Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003766

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01019/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

DA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Lee, Counsel instructed by Barnes, Harrild & Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of Judge Monson of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 15th May 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 20th September 2023, refusing his protection and human rights application.
Background to the appeal
2. DA is an Iraqi national who arrived in the UK on 19th August 2020 and claimed asylum on 20th August 2020.
3. The appellant states that he started a business taking animals from his home area to Mosul and selling them. He states that, in 2014, when ISIS took control of Mosul, 4 men to whom he had sold animals refused to pay him and threatened him when he asked for the money he was owed. The appellant states that the animals were owned by other people who then threatened him and his family because he was unable to pay them for the animals. The appellant states that there would be no sufficiency of protection because the people threatening him have links to ISIS and the government. He further states that there is no reasonable internal flight relocation available to him. The appellant also states that he would be at risk on return because of his westernisation.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
4. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge found that the appellant’s ongoing debt did not engage the Refugee Convention [30]. He further found that there was no evidence to show that the appellant would be marked out as westernised on his return to Iraq [33]. The judge found that the appellant was not a member of a particular social group [34]. The judge did not find the appellant’s claim to be at risk to be a credible claim. He did not find the letter from the local Mukhtar to be a reliable document [38]. The judge found that there were discrepancies in the appellant’s account [39], [43], [44]. The judge also found that the appellant would not be the only person whose trade would have been affected by ISIS taking control of Mosul [45]. He found that it was credible that the appellant’s business had collapsed but not that his creditors did not realise the reason or realise that the appellant had no assets for them to pursue [46], [47], [48]. The judge noted that the appellant remained in his home area for a number of months without difficulty and that the appellant’s family remained in the area [49].
5. The judge considered relocation and found that the appellant could not return to his home area but that the appellant could relocate to Rizgari [51]. He found that the appellant’s disability had not caused him problems in the past in Rizgari which was a formerly contested area [52]. The judge considered alternative areas to which the appellant could relocate and found that the appellant could relocate to Sulaymaniyah [53]. The judge found that the appellant would be eligible for assistance under the Voluntary Return Scheme, that the appellant’s adult sons could provide assistance and that the appellant’s brother could also assist the appellant with integration [54]. The judge further found that the appellant would be able to access his CSID [54].
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. On 9th August 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Robinson granted permission to appeal on the single ground put forward by the appellant.
The ground of appeal
7. The appellant’s grounds of appeal submitted that the judge had failed to take proper account of the specific characteristics of the appellant when assessing whether the appellant could relocate to a formerly contested area. In particular, the grounds submitted that the judge had erred in failing to properly apply the principles in SMO and KSP (Civil documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAT) and had failed to assess whether the appellant would be perceived to have links to ISIS or any opposition to the Iraqi government and the effects of the appellant’s ethnicity, westernisation and disability. The grounds further submitted that the judge should have considered the reasonableness of return to the appellant’s home area first taking account of all relevant characteristics before considering whether there was a reasonable internal flight alternative.
The Rule 24 response
8. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 28th August 2024. The respondent, submitted that the judge had properly considered whether the appellant would be perceived as westernised. The response further submitted that, even if the judge erred in his assessment of the risk to the appellant in his home area, the appellant’s grounds of appeal did not take issue with the judge’s internal relocation assessment and the application must therefore fail.
The hearing
9. I heard submissions from both parties and indicated at the end of the hearing that I reserved my decision. The submissions are fully set out in the recording of the proceedings.
Error of law decision
10. I bear in mind that an appellate Tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so I apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
11. Mr Lee, in his submissions, submitted that the judge had failed to take account of each of the relevant factors regarding the appellant’s characteristics when assessing whether the appellant could relocate to his home area or a formerly contested area. He stated that the appellant relied on three individual characteristics; the fact that he was a Sunni of Kurdish ethnicity, the appellant’s disability and the appellant’s contention that he would be perceived as westernised. Mr Lee referred to SMO and said that these were all factors which should have been considered by the judge when considering return.
12. At [51] the judge finds that the appellant cannot return to his home area because he has no home there. He goes on to consider whether there is a reasonable internal fight alternative and finds that the appellant can internally relocate to Rizgari. He links that finding to his findings regarding the humanitarian protection claim. The judge’s findings with regard to the humanitarian protection claim are that the appellant’s business had collapsed, he was not being threatened by creditors and that he had remained in his home area without problems and his family had also remained there without problems.
13. The decision in SMO sets out the factors to be considered when considering return to an appellant’s home area in a formerly contested area. The decision states that a Tribunal should firstly consider whether it is possible for an appellant to return to his home area taking account of the relevant factors and then , if the Tribunal finds that is not possible, should consider whether there is a realistic internal flight alternative.
14. The Judge found that the appellant could not return to his home area because he found that it was credible that he no longer had a home there [51]. Whilst the Judge did not consider the factors as set out in SMO when making that assessment, this is not a material error of law as the Judge found, in any event, that the appellant could not return there. The Judge then went on to consider whether the appellant could relocate to Rizgari [51]. In his assessment of relocation to Rizgari, the judge arguably did not consider all of the factors outlined in SMO which related to the appellant. The judge accepted that Rizgari was a formerly contested area and that the appellant had a disability. He did not consider whether the appellant would be perceived to have links with ISIS or with any opposition movement or whether the appellant would be at risk as a result of being a Sunni Kurd. The grounds submitted that the judge had also not taken account of whether the appellant would be at risk as a result of being westernised. However, the judge had already made adverse findings with regard to the appellant’s claim to be at risk because of westernisation and had found that the appellant had not shown that he was at risk because of this. He gave cogent reasons for doing so.
15. While there may have been an error in the Judge’s assessment of the appellant returning to his home are and/or another formerly contested area, that does not automatically mean that it is a material error. In the decision, the judge goes on to consider whether the appellant could safely relocate elsewhere in Iraq. He finds that it is open to the appellant to relocate to Sulaymaniyah. In making this finding, the judge has considered the relevant factors to be taken into account. He has given consideration to the appellant’s disability, to the funds which may be available to him and to the other assistance available to him including the assistance of his adult sons and brother. The grounds did not seek to challenge those findings. Mr Lee submitted that the grounds, in effect, covered all of the internal relocation potentials but that is not how the grounds are worded. The grounds make specific reference to the assessment of return to a formerly contested area and to the sliding scale of assessment to be undertaken in those circumstances but do not address the findings of the judge that the appellant could safely internally relocate to Sulaymaniyah.
16. The judge has given cogent reasons for finding that the appellant could safely internally relocate to Sulaymaniyah. In making that assessment, the judge has considered the appellant’s disability among other factors including the fact that the appellant had left his CSID with his wife. Even if an error had been made with regard to the assessment of return to either the appellant’s home area or Rizgari, the judge has, in any event, properly assessed whether there was an alternative internal flight option available to the appellant and found that there was such an option. The error with regard to the assessment of return to the appellant’s home area or Rizgari is not, therefore, a material error of law as the judge also found that there was a reasonable internal flight alternative available to the appellant in an area which was not a formerly contested area.
17. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law.

Notice of decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
The decision shall stand.

F Beach
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18th February 2026