Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003725
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59979/2023
LP/03199/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

RLH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Brown
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 29 August 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision of 13 October 2023 to refuse his application for asylum of 18 March 2022. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed his appeal. On appeal to the Upper Tribunal, UTJ Keith and DUTJ Kudhail, by a decision dated 20 December 2024, allowed the appellant’s appeal and directed a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal.

2. At [15] of its error of law decision, the Upper Tribunal preserved a number of findings of the First-tier Tribunal:

We discussed and agreed with the representatives which of the Judge’s findings it was appropriate to preserve for a remaking. We list these briefly now. They are §12 of the Judge’s decision where there was a reference to the appellant not being inconsistent; §13, to where there was no undermining of the appellant’s credibility; §14 where there was an inconsistency about the timing of detention; §16 where there was an inconsistency in the appellant’s account about reporting; §17 and §18 and the analysis of little weight to the family statements; §21 and the acceptance of sur place activities; §30, that that the appellant genuinely held political beliefs; and §32, that the Facebook account of the appellant was publicly viewable.

3. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds an appellant must show a real risk of serious harm at the date of the hearing. The burden of proof rests on an appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood.

4. At the resumed hearing, the appellant gave oral evidence with the assistance of a Kurdish Sorani interpreter. The appellant was cross examined by Dr Ibisi.

5. I heard the submissions of the advocates and then reserved my decision.

6. Mr Brown’s skeleton argument helpfully summarises the issues to resolved at the resumed hearing as follows:

(i) Is it reasonably likely that the Appellant was arrested and detained because of his work with IPLUS TV? If so, he has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his imputed political opinion.
(ii) If not, is it reasonably likely that the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations in the United Kingdom, and publication of political views on the Facebook website, have come to the attention of those in Kurdistan likely to be hostile to such matters?
(iii) If so, does the Appellant face a real risk of persecution upon return to Iraq?
(iv) If not, is the Appellant likely to continue expressing his earnestly held political views by attending demonstrations and publicising his political views on the Facebook website?
(v) If so, does the Appellant face a real risk of persecution upon return to Iraq?
(vi) Is there a real risk that the Appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom would occasion (a) a significant, meaning substantial, reduction in his life expectancy arising from a completed act of suicide and/or (b) a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of mental health resulting in intense suffering falling short of suicide?

7. The First-tier Tribunal’s preserved findings are set out in detail in its decision at [14-15]:

14. I do find however, that the appellant’s description of events is not consistent with the background evidence relied on by the respondent. The appellant’s account as to how long he was detained is confused. He initially says he was detained for 2 days in the screening interview, corrects this to 3 or 4 days and then says it was 3 days in the asylum interview. The Rudaw article relied on by the respondent indicates members of the TV station told Rudaw employees had been detained ‘briefly’.

15. The account given to the Committee to Protect Journalists (‘the CPJ’), quoting a statement from the TV station itself, is that employees were detained for ‘an hour’. Leaving aside the appellant’s confusion about how long he was detained for, even the shortest period of two days is wholly inconsistent with the account provided by the station itself; that employees were detained for an hour. I find this is a matter which undermines the appellant’s credibility.

8. In his oral evidence at the resumed hearing, the appellant said that he had been detained for 3-4 days. He was not aware how long any colleagues had been detained. He believed that, as a member of a ‘military group’, he had been detained longer than ‘civil people.’

9. In her submissions, Dr Ibisi argued that the appellant should have remembered reasonably accurately how long he had been detained. His inability to give evidence which was consistent with the media report could not be explained by his mental state or diagnosis of PTSD. Mr Brown submitted that the Freedom From Torture report now adduced in evidence showed that the appellant’s injuries (including being hit on the heard with a gun, as he claimed) were ‘highly consistent’ with his account. Supporting a diagnosis of PTSD, the report states at [143]:

The timing of onset of symptoms is in keeping with the detention being the primary causal factor for his PTSD. He first remembers having vivid memories during the journey to the UK. The experiences intensified when he was in hotel accommodation after arrival, it was then that he first remembers seeing the man and experiencing this as a hallucination (rather than a memory that he could easily identify as a memory). As time has progressed he has experienced worsening dissociation and numbing of his feeling of self, alongside worsening of depression symptoms (see below). The symptoms are causing a strain on his ability to maintain friendships and significantly affecting his day to day activities. ICD-11 states that, “The symptoms persist for at least several weeks and cause significant impairment in personal, family, social, educational, occupational or other important areas of functioning.” I find the timing and progression of his symptoms in keeping with the detention as a primary causal factor for his PTSD. Other events (the journey) and external stressors (ongoing uncertainty, estrangement from family) since, have influenced the progression and severity of his symptoms.

10. Mr Brown submitted that the appellant’s ill treatment and his subsequent PTSD had interfered with his ability to recall accurately details of his detention.

11. I have reminded myself of the preserved findings of fact. The appellant did work as he claimed for a TV channel which had been targeted by the KRI authorities. The primary inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence concerns the length of his detention. The respondent submits that the appellant is lying and that he had not been detained at all. The appellant’s claim of having been detained for several days is irreconcilable with objective material which indicates that individuals at the TV station had been detained only ‘briefly.’

12. There are several possible ways of reconciling the evidence. The appellant may not have been detained at all but that ignores the fact that he worked for a TV station at a time when we know it was targeted by the authorities. He may have been detained briefly and he has exaggerated the length of detention. He may be telling the truth and the media report of the incident is inaccurate or incomplete. The appellant may be correct to say that ‘civil’ members of the staff were detained for a briefer period. I take into account also the findings of the medical report, in particular those parts which found the appellant’s account ‘highly consistent’ with his injuries. I note also that the appellant has not attempted in his evidence at the resumed hearing to rely on the diagnosis of PTSD so as to bring his evidence of the length of detention into line with the objective media evidence; instead, he maintained his claim that he had been detained for 3-4 days.

13. Drawing these various threads together, viewing the evidence holistically, and having in mind the relatively low threshold of proof in an asylum appeal, I find that the appellant was detained for the period he claims following the raid on the TV station where it is accepted he worked. In my opinion, the brief media report may not tell the whole story of the raid on the TV station. It is plausible that some of those detained in the raid were held longer than a few hours.

14. I am aware that I make those findings against the background of the First-tier Tribunal’s negative preserved findings. However, I had the opportunity of hearing the appellant’s oral evidence and considering supporting evidence which was not before the First-tier Tribunal. To that extent, I have been able to reach my own opinion of the credibility of the appellant’s evidence.

15. As I understand the position of both parties, the finding in [13] above should lead me to conclude that the appellant faces a real risk of persecution on return. Accordingly, I have not examined the remaining issues in the appeal in any detail. I do observe, however, that, given the appellant’s past history and the evidence concerning his sur place activities in the United Kingdom now adduced, he may be at risk on return on account of those activities. In any event, I find that the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State decision should be allowed on asylum and Article 3 ECHR grounds.

Notice of Decision

I have remade the decision. The appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 13 October 2023 is allowed on asylum and human rights (Article 3 ECHR) grounds.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 2 November 2025