Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003496

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/01617/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FARRELLY

Between

WH
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G. Goddard of Citizens Advice Bureau Southwark
For the Respondent: Mr B. Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This decision is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) decision made on 7 June 2024 but set aside in part by the Upper Tribunal on 7 April 2025.
2. Most of the findings of the FTT were unchallenged and have been preserved. These include:
(i) The appellant is a citizen of Sierra Leone.
(ii) In 2019, he joined the Sierra Leone People’s Party (“SLPP”). He became a leader of the Soja Team, the party’s grass roots youth group.
(iii) The SLPP was the ruling party in the country at all relevant times. We note that it remains the ruling party.
(iv) In March 2021, the appellant was threatened by Ratti, the leader of the Soja Team, after he refused to help mobilise the Soja Team in a dispute with a group of street traders known as the Belgium Sellers.
(v) In October 2021, Lawrence Leema, who was then the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and National Publicity Secretary of the SLPP, directed the appellant to organise violent disruption by the Soja Team in order to aid the SLPP in a byelection. The appellant refused and criticised the way the party was using the Soja Team and putting its members in danger. Mr Leema threatened to have the appellant killed. The appellant went into hiding, and while he was in hiding, members of the SLPP went to his home to try to “catch” him at Mr Leema’s behest. The appellant then fled the country.
(vi) The appellant had also been threatened by members of All People’s Congress (“APC”), which is the other main political party in the country, because of his work for the SLPP.
(vii) It is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted by the APC if he returned to Sierra Leone now, because the APC is not in power and the appellant is no longer an active leader within the SLPP.
(viii) It is not reasonably likely that Ratti would seek to persecute the appellant if he returned; this can be inferred from the fact that the two men went their separate ways after their dispute in March 2021. However, Ratti is allied with Mr Leema and it is reasonably likely that he would seek to harm the appellant if directed to do so by Mr Leema.
(ix) It is reasonably likely that Mr Leema would seek to persecute the appellant if he returned to Sierra Leone.
3. It is not in dispute that in June 2023, Mr Leema was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and he no longer sits in the cabinet. This followed accusations that he had been involved in extra-judicial killings at a time of nationwide protests in August 2022. At the hearing before the FTT, the appellant argued that Mr Leema retained influential within the party, as evidenced by the fact that he had retained his role as National Publicity Secretary.
4. In a decision promulgated on 13 March 2025, the Upper Tribunal set aside the FTT’s finding that Mr Leema would no longer be able to act against the appellant with impunity, and that both state protection and internal relocation would be available. That decision is included below as an Annex to this decision.
5. There is now only one issue for this tribunal to determine: whether the appellant would have access to state protection or internal relocation against Mr Leema’s reasonably likely attempt to persecute him.
The hearing
6. At the remaking hearing, we had before us:
(i) The appellant’s composite bundle prepared for the error of law hearing and uploaded on 12 February 2025;
(ii) An appellant’s schedule of evidence, uploaded on 19 February 2025;
(iii) An appellant’s supplementary bundle of 37 pages, filed on 10 June 2025, which included an application for its contents to be admitted as required by Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 ; and
(iv) The Upper Tribunal’s decision of 7 April 2025.
7. We admitted the updated evidence contained in the bundle of 10 June 2025. This included hyperlinks to five videos available on YouTube, which purported to be of Mr Leema speaking on national television as the National Publicity Secretary of the SLPP. It was agreed that we did not need to watch the videos in court, because Mr Hulme confirmed that the respondent accepted that Mr Leema was the national spokesperson for the party and regularly appears on television to discuss political matters.
8. The parties also agreed that Para. 339K applied, because Mr Leema had made a direct threat of persecution against the appellant.
9. We then expressed to Mr Goddard our serious concerns about the quality of the expert report by John Birchall adduced by the appellant. We noted that the bulk of the report was not directly relevant to the issues before us (such as the sections on the history of British colonialism in Sierra Leone and on “sexual activity” in Freetown). We informed him that we were unlikely to put much weight on the report and he raised no objection.
10. The appellant had not prepared an additional witness statement for these proceedings, but Mr Hulme informed us he intended to cross-examine him about the issues of state protection and internal relocation. As his previous statements had been adopted at the hearing below, we proceeded directly to cross-examination, with the parties’ agreement.
11. The appellant gave evidence with the assistance of a Krio interpreter. We were satisfied that he and the interpreter understood each other. He answered questions from Mr Hulme, from the panel, and from Mr Goddard. Mr Hulme asked him to explain various statements he had made at his asylum interview and in his appeal statement. In answer to the questions, the appellant said that when he had told Ratti not to go to the police during the dispute with the Belgian Sellers, he had believed that the police would have investigated. He had had direct interactions with other leaders of the party, including the Chairman and the Secretary General, but he could not have complained to them about Mr Leema because he is “one of the fathers of the party” and “everyone is scared of him, because if he says something, he will do it”. His interactions with the other leaders of the party had been at the party office, and he later clarified in answer to questions from the panel that his relationship with them had not been a personal one but had been based on his role in the Soja Team. He would not be able to relocate to an area that was a stronghold of the APC, because he was a member of the SLPP, although he would no longer be involved in politics because he was afraid.
12. We then heard submissions from both representatives. Both confined their submissions to the current role of Mr Leema in the SLPP. Mr Hulme submitted that Mr Leema’s removal form the post of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in June 2023 showed that the party was willing to act against him. Moreover, as he was no longer Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, he no longer had direct control over the police. The appellant could relocate to an area that was an APC stronghold, because the FTT had previously found that he would not be at risk from the APC.
13. Mr Goddard relied on his skeleton argument from April 2024, so far as it was still relevant. He submitted that the party had not acted in any significant way against Mr Leema, and that the position of national spokesperson showed that he continued to play a central role. He could not realistically be viewed as a non-state actor.
14. At the end of the hearing, we rose for a brief adjournment. We then allowed the appeal and gave a summary of our reasons for doing so. We now set those reasons out in more detail.
Discussion
15. There is a single issue before the Tribunal: given that it has been found (to the relevant standard of proof) that Mr Leema would seek to persecute the appellant if he returned to Sierra Leone, is there a real risk that he would be able to do so?
16. We accept that Mr Leema no longer directs the state security apparatus, as he may have done while Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. However, it has never been the appellant’s case that he feared being subjected to a formal arrest and prosecution (however improperly motivated). His fear was of Mr Leema or members of the Soja Team or SLPP acting at his behest. He says that the people who came to his home while he was in hiding in 2021 were members of the SLPP, not that they were police officers. The fact that they did so was previously accepted by the FTT ([31]), and the FTT also found that there was a reasonable likelihood that Ratti would act against the appellant “on Mr Leema’s behalf”.: [33] We therefore find that the fact that Mr Leema no longer officially directs the state security apparatus does not mean he would not have the means to act against the appellant.
17. Nor do we find that state protection would be available. We find on the basis of the unchallenged independent evidence before us that there are widespread allegations that Mr Leema has been involved in extrajudicial killings and acts of political violence, but there has been no meaningful state response to these allegations.
18. For example, a newspaper article from 11 February 2025 describes an appeal for charitable support by a man who said he had been shot in the leg by Mr Leema’s security guard in 2020. He had received emergency surgery, but he was then detained in prison for 19 months, where his condition deteriorated to the point where his leg had to be amputated. The man said he was no longer able to support himself and was forced to beg to survive. This does not suggest that the state takes acts of extra-judicial violence by Mr Leema seriously; not only was Mr Leema not held to account, but no compensation was offered to his victim, which would suggest that the crime was not officially acknowledged.
19. More significantly, at some point in late 2022 or early 2023, the President set up a Special Investigative Committee (“SIC”) to investigate anti-government protests in August 2022 in which 37 people had been killed. Mr Leema had been accused of killing “some of the people” and had been repeatedly summoned by letter and telephone to give evidence before the SIC. He failed to attend, and when the SIC released its report, it blamed the APC for inciting the violence and found that the claim of extra-judicial killing “could not be ascertained”. This was in April 2023. In June 2023, Mr Leema was removed from his post as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs but retained his post as party spokesperson.
20. Thus, when Mr Leema was publicly accused of being responsible for a significant number of high-profile extra-judicial executions, he refused to appear before a special commission of inquiry established by the President himself. There was no formal sanction for his non-compliance. It is true that he was then removed from one of the two positions he had held at the time of the extra-judicial killings, but he retained the other and the SLPP continues to find it appropriate for him to act as the public face of the party. He also referred to himself in an interview conducted in March 2025 as a member of the party’s “executive”, which suggests that he continues to play a role in directing the party’s operations.
21. For these reasons, we find it reasonably likely that the authorities would fail to protect the appellant from Mr Leema. We reject the implication of Mr Hulme’s line of questioning that the appellant would be protected by other high-ranking members of the party. As the appellant clarified in his evidence, those connections were based on his active role in the party (which he no longer holds), not on any personal friendship or loyalty.
22. We also find that it is reasonably likely that internal relocation would not be safe. It is reasonably likely that the power of the national government and the ruling party extends throughout the country. Although some areas may be APC strongholds in terms of popular support, there is nothing to suggest that the APC exercises de facto control over those areas. The unchallenged finding of the FTT was that the APC would not be able to harm the appellant because they are not in power. This does not suggest that they are in de facto control of areas that are their strongholds. It suggests the opposite. The findings of the SIC, as reported in the unchallenged news articles before us, indicate that state power remains firmly in the hands of the SLPP: the SIC blamed the violence entirely on the APC and declined to make any findings about whether members of the APC had been unlawfully killed. We therefore consider it reasonably likely that Mr Leema would be able to reach the appellant in areas of the country that are, politically, APC strongholds.
Conclusion
23. It was previously accepted to the relevant standard of proof that Mr Leema has threatened to kill the appellant because of a disagreement over the deployment of the Soja Team in a byelection campaign, and that he would seek to persecute the appellant if he now returned to Sierra Leone.
24. There can be no question but that the harm the appellant fears rises to the level of persecution, and that it is for a Convention reason, namely political opinion.
25. For the reasons set out above, we conclude that there is a real risk that neither state protection nor internal relocation would be available to the appellant.
26. There has never been a suggestion that the appellant is excluded from the protection of the Convention for any reason.
27. We therefore find that the appellant has been a refugee as defined by Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention since he left Sierra Leone in February 2022 and that his removal from the UK would breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
28. The harm the appellant fears would also rise to a violation of article 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
29. The appellant does not appeal on article 8 grounds.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds, with reference to articles 2 and 3 ECHR.

Order under Rule 10(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
As we have allowed the appeal, we have considered making an order for the respondent to pay the appellant’s appeal fee, as provided for by Rule 9(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. We consider it appropriate to make such an order, but have been unable to determine from the papers before us if any fee has been paid.
We make a fee award of any fee that has been paid or is payable.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 July 2025

ANNEX
(Error of law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003496

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01617/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

WH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Goddard of Citizens Advice Southwark
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First Tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) given on 7 June 2024 to dismiss the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his asylum and human rights claim (it being accepted that the appellant’s claims under the Refugee Convention and under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights would stand or fall together).
2. The First-Tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal, and we have considered whether it is appropriate for that order to continue pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (as amended). Having taken into account Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, we are satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order because the appellant has made an application for international protection and we consider that the UK’s obligations towards applicants for international protection and the need to protect the confidentiality of the asylum process outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the proceedings
3. The appellant is a national of Sierra Leone. It is not disputed that he was at material times a member of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), the governing political party in Sierra Leone. After becoming a member of the SLPP, he joined the ‘Soja Team’. This was a grass roots youth group for SLPP members. The appellant had a high profile role, would organise programmes, take a prominent role at rallies, and campaign in elections.
4. The appellant entered the UK on 18 February 2022, made an application for asylum on 22 March 2022 and that application was refused on 30 October 2023 (“the Refusal Decision”).
5. The appellant’s application for asylum was on the basis that he had reasonable grounds upon which to fear persecution if he was returned to Sierra Leone. His fear arose through three incidents which be believed gave rise to adverse interest in him from three separate individuals (the respondent having accepted that he was of adverse interest to these three individuals).
6. The first incident was when he was threatened with death in 2021 by Mr Kamara, a member of the main opposition party in Sierra Leone, the All People’s Congress (“APC”).
7. The second incident was when he was threatened on 4 March 2021 by ‘Ratty’, the leader of the Soja Team.
8. The third incident was when he was threatened on 2 October 2021 by Mr Leema, who was then Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. Mr Leema called the appellant by telephone and asked him to organise violent disruption to aid the SLPP in a byelection. The appellant refused, saying that he would not put Soja Team members in danger and that he disliked how the politicians were using them. Mr Leema threatened to have him killed. The appellant says that he went into hiding, thereby escaping an attempt to catch him at his house on 9 October 2021. He then fled the country.
9. The appellant accepted that Mr Leema was removed from the post of Deputy Minister in June 2023 but he maintained that this was essentially a public relations exercise and that Mr Leema remains a powerful person in the party. He is still on the executive of the SLPP and acts as a spokesperson [23].
10. In the Refusal Decision the respondent accepted that these incidents took place, but found that the appellant’s ability to remain in Sierra Leone for a period of time thereafter indicated that none of the men he feared had an ongoing interest in harming him. Moreover, neither the APC nor Ratty were state actors, while Mr Leema had been removed from his post and “was no longer part of the ruling party”. State protection and internal relocation would therefore both be available.
The Judge’s decision
11. Whilst the Judge was not satisfied that there was a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant would face persecution from the APC or Ratty if he returned to Sierra Leone, he did find that there was a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant would be persecuted by Mr Leema (or potentially Ratty on Mr Leema’s behalf) if returned to Sierra Leone [33]. There is no challenge to these findings.
12. Whilst the Judge accepted that “Mr Leema retains a role within the SLPPP despite his demotion from his Ministerial role” [36], he also determined at [38] that Mr Leema was likely to have a diminished role within the SLPP, “such that he cannot direct the state apparatus of the SLPP at will or throughout Sierra Leone.” He was “not confident that, given Mr Leema’s diminished role, he would still be able to direct Ratty and the Soja Team to carry out his will.” [39]
13. On that basis the Judge determined at [38] that Mr Leema would not be able to “prevent the Appellant from seeking the protection of the state authorities, who have spoken out against political violence and threatened those who take part in it with the full force of the law, against Mr Leema, Ratty, and the Soja Team.”
14. In the alternative the Judge determined that the appellant can relocate within Sierra Leone to avoid Mr Leema, Ratty, and the Soja Team [40].
15. On the above grounds the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal on both Refugee Convention and Article 3 grounds.

Grounds of Appeal and Submissions
16. The appellant appeals on four grounds:-
(i) Irrationality, in that the evidence before the Judge is evidence that Mr Leema in fact maintains significant influence with the ruling party rather than diminished influence, and it was irrational to conclude otherwise.
(ii) A failure to consider material evidence, namely a video from December 2023 allegedly showing Mr Leema appearing on a television programme on behalf of the ruling party. It is material as it provides compelling further evidence that Mr Leema maintains a significant and integral role at the centre of the party and therefore cannot rationally be characterised as a separate entity from the state of whom the state can readily control.
(iii) Irrationality, in that it is irrational for the Judge to accept that the government’s apparent investigations into Mr Leema’s alleged involvement in political violence are genuine and meaningful, given the fact that Mr Leema maintains a significant role in the ruling SLPP party, speaking on behalf of that party.
(iv) Irrationality in the finding that internal relocation would be available. Having found the appellant to be at risk of persecution from Mr Leema [33], the Judge also accepts that he cannot relocate to Kenema in Sierra Leone where Mr Leema is reportedly based [41]. However, if, as the Judge finds, Mr Leema maintains command of the party to the extent that the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection from him in Kenema, it is illogical to conclude that he does not have power and influence over the party more generally.
17. There was no Rule 24 response, but Ms Ahmed confirmed at the outset of the hearing before us that the respondent opposed the appeal on all grounds.
18. Mr Goddard submitted that in essence the appeal turned on a narrow point. It was accepted by the Judge that there was a reasonable degree of likelihood of persecution by Mr Leema if the appellant returned to Sierra Leone. The Judge accepted that Mr Leema retained a role within the SLPP but found that he had been demoted [36] and accordingly was not in a position to direct the state apparatus of the SLPP at will throughout Sierra Leone. The issue was whether this finding was reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence before him.
19. Mr Goddard pointed to the appellant’s case, as summarised in the decision. It was the appellant’s view that Mr Leema’s demotion had been nothing more than a publicity exercise in the run up to the election [23]. The appellant had provided evidence that he remained the party’s spokesperson [24], and this did not appear to be in dispute. It was simply irrational to treat the party spokesperson as someone who did not have a significant role.
20. Moreover, there was video evidence of Mr Leema speaking in November 2023 as a spokesman on behalf of the SLPP on the issue of an attempted coup. In that video, he could be seen “talking at length on a matter of national importance”. There was no indication that the Judge had taken this evidence into account. Although the Judge had set out the “standard line” (at [28]) that he had considered all of the evidence before him, the significance of the video was such that the Judge was required to explain what he made of it. Either the Judge had not considered it or if he had, he had failed to give reasons for why he did not think it showed that Mr Leema continued to hold considerable influence.
21. Finally, on Ground Four, it was illogical to conclude that Mr Leema could be a threat in one area of the country but not in an other, if the issue was his influence within a national governing party.
22. For the respondent, Ms Ahmed submitted that Ground One was simply a disagreement. The Judge had very carefully considered the evidence relating to Mr Leema at [35] and [36]. At [24], he referred to the appellant’s evidence, which showed that the SLPP was investigating extra-judicial killings. Ms Ahmed submitted that the Judge’s reasoning at [37] and [38] was sound. He accepted that Mr Leema retained a role in the party but it was open to him to find that there was nothing in the evidence to show that he was still sufficiently powerful to carry out political violence without the fear of law enforcement.
23. On Ground Two, Ms Ahmed submitted that the Judge was not required to list every piece of evidence that he considered. He did state that he had considered the evidence before him at [28]. He had also confirmed in open court that he was being asked to watch the video, and so it could be assumed that he had watched it. The evidence was not of such weight that the Judge was required to comment on it. The Judge did specifically accept that Mr Leema retained a role in the SLPP [36], and it was for the appellant to produce evidence to establish that a spokesperson would have a particular level of influence, and he had not done so.
24. On Ground Three, it was not irrational to find that the investigation into Mr Leema was meaningful simply because he had been retained as a party spokesman. The Judge had noted at [35] that there was no evidence that the government persecuted all of its critics.
25. On Ground Four, Ms Ahmed accepted that given the argument here was about a state actor it was difficult to support the internal relocation point as an alternative option. However, this was not a material error, because the other Grounds of Appeal failed.
Discussion and Conclusions
26. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, we have reminded ourselves of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114]. In particular we bear in mind the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Ullah [26] (i) the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently; (ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the First Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account; (iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the First Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First Tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out; and (iv) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law.
27. Having carefully considered the submissions of Mr Goddard and Ms Ahmed on the “perversity” points – Grounds One and Three - we are not satisfied that it can be said that the decision of the Judge was perverse. As noted above, the Judge found that Mr Leema would seek to persecute the appellant if he returned to Sierra Leone. The key issue in the appeal was therefore whether Mr Leema still retained sufficient influence within the SLPP that state protection would not be available. There was certainly evidence that supported the view of diminished influence, namely that he had been demoted and was under investigation (see paragraphs [26] and [35]). There was also evidence to point in the other direction, as set out by the appellant at paragraphs [23] and [24]. The Judge’s ultimate conclusion was one that was open to him on the evidence to which he refers in the decision.
28. We conclude, however, that the Judge did err as set out in Ground Two. It was not disputed before us that the link to the video was in the appellant’s bundle and that the Judge confirmed during the hearing that he was being invited to watch it before making his decision. Nor was it disputed that the video purported to show Mr Leema speaking on behalf of the SLPP on a national television programme on the issue of a recent coup attempt. We accept the force of Mr Goddard’s argument that if he was being asked to speak for the SLPP on national television on an issue as important as a recent coup attempt, Mr Leema did retain considerable influence and was not under serious investigation. Ms Ahmed submitted that it could not simply be assumed that a person who was labelled as the party’s national spokesperson continued to have significant influence, and that it was for the appellant to provide evidence of this. Arguably, this was the appellant’s key piece of evidence that the role of national spokesperson was, in fact, a very significant one.
29. For this reason, if the Judge did not take the video into account, he acted irrationally by failing to take into account highly material evidence.
30. If the Judge did watch the video and simply did not mention it, this was also an error, in the context of the issues and evidence in this appeal. The scope of the duty to give reasons was set out in MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reaffirmed in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC). It is trite that it “does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained.” Joseph at [43], citing English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605 at [19].
31. However, the duty is “intensely contextual in nature” (MK at [10]), and it does require the Tribunal to “explain [its] assessment of the more important pieces of evidence and to provide reasons for choosing to give (as the case may be) no, little, moderate or substantial weight thereto.”: [6].
32. In the specific context that Mr Leema’s influence within the SLPP was the issue on which this appeal turned, and the conflicting evidence on that issue, we consider that the video was one of the “the more important pieces of evidence” and that the Judge was required to explain what he made of it.
33. Finally on Ground Four, we did have some difficulty in seeing how this could be seen as an alternative, as set out at [40], in circumstances where it was not disputed that Sierra Leone was a unitary state where the government’s authority applied throughout. We took Ms Ahmed to broadly accept that it was not really possible to see this as an alternative ground.
34. For the reasons set out above we find that Grounds Two and Four are made out, and that these errors are material to the outcome of the appeal. We set aside those parts of the decision that relate to:
(i) Mr Leema’s ongoing influence within the SLPP [36]-[38];
(ii) The availability of state protection [39]; and
(iii) Internal relocation [40]-[42].
35. There has been no challenge to any of the Judge’s other findings, which are therefore preserved.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-Tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law requiring it to be set aside. All findings are preserved except those listed at [34] above.
The appeal is adjourned for re-making at the Upper Tribunal.
Directions
The following directions apply to the future conduct of this case:-
(1) The resumed hearing will be listed at Field House, on a date to be fixed, reserved to Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick with a time estimate of [3] hours.
(2) The updating evidence lodged and served by the appellant on 11 February 2025 is admitted.
(3) If any party wishes to adduce any further evidence, this must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 10 working days before the next hearing, accompanied by an application made pursuant to rule 15(2A) of the Tribunals Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
(4) Any skeleton arguments must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 5 working days before the next hearing.
(5) If the appellant or any other witness wishes to give oral evidence, they must provide a witness statement capable of standing as evidence in chief, to be served in accordance with direction [3] above, and must state if an interpreter is required, and if so in which language.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13.03.25