services are unavailable to the Appellant upon return”. There are two distinct difficulties with this conclusion. First, the Judge failed to consider whether appropriate medical treatment would be accessible to the Appellant in Zimbabwe. The Judge confined their analysis to the availability of medical treatment. As the Supreme Court has clarified, in this context, availability and accessibility are distinct and alternative considerations. Second, contrary to the Judge’s conclusion, there was no burden on the Appellant to “demonstrate that adequate medical services are unavailable” in Zimbabwe. A lower standard of proof applies. In relation to this limb of the test, the Appellant was merely required to show that there were substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that appropriate medical treatment would be unavailable or inaccessible. Accordingly, in our judgment, the Judge’s conclusion in respect of the Article 3 claim based on ill-health is vitiated by an error of law.
9. We now turn to the second ground, which concerns the Appellant’s claim based on his political opinion. The Judge addressed this claim at [82]-[91]. At [86], the Judge noted that “there has been a material change in country conditions since the Appellant was recognised as a refugee”. However, there is no reasoned consideration as to whether this change is durable. The Appellant had adduced extensive objective evidence regarding Zimbabwe at pages 63-206 of the appeal bundle. The Judge, at [86], observed that “the objective evidence does not assist the Appellant” and that “there is no apparent reference to low level supporters”. In our judgment, this is inadequate. The Judge should have properly engaged with the objective evidence and decided, with adequate reasons, whether the change in Zimbabwe is durable. The evidence before the Judge included reference to the opinion of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) that the situation in Zimbabwe does not permit a reasonable and well-justified application of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention. The UNHCR’s opinion was not binding on the Judge, but it was materially relevant. The Judge has not taken this into account nor provided a reasoned justification for adopting a different view of the facts. In the circumstances, the Judge’s conclusion in respect of the claim based on political opinion is wrong in law.
10. The final ground concerns the Article 8 claim. The Judge, at [104], found that the Appellant “has failed to demonstrate that any exceptions should apply in his favour”. This is unobjectionable. However, immediately thereafter, the Judge added that “for the same reasons very compelling circumstances do not exist”. Section 117C of the 2002 Act provides exceptions as to private life at sub-section (4), family life at sub-section (5), and states at sub-section (6) that “in the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”. In NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662 [2017] WLR 207, at [27], the Court of Appeal held that fallback protection under sub-section (6) also extends to those sentenced to less than four years who fall outside the two exceptions. In HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 [2022] 1 WLR 3784, at [51], the Supreme Court clarified that, when considering whether very compelling circumstances exist under sub-section (6), all relevant circumstances of the case must be weighed against the strong public interest in deportation. The Supreme Court referred to Boultif v Switzerland [2001] ECHR 497 (2001) 33 EHRR 50, Üner v The Netherlands [2007] INLR 273 (2007) 45 EHRR 14, and Unuane v United Kingdom [2020] ECHR 832 (2021) 72 EHRR 24, and listed relevant factors. In our judgment, the Judge erred in law by treating the Appellant’s failure to satisfy the exceptions as determinative of whether very compelling circumstances exist. Moreover, there is no reasoned engagement by the Judge with the relevant factors. The Judge’s conclusion on this issue is, in any event, vitiated by the errors of law identified above.
11. For all these reasons, we find that the Judge erred in law in dismissing the Appellant’s appeal and that those errors were material to the outcome. We therefore set aside the Judge’s decision.
12. Mr Jafferji, as noted above, stated that there was no challenge to the Judge’s conclusion that the Appellant was excluded from protection of the Refugee Convention because of his offending and that he had failed to rebut the presumption under section 72 of the 2002 Act that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the finding made by the Judge at [81] shall stand and is preserved. It is not vitiated by the errors of law we have identified in the Judge’s decision.
13. We have a discretion under section 12(2)(b) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”) either to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for reconsideration or to re-make the decision at the Upper Tribunal. In considering how to exercise that discretion, we have carefully considered paragraphs 7.1 to 7.3 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement for the Immigration and Asylum Chambers, and the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 [2023] 4 WLR 12, and Begum (Remaking or Remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). This is not a case where the effect of the errors made by the Judge has deprived a party of a fair hearing or any other opportunity for that party’s case to be put forward and considered below. We have preserved the unchallenged finding made by the Judge that the Appellant constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom and is excluded from the Refugee Convention. In our judgment, the nature and extent of the judicial fact-finding necessary for re-making the decision in the appeal are such that, having regard to the overriding objective, it is appropriate to retain the appeal at the Upper Tribunal.
14. In the circumstances, we exercise our discretion under section 12(2)(b) of the 2007 Act to retain the appeal at the Upper Tribunal in order to re-make the decision.
DIRECTIONS
15. We announced our decision, as set out above, following oral submissions at the hearing on 19 May 2025. We were minded to proceed immediately with the re-making of the decision at that hearing. The directions issued to the parties on 28 March 2025 and 7 May 2025, at paragraph (v), included the following:
“There is a presumption that, in the event of the Tribunal deciding that the decision of the FtT is to be set aside as erroneous in law, the re-making of the decision will take place at the same hearing. The parties are expected, therefore, to have complied with rule 15(2A) (by providing any evidence which was not before the FtT) in advance of the ‘error of law’ hearing.”
16. However, with considerable reluctance, and at Mr Jafferji’s request, we adjourned the re-making stage. Mr Jafferji sought an opportunity to collate further evidence and documentation, and we were persuaded, by a narrow margin, that it was fair to grant him that opportunity. We wish to emphasise that this constituted a departure from the presumption referred to above. Further, this appeal was originally listed for hearing on 8 April 2025 but was adjourned at the Appellant’s request. The parties should be on notice that the Upper Tribunal is unlikely to grant any further adjournments.
17. After hearing submissions regarding the future conduct of this appeal, we give the following case management directions:
(1) The appeal shall be listed for a resumed hearing at the Upper Tribunal, with a time estimate of 3 hours.
(2) The Secretary of State shall, no later than 28 days from the date on which these directions are issued, file and serve,
(a) the Secretary of State’s decision dated 12 December 2001 refusing the Appellant’s asylum claim,
(b) any documents that the Secretary of State is able to locate which are relevant to the withdrawal of the decision dated 12 December 2001 and the grant of indefinite leave to remain to the Appellant, and
(c) the UNHCR’s letter referred to in the Secretary of State’s decision dated 21 September 2023 revoking the Appellant’s refugee status.
(2) The Appellant shall file and serve a new hearing bundle, which must comply with the Upper Tribunal’s directions issued on 7 May 2025, no later than 28 days before the resumed hearing.
(3) The Appellant shall file a skeleton argument as to the re-making of the decision in the appeal no later than 21 days before the resumed hearing.
(4) The Secretary of State shall file and serve a skeleton argument as to the re-making of the decision in the appeal no later than 14 days before the resumed hearing.
(5) The Appellant shall file and serve a composite authorities bundle no later than 7 days before the resumed hearing.
18. These directions must be followed unless varied, substituted, or supplemented by further directions. The parties are reminded that failure to comply with these directions may, among other things, result in the making of an adverse order pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.

Zane Malik KC
Deputy Judge of Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Date: 9 June 2025