Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003446

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52123/2023
LP/01572/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19/08/2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILDING

Between

JK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Wass, Counsel, instructed by Barnes, Harrild and Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal shall continue in force.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lewis (“the Judge”), who in a decision dated 30 January 2024 dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection claim.
Background
2. The Appellant claims to have left Iraq on 29 January 2016. He travelled through Iran, Turkey, Greece, Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia, Germany, and France before arriving in the UK. He applied for asylum in Germany; his application was refused. He arrived in the UK on 5 August 2020 by boat; his application for asylum is recorded as having been made on 6 August 2020. A screening interview was conducted on 6 August 2020. The Appellant subsequently returned a Preliminary Interview Questionnaire and a witness statement, both dated 17 June 2021. An asylum interview was conducted by video on 24 August 2022; the interview was not completed on this date; the interview was continued and completed on 15 September 2022. The Appellant’s application was refused on 21 March 2023.
3. The basis of his claim is that he is an Iraqi Kurd from the KRG. He claims that he had been arrested in the KRG on account of his anti-government views, which he made public on Facebook between February and November 2015. He claimed that he was arrested in November 2015, and was held for 25 days during which he was ill treated. He was subsequently told he had to become an informer, which he refused to do. He claims this led to a further arrest in January 2016. After he was released he fled, leaving Iraq on 29 January 2016.
4. The appellant suffers from a rare medical condition, hypohidrotic ectodermal dysplasia. In Iraq he had been in receipt of disability benefit payments but these were stopped when he was discovered making the anti-government Facebook posts.
5. The appellant further claimed that as an undocumented Iraqi national he is unable to relocate to Baghdad or elsewhere in the KRG without facing serious harm.
6. The respondent refused his claim on 21 March 2023. The respondent refused his claim on the basis that his account was not accepted in full. Whilst the respondent accepted that the appellant may have been on the receiving end of mockery and verbal abuse on account of his disabilities, his arrests and detention were not accepted.
7. His appeal was heard by the Judge on 15 November 2023 and 18 December 2023. The Judge dismissed his appeal on the basis that he did not accept that the appellant had given a credible account. In particular the Judge considered it fatal that his narrative as to what happened to him differed from what he told the German authorities. The Judge expressly found:
20. In reaching this conclusion I note in particular that the history of the Appellant’s claim for asylum in Germany, his subsequent departure for the UK, and the initial presentation of his claim in the UK, are such that the Appellant’s credibility is damaged to an extent where I am not prepared to place any particular reliance upon any of his testimony that is not supported from an independent source. In this context and generally, I find the supporting medical evidence to be unreliable; even if I felt that I could place more weight on the supporting medical evidence as indicative of injuries having been sustained during a period ill-treatment, I find that the quality of the evidence presented overall by the Appellant is such that I am not satisfied that any such ill-treatment arose for the reasons given – and accordingly I am not satisfied that the Appellant has been able to demonstrate that he faces any continuing risk whether for a Refugee Convention reason or otherwise.
8. The Judge dismissed the appeal as he did not accept any of the appellant’s account. We consider other parts of his decision below and do not need to repeat them here. The Judge dismissed the appeal on protection grounds. The Judge did also, briefly, also dismiss the appeal on Article 3 and 8 grounds, however there is no direct challenge to those conclusions outside of the challenges to his credibility findings and as such we say no more about it.
9. The appellant appealed raising three grounds of appeal. Firstly, that the Judge materially erred in failing to assess the appellant’s ‘historic’ claim in his credibility assessment, instead rejecting the claim on account of him being untruthful in other matters. Secondly, the Judge failed to properly factor in the medical evidence into his credibility assessment, as such the Judge erred by undertaking an unlawful approach to the medical evidence, otherwise known as the “Mibanga error”. The third ground was that the Judge materially erred in applying the standard of proof, requiring a standard which was “too demanding” and, in essence, the Judge had elevated the standard by requiring corroboration.
10. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal, but upon renewing to the Upper Tribunal, permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens on 12 March 2025 on all grounds
The hearing
11. We heard submissions from both representatives. Ms Wass relied on the grounds of appeal. In relation to ground one, she argued that the Judge’s findings at paragraph 20 were a “clear error”, and that the Tribunal should have reminded itself that credibility has to be determined by what weight to be given to the various statements by the appellant, and crucially had to consider the underlying narrative, rather than disposing of it all because of the narrative he had given elsewhere.
12. Ms Wass submitted that the Judge had to take into account each aspect of the claim individually. That the appellant has previously said he was not in touch with his family impacts this, but that sits independently of the issue of ill treatment in Iraq.
13. Ground two is interrelated given that the Judge has drawn his conclusions without considering the medical evidence and as such the credibility assessment has been undertaken without taking into account, in particular, the medical report relied on by the appellant.
14. Ground three was not developed much beyond what was written, however Ms Wass submitted that the Judge in finding against the appellant had in essence rejected his claim on account of there being no corroborative evidence, which, she submitted, was an impermissible approach following WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894.
15. Mr Parvar in response submitted that the Judge had not erred in his approach. He submitted that in relation to ground one the Judge has made a complete set of findings as to the significance of the differing accounts the appellant gave to the Secretary of State in his claim, when he first arrived in the UK, and then again what he said he told the German authorities. That was a significant feature which, essentially, meant that that Judge found that he could not believe anything he had said unless it was corroborated by independent evidence.
16. In relation to the second ground, the Judge did consider the medical report, and rejected it in its entirety for clear reasons. That is not a “Mibanga error” but is clearly a decision which has taken into account the material evidence relied on by the appellant and has rejected it as being not capable of attracting any real weight.
17. Ms Wass responded briefly. We reserved our decision.
Decision and reasons
18. We do not consider that the Judge materially erred as claimed. His decision is a careful, structured, and detailed one which simply finds that the appellant’s credibility is so undermined for the reasons given that the Judge cannot accept anything that he says as being truthful.
19. Given how they are advanced we have taken grounds one and two together. They advance the proposition that the Judge should have considered the underlying narrative before coming to his credibility findings, instead he erred, it is argued, because he found that the appellant’s differing accounts given in Germany, on arrival in the UK, and in his interview were so unexplained that the appellant’s credibility was so damaged that the Judge could not accept his oral testimony. The Judge expressly found:
20. In reaching this conclusion I note in particular that the history of the Appellant’s claim for asylum in Germany, his subsequent departure for the UK, and the initial presentation of his claim in the UK, are such that the Appellant’s credibility is damaged to an extent where I am not prepared to place any particular reliance upon any of his testimony that is not supported from an independent source. In this context and generally, I find the supporting medical evidence to be unreliable; even if I felt that I could place more weight on the supporting medical evidence as indicative of injuries having been sustained during a period ill-treatment, I find that the quality of the evidence presented overall by the Appellant is such that I am not satisfied that any such ill-treatment arose for the reasons given – and accordingly I am not satisfied that the Appellant has been able to demonstrate that he faces any continuing risk whether for a Refugee Convention reason or otherwise.
20. We do not consider that this ground is made out. The Judge was faced with a variety of accounts given by the appellant, we set out fully below his conclusions on this so there can be no doubt that the Judge was simply so unimpressed with the appellant’s explanations as to what happened that he did not accept him as a witness of truth:
21. In respect of the history of the Appellant’s claims in Germany and the UK I note in particular the following – most of which detail emerged at the hearing:
(i) The Appellant claimed that his original intention when leaving Iraq was to reach the UK.
(ii) When the Appellant left Iraq he was, he says, in possession of the originals of his passport, a CSID, a NID, and a disability identification document.
(iii) He claimed that he gave his passport to an agent prior to entering Germany.
(iv) On entering Germany he was detained and made an application for asylum. He thinks this was on 18 February 2018. He gave the German authorities his CSID, NID, and disability
document. As far as he is aware the German authorities still retain the originals.
(v) He had legal representation in Germany in respect of his asylum claim.
(vi) Whilst in Germany he was issued with an identity card by the German authorities which required to be renewed every 6 months.
(vii) Following the refusal of his asylum claim the German document was marked with a red line, and he had to renew such a card every 3 months.
(viii) It was the Appellant’s evidence to me that in making his asylum claim in Germany the Appellant did not advance the account that he now relies upon in the UK. He based his claim only on his medical condition. He claims that he was afraid to tell the German authorities about his anti-government Facebook posts: he claims this was because there were Kurdish people “everywhere”, and he was scared that the KRG authorities would find out which might put his family in Iraq at risk.
(ix) The Appellant said it took the German authorities about 4 years to decide his asylum application. (Given that he arrived in the UK in August 2020 this means that he must be wrong in respect of either or both the date of entry to Germany, or the length of time that it took to decide his asylum application.)
(x) The asylum application was refused in Germany. The Appellant claims that he was not given detailed reasons for the refusal. He says that the German authorities did not accept that he was from Iraq. He understood that he was to be deported, although no date for removal was set.
(xi) The Appellant approached an office of the Iraq Embassy in Frankfurt to obtain a replacement passport. Although he did not have original documents he was able to get authenticated copies from the German authorities who held the original documents that he had surrendered when he made his claim. In order to complete the process of obtaining a passport he was required to present himself in person to be fingerprinted at which point the passport would be issued: an appointment was scheduled for 15 September 2020. However, the Appellant left Germany for the UK (via France) before this date: it is to be recalled he arrived in the UK on 5 August 2020.
(xii) There was a contradiction in the Appellant’s evidence in this regard. At one point he appeared to suggest he was seeking to obtain the Iraq passport because the German authorities had not accepted that he was from Iraq. However, when asked why he did not therefore wait to get the passport, he said that once he had the passport the German authorities could deport him to Iraq.
22. In my judgement the reality is that the Appellant was going through the documentation process in preparation for his removal from Germany to Iraq. In the circumstances I do not accept without more that his application for protection was refused simply because it was not accepted that he was from Iraq.
23. As noted above, it is the Appellant’s case that he had representation in Germany. It has at all times been open to him, or his advisers, to contact his representatives in Germany to provide evidence in respect of the nature of his application for asylum there, and any reasons for refusing it. Insofar as the reason for seeking protection might be the one that is now presented in the UK, the Appellant has offered no sound reason for not presenting such a claim to the German authorities. If he did not present such a claim to the German authorities then it undermines the presentation of such a claim now.
24. The picture that emerges is of an unsuccessful claimant who decided to ‘try his luck’ in a different jurisdiction, mindful that if he did not leave Germany he was at risk of being returned to Iraq given that the documentation process for such removal was well advanced.
21. As can be seen from the above the Judge was particularly unimpressed with this backdrop, in particular given that the bulk of the above emerged only during the hearing. This part of the narrative is as important to the claim as the appellant’s reasons for leaving the country. The grounds of appeal are advanced on the basis, essentially, that that backdrop is irrelevant to the claim if the central reason for leaving the country is accepted. We disagree with that as a proposition.
22. Whilst it is trite that the mandatory considerations found within s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc. ) Act 2004 are neither the starting point, nor the determinative feature of a credibility assessment, the Judge here was considering different facts, namely what the appellant had (and had not) told the German authorities as part of his claim. Again the Judge set the key aspects of this out in his decision:
25 And indeed the Appellant now admits that he was coached by an agent as to what to say when he made his application for asylum in the UK – albeit that he did not follow everything that he was advised to say. He told me that he was “really concerned” about this - yet it did not prevent him, at least in part, following advice to lie.
26 In particular:
(i) The Appellant says he was told that he should deny that he had any family in Iraq at all. It is for this reason that his initial witness statement claims that he has no siblings – whereas later documentation makes reference to 2 brothers.
(ii) Although he had been advised to say that he had no parents, in the event he claimed that he had lost contact with his parents and did not know whether they had ever been released from detention following their arrest. In substance, the Appellant offered a modified version of the lie he had been advised to tell.
(iii) The Appellant now acknowledges that he had contact with his parents whilst he was in Germany, and has had contact with them since he has been in the UK. However, he said that his contact with them was limited: but this was not because there was any difficulty in communicating but because he had chosen not to have regular contact with them for fear, he said, of putting them at risk.
(iv) The Appellant maintained that his parents had been contacted by the authorities in Iraq – that they have been “called”. He claimed that the agent had told him to elaborate on this and to say that they had been arrested. It may be seen that the contents of his statement of 17 June 2021 are fundamentally untruthful in this regard.
27 I am in effect being asked to find that the Appellant is now being candid in respect of his history, and that such candour is demonstrated by his preparedness to accept having been untruthful in the past. I am not prepared to make that inference. I find that the very significant variation in the presentation of his asylum claim as between Germany and the UK, and his admitted lying in support of his application in the UK, are such that it is not remotely realistic to conclude that he is reliable in respect of any aspect of his history that is not independently corroborated.
23. Given the above it is perhaps unsurprising that the Judge rejected the appellant as a witness of truth, and further unsurprising that he found that he could not accept any of his oral testimony unless it was corroborated by independent evidence. It is clear that the Judge had considered the entirety of the appellant’s narrative, that much is plain given the Judge’s detailed description as to the differences in his accounts at various stages, and his reflection that at least one statement made by the appellant historically to be “fundamentally untruthful”.
24. Taking a step back it is apparent that the appellant was a witness on whom the Judge could not place any reliance. The Judge was, in those circumstances, entirely entitled to find that he could not accept anything he said unless it was supported by independent evidence. That the lower standard of proof applied in this case, does not alter the reality of the situation the Judge found himself in. On a fair reading of the decision, there is nothing to support the submission that the judge applied the wrong standard of proof.
25. The Judge did not reject the appellant’s account because of a lack of corroboration, contrary to the submission in the grounds of appeal, but he rejected the account on the basis of the finding of the Judge that the appellant’s oral testimony was so unreliable that he could not accept it. The Judge gave clear reasons for this conclusion, which we entirely understand.
26. The grounds of appeal rely on MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49, and quote an excerpt from paragraph 32 of the judgment:
“Where the appellant has given a totally incredible account of the relevant facts, the tribunal must decide what weight to give to the lie, as well as to all the other evidence in the case, including the general evidence. The AIT in the present case was rightly alive to the danger of falling into the trap of dismissing an appeal merely because the appellant had told lies. The significance of lies will vary from case to case. In some cases, the AIT may conclude that a lie is of no great consequence. In other cases, where the appellant tells lies on a central issue in the case, the AIT may conclude that they are of great significance.”
27. However, firstly the above extract is not the complete part of either paragraph 32 and misses out paragraph 33:
32 Where the appellant has given a totally incredible account of the relevant facts, the tribunal must decide what weight to give to the lie, as well as to all the other evidence in the case, including the general evidence. Suppose, for example, that at the interview stage the appellant made an admission which, if true, would destroy his claim; and at the hearing before the AIT he withdraws the admission, saying that his answer at interview was wrongly recorded or that he misunderstood what he was being asked. If the AIT concludes that his evidence at the hearing on this point is dishonest, it is likely that his lies will assume great importance. They will almost certainly lead the tribunal to find that his original answers were true and dismiss his appeal. In other cases, the significance of an appellant's dishonest testimony may be less clear-cut. The AIT in the present case was rightly alive to the danger of falling into the trap of dismissing an appeal merely because the appellant had told lies. The dangers of that trap are well understood by judges who preside over criminal trials before juries. People lie for many reasons. In R v Lucas [1981] QB 720, the Court of Appeal had to consider whether a statement containing a lie was capable of amounting to corroboration. At p 724F, Lord Lane CJ said:
"To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly, it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly, the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family…."
33 Although the analogy is not exact, it is close enough for these words to be of relevance in the present context. So the significance of lies will vary from case to case. In some cases, the AIT may conclude that a lie is of no great consequence. In other cases, where the appellant tells lies on a central issue in the case, the AIT may conclude that they are of great significance. MA's appeal was such a case. The central issue was whether MA had close connections with powerful actors in Mogadishu. The AIT found that he had not told the truth about his links with Mogadishu. It is in such a case that the general evidence about the country may become particularly important. It will be a matter for the AIT to decide whether the general evidence is sufficiently strong to counteract what we have called the negative pull of the appellant's lies.
28. As can therefore be seen, the context and significance of the lie is important. In MA the issue was as to having close clan connections, but the overall safety of return will turn less on lies told, and more on an analysis of the general situation.
29. That is markedly different to the situation arising in the present case. The appellant’s case as to risk was on account of his ventilating his political opinion against the government of the KRG, once that account has been rejected, and absent any arguments as to generalised risk, the “negative pull” of the lie becomes stronger. In our judgment this case is a prime example of a case where a Judge, having not accepted anything he has been told, comes to the inevitable conclusion that the appellant’s lies or lack of credibility mean that he cannot accept any of his account.
30. Finally on this ground, we do not accept that the Judge was requiring corroboration as deprecated in WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894. The Judge’s finding as to the appellant’s credibility was separate to any reference to independent corroboration. Contrary to the grounds of appeal, the Judge was emphasising such was the appellant’s poor credibility that absent where there was independent evidence, he was unable to accept any of his oral testimony. In our judgment that conclusion was entirely within the range of findings open to the Judge.
31. Ground two advances a submission that the Judge has failed to properly take into account the medical evidence. The Judge plainly was aware of it, as he included reference to the medical evidence in his introduction to the negative credibility findings at paragraph 20, the Judge plainly was aware of the appellant’s medical condition given he expressly referenced it in paragraph 18. We reject any suggestion that the medical evidence was an after thought in his credibility assessment.
32. The third ground as pleaded simply ignores the Judge’s reasons and findings as to why no weight can be placed on the report. Contrary to the established principles in Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367, the Judge did not reject the medical evidence only once the appellant’s credibility had been rejected, he rejected the reliability of the medical evidence completely. The Judge went into considerable detail about the unreliability of that medical evidence. Given what he says about the inadequacy of that evidence we feel it appropriate to set those findings out in full:
28 As regards independent corroboration, I find that even if I were to conclude that the medical evidence relied upon by the Appellant by way of a scarring report provided an adequate basis to be satisfied that he had sustained scarring through an episode of ill-treatment, this would not be sufficient to satisfy me, even on the lowest standard, that such an episode of ill-treatment arose in the circumstances, and for the reasons, claimed. In short, even taken at its highest, I am not satisfied that the scarring report corroborates the Appellant’s account: there may, for example, be other reasons that he was detained and ill-treated wholly unrelated to his claimed expression of political dissent, and as such there is no basis to conclude that a further episode of such detention and ill-treatment is likely.
29 But, in any event, I am not prepared to place any particular weight on the scarring report for the reasons explained below.
30 The Appellant submitted a scarring report dated 22 August 2023 prepared by Dr Karen Stanley (Appellant’s bundle ages 5-21).
31 In his witness statement dated 17 June 2021 accompanying a Preliminary Interview Questionnaire the Appellant stated “I still bear the scars on my lower back and right arm after I was burned with a lit cigarette” (paragraph 6). Seemingly at the same time the Appellant submitted a number of photographs purportedly showing scars. These included photographs of his head, his upper arms, his left forearm, and his lower back. There was seemingly no photograph of his right arm submitted.
32 Dr Stanley’s report specifically addresses scars on the Appellant’s chin, striae on his left and right upper arms, hyperpigmentation on his left forearm, and a scar on his lower back. There is no reference to any injury to the Appellant’s right arm.
33 During cross-examination the Appellant not only insisted that he had a scar on his right arm but claimed to have shown it to, and discussed it with, Dr Stanley. He also claimed to have shown her further scars on his lower body - specifically his right inner thigh - in respect of which, he said, he had been too embarrassed to have photographs taken. There is no reference in Dr Stanley’s report to any such scarring.
34 The Appellant appeared visibly agitated when it was put to him that Dr Stanley’s report did not seemingly match his account of his scarring. During a brief pause in the hearing – facilitated for this very purpose – the Appellant’s counsel looked at the Appellant’s right arm, and confirmed to me that there appeared to be two small round scars. Given that the Appellant had mentioned an injury to his right arm in his initial witness statement (which was available to Dr Stanley), and given that it was confirmed by counsel that he did indeed have a scar on his right arm, it seemed, at this stage, entirely possible that he would have discussed such a matter with Dr Stanley – and if so, in turn, possible that he described further scars that had not then been addressed in the report. In the circumstances I considered it appropriate that he be given the opportunity of providing evidence to clarify further what was said and shown to Dr Stanley, and why – if it were the case that he mentioned further scarring to Dr Stanley – she had made no mention of such matters in her report. Accordingly, the appeal was adjourned, and Directions issued, affording the Appellant an opportunity to provide an addendum to Dr Stanley’s report and/or any further report in respect of his scarring.
35 An Addendum Scarring Report dated 15 December 2023 prepared by Dr Stanley was filed.
36 I regret to say that I find this report unsatisfactory insofar as it offers no adequate explanation for omissions in the earlier report. Moreover, it gives rise to significant concerns over Dr Stanley’s methodology.
37 Dr Stanley now acknowledges that the Appellant has the additional scarring that he referred to at the hearing. The best that she is able to offer by way of explanation for not having included the scarring to the Appellant’s right arm and lower regions, was that her reported focus on the scars in respect of which she had been provided with photographs. However, she offers no explanation as to why she limited herself in this way. Nor does she say in terms whether or not the Appellant had discussed the scars to his right arm and lower regions during the initial consultation that gave rise to her first report. As such I left in considerable doubt as to the extent to which she probably was able to examine the Appellant – on what was acknowledged to be a remote consultation, and to what extent she any adequate notice of the consultation – particular bearing in mind that she accepts that ultimately she just addressed the photographic evidence. Given that there was potentially an associated credibility issue as to whether or not the Appellant had claimed during the consultation that the scars to his right arm and lower regions were caused by ill-treatment in detention, Dr Stanley should have been clear in her second report as to what her notes in respect of her first report had to say on the matter: instead she provides nothing in this regard.
38 Be that as it may, there is a further – and in my judgement more significant - problem in respect of the Addendum Report.
39 The addendum report makes mention of the Appellant’s nose, and includes a photograph, or video still, of his face. There is no mention of the Appellant’s nose in the first report. Nor has the Appellant at any point hitherto in the materials available to Dr Stanley claimed that he had suffered injury to his nose during ill-treatment by the authorities: Dr Stanley acknowledges as much in her words “Whilst I have not been asked to provide comment on this…”. Nonetheless, unsolicited, comment she provides: “the obviously misshapen appearance of [the Appellant’s] nose, as shown in the picture here, suggests a previous nasal fracture.” Dr Stanley subsequently opines the “nasal fracture is highly consistent with his account of being kicked in the face”.
40 I brought it to the representatives’ attention that in considering the Appellant’s underlying medical condition I had seen mention that saddle nose deformity was often seen in ectodermal dysplasias: in particular I directed the representatives attention to the following webpage - https://www.nfed.org/blog/treating-nasal-problems/ .
41 I acknowledge that there is guidance from the Upper Tribunal as to the inappropriateness of the Tribunal conducting post-hearing research of its own motion. However, this was not post hearing: moreover it was a matter that I brought to the attention of the representatives. Whilst I did not expect either of them to articulate a specific medical opinion, the relevance of this is that it was a matter to which Dr Stanley should have had proper regard as a possible alternative explanation for the appearance of the Appellant’s nose.
42 What I am left with is a report that seeks to suggest that the appearance of the Appellant’s notes is a corroborative factor to his account, in circumstances where the Appellant had not made such a claim himself, and there was potentially another explanation arising from the Appellant’s medical condition. In my judgement this gives rise to an uneasy sense that Dr Stanley has failed to be entirely objective in offering her opinions. In my judgement this is sufficiently troubling - when taken in isolation, but the more so in combination with my earlier observations in respect of her methodology - that I am not prepared to accord any meaningful weight to the opinions of Dr Stanley as expressed in either of her reports on the Appellant.
43 For the avoidance of any doubt, in this context and generally, I have had regard to the contents of the Appellant’s GP records printed on 27 November 2023. Necessarily this printout was not available to Dr Stanley when she prepared her first report in August 2023: indeed her failure to seek GP records from the Appellant’s representatives before preparing her report is appropriately a matter of criticism. Nor is it clear that Dr Stanley had such records available to her at the time of preparing the Addendum: she makes no reference to having been provided with such records. Be that as it may, the potential relevance of the record is that in the entry for 1 June 2023 the Appellant seemingly reports that he sustained damage to his nose whilst being ill-treated in Iraq. However, at an earlier consultation on 1 July 2021 it was noted that the Appellant had a “saddled nose” in the context of describing his ectodermal dysplasia; there is no reference at that time, or at any time prior to 1 June 2023, to the possibility that the saddled nose was a consequence of assault. Nor did the Appellant make any such claim in case statement of 17 June 2021 or at his asylum interview in August 2022.
44 In all such circumstances the single reference in the entry for 1 June 2023 to a nose fracture does not offer any sort of justification for the Appellant’s ectodermal dysplasia not being addressed by Dr Stanley as a possible cause for the appearance of his nose. Further, what emerges is a seeming further level of inconsistency in the Appellant’s narrative.
33. As is clear from the Judge’s decision he rejected the medical evidence in a comprehensive and detailed way. This was not, contrary to the grounds of appeal, the Judge ignoring the medical evidence when he was making his credibility findings, it was a Judge rejecting the entirety of the medical evidence relied on as not being capable of being given any real weight in his assessment.
34. As such we find that the Judge did not materially err as advanced, and his decision stands.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.

Judge T.S. Wilding

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Date: 29th July 2025