Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003641

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53626/2023
IA/00368/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON

Between

TM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Blockley, AJ Bradley and Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) via CVP on 3 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, the decision, dated 3rd June 2024, of a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the Judge”) who upheld the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s claim for asylum.

Background

2. The Appellant claims to be a Palestinian refugee with habitual residence in Syria. He claims to have left Syria on 23rd December 2018 and travelled through Europe before entering the United Kingdom on 31st January 2019.

3. He claimed asylum on the day of his arrival. That claim was refused by the Respondent on 27th September 2019 and an appeal against that refusal dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the 2020 Judge”) in a determination dated 12th February 2020.

4. Fresh submissions were lodged by the Appellant on 4th January 2023. They were refused by the Respondent on 8th June 2023 and an appeal against that refusal was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) in a determination dated 3rd June 2024.

The 2019 application / 2020 appeal

5. The Appellant claims that his parents left Palestine and moved to the Al Yarmouk refugee camp (“the camp”) in Syria in 1948. He was born in the camp in 1971. In 2018 he was stopped at a checkpoint while re-entering the camp and was detained for a month and mistreated. He was able to escape detention and flee Syria. He fears the Syrian authorities and the general country circumstances in Syria.

6. The application was refused by the Respondent on 27th September 2019. It was noted that the Appellant’s claim that his parents left Palestine in 1948 was generally consistent with external information about the Arab / Israel war, and that he had given evidence about Syria and the camp that was generally consistent with external information. It was noted that he had provided an identification document that details his place of birth as being in the camp, but that this was a photocopy.

7. The Respondent noted various elements of the Appellant’s account that were inconsistent with external evidence:
a. His account that his parents moved to the camp in 1948 is inconsistent with external evidence that the camp did not open until 1957;
b. His claim that his parents were not offered aid in the camp is inconsistent with external evidence regarding the camp;
c. His claim that aid stopped in 1967 or 2012 is inconsistent with external evidence that it continued until 2014 or 2015; and
d. His claim that only Palestinian groups had control of the camp was inconsistent with external evidence.

8. The Respondent noted that the Appellant had been inconsistent about his level of education and whether he had been detained in a prison inside or outside of the camp. Despite his claim that he was born in the camp, UNRWA had been unable to trace any record of him having lived or being registered there. He failed to claim asylum when travelling through France and Italy before arriving in the United Kingdom.

9. The Appellant attended a language analysis interview on 30th April 2019 and the conclusion within that report is inconsistent with his claim of a Syrian background. It concluded that his speech is consistent with the linguistic community of an Egyptian rural dialect.

10. The Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claimed nationality and concluded that he is Egyptian and could safely return to Egypt.

11. The Appellant’s appeal against that decision was refused by a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the 2020 Judge”) in a determination dated 12th February 2020, after an appeal held on 3rd February 2020.

12. The 2020 Judge gave weight to the linguistic report and noted that the Appellant was inconsistent about why he speaks in an Egyptian dialect. The Appellant had said that his parents spoke Egyptian as they were living with Egyptian people and that Palestinians speak with an Egyptian dialect because Palestine is near Egypt. He initially said that he did not know if his parents had been to Egypt before later saying that they had. He did not know whether his parents moved to the camp in 1948 or 1967. He did not know why he was recorded as saying in the screening interview that he had been educated up to secondary school level as he had not gone to school.

13. The 2020 Judge noted inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account; the fact that the only documentation relied upon was a photocopy of his identification which had to be weighed against the fact that UNWRA checks showed that there was no record of the Appellant’s presence in the camp; and a linguistic report that concluded that the Appellant was from Egypt.

14. The 2020 Judge concluded, at paragraph 83 of his determination:

“I am satisfied that the linguistic report is accurate and that this man is from Egypt. I do not find that he is either Syrian or Palestinian. I consider that he has made up a false claim so as to remain in the United Kingdom.”

The 2023 application / 2024 appeal

15. Upon becoming appeal rights exhausted, the Appellant lodged further submissions on 4th January 2023, together with further evidence that had not been before the 2020 Judge, in particular:
a. Witness statement from JA, a Syrian national who says that he knows the Appellant from Damascus, Syria; and
b. Report from Dr Antonio Giustozzi, dated 20th March 2021, about verification of the Appellant’s identification papers.

16. Dr Giustozzi detailed the following in his report:

“4. Maguire Solicitors provided me with scanned copies of the identity papers (see below). Because of the way verification takes place, with the issuing authorities comparing pictures (if any), record numbers, signatures, stamps or any other information contained in the document5 against the information they hold, the original of the document is not required and a copy suffices.

5. I passed on the scanned copy to my researcher Nada Alshikh, based in Damascus. Ms Alshikh is a journalist and student of the Media Faculty at Damascus university.

6. Ms Alshikh sought to verify the identity papers with Salem al-Qadir, a staff member of the general authority for Palestinians refugees, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour in Damascus. She visited his office on 20 March 2021.

7. Ms Alshikh handed over the copies of the papers to Mr al-Qadir and asked him to confirm whether they were genuine or otherwise. Mr al-Qadir examined the copies for some time and then went back to Ms Alshikh and told her that the two identity papers were indeed genuine”.

17. The claim was again refused by the Respondent on 8th June 2023. The Respondent relied upon the 2020 determination. It noted that JA’s account was inconsistent with the Appellant’s. It noted that Dr Giustozzi was only provided with scanned copies of the identity papers and that the documents were examined by a third party, Mr al-Qadir, whose qualifications, conclusions and reasoning had not been provided.

18. In response to the Refusal, the Appellant obtained an addendum report from Dr Giustozzi, dated 21st October 2023. In that report, Dr Giustozzi stated:

“2. Ms Alshikh had to verify the document with the issuing authority of the document, the general authority for Palestinians refugees, Minsitry of. Social Affairs and Labour, as there is no other choice.

3. Ms Alshikh visited the premises of the Authorruty and asked who could help with verification, she was directed towards Mr Salem al-Qadir, who on 20.03.21 was tasked with taking queries from the public. Mr al-Qadir does not have any particular skills in authenticating documents. He was asked to verify the document against the records of the Authority, to which he would have access in his quality of official working in that department.

4. Mr al-Qadir took the copies and disappeared into the offices of the Authority. He re-emerged later saying that he could confirm the genuine character of the two documents.

5. It is common practice to get documents verified by the authorities in this way. In order to verify a document, it is necessary to take it or a copy to the issuing authority and ask them to check it against the records. There is no particular skill involved, any individual can ask for this and any official tasked to take these queries can verify the document”.

19. The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against that Refusal after a hearing on 13th May 2024. His reasons are outlined within a determination, dated 3rd June 2024.

20. Between paragraphs 16 and 25 of his determination, the Judge summarised the Appellant’s evidence: The Appellant had stated that his father separated from his mother when the Appellant was around seven years of age and, thereafter, he lived with his father and Egyptian stepmother until adulthood. The linguistic report had failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that his parents had spoken with an Egyptian accent. He disputes that he had said in his screening interview that his parents moved to the camp in 1948. He is unclear whether his parents had ever been to Egypt as he has memory problems. There is no trace of him in the camp as he never went to school.

21. The Judge summarised the fresh evidence that accompanied the submissions as follows:

“24. The Appellant claims that he now has another ID card, which was sent to him by a friend from Syria who was able to obtain a replacement ID from the office where he works. He was able to have it re-issued after the Appellant provided his birth certificate. The ID card was with his friend from Germany called “Daoud” and was sent to the Appellant about six months ago however the Appellant claims he lost the envelope. The Appellant claims that the birth certificate was lost by a firm of Solicitors that once acted for him.

25. The Appellant relies on the evidence of JA, who he claims he met at a Mosque during a celebration of Ramadan/Eid in Glasgow. He states that his father worked as a labourer but later worked in a shop. He would assist his father in the shop during the day and that is where he met JA.”

22. JA gave evidence and told the Judge that he knows the Appellant from Syria. He said that the Appellant’s father owned a clothes shop where the Appellant worked. JA and his own father were customers. JA was not subject to cross-examination.

23. Within his determination, the Judge identified that the 2020 Judge’s decision was his starting point and, at paragraph 35 stated:

“Having read the decision with care, it is clear from the findings set out between paragraphs 76 to 83 that [the 2020 Judge] had significant concerns about the Appellant’s credibility, concluding that he gave inconsistent evidence; was factually inaccurate with regard to the external factors known about the camp; was not registered as having lived in the camp, and that he is Egyptian, placing particular reliance on the result of a language assessment.”

24. The Judge noted that the expert evidence and the evidence of JA had not been before the 2020 Judge.

25. The Judge also noted a psychological reports relied upon by the Appellant from …”Dr Ruth Gordon and Dr Ifaf Asghar, who confirm the Appellant’s mental health difficulties as PTSD, depression and anxiety. Dr Asghar states that it is at least ‘possible’ that these difficulties could affect his memory and recall, which the Appellant contends, accounts for any inconsistencies in his evidence.” At paragraph 38, the Judge states that he has taken into account that evidence when deciding what weight to attach to any gaps or inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account.

26. In relation to the fact that the Appellant could not be traced by UNRWA as having been present in the camp, the Judge found the following:

“39. It was clearly a concern to [the 2020 Judge] that despite extensive checks being carried out by UNRWA, there is no record of the Appellant having lived in the camp, despite his claim that he lived there for a significant period, throughout his childhood into adulthood. In addressing that issue at paragraph 23 of his witness statement, the Appellant relies on the fact that he did not go to school in the camp and claims that he cannot read or write however that account is contradicted by paragraph 8 of his witness statement where he describes undergoing some schooling and states that his parents taught him how to read and write. I also note that during his Screening Interview, it is recorded that he was educated to secondary school level, albeit he disagreed with the accuracy of that statement at the time of his earlier appeal hearing.

40. Furthermore, in his witness statement at paragraph 23, the Appellant describes that his parents were very poor and offers that as a reason for him not going to school, whereas in response to Q.150 of his asylum interview he said that he did not like school and preferred working for a living.

41. For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Appellant has been wholly inconsistent in his explanation for why UNWRA has no record of him living in the camp, despite their extensive checks, which is a factor that weighs heavily against his credibility.”

27. At paragraph 42, the Judge considered that, whilst the Appellant had adequately explained the inconsistency about when his parents moved to the camp but that “… many of the other inconsistencies identified by the Respondent and [the 2020 Judge] have not been addressed by the Appellant in his witness statement. Instead, his witness statement rehearses the account he gave at his first appeal and focusses on the new evidence he presents…”

28. The Judge, at paragraph 43, considered JA’s account about the Appellant to be “…limited, vague and inconsistent with information provided by the Appellant”.

29. At paragraph 44 he detailed:

“At no stage during his asylum interview did the Appellant mention that his father worked in a shop, let alone that he assisted him in the running of his business. To the contrary, the Appellant stated that his father worked as a labourer when he was growing up and that when he [the Appellant] was older, he became responsible for his parents ‘expenses’ (AI Q: 145-146). The Appellant did not address this inconsistency in his witness statement and the fact he has been inconsistent affects the weight that I can attach to the evidence of JA about their interactions.”

30. The Judge noted that Dr Giustozzi’s expertise had not been challenged. He assessed the evidence as follows:

“46. The Appellant states that he provided a birth certificate to a friend, who resides in Damascus and who works in an office from which identity documents can be obtained. The Appellant further claims that he provided a copy of his birth certificate to his friend to allow for the process of obtaining an identity card to be completed however the birth certificate was then lost by his previous solicitor.

47. I have not been provided with a statement from the Appellant’s friend to explain who he is, his occupation or the process that was gone through in obtaining the new identity card. Whilst the Appellant is under no obligation to corroborate his claim, that is evidence I would have expected to find standing their apparent close relationship and continued contact.

48. I am also unimpressed by the Appellant’s explanation that the birth certificate was lost by his previous Solicitor. Whilst the Appellant has provided a copy of a letter from the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission, which confirms that he registered a complaint, it contains no meaningful detail about the nature of the complaint or the outcome of any investigation into it, if there was one.

49. I also have no information about the Appellant’s friend in Germany called ‘Daoud’, who apparently sent him an ID card in an envelope which he then lost, let alone a clear explanation for why Daoud was in possession of the identity card in the first place. Once again, this is evidence I would have expected to find.

50. I fully accept from the report provided by Dr Giustozzi, that scanned copies of identity documents can be checked against official records to determine their authenticity, but I have been provided with very limited information about what documents were checked and the processes involved. I am simply told that a ‘scanned copy’ of documents was passed on by Dr Giustozzi’s to his researcher in Damascus, who then passed the ‘scanned copy’ on to a Mr al-Qadir for verification against official records.

51. Whilst Dr Giustozzi states in his supplementary report that there is no skill involved in identifying a document, the fact remains that I have no information at all from Mr al-Qadir confirming who he is, his occupation, the process he embarked on in verifying the documents or his account that the ‘scanned copy’ documents are genuine. There is no reason given for why this information has been omitted, which is unsatisfactory and affects the weight that I can attach to the expert report.”

31. The Judge dismissed the appeal on all grounds:

“53. After carefully reviewing all the documentary and oral evidence in the round, I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that the Appellant was born and raised in Syria. For the reasons given, I find instead that the concerns about the Appellant’s credibility remain and that IJ Bannerman’s findings should be preserved, including his finding that the Appellant is from Egypt, a finding supported by the language assessment.”

Grounds of appeal

32. Grounds of appeal were submitted on 18th June 2024 and permission to appeal refused by another First-tier Tribunal Judge on 15th July 2024.

33. Further grounds of appeal were submitted to the Upper Tribunal on 26th July 2024.

34. The first ground of appeal relates to the Judge’s assessment of JA’s evidence. It is argued that the Judge erred in finding that there was an inconsistency between JA’s and the Appellant’s evidence:

“7. At question 144 of the interview (page 28 of the appellant’s bundle) the appellant is asked, “How did you support yourself in the camp?”, to which he responds, “I was working selling cigarettes and anything”. At question 145 he is asked, “How did your parents support themselves?”, to which he responds, “I was responsible for their expenses”. Question 146 is “How did they support themselves when you were younger?”, to which he responds, “My father worked as a labourer”.

8. The appellant was born in 1971. In his witness statement he notes that his father died in 2018 and his mother died in 2017. The appellant says that his father stopped working in 2014 (para. 36, page 5 of the appellant’s bundle). The questioner does not ask what the appellant’s father did for work when the appellant was older. The appellant would have been 18 years of age in 1989. There was no evidence before the FtT as to how the appellant’s father made a living in the 1990s and thereafter until he stopped working in 2014. It is submitted that there is no inconsistency. The appellant in his asylum interview was answering the question to put him. The questioner did not ask what the appellant’s father did for work when the appellant was an adult. As the appellant was not cross-examined, he was not asked at the hearing to explain this inconsistency.

9. The FtT discounts the evidence of JA largely on the basis that the appellant was inconsistent on this point. The FtT has erred in finding that there was an inconsistency. As a result, it has erred by not attaching sufficient weight to the new evidence of JA which corroborated the appellant’s claim that he was from Syria.”

35. The second ground of appeal relates to the Judge’s assessment of the expert evidence, particularly the process through which the identification document was verified:

“12. It is submitted that the FTT has failed to have regard to the evidence of an expert (whose expertise was not challenged) and instead imported its own expectations of how documents should be verified by a government department in Syria.

13. Dr. Giustozzi’s initial report stated (para. 6, page 37 of the respondent’s bundle) that Mr al-Qadir was a staff member of the general authority for Palestinians refugees, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour in Damascus.

14. In his supplemental report, Dr. Giustozzi states (at para. 3, page 9 of the appellant’s bundle) that:

“Ms. Alshikh had to verify the document with the issuing authority of the document, the general authority for Palestinians refugees, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, as there is no other choice”.

15. He continued at para. 5:

“It is common practice to get documents verified by the authorities in this way. In order to verify a document, it is necessary to take it or a copy to the issuing authority and ask them to check it against the records.”

16. It is not clear what other evidence could reasonably have been provided by the appellant in relation to Mr al-Qadir or the process that he undertook in verifying the documents, when one considers the expert evidence of how documents are commonly verified by the relevant authorities in Syria. Had the FtT had proper regard to this material expert evidence, it may have reached a different conclusion regarding the authenticity of these identification documents which support the appellant’s claim that he is from Syria.”

36. The third ground of appeal relates to the Judge’s comments at paragraph 39 concerning the fact that the 2020 Judge was “clearly concerned” that there was no record of the Appellant at the camp.

“18. The only reference to the UNRWA in the First FtT Decision (other than the summary of the respondent’s decision and the parties’ submissions) is at para. 76 where IJ Bannerman states:

“Having taken into account all of the evidence I consider that the only documentary piece of evidence that assists the Appellant in any way is the photocopied ID document really but that is a photocopy and whilst I consider it in the round it has to be weighed against the Respondents' position that UNWRA were not aware of him despite their extensive checks.”

19. It is respectfully submitted that it is not clear that IJ Bannerman was concerned that the UNRWA had no record of the appellant living in the camp. Rather, the respondent’s position on the matter appears to have been a factor that has weighed against the appellant. Contrast the language of IJ Bannerman in relation to the written language report which was described as “[o]f striking importance” (para. 77).

20. There is no detailed analysis in the First FtT Decision of any evidence relating to the UNRWA checks or the correspondence between the UNRWA and the respondent. There is only an acknowledgement of the “Respondent’s position”. It is not clear whether the UNRWA would expect to have records of all persons born or schooled in the Al Yarmouk Camp in the 1970s or 1980s. In the absence of any such information, it is not possible to assess the weight that should be given to the respondent’s position that the UNRWA had no record of the appellant. Nonetheless, the appellant’s inconsistent explanations for why the UNRWA has no record of him “weighs heavily” against him in the Second FtT Decision (para.41).

21. It is submitted that the FtT has identified the wrong starting point for the purposes of the guidance in Devaseelan in attributing too much weight to the FtT’s findings related to the UNRWA in the First FtT Decision. In the First FtT Decision, the FtT has done little more than acknowledge the “respondent’s position”. In the absence of any detailed analysis in relation to the extent to which the UNRWA would be expected to hold records of the appellant, the FtT has unfairly expected the appellant to explain why no such records were held and reached unfavourable findings in relation to credibility as a result of his inconsistent explanations arising therefrom.”

37. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Mahmood on 22nd August 2024 on the basis that it was arguable that the Judge had not correctly considered the expert reports that had contended that the copy documents were verified with the relevant Ministry. Judge Mahmood considered that the other grounds of appeal have less force but that that all grounds may be argued.

The hearing

38. The documents relied upon by the parties were contained within a 701-page electronic bundle.

39. Within that bundle was a section: ‘Appellant’s evidence not before the FTT’. There was no application to rely upon evidence not before the Judge, nor was there otherwise any explanation why the evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained before the First-tier Tribunal hearing, as required within the principles provided in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. In any event, the documentation within that section was limited to a further statement from the Appellant that did not contain new evidence but reiterated the grounds of appeal.

40. Within oral submissions, Ms Blockley argued that the perceived inconsistency between JA and the Appellant about the Appellant’s father’s working history failed to acknowledge that the Appellant’s father may have had employment after the Appellant became an adult. That employment was not disclosed in interview given that the Appellant was asked about his father’s work when he was a child. Further, there was no cross-examination of JA and the Appellant and so they did not have the opportunity to address the perceived inconsistency, which gives rise to unfairness.

41. Ms Blockley argued that the evidence to support the validity of the identification documents was sufficient. She submitted that the Judge had demonstrated a greater level of anxious scrutiny to that evidence that he had to the evidence relied upon by the Respondent that UNRWA could not trace the Appellant’s registration at the camp. She identified that the evidence that had been relied upon by the Respondent was an email from VerofReg@UNRWA.ORG, dated 6th August 2019, in which the unnamed author stated that they were unable to track any record of the Appellant but that further enquiries could be made upon provision of further documentation, such as the Appellant’s identification documentation. Ms Blockley stated that it was unknown who had provided the information or their qualifications. She said that it was unclear what database was checked, for example whether it was a database of people who received funding or people who lived in the camp.

42. We asked Ms Blockley whether those challenges to the evidence had been made before the Judge and she replied that she did not know. She accepted that no evidence was before the Judge about the Appellant’s registration at the camp that was not been before the 2020 Judge.

43. Ms Blockley was asked to comment upon the content of Dr Giustozzi’s addendum report, at paragraph 4 (emphasis added):

“Mr al-Qadir took the copies and disappeared into the offices of the Authority. He re-emerged later saying that he could confirm the genuine character of the two documents.”

44. She was asked whether that that falls short of an opinion that the documents were genuine, rather than it had a “genuine character”. She replied that the genuineness of the document was a binary question: it was either genuine or it was not.

45. No rule 24 response was provided by the Respondent.

46. Mr Diwnycz argued that there is a difference between a document having genuine characteristics and a document itself being genuine. He submitted that the Judge had regard to the appropriate test when considering the reliability of the documents relied upon by the Appellant, as outlined within Tanveer Ahmed [2002] Imm AR 318.

47. He identified that the decision of the 2020 Judge had not been subject to a successful appeal and so his findings were the Judge’s starting point. The Judge directed himself correctly and there was no error within his determination.

Analysis

48. Throughout our consideration of the appeal, we have had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at paragraph 2:

"The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."

Ground 1

49. Ms Blockley argued that the failure to question the Appellant and witnesses about any perceived inconsistency gives rise to unfairness. We reject that submission. The Judge was required to make findings upon the evidence before him. It was not his responsibility to seek to fill gaps in the evidence or cross-examine witnesses. He had before him evidence by JA that presented as inconsistent with evidence from the Appellant in relation to the Appellant’s father’s work and he was entitled to have regard to that inconsistency.

50. As outlined within paragraph 7 of the grounds of appeal, the Appellant had been asked a number of questions about his father’s income during his asylum interview and at no stage stated did he disclose that his father had owned a clothes shop in which he, the Appellant, had also worked. That was a notable omission and the Judge was entitled to find the Appellant’s answers in interview inconsistent with JA’s evidence.

51. Further, the Judge did not rely solely upon the inconsistency in reducing weight given to JA’s evidence but also noted, at paragraph 43 of his determination, that JA’s evidence was “limited” and “vague”.

52. The Judge’s findings were reasonably open to him upon the evidence and they were adequately reasoned within the determination. There was no error of law in the Judge’s assessment of JA’s evidence.

Ground 2

53. We are satisfied that the Judge considered with care the documentary evidence and the expert evidence and that he made findings that were reasonably open to him.

54. Whilst the grounds of appeal focus upon the Judge’s comments about the lack of information about Mr al-Qadir, contained in paragraph 51 of the determination, it fails to acknowledge that this was not the only reason why the Judge gave limited weight to the documentation.

55. The Judge noted the lack of any corroboration from the Appellant’s friend who is said to have somehow obtained the Appellant’s birth certificate. He found that he would expect to have seen evidence from the friend in all the circumstances. The birth certificate had not been adduced in evidence as the Appellant claimed it had been lost by his previous firm of solicitors.

56. Similarly, the Judge noted the lack of evidence from “Daoud’, from Germany, who is said to have sent the Appellant his identification document. There was no explanation why Dauod had the identification in the first place. The envelope in which Daoud sent the identification to the Appellant was not adduced in evidence as the Appellant claimed it has been lost.

57. The Judge correctly identified that corroboratory evidence is not required in asylum claims. However, it was permissible for him to reduce the weight given to evidence if there was supportive evidence that could have been expected to have been obtained. Thomas LJ in TK (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40 stated, at paragraph 16 of his judgment:

“Where evidence to support an account given by a party is or should readily be available, a Judge is, in my view, plainly entitled to take into account the failure to provide that evidence and any explanations for that failure. This may be a factor of considerable weight in relation to credibility where there are doubts about the credibility of a party for other reasons.”

58. That was reiterated in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216, at paragraph 86:

“It was common ground before this Court that there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department (13190, a decision of the then Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 1 April 1996). On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight. This is what was meant by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) [[2019] EWCA Civ 160] at para. 46(iv).”

59. The Judge was “unimpressed” with the Appellant’s explanation for how the birth certificate had been lost by his previous solicitors. He noted the lack of “meaningful detail” within the complaint to the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission. We note that he did not provide any documentation in response, such as the former solicitor’s reply to the complaint.

60. The Judge noted, at paragraph 51, the lack of information about Mr al-Qadir and the fact that there was no reason given for the information being omitted. Those were reasonable observations the Judge was entitled to take them into account when assessing the weight of the evidence. It is notable that the Appellant did not provide a witness statement from Mr al-Qadir or Nada Alshikh. Again, that is evidence that could reasonably be expected to have been obtained, particularly given to the challenge to the verification within the Refusal and Respondent’s Review.

61. The Judge took a holistic approach when assessing the expert evidence concerning the documentation and made findings that were reasonably open to him after adequate analysis. There was no error of law in the Judge’s assessment of the expert evidence.

Ground 3

62. Ms Blockley argued that the Judge adopted a greater degree of scrutiny in analysing the Appellant’s expert evidence concerning the genuineness of the Appellant’s identification documents than he did to the Respondent’s evidence that the Appellant’s presence in the camp could not be traced.

63. Despite the skill in which that argument was pursued, it had no merit. The Appellant bears the burden of proving his case. As per Tanveer Ahmed, he was required to show on the balance of probabilities that the identity documents are reliable. Within the Refusal and the Respondent Review, the lack of adequate detail about Mr al-Qadir was identified. The Appellant had adequate opportunity to obtain further information about him and the process used to verify the documents but he failed to do so.

64. Conversely, Ms Blockley could not confirm that her criticisms about the evidence from UNRWA had been pursued before the Judge.

65. We note that, the evidence from UNRWA came directly from a UNRWA email address, whereas the evidence of the documentation being verified came third hand: Mr al-Qadir had told Nada Alshikh who in turn told Dr Giustozzi. Only Dr Guistozzi provided evidence by way of his report and addendum report.

66. In any event, the fact that the Appellant could not be traced at the camp was a finding of the 2020 Judge. The Judge had regard to Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 000702 in which it was held, at paragraph 39:

“(1) The first Adjudicator's determination should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of the Appellant's status at the time it was made. In principle issues such as whether the Appellant was properly represented, or whether he gave evidence, are irrelevant to this.

(2) Facts happening since the first Adjudicator's determination can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. If those facts lead the second Adjudicator to the conclusion that, at the date of his determination and on the material before him, the appellant makes his case, so be it. The previous decision, on the material before the first Adjudicator and at that date, is not inconsistent.

(3) Facts happening before the first Adjudicator's determination but having no relevance to the issues before him can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. The first Adjudicator will not have been concerned with such facts, and his determination is not an assessment of them.”

67. Paragraph 18 of the grounds of appeal references paragraph 39 of the Judge’s determination in which he stated that the 2020 Judge was “clearly concerned” that there was no record of the Appellant having lived in the camp. Paragraph 19 of the grounds of appeal argues that “…it is not clear that [the 2020 Judge] was concerned that the UNWRA had no record of the appellant living in the camp…”

68. We do not accept that argument. The 2020 Judge’s concern was expressed at paragraph 76 of his determination in which he found:

“Having taken into account all of the evidence I consider that the only documentary piece of evidence that assists the Appellant in any way is the photocopied ID document really but that is a photocopy and whilst I consider it in the round it has to be weighed against the Respondents’ position that UNWRA were not aware of him despite their extensive checks”.

69. We do not accept the submission, at paragraph 21 of the grounds of appeal, that the 2020 Judge “…had done little more than acknowledge the “respondent’s position””. We are satisfied that he made an adverse finding arising from the fact that there was no record of the Appellant within the camp, which is evident from by wording at paragraph 76 that it “weighed against” evidence that was supportive of the Appellant’s case.

70. Ms Blockley correctly acknowledged that there was no evidence before the Judge to support the presence of the Appellant in the camp over and above that before the 2020 Judge, albeit we note the evidence of JA which we consider was appropriately rejected by the Judge. Had the Appellant considered that there was further evidence that could be obtained from the camp, such as further checks, he and his representatives could have sought that information and evidence. They did not do so. As such, the Judge was entitled and, we find, compelled to retain the findings of the 2020 Judge in that regard.

71. Further, the Judge’s findings were not solely reliant upon the lack of record of the Appellant within the camp. He also noted, at paragraphs 39-41, inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account about his schooling within the camp, particularly paragraph 41, which states:

“For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Appellant has been wholly inconsistent in his explanation for why UNWRA has no record of him living in the camp, despite their extensive checks, which is a factor that weighs heavily against his credibility.”

72. The Judge made findings reasonably open to him upon an adequate assessment of the evidence.

Holistic assessment of the Judge’s determination

73. To necessitate the decision being set aside, any identified error of law must be material, in that it must have made a material difference to the outcome of the appeal before the Judge.

74. Even if the grounds exposed an error of law, it would not amount to material errors of law if there was, notwithstanding, a sound adverse credibility assessment sufficient to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.

75. The Judge, at paragraph 35 of the determination, outlined above, acknowledged the credibility findings of the 2020 Judge. He identified, at paragraph 42, that many of the inconsistencies identified by the Respondent and the 2020 Judge had not been addressed by the Appellant in his witness statement. He relied upon the linguistic evidence that was damaging to the Appellant’s case.

76. For those reasons, even had the grounds of appeal identified errors of law, it would not have infected the Judge’s decision so as to be material, as the unchallenged reasons alone are sufficient to reject the Appellant’s account.

Conclusion

77. The Judge’s determination demonstrates a thorough and detailed analysis of the evidence and contains findings of fact that were open to him. As such, no error of law is made out, either material or otherwise.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.

DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4th March 2025