UI-2024-003861
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-003861
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52796/2023
LP/01096/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 May 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES
Between
S P
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Panagiotopoulou, Counsel instructed by Immigration Global Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 5 February 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) promulgated on 2 July 2024, dismissing the appeal of the appellant, a national of Albania, against the respondent’s refusal on 21 April 2023 of his international protection claim made on 10 October 2018. The decision of the FTJ was set aside for error of law by decision of myself and Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan issued on 6 February 2025 (see annex attached). Extensive findings were preserved as set out.
Anonymity
2. I continue the anonymity order for the same reasons as did the panel at the error of law hearing. The appellant is admitted to be a victim of trafficking within Albania and he has consequent mental health problems. I consider his interests, and the public interest in maintaining confidence in the asylum system by ensuring vulnerable people are willing to provide candid and complete information in support of their applications, outweighs the public interest in open justice.
The issues/the hearing
3. Unfortunately, the appeal has taken a long time to come to a remaking hearing for several reasons. Remaking was due to take place in April 2025, but the appellant’s counsel was taken ill shortly before the hearing. In early July, the appellant’s then representatives applied for a further adjournment as the appellant was in detention and they were unable to obtain instructions. Both the appellant and respondent were directed to provide further information by the end of July including about the reasons for the appellant’s detention. They did not do so. It is not clear why further information was not readily forthcoming, as the appellant was sentenced on 11 July 2025 to a term of imprisonment of 8 months, suspended for 18 months, for possession of cannabis with intent to supply. The proceedings were transferred to Bradford as the appellant had moved to Doncaster, but the appeal was adjourned shortly before the hearing in November. Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato adjourned the hearing due to take place in November in Bradford so that new solicitors could take instructions, and because there was still at that time no information about the sentence passed on the appellant. He transferred the proceedings back to London so that counsel previously instructed could be retained.
4. The respondent subsequently on 17 December 2025 clarified the appellant’s sentence and explained that she would be submitting that the conviction had no impact on the issues surrounding the international protection claim but would be submitting it would negatively impact any claim made in respect of Article 8 and the proportionality assessment.
5. I admitted the fresh evidence on which both the appellant and respondent intended to rely, even though it was served late. Accordingly the evidence before me and on which I have relied is the evidence in the error of law bundle, which was the evidence before the FTJ when making the original decision, and the evidence in the appellant’s supplementary bundle (81 pages according to the index) and respondent’s supplementary bundle (72 pages, being the sentencing remarks, the country information note of January 2025 about mental healthcare in Albania and the February 2025 CPIN on actors of protection in Albania).
6. The respondent through Mr Terrell consented to the appellant raising the new matter of his relationship with his partner. It was noted that although the appellant’s partner had made a witness statement, she was not able to attend the hearing as she was in Germany where her brother was ill in hospital.
7. The issues for me to determine were whether:
(i) the appellant was a member of a PSG as the victim of trafficking or modern slavery;
(ii) the appellant would be at real risk of persecution on return to Albania on account of his specific circumstances (no error having been found in the FTJ’s assessment that there was a general sufficiency of protection in Albania for former victims of trafficking);
(iii) If the appellant were at risk in his home area, would internal relocation be safe and not unduly harsh;
(iv) Would the appellant’s return breach Article 8 ECHR.
8. It was agreed that the appellant would be treated as a vulnerable witness in view of his mental health conditions. I heard evidence from the appellant through an Albanian interpreter. The appellant confirmed the truth of his witness statement prepared for this hearing. He was asked additional questions in examination in chief about why his partner was not present, was then cross-examined and re-examined and I asked him questions. I refer to the detail of his evidence as necessary when coming to my findings below.
9. After the conclusion of the evidence I heard submissions from the representatives which I summarise.
10. Mr Terrell submitted that although the appellant’s claim had been broadly accepted, some things were either untrue or perhaps exaggerated. The FTJ had found that the appellant’s family had been threatened once in an incident following the appellant’s departure from Albania. 8 years later, the risk would become more and more remote subject to whether the appellant’s evidence was accepted. He submitted it should not be. It was surprising that the claim that when he was released from immigration detention his mother told him that the gang were still looking for him did not feature in his witness statement – that was not what paragraph 6 said, that harked back to what he had been saying to the FTJ. It was simply extraordinary, Mr Terrell submitted, that if that had really happened, it would not be front and centre of his recent witness statement. He submitted it was invented. If that were so, then I should be cautious about accepting the claim of lack of contact with family, he submitted. The appellant had never really explained why the occasional phone call would put his mother in danger. It was just convenient to say so, he submitted. There were other credibility issues. It was surprising there was no evidence from the cousin about his possible ability to support the appellant. He pointed out that I had been concerned about the appellant’s living arrangements and, he submitted, it seemed as clear as day that the appellant living with his girlfriend was not something the support workers were aware of or they would have mentioned it. That was material because the living arrangement went to the appellant’s level of independence and if the author of the report was not aware, it undermined some of the conclusions reached. Considering the relationship, even if it were genuine and subsisting, it had not been a relationship akin to marriage for two years, it was fairly recent and there was minimal evidence of its subsistence. Only the partner could answer the question of whether she would go to Albania with the appellant or support him from the UK, and she was not here. Her assertion that she would not go to Albania should be given little weight.
11. In terms of the risk, as someone who did have some level of family support in Albania and the UK, it was likely that collectively something could be put together for the appellant in the short to medium term. He did have mental health issues, but they had an uncertain impact. There were stressful things in the appellant’s life, but they were temporary. The appellant had only recently started medication, for almost 2 years after the medical report in 2023 he received no mental health treatment at all but was able to function and indeed this was when the offence was committed. Ultimately his submission was that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate, find employment, rely on support from family members and seek protection from the police if necessary.
12. Mr Terrell then referred me to the evidence from the CPIN on mental healthcare about the number of psychiatrists, that other antidepressants were available, that there was an insurance fund which the appellant could access and that treatment was available in other areas outside Tirana. There was stigma relating to mental health, but we were not in the territory of stigma where someone was obviously unwell, he submitted.
13. As far as risk was concerned, I was referred to the July 2024 CPIN on human trafficking. Mr Terrell submitted re-trafficking was an issue but was relatively rare. The appellant had been trafficked as a child, but was now 24, was relatively distrustful of others and was unlikely to be tricked again. He said he was not going to make specific submissions on a Convention reason, other than that the appellant was not part of a PSG. Considering Article 8 ECHR, the appellant was not someone who would be seriously inhibited or unable to integrate into Albania, the evidence could not justify that finding. The relationship did not meet the rules, but in any event the evidence was not sufficient to show insurmountable obstacles. Outside the rules the relationship should be given little weight, it was formed when the partner was aware of the appellant’s immigration status. Overall a claim outside the rules was hopelessly weak, the appellant arrived as a minor and he remained in the UK to pursue an asylum claim. He had committed a serious offence; the public interest plainly outweighed the appellant’s interest.
14. Ms Panagiotopoulou relied on her skeleton argument. She referred me to the paragraphs of the Country Information Note on mental healthcare which related to stigma and to paragraph 5.1.1 which she said was informative when considering the numbers of qualified professionals. She then took me to the relevant paragraphs in the CPIN on human trafficking. She said that following EMAP male victims of trafficking formed a PSG. The same risk factors which applied to women also applied to men. Victims were reluctant to identify as such given the stigma from family and society. There was still an implementation gap. Given the problems with underreporting, the statistical data was not reliable. Male trafficking was widespread. Family support was critical to assist victims. There was stigma when accessing state services. There were shortcomings in police protection. There were no shelters for male victims of trafficking. The section on men at 10.8 of the CPIN on human trafficking showed that few men sought help and at section 12 that there were difficulties for victims of trafficking reintegrating, accessing support and affording medication. I was taken to and have noted the specific paragraphs and subparagraphs.
15. In terms of specific submissions, it was submitted that the starting point was that the credibility findings were retained. The risk in the home area had not disappeared; that was not the FTJ’s findings. It was right that the appellant’s statement was not particularly detailed, but paragraph 6 of his recent statement and paragraph 8 of his original witness statement did not run counter to the appellant’s evidence at the hearing. The appellant ceased contact with his mother because he was concerned about her safety. Even if that were an elaboration, the appellant had not had contact with his father, and it was the family’s economic situation which had led to his exploitation. He would be relocating without the physical and financial support of his family in any event. The Home Office knew the cousin’s circumstances. He and the appellant’s partner were only working part-time and would not be able to support the appellant. Mere economic support would not assist anyway; the appellant had no formal qualifications to enable him to access the job market, he had no barbering qualifications. That would not be sufficient, she submitted, for the appellant to support and establish himself.
16. The appellant was in fragile mental health, it was submitted and the starting point was Dr Chawla’s report. It was from December 2023, but it highlighted that the appellant was particularly vulnerable and exhibited physical symptoms of PTSD and anxiety and depression and that was repeated in the recent medical evidence. The appellant had a fit note and was awaiting initial assessment for therapy; he waited because he was reluctant and afraid of doctors, but he did have physical symptoms of anxiety; that had been referred to before. There was sufficient evidence, it was submitted to lead to the conclusion that the appellant was suffering from long term health issues despite the absence of a recent detailed medical report.
17. Ms Panagiotopoulou submitted that it was significant that the appellant still had a support worker at his age. The report from October 2025 did not state his full address and did not say that the only address was the one in Greenwich. The inference is that as the appellant says, the support worker was fully aware of the fact that the appellant also lived with his partner.
18. There was, she submitted, a reasonable and credible explanation for the partner’s absence. There were two notices of intention to marry, so the relationship was a serious one. The partner had made it very clear however that she had no connections to Albania and she was concerned about the security situation; she would not move with him.
19. When considering internal relocation more generally, I should consider previous country guidance case law which supported the appellant’s real fear that the traffickers may be able to track him down; the Asylos report was also relevant. Internal relocation would not therefore be safe and would also be unduly harsh.
20. I reserved my decision.
Discussion; conclusions
Legal framework relevant to the protection claim
21. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, the potentially relevant reason in this case being membership of a particular social group. The burden of proof is on the appellant and, as this application long pre-dates the coming into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, the single standard of proof is the lower standard, which has been expressed as a reasonable degree of likelihood.
Is the appellant a member of a particular social group (“PSG”)
22. The suggested PSG is “male victims of trafficking” or “male victims of modern slavery”. The respondent agrees in the CPIN that men who are trafficked do have an immutable characteristic, namely the experience of being trafficked. Victims of modern slavery would have a similar experience or common background. For the rest of the decision, as nothing turns on it and the literature references “victims of trafficking” rather than “victims of modern slavery”, I have referred to the appellant as a “victim of trafficking” although strictly he may be better seen as a victim of modern slavery (child criminal exploitation) as the conclusive grounds decision sets out.
23. Regulation 6 (1) (d) of the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 (incorporating the Qualification Directive) states:
“a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where, for example:
(i) members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and
(ii) that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.”
24. EMAP (Gang Violence – Convention Reason) El Salvador CG [2022] UKUT 335 (IAC) explains that regulation 6 is to be read disjunctively, so that the “and” at the end of (i) should be read as “or”. That case sets out that the rationale for such an approach is set out fully in DH (Particular Social Group: Mental Health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 00223 (IAC) [at §46-75], and is supported by the obiter dicta of four members of the Appellate Committee in Fornah (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46, who found the proposition that both elements must be satisfied to be inconsistent with international authority.
25. As there was no direct challenge to the reasoning in EMAP, I see no reason why I should not rely on it and I am therefore satisfied that the appellant forms part of a PSG as sharing a common background which cannot be changed with other victims of trafficking/modern slavery.
26. Whilst it is said that alternatively male victims of trafficking or modern slavery also share a distinct identity, this is not something which I need to decide, and as Mr Terrell on behalf of the respondent expressly declined the opportunity to make more detailed submissions on the issue of whether the appellant was a member of a PSG, and so I did not hear any detailed submissions on the effect of case law, I consider this decision is not the place to analyse the matter further.
27. Of course, being a member of a PSG does not in itself mean that a person would be at risk on return. In addition, although this was not listed as one of the issues, the appellant must show that he is at risk for a Convention reason, i.e. in this case he must show that the risk arises at least in part because of his experience as a male victim of trafficking.
Risk of persecution on return?
The credibility of the appellant’s account of recent threats and loss of contact with his mother
28. My starting point is that the appellant was found to be “broadly credible” by the FTJ. He believed the factual account given by the appellant for the reasons he gave at [19].
29. [31] of the FTJ’s decision is part of the preserved findings. It is worth quoting in full here. The Beni and Goni referred to are the appellant’s former traffickers: “Following his departure from Albania his family in Albania were visited and threatened once and Beni and Goni drove by the family home a number of times. The appellant speaks with his mother regularly by phone. She has not told him of any further threats since.”
30. In his witness statement sworn on the 22 January this year, under the heading “Risk from the criminal gang” the appellant says at paragraph 6 “Since I arrived in the UK, my mother told me that men came to our family home asking about me and threatening her. This confirmed to me that the gang continued to look for me.” He continued at paragraph 7 “Because I feared that any contact with me would place her at further risk, I made the very difficult decision to stop all contact with my mother…”.
31. The appellant was asked in cross-examination whether the decision was made to stop contact shortly after he came to the UK. He said it was shortly after he was released from immigration detention and after a phone call, so he could protect his mother. He said he did have contact with his mother in 2018 after he left Albania, but it was not very often. He agreed he was still in contact with his mother in 2023, but he said it was not very often. It was put to the appellant that it was on only one occasion that his mother indicated to him that the traffickers were looking for him and he responded that she always told him that she faced problems from the gang and whenever she called the situation seemed to be worse and worse and the last call she was crying and hoping for the best for him. He said that he was released from immigration detention in August 2025 and the traffickers went to his mother as they had presumed he would be sent back to Albania. He found out that the traffickers were looking for him from phone calls from his mother and that was the last time he heard from her. It was put to him that he did not say in his latest statement that men were still looking for him and that would have been important to mention, and he said that he did say that he had not been in touch with his mother since August 2025. He was asked why the occasional phone call would put her in danger and he said that they found out he was in detention and might be sent back so the only thing he could do was to protect the person he loved. It was suggested that he was not telling the truth about the gang and he said that he had no reason to lie, he had said in his witness statement that he had stopped contact with his mother and the phone calls from detention centre could be traced; the Home Office could trace the calls and find out about them.
32. I asked the appellant why the occasional phone call with his mother would put her in danger and he said because the gang might go to his mother’s and make threats to her about them speaking and asking when he was coming back, so to avoid that he stopped contact with his mother.
33. When considering the appellant’s evidence at the hearing, I appreciate that I have treated him as a vulnerable witness. There was no indication from the medical evidence however that his mental health conditions would make him forgetful or confused about recent events.
34. I appreciate that the appellant has been found to be broadly credible in his account. However, the picture he describes now of what happened in the past as far as the threats were concerned does not fit with the FTJ’s findings. The FTJ found that the family were threatened once, and that the appellant’s mother had not told the appellant of any further threats although they spoke regularly. By contrast, the appellant said at the hearing before me that he had not been in contact with his mother very often, but she always told him she faced problems and the situation seemed to be getting worse and worse. Against that background, the appellant’s evidence to me was that he had discovered in August 2025 when he was released from immigration detention that the traffickers were still looking for him as they thought he was going to be returned to Albania. Yet despite that evidence, his witness statement did not mention August 2025, or the traffickers having found out he had been released from immigration detention, but is vague in its terms as I have set out above. I agree with Mr Terrell that if the appellant did have specific relatively recent evidence that the gang knew of his whereabouts and were still looking for him, he would have set that out very clearly in his witness statement. Because the appellant was so vague in his witness statement when he could easily have given detail about a critical event and because, as I have explained, the evidence he is giving now of what happened in the past appears to be different to the evidence accepted by the FTJ, I am not satisfied even to the low standard applicable that the appellant’s mother has been threatened recently or that the traffickers know that the appellant was in detention centre/released from detention centre. I am not satisfied that there has been more than one threat to the family.
35. I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant has ceased contact with his mother. This is not only because I am not satisfied the appellant was telling the truth about the recent threats but also because he did not give a reasonable explanation of why he stopped contact with his mother. The appellant did not answer the question why a phone call to his mother would put her in danger but answered a different question, and when I put the question to him again his answer was not reasonable. The traffickers could not possibly be aware of when he was phoning his mother. Even if they were not in contact and his mother told that to the traffickers, there would be no reason for the gang to believe her.
The appellant’s mental health
36. The starting point is Dr Chawla’s report. Dr Chawla saw the appellant at the end of November 2023 in a video interview. It is not clear whether an interpreter was present. Dr Chawla does not list the appellant’s medical records in his sources of information or otherwise refer to them so I can only assume that he did not review those records. He concluded that the appellant was suffering from complex post-traumatic stress disorder and that he suffered from significant distress and disability in his personal and social functioning. It was suggested that the appellant should undergo trauma focused psychotherapy, and medication could be considered although the appellant was said to be very apprehensive about this. He was reported to be having recurrent thoughts of self-harm and Dr Chawla considered that a co-ordinated approach involving mental health professionals, social services and legal advocates was essential to address the multifaceted challenges the appellant was said to be facing. Dr Chawla said that he presented significant risks and intervention was imperative to address those risks and prioritise his safety and overall well-being. Dr Chawla concluded that there was a strong probability that the appellant’s mental health would deteriorate significantly if he was returned to Albania, that the environment was likely to trigger PTSD and that his return posed a high risk of both planned and impulsive suicide attempts due to the lack of protective factors.
37. In fact, the appellant did not receive any treatment after Dr Chawla’s report until he entered immigration detention. He said he had a phobia of medical professionals, and he tried to get over this with the support of his partner and the support workers. He said at the end of November 2025 he went to see the doctor after he felt that the situation was getting worse all the time, he said his partner was trying to egg him on to see the doctor from August and the phone call with his mother.
38. Whilst I do not doubt that the appellant suffers from PTSD or that he is reluctant to trust medical professionals, I find it surprising that if as Dr Chawla says, intervention was imperative to address the risks the appellant faced at the end of 2023, those who supported him did not make more efforts to ensure he did obtain medical treatment. Although Dr Chawla’s conclusion was that the appellant suffered from significant distress and disability in his personal and social function, during the almost two years the appellant was without treatment the appellant managed to form his relationship with his partner (see findings below) and deepen it so it progressed to an intention to marry, and he was sufficiently able to function as to involve himself in drug-related offending. I do not suggest that the appellant was not suffering from any mental health issues, simply that the appellant was able to manage without medical support, albeit with the support of his support worker and subsequently his partner. That said, a recent GP letter confirmed that the appellant suffered from anxiety and depressive disorder as well as PTSD and that he had recently started counselling therapy, but still experienced significant symptoms despite engagement with treatment and that the ongoing uncertainty and pressure were having a negative impact on his mental health.
39. Whilst I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the impact on the appellant of return to Albania would be as devastating for his mental health as Dr Chawla represents with the risk of suicide, particularly as unlike the situation at the end of 2023, the appellant was not reporting any thoughts of deliberate self-harm at his medical appointment on 13 December 2025 (see record of appointment in the evidence), I am satisfied that return to Albania would be likely to have a negative effect on his mental health. It would evidently be a very unwanted stressful event, and although I consider that the appellant has not been telling the truth about the recent threats from the traffickers, I accept that the appellant is understandably very frightened about returning to Albania given his past experiences, remains genuinely fearful of his traffickers, and on return would be physically separated from his support network. The process is stressful for him and at times of stress he experiences visible skin symptoms which have been noticed now and were noticed in the past.
The appellant’s support network
40. I am satisfied that the appellant is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner. I appreciate she was not at the hearing to give evidence, but putting to one side for the moment the length and strength of their relationship, she was prepared to give him an address for immigration bail purposes, and I accept that she offers him support.
41. I am not satisfied that the relationship has been as long or as committed as was put forward. The appellant’s partner said in her statement of January 2026 that they had been in a relationship for about five years, which would put the relationship as beginning in early 2021. The appellant said that they started to talk about 5 years ago and they entered a relationship about three years ago (so 2023), but he said initially they had some misunderstandings as they were young and made mistakes. I note however that to Dr Chawla in November 2023 the appellant said that he had been in a relationship, but it ended due to struggles with his behaviour due to his PTSD. There was no mention to the FTJ in June 2024 of any relationship, any family life in the UK, or any special features of the appellant’s private life, so I am not satisfied that the serious or committed nature of the relationship is any longer than a year to eighteen months or so in duration.
42. I also consider it significant that the appellant’s partner was not present at the hearing and there was no further witness statement or letter from her. I appreciate that it is said that the appellant’s partner intends to be with her brother as long as it takes the situation to improve, but she went first to Germany in early December and then returned for a few days to the UK in late January and went back to Germany. There may be reasons linked to her brother’s condition why she was not able to stay in the UK for longer so she could attend the hearing which is so critical for the appellant, but the fact is she did not attend and I have no explanation from her. I appreciate the couple have an appointment to give notice to marry but bearing in mind that the appellant’s partner already left the appellant once because of his behaviour, that the relationship has not been as long (at least continuously as long) as has been presented and the appellant’s partner was not present at the hearing, I consider it more likely than not that the appellant’s partner would not, as she says, go to Albania with the appellant. I find it realistic that she would be fearful of Albania given the appellant’s experiences and that there is nowhere obvious as I explain below for them to go in Albania, and she has no other connection with Albania than through the appellant and she is settled in the UK. The appellant would therefore be without the day-to-day support of his partner on return. Whilst she would provide some emotional support, I do not consider she would be able to provide consistent or full financial support, she is not working whilst in Germany and although she normally works in a restaurant, such work is not highly paid.
43. The appellant is also in regular contact with his cousin with whom he came to the UK who is a barber and the appellant has been watching him at work and trying to learn barbering skills. The appellant said the cousin did not have enough money for himself as he only worked part-time as he had a health condition which meant he could not stand for very long. I do not consider it undermines the appellant’s case that there was no supporting evidence from the cousin. The cousin has just been mentioned in passing as a relative giving him work experience; it had not earlier been suggested that the cousin might support him. Whilst the appellant’s partner is assisting with his financial support in the UK, there is nothing to suggest that the cousin is. I consider that the cousin would be unlikely to be willing or able to involve himself with the appellant’s long-term support in Albania although as a relative who understands the appellant’s history and trauma, I am sure that he would do his best to assist if for example the appellant had the occasional unexpected expense (such as a medical bill) which he might need help to meet.
44. The appellant has had the support of a support worker. I have their reports and a reference written for him. The reference describes him as someone who is respectful, calm and independent and who is said to have demonstrated good character, responsibility and resilience. He demonstrates strong independent living skills and is polite, punctual and reliable. Although the situation affects his emotional well-being, he is said to focus on positive activities and show emotional maturity by seeking reassurance and maintaining hope during difficult periods.
45. I find that the appellant has not been completely frank with his support workers about his relationship with his partner. He told me at the hearing that he lives two weeks in Greenwich at the flat which is provided for him and two weeks with his partner (originally in Doncaster, now in Bedworth) and that his support worker knows. However he has weekly sessions with the support worker, which from the way the notes of the meetings are written appear to be in person. The session on 1 September records that the appellant had confirmed he was sleeping at his flat and using the space responsibly. The summary dated 4 October says that the appellant “uses his flat appropriately and sleeps there regularly, inviting his girlfriend over occasionally in a manner that remains appropriate”. Whilst the language is consistent with describing the living arrangements of a young man who may stay over at his girlfriends’ property from time to time, it is curious language to use about a young man who is really living with his fiancée. I am not satisfied that the support worker knows the true position and therefore not satisfied that she knows the appellant as well as she thinks she does.
46. In any event, the reports demonstrate a person who is said to be independent, resilient and to show strong independent living skills. They show that he follows up missed monthly payments and how to have a dentist’s invoice reimbursed. There is little difficulty demonstrated with activities of daily living. The report says that staff have noted signs of emotional distress such as anxiety and the marks visible on his skin, but that he is anxious and depressed and has skin problems has been confirmed by his doctor. It is not clear what support the staff give beyond encouragement as there is no information precisely what support the staff are engaged to give, or what precise support they do give (for example I am aware that support can be provided for former looked after children up to the age of 25 but there is nothing specific about the nature of the support or the reasons for it revealed in the evidence). The report says that the appellant seeks support appropriately when he needs it, such as contacting his solicitor and attending his probation appointments consistently but it is not clear from the manner the report is written whether it is support staff providing that assistance, or as seems more likely, that the appellant seeks that support by contacting his solicitor and making sure he attends probation appointments regularly, i.e. he is able to seek the support on his own without the help of support staff.
Protection and support available to the appellant on return to Albania?
47. The FTJ found that there was a reasonable degree of likelihood (although he would not have found that on the balance of probabilities) that if the criminal gang came across the appellant and realised he was someone who ran away from them when 16 they might give him a punishment beating. He considered that the appellant could however access police protection against any violence from the gang.
48. The risk on return is not simply of a punishment beating but also of re-trafficking whether from the gang or from others.
49. I consider the risk in the context that I find the appellant would not in fact return home. He is understandably frightened of those who trafficked him, whom he described as well-known in his home area, and giving a powerful appearance, driving fashionable cars, and socialising with police officers. I appreciate that the FTJ found that the appellant’s assertion that the gang had connections with the authorities was mere speculation, but he did not disbelieve that the appellant had seen them socialising. Understandably the appellant would be fearful, even if that fear were not well-founded. Furthermore, the appellant is not in contact with his father and his home was a place of domestic violence.
50. The appellant would therefore be making a fresh start somewhere different in Albania.
51. I do not consider the gang would try and trace the appellant in Albania. I have not been satisfied that the gang continue to threaten the appellant’s family or are actively looking for the appellant and almost 8 years have passed since he escaped from them. He escaped to the UK, he was not trafficked to the UK, and his experience of the gang is in his local area of Kamez, so that there is no evidence to indicate that the gang who trafficked him operates throughout Albania or internationally. The gang attacking the appellant if they came across him in the local area is quite different from searching for him throughout Albania. I consider if he were to relocate, he would be safe from the gang. He may not even need to move particularly far. Kamez is in Tirana County, but it is a separate town from the city of Tirana and given the FTJ’s findings and my conclusions the gang will not be directly seeking him out.
52. When considering the risk of re-trafficking I bear in mind Mr Terrell’s comments that the appellant was unlikely to be tricked again. The appellant will of course be more wary, but his experience of “work” in Albania in the sense of receiving payment for his efforts was in the context of being trafficked. Unless he can reintegrate into society there remains the risk that he will simply be prey to different traffickers in another area. Rule 339K of the immigration rules is important. The appellant has already been subject to persecution/serious harm, and the fact he has already been so subject is regarded as a serious indication of his well-founded fear unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. Whilst I appreciate it can be said that rates of re-trafficking are low, the data are obviously predicated on following acknowledged victims of trafficking who have accessed services. If services are not accessed, then inevitably that person’s experience will not be captured by the data. The appellant’s ability to integrate is important therefore.
53. The CPIN on human trafficking (paragraph 3.3.2) refers to men and boys from lower economic backgrounds, who have a low level of education or lack of employment opportunities, have physical or mental disabilities, have experienced domestic abuse or family breakdown, and/or live in remote areas being more vulnerable to trafficking or re-trafficking. It also indicates that whether men and boys who have been trafficked to the UK face a risk of serious harm will depend on their personal circumstances, their area of origin, health or disability, availability of a support network and the intent and reach of their traffickers (3.3.4). I appreciate the appellant has not been trafficked to the UK, but the risk factors would appear to be the same wherever the location of the person’s experiences. Ms Panagiotopoulou refers to re-trafficking risk factors in the Asylos report of May 2019. I cannot find the reference she cites at paragraph 13 of her skeleton argument about re-trafficking risk factors, but the factors she cites of exposure to violence, an unstable family background, the absence of protective structures caused by family breakdown, poverty and economic vulnerabilities, disabilities and mental health problems all appear relevant.
54. The country guidance case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) although obviously only country guidance in the case of trafficked women, explains that whether trafficked women are at risk of persecution on account of being members of a PSG and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking's state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.
55. Similar factors appear to be relevant for men bearing in mind what the respondent accepts in the CPIN about risks for men and boys (see paragraph 53 above) (except for the presence of the child).
56. I observe that it must be remembered that the limitations of the services available were recognised at the time of TD and AD in 2016, yet it was still found that in general there was sufficiency of protection available to victims of trafficking. There remain limitations but Albania remains on Tier 2 and is demonstrating increasing efforts compared with the past (see section 10 of the CPIN on human trafficking). The Asylos 2024 report highlights some inadequacies in the system, but the material simply does not demonstrate that there is not in general a Horvath standard of protection even for those men who have been trafficked in the past.
57. Considering the appellant’s specific circumstances - he is from a family who struggled financially and he experienced domestic violence. He does not live in a remote area. He attended school in Albania until he left and has gained basic English language qualifications in the UK, so he is not without education, but he does not have a high level of education. Whilst he may be interested in barbering and have work experience in the sense of watching or helping his cousin at the barbers, it is difficult to see how that would lead directly without further training or experience into a job in Albania. He has mental health difficulties, the result of his past trafficking which have led to his being declared unfit to work for a period by his GP in the UK (see “fit note”). He would not be returning home to the support network of his family. I have found the appellant is still in touch with his mother, but whilst she would be able to offer emotional support, she would not be able to support him financially. The appellant’s partner would again be able to offer emotional support and encouragement, and I consider some financial help, but not full support and the cousin would at best be only able to give very occasional and very limited help. To be able to reintegrate and thus reduce the risk of re-trafficking the appellant needs assistance with his mental health, his employability, and his fears. The fact that he does not have a complete support network already means that to access protection and to avoid risks of re-trafficking he must be able to access support from the state or from an NGO providing help.
58. Bearing that in mind I consider what support would be available to the appellant on return. There are no shelters available for adult men, but adult men can be provided with support in rented accommodation (see 11.2.4 and 11.2.5 of the CPIN on trafficking). I conclude that the appellant does not need the support of a shelter. He does not need its 24 hour protection given my conclusions about the interest of the traffickers and in terms of his mental health and ability to look after himself he has proved from his circumstances in the UK, independence and ability to cope with daily living that he can manage to live on his own at least with some support, he does not need 24 hour live-in care. The NGOs explain that men can access the same levels of service as women, can receive educational and vocational training and housing and psychological assistance (see section 12 of the CPIN). The UK government is funding reintegration programmes including information sheets setting out the reintegration support available to victims of trafficking and explaining how it is accessed (12.1.24).
59. It is right that as Ms Panagiotopoulou pointed out both in her skeleton argument and in submissions, there are difficulties for men (and indeed women) reintegrating. There are difficulties and funding for reintegration was said to be less than half of what was needed (12.1.4). The economic assistance to victims of trafficking provided by the government was low and survivors might face discrimination when applying for assistance (12.2.2). Documentation must be provided to access state economic assistance and there is stigma (12.2.3). I have considered the material in the Asylos report, to which I was referred in the skeleton argument, but although there are difficulties, there are services available to men through the NGOs, and they are helping men who come forward. It is apparent from the CPIN that the NGOs would help those they supported to access the bureaucracy of state services such as housing and economic aid (12.3.4 and 12.3.6) for example.
60. It is submitted in the skeleton argument that the appellant would have to self-identify as a victim of trafficking and such self-identification would result in him being stigmatised by the community. Stigma is real, but the appellant will not be having to access services very local to his family home near those who already know him and might talk about him to others who know his family. It is not suggested that the NGOs stigmatise victims of trafficking; it is clear that they are dedicated professionals whose job it is to help such victims including to help them access the services to which they should be entitled.
61. Section 1.6 of the Asylos report which deals with stigma affecting trafficked men and boys refers to a lack of willingness among men to acknowledge they have been trafficked because men do not see labour exploitation as trafficking, and men are seen as weak for letting someone exploit them or simply as failed migrants, but forced criminality or forced labour would still have less stigma than sex trafficking (see in particular comments of Dr Brachou p 66 of report). Men do move away from their homes to look for work, and a young man living on his own will not face the same type of obvious suspicion and stigma as a young woman living away from family.
62. I consider that it would be reasonable for the appellant to seek the help of NGOs on return, based away from Kamez, with the emotional support to do so, albeit at a distance, from his partner and mother and in this way, he would be able to obtain somewhere to live and some basic subsistence on return.
63. It is apparent that the help of NGOs with accommodation as well as suffering from some resource issues is time limited. Different and Equal and Vatra for example provide accommodation services to men (see the annexes to the CPIN) but Different and Equal can help those they support pay rent for up to a year and Vatra for six months’ (see 12.3.3 and 12.3.6 respectively). After this time they hope with their help those they support will have been able to access the social housing programme. The appellant would still need to work at that point even if his housing were subsidised but section 12.4 details the help and support which is given with education and training. There are challenges for victims of trafficking, see for example 12.4.5, but if the appellant is able to receive support for his mental health, he is well-placed in that he is already interested in barbering and knows how that operates and will be supported to access education and training if he receives help via an NGO as I conclude he will be able to do.
64. What will be critical will be the availability of assistance with the appellant’s mental health. Section 12.5 in the CPIN is confusing because it mixes up all the different types of mental health support which are available. I appreciate that there are limitations with mental health support, I have considered the Asylos report, but despite the limitations, the NGOs such as Different and Equal, Vatra and Mary Ward Loreto appear to offer their own counselling and therapy (see the annexes to the CPIN for the services which are provided) not just to those in the shelter but to those they support in the community. The services include psychological services with evaluation by a psychologist followed by therapy (see 12.5.13). I note that in the UK at the time of the hearing the appellant was waiting for an assessment for psychological therapy (see message relating to initial assessment for such therapy on 19 February). Thus, although there are references to psychological therapies not being available from the state or in schools (12.5.10) it seems to be available from the NGOs. I note that for serious cases referral to psychiatrists or psychiatric hospitals is available (see 12.5.4). The CPIN on mental health shows that specialised treatment for PTSD is available at the Mother Theresa hospital in Tirana (4.3.2), there are other psychiatric hospitals in other parts of Albania, and patients pay nothing for mental health services at the point of service if they are insured or for drugs which are reimbursable from the health care insurance fund (section 7). Returning to the CPIN on trafficking, it is clear that health insurance for victims of trafficking is covered by the state (12.5.2). It seems in context as if the reference to the costs of medication not being covered by insurance (12.5.1) are to the costs of medication which are outside the health care insurance fund (see also the discussion at 12.5.15). I note from the CPIN on mental health (section 6) that the medication the appellant is currently taking is not provided by the insurance fund, but others are provided to treat depression and anxiety, and I do not have any evidence which would indicate that the medication available would not assist the appellant.
65. I appreciate that the appellant’s mental health is likely to worsen on return to Albania, but although he is currently anxious and has been signed off work, his support workers describe him as someone who demonstrates independent living skills, resilience and emotional maturity and has engaged well with those who are helping him. I understand that they believe that the progress he has made will be severely disrupted if he were removed from the environment where he has built safety, routine and support but there will be some support available for him in Albania and those organisations who support victims of trafficking will be used to helping those who are newly returned navigate the challenges including the stresses of starting life again in Albania.
66. I repeat that I have considered the Asylos report, specifically those sections referred to in the skeleton argument, but I conclude that despite the limitations, there will be services available which the appellant will be able to access if necessary with the prompting of his partner and his mother. I do not suggest that it will be easy but if the appellant accesses those services he will have somewhere to live, be assisted with his mental health or access health services and when he is in a better position to do so, employment opportunities. That the appellant, although under stress is spoken of so positively by his support workers, is a good indication that once he accepts help in Albania and appreciates that he is not under the immediate threat that he fears he will be able to progress in work or a business given the assistance I have mentioned (and as he is already interested in barbering he has the foundations for work beyond a basic warehouse job) and so integrate and remove the risk of re-trafficking. I conclude that the appellant will be able, having received the support available, to cope on his own when the support from the NGOs ends, with the emotional support if necessary of his mother and his partner.
67. I am not satisfied therefore bearing in mind the support available to returned male victims of trafficking that the appellant even bearing in mind his particular circumstances will be at risk of persecution or re-trafficking. I consider that there are good reasons to indicate that his past treatment will not be repeated.
Internal relocation
68. It follows from my conclusions above that the appellant will be safe if he relocates internally.
69. I consider internal relocation would be reasonable and not unduly harsh. My conclusions are predicated on the appellant accessing the support available with the help if necessary of his mother and partner but having accessed the support available, whilst as I have said there is stigma for victims of trafficking, the stigma is likely to be less rather than more if the appellant makes a fresh start in a new area where people do not know him. The appellant does not have florid and obvious mental health problems (he is not psychotic for example) so is unlikely to be seen by the public as a person will mental health issues. Initially he will have the support from NGOs and will be able to obtain treatment for his mental health and after that he will be in the same position as other young men who are having to make their way on their own in the area.
Article 8 ECHR
Very significant obstacles to integration?
70. To succeed under the private life component of immigration rules, the appellant must show on the balance of probabilities that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into Albania.
71. It will be difficult for the appellant returning to Albania where he has not lived since 2018. However he grew up there and has not lost touch with the culture of Albania and I have not been satisfied that he is no longer in contact with his mother.
72. The main obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Albania are his need for support upon arrival and his subjective fear of what will happen to him. I have concluded that he will be able to access support from the NGOs who work in the area which will assist him to establish himself. When considering subjective fear, the case of NC v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1379 is relevant. That case indicated that what a tribunal should do is to consider the likely reality of the appellant’s day to day life if returned and if there were likely to be obstacles to reintegration, it should consider whether there were steps which an appellant could reasonably take to mitigate such problems, for example by seeking state protection or asking for help from family members [28]. I conclude that the appellant will be frightened but by working with the support available from NGOs which it would be reasonable to access and which he will have the emotional support of his mother and partner to access, he will be assisted with those fears and as time passes he will appreciate that he is not at risk. There is some stigma associated with his past, but it will not be immediately obvious to everyone he meets at work or in a café or bar and what will be more evident on initial questioning or conversation is his failed migration.
73. The case of Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 explains that: “The idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life.”
74. The appellant understands how life in Albania is carried on. He has the capacity to participate in it in the same way as he did when he lived there as a child and as he participates in life in the UK. He will be frightened but he can call on the support available and with that support and assistance with his mental health he will be able to interact socially with his peers, make friends again and be able to work and build a life for himself again. He has not satisfied me therefore that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Albania.
The appellant’s relationship with his partner
75. I am satisfied that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner for the reasons I have explained and they have plans to marry. I am satisfied that they enjoy family life together.
76. I am not however satisfied that the appellant and his partner have been in a relationship similar to marriage for at least 2 years for the reasons I have explained at paragraph 41 above when making findings about the serious nature of the relationship. Whilst the definition of partner in Appendix FM of immigration rules includes “fiancée”, an applicant can only obtain leave as a partner if that partner is a fiancée if the applicant arrived with entry clearance as a fiancée.
77. Whilst I am satisfied that the appellant’s partner would not move to Albania, I am not satisfied that there would be insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Albania. It is a high test to meet. Albania is not a country known to the appellant’s partner, she does not speak the language, but it is a European country which is a candidate state for membership of the EU. I have not been satisfied that the appellant has an objectively well-founded fear of the gang throughout Albania and as I have repeatedly said the appellant would be able to seek support for his reintegration and for the difficulties arising out of his past experiences. The appellant’s partner could learn the language, could work in Albania and they would be able to make a home for themselves there. It would not be easy, but I am not satisfied that there would be very significant difficulties which could not be overcome or which would entail very serious hardship for the couple.
Proportionality
78. The factors weighing in favour of the appellant are his private life in the UK, his relationship with his partner who will not move to Albania and the difficulties he will face on return to Albania re-establishing himself as a former victim of trafficking.
79. Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 requires me to have regard to the consideration of giving little weight to the appellant’s private life, as he established it at a time when he was in the UK either unlawfully or with precarious status. I do give some weight to the appellant’s private life, however. I do so because he arrived in the UK as a child, was found to be the victim of trafficking, and as a looked after child, he was helped and encouraged to integrate into the UK. He was entitled to await the determination of his asylum claim and it is not his fault that it took the respondent 4 ½ years to decide the claim and he was then entitled to challenge it on appeal. During this time the strength of his private life in the UK would have grown.
80. Section 117B of the 2002 Act also requires me to have regard to the consideration of giving little weight to a relationship formed with a qualifying partner that is established by a person at a time when the appellant is in the UK unlawfully. I consider there may be questions of whether the appellant was in the UK unlawfully as he remained pending the final resolution of his asylum claim, but I do give the appellant’s relationship with his partner little weight regardless of the statute. I give it little weight because the relationship has only deepened to the extent of being referred to as a consideration since the original hearing before the FTJ, and so has developed in the most precarious of circumstances where the couple must have known that they could not rely on the appellant remaining in the UK.
81. I also give some weight to the difficulties the appellant will face on returning to Albania even though I have considered that they do not amount to very significant obstacles to his integration.
82. On the other side, there is a strong public interest in the maintenance of immigration control as the appellant does not meet the requirements of immigration rules. In addition, although the appellant is capable of financial independence, he is not yet financially independent of the state and whilst his partner has also been supporting him there is no evidence she can support him to the level required by immigration rules of a partner. The appellant is also not of good character. He has committed a serious offence and that is relevant, albeit it was not suggested that the conduct is serious enough to lead to his deportation.
83. Overall, I conclude, and would have concluded even if the appellant were of good character, that the public interest outweighs the appellant’s and his partner’s interests. Although difficult, both family life and private life could be continued in Albania, and the appellant must have known since he became an adult that he was unlikely to be able to stay in the UK unless he succeeded in his international protection claim. I consider that the decision does not have unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or his partner and it is proportionate and does not breach Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed on remaking.
A-R Landes
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
8 May 2026
Annex (error of law decision)
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-003861
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52796/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
06/02/2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES
Between
S P
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Panagiotopoulou, Counsel instructed by Sentinel Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Howells, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 6 December 2024
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Albania. He entered the UK illegally in October 2018 at the age of 16 and claimed asylum on arrival. He appeals, with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor, the decision of Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal M K P Davies promulgated on 2 July 2024 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 21 July 2023 to refuse his international protection and human rights claims.
2. We have continued the anonymity order made in the First-Tier Tribunal. There is a public interest in open justice, but the appellant is admitted to be a victim of trafficking within Albania and he has consequent mental health problems. We consider that his interests, and the public interest in maintaining confidence in the asylum system by ensuring vulnerable people are willing to provide candid and complete information in support of their applications, outweigh the public interest in open justice.
The judge’s decision; the grounds and rule 24 response
3. The respondent had accepted in the decision letter that the appellant was deceived into working on a cannabis farm in Albania by two members of a gang. The judge found the appellant to be broadly credible [24].
4. The salient facts found by the judge were the following:
(i) The appellant lived in Kamez, Tirana County with his parents and siblings [26];
(ii) His father drank and was physically abusive [26];
(iii) The family struggled financially [26];
(iv) When the appellant was 15, in July 2017, he was approached by 2 men who told him he could make lots of money working for them. The work turned out to be in a cannabis farm. When the appellant protested, he was punched on the nose and told he could not leave and was told that if he said anything they would hurt his family. When he did work he was shouted at and hit if he was thought not to be working fast enough [27];
(v) The appellant worked at the cannabis farm for almost a year. He was allowed to attend school and sleep at home and was paid, but not regularly. After witnessing another man being beaten up and then dragged away, the appellant became scared and left Albania in July 2018 with a cousin who was working in similar circumstances [29];
(vi) The appellant sometimes saw police officers speak to the gang men at the warehouse and saw the two men who had approached him drinking coffee with police officers [28];
(vii) The assertion that the criminal gang the appellant feared were well connected to the authorities was speculation based on the appellant’s observations [24];
(viii) The appellant’s family in Albania were visited once and threatened after the appellant’s departure and the two men who had approached the appellant drove by the family home a number of times. The appellant has not been told of any further threats since (the appellant is in regular contact with his mother) [31];
(ix) There was a potential risk of an act of persecution from the criminal gang who trafficked the appellant [36];
(x) The appellant has been diagnosed with PTSD [33], [49]. He has been recommended specific treatment for PTSD and medication, but the appellant has not been in contact with his GP to ask for it [33].
5. The judge considered that the appellant could not qualify for refugee status as he would be the victim of criminal acts which would be committed for non-convention reasons, he would simply be punished by the criminal gang for leaving [37]. This finding is challenged by ground 1. The respondent accepted in the rule 24 response that the judge erred in failing to consider whether the appellant would be persecuted as a member of a PSG, namely victims of trafficking. Whilst the error is accepted, the respondent contends that such error is not material and avers that any other errors found would not be material, as the judge’s finding that there was a viable option of internal relocation was not challenged.
6. Having considered the December 2022 CPIN on actors of protection, the judge found that the Albanian state operated an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution. There were some issues with corruption, inefficiencies and resources set out in the background material produced by the appellant and referred to by Ms Panagiotopoulou, but this “implementation gap” was not sufficient to conclude that the authorities did not operate an effective system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution [41].
7. When considering sufficiency of protection for the appellant in respect of re-trafficking the judge specifically referred to the skeleton argument relying on the Asylos report and the claimed “implementation gap.” He also referred to the other reports in the appellant’s bundle and the most recent Asylos report. He concluded that “whilst these show an “implementation gap” the gap is not so wide that it is sufficient to make good a submission that Albania does not operate an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution, and punishment of acts constituting persecution such that the Appellant requires surrogate international protection” [55]. This conclusion and the conclusion at [41] are challenged in ground 2 for inadequacy of reasons. The respondent avers that there were adequate reasons given.
8. The judge concluded that the appellant would be able to access protection in respect to his fear of being beaten by the criminal gang, explaining that he would feel able to approach the authorities to seek protection if he feared being the victim of a violent crime [42]. The reasons given by the judge were that the appellant was an articulate 22-year-old who had had the benefit of some further education in the UK, and considerable experience dealing with officials in the UK. Ground 3 avers that the judge failed to have regard to the background material about the stigma attached to victims of trafficking, and to the authorities’ attitude. The respondent refers to the judge reminding himself that he had taken account of the documents before him and noted the limited reference to stigma in the skeleton argument. It was averred that the judge considered the country guidance relevant to trafficked women and gave adequate reasons for finding the appellant could access protection.
9. When considering whether in the appellant’s individual circumstances there was a risk that the protection available to victims of modern slavery would not be available to him, the judge referred to the March 2024 CPIN on human trafficking [43] and followed the approach in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 in respect of female victims. When so doing and considering the social status and economic standing of the appellant’s family he concluded of the appellant at [47] “He is not from a particularly poor or low status family. The family experienced financial difficulties and his father was an alcoholic. However, he was able to earn money albeit illegally when 15 years of age and able to fund a journey to the UK. He will be entitled to some re-integration funding on return. I find that his economic status is not such that it puts him at risk of re-trafficking.” Ground 4 avers that such finding was contrary to the evidence and contrary to the judge’s earlier acceptance that the family had experienced financial difficulties which were the catalyst for his being deceived into working on a cannabis farm. The respondent avers that there was no contradiction, and in any event economic standing was only one of the individual circumstances.
10. The judge was satisfied, referring to a country information note of December 2022, that medical treatment would be available to the appellant in Albania, mental health services being free and treatment for PTSD being available in Tirana. He said he did not believe the appellant’s mental health issues would put him at risk of re-trafficking [49]. He took into account the psychiatrist’s view that the appellant’s mental health might deteriorate if he were returned but was satisfied that treatment and care was available in Albania to address those concerns [60]. Ground 5 avers that the judge failed to have any regard to the background evidence in the CPIN on human trafficking relating to the lack of mental health services available for victims of trafficking. The respondent pointed out that it was not clear how the references to the CPIN on human trafficking supported the grounds of appeal, and in any event mental health was only one of the individual circumstances considered.
11. The judge also concluded that the appellant’s standard of education would not put him at risk of re-trafficking [48], that he was from the area around Tirana where there were support facilities available [50], that he was 22 so not of an age where he could be easily manipulated so as to be at risk of re-trafficking [51] and that he had remained in regular contact with his mother who could provide emotional and practical support and although he might not choose to live with her for fear of meeting members of the criminal gang, she would be available to provide support and so any risk of re-trafficking was reduced [52].
12. The judge did not consider it unreasonable for the appellant to relocate to avoid criminal gangs in his hometown if he were reluctant to access the available protection there. He had English language skills, a supportive mother, work experience and the benefit of a secondary education [56].
13. When considering Article 8 ECHR, the judge was not satisfied that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Albania, as the authorities would help with integration, the appellant spoke the language, was familiar with the culture, had lived in Albania until 16, and was in regular contact with his mother in Albania [65]. Ground 3 avers that the judge failed to have regard to the background evidence about the stigma attached to victims of trafficking which impacted on issues of re-integration. The respondent in the rule 24 response referred to the limited reference to stigma in the appellant’s skeleton argument.
Submissions at the hearing
14. Ground 2 - In developing her submissions, Ms Panagiotopoulou said that the judge had referred to the CPIN on actors of protection, but the “implementation gap” did not come from that CPIN but from the human trafficking CPIN. The judge was referred specifically to the implementation gap (para 10.1.1 of that CPIN) in submissions and he failed to give proper reasons. The reasons he gave needed to encompass evidence about trafficking and it was not sufficient to give a mere statement as had been done at [55]. He should have explained why he reached that conclusion on such a core issue. The 2024 Asylos report at p 768 of the bundle set out the barriers to protection. Ms Panagiotopoulou said that the CPIN at section 10 identified the implementation gap and referred to an earlier version of the Asylos report. If the judge had considered 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 of the trafficking CPIN he would not have come to the conclusion that the implementation gap was not significant; he had not considered the USSD report.
15. Mr Howells responded that the inference to be drawn from the judge’s comments at [41] was that submissions about the implementation gap did not displace the information in the material to which he had referred. The judge had taken into account TD and AD which was taking the position at its most favourable to the appellant.
16. Ground 3 – It was submitted that when considering that the appellant was an articulate 22-year-old with experience of officialdom in the UK, the judge failed to have regard to the stigma attached to male victims of trafficking. The judge looked at the appellant in the context of being a victim of violent crime, rather than in the context of being a victim of trafficking. The judge simply failed to engage with the evidence about the reluctance of male victims of trafficking to identify themselves as such. Ms Panagiotopoulou reiterated that she had referred to stigma in her submissions, not just in respect of risk from trafficking but also in respect of reintegration.
17. Mr Howells responded that the judge had taken account of all the documents. In the quote from TD and AD the judge would have had in mind the stigma attached to victims of trafficking, and he addressed the risk factors which might apply to the appellant. It would also have been in his mind when he was considering very significant obstacles to integration.
18. Ground 4 – Mr Howells accepted that there was “some tension” between the judge’s findings at [26] and [47] about the family’s economic status, although what the judge said could be interpreted as meaning that the appellant’s family had financial difficulties but were not of the lowest economic status. We asked him if he accepted the tension, what the implications were for the safety of the decision, and he said that if the judge had erred only in that respect, he would say it was arguable that the error was not material. He agreed however that if the judge had erred as advanced in ground 5 as well as ground 4 then that would be material.
19. Ground 5 – Ms Panagiotopoulou clarified for us the references to the background material in the CPIN on human trafficking to which she had intended to refer, 12.5.12, 12.5.6 and 12.5.2 which, she said, highlighted where services fell short. Vulnerable mental health was one of the main factors relevant to the risk of re-trafficking and the judge’s findings were, she submitted, simply contrary to the evidence before him. The judge had just relied on the generic CPIN with respect to the provision of mental healthcare.
20. Mr Howells responded that again the judge had made it clear he had taken account of all the documents. The grounds relied on particular paragraphs from a CPIN which concluded overall that mental health support and counselling was available; the finding was reasonably open to the judge on the evidence before him. Ms Panagiotopoulou in reply queried whether the summary in the CPIN in fact reflected the detailed contents of the section referring to mental healthcare.
Discussion and conclusions
21. Ground 1. We agree with the representatives that there is an error. The judge simply did not consider whether the appellant might be persecuted as a member of a PSG comprising victims of trafficking or male victims of trafficking.
22. Ground 2. When considering ground 2, it is important to have in mind the way the judge structured the decision. He considered first at [39] – [41] whether there was, in general terms, a sufficiency of protection in Albania. It was for this reason that he only considered the CPIN on actors of protection in those paragraphs. His explanation at [41] that whilst there were some issues with corruption, inefficiencies and resources this “implementation gap” was not sufficient for him to conclude that a generally effective protection system was not operated, is brief but perfectly sufficient.
23. At [54] – [55] the judge considered the specific arguments in relation to the protection available for victims of trafficking, or potential victims of trafficking. We find that there is force in the points made by Mr Howells. The judge clearly directed himself to the documentary evidence, [6], [55], referring specifically to the most recent Asylos report. He quoted from the executive summary of the March 2024 CPIN on trafficking, which refers to the layers of protection available and the onus on the person claiming asylum to explain and substantiate why those layers would be unavailable to them. He also quoted from the country guidance of TD and AD which in respect of trafficked women and girls explains that there is in general a Horvath standard sufficiency of protection, although this will not be effective in every case. He specifically explained that he considered the guidance in respect of women victims of modern slavery was also relevant for male victims [45]. This evidently informed his conclusion at [55] that the “implementation gap” was not so wide as to mean that the state did not offer a sufficiency of protection to male victims of trafficking in general. The judge is criticised by the appellant for not referring specifically to 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 of the CPIN, but overall section 10 of the CPIN whilst setting out the implementation gap, also refers to material which indicates that there are problems with implementation in every country in the world and highlights the positive efforts made by Albania. A judge is not bound to give reasons for reasons and we consider that he was clearly saying that the submissions about the implementation gap did not displace the information he had referred to which he accepted. We find the judge did not err as alleged at ground 2.
24. The remaining grounds challenge the way the judge considered the particular circumstances of the appellant and whether he would be able to access the protection available. We consider that there is force in those grounds, particularly when taken together and, for the reasons we explain, we find that grounds 3, 4 and 5 are made out.
25. Ground 3. The judge rather artificially separated the consideration of whether the appellant would be able to access protection from the risk of violence from the criminal gang, from the consideration whether he would be able to access protection in respect of re-trafficking, and we agree with Ms Panagiotopoulou that the judge should have considered the appellant approaching the police in the context of his being a victim of trafficking rather than simply a victim of violent crime. When considering whether he would approach the authorities, the question of stigma and the reluctance of male victims of trafficking to identify themselves as such was clearly relevant and should have been considered by the judge. Whilst the judge did consider the TD and AD factors, he did so subsequently in the decision and not in this part in which he, artificially as we have said, considered the appellant in the context of being a victim of violent crime.
26. Ground 4. Mr Howells rightly accepted that there was tension between the judge’s findings at [47] and his earlier findings at [26]. We consider there to be a contradiction and a significant one. As the grounds plead, the financial difficulties were the catalyst for the appellant becoming a victim of trafficking. We should say we find it surprising that the judge took into account the appellant’s ability to earn money when he had been doing so as a victim of trafficking. Although the judge considered other TD and AD factors and it is not averred he erred in those other factors (apart from mental health), the economic factor is evidently a significant one, particularly as men are commonly trafficked for forced or criminal labour (see CPIN on trafficking 3.1.2).
27. Ground 5. we consider this ground bearing in mind that the challenged paragraph is the paragraph where the judge considers the effect of the victim of trafficking’s mental health. That medical treatment is available does not answer the pertinent question of whether support would be practically available and accessible by the appellant in his individual situation. It is in that context that the failure by the judge specifically to turn his attention to the sections in the trafficking CPIN about mental health services and their practical availability to victims of trafficking becomes relevant. The appellant was described by the psychiatrist at [10.4] of his report as suffering from significant distress and disability in his personal and social functioning. The judge found that the appellant may choose not to live with his mother for fear of meeting members of the criminal gang [52,] and it is in this context that the judge should have considered what treatment the appellant would practically be able to access.
28. Mr Howells accepted, we consider entirely properly, that errors in both grounds 4 and 5 would be material. Grounds 3 – 5 as we have said above, go to whether the appellant would be able to access the available protection. Although the judge’s conclusions on internal relocation were not specifically challenged, whether the appellant can access treatment which he needs and whether he would be able to support himself (to which his economic circumstances are relevant) are part of the analysis of whether relocation would be reasonable and not unduly harsh.
29. We therefore set aside the judge’s decision for material error of law, preserving the judge’s positive credibility findings and findings about the appellant’s history.
30. Ms Panagiotopoulou asked us to remit to the First-Tier Tribunal, but as we indicated at the hearing this is an appeal which should remain in the Upper Tribunal. The facts relating to the appellant’s history and circumstances are not in dispute and no fairness issue was raised by the grounds.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside.
The judge’s findings at [24], [26] – [34] and [36] are preserved.
Remaking of the decision is retained in the Upper Tribunal.
Directions
1) The resumed hearing will be listed at Field House on the first available date with a time estimate of 3 hours;
2) An Albanian interpreter will be provided;
3) The appellant is at liberty to file further evidence relating to his current circumstances and health at least 14 days before the resumed hearing;
4) Either party is at liberty to file updating background material at least 14 days before the resumed hearing.
A-R Landes
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
31 January 2025