Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003905
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59775/2023
IA/00114/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

OMOLA AYOPSI OLAYINKA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Forrest
For the Respondent: Mr Mullan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh on 4 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a female citizen of Nigeria born on 24 April 1998. Her application for international protection was refused on 18 October 2023. She appealed to the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed her appeal. She now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.

2. Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman granted permission on Ground 4 only:

Ground 4: At para 3 onwards the appellant raises some points in relation to the judge's assessment under Article 8 ECHR. The point raised at para 3.1 is parasitic on Ground 1, which I have already found is unarguable. However, I accept that it is arguable that the judge failed to have proper regard to the nature of the appellant's claimed family life with her mother and brother in the UK and the fact that she left Nigeria several years ago as a child. I therefore grant permission on the points raised at paras 3.2 and 3.3 of the grounds of appeal.

3. Article 8 ECHR provides:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

4. Paragraph 3.2 of the grounds of appeal asserts:

3.2 It has incorrectly applied the principle based on Kugathas (2003) INLR 70 that family life exists where the person is over 18 years old if there is an element of dependency over and above normal emotional ties. The FTT considers this in detail at paragraph 16. It concludes that because the appellant is not formally recognised as a carer for the purposes of receipt by her brother of state benefit, there is no such element. In so concluding it has erred by ignoring the wider implications for the family (appellant, mother and brother) of the contribution by the appellant to her brother’s welfare particularly in circumstances in which the mother is unable to look after the appellant’s brother on account of working commitments and the appellant has to provide care. Such care may not be formally recognised by the state but it is an integral part of the family life that exists between the appellant, her mother and brother.

5. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision at [16] states:

The Appellant's mother claims to look after the Appellant's elder brother because of his considerable needs. The benefit awarded to the brother is in his own name. There is no Appointee. There is no formally appointed Carer or Legal Guardian. These are matters that would have been considered before a benefit could be awarded. In support of this observation I further note that the Appellant's mother is a residential care worker in a home. She works two weeks in the home and then has two weeks off. I can accept that the Appellant may provide some assistance to her brother as they both reside in the same household. However, there is no clinical evidence to support any claim for dependency on the brothers part that is relative to the Appellant's input.

6. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision is not particularly well-structured. The judge considers international protection (not pursued before the Upper Tribunal) and Article 8 ECHR (private and family life) at various points in his decision. It is, however, tolerably clear that the judge (i) did not find that the appellant enjoyed a family life with her adult relatives, including her elder brother, which attracted the protection of Article 8 ECHR and; (ii) paragraph 276 of the Immigration Rules was engaged as regards the appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom but that there exist no very significant obstacles to her integration in Nigerian society, notwithstanding that the appellant left Nigeria as a child.

7. The judge’s choice of words at [16] is also unhelpful. He refers to there being no ‘clinical’ evidence of the brother’s dependency on the appellant. He also gives too much emphasis to the absence of formal financial ties between the appellant and her brother. The grounds reasonably argue that the Tribunal’s assessment of the existence of family life should have be holistic and not confined to specific kinds of evidence. Having said that, evidence for a family life between adult siblings showing ‘additional elements of dependence, involving more than normal emotional ties’ is significantly absent (see Kugathas cited above). The judge makes the point that the appellant’s mother appears to provide much of the brother’s care. Even if the appellant provides some care for the brother when the mother is unavailable, it is difficult to see how that may constitute the level of dependency required to engage Article 8 ECHR between adult siblings. In my opinion, it was open to the judge on the evidence to hold that there exists no family life which attracts the protection of Article 8 ECHR between the appellant and her United Kingdom family. Even if the judge has erred in law by a lack of clarity in his analysis of family and private life, the error does not require a Tribunal to reconsider the evidence; on that evidence, a Tribunal would be bound to find that Article 8 ECHR family life is not engaged.

8. I am aware that at [55] the judge wrote:

Family life, at the level the Appellant currently enjoys, is capable of continuing by using such modern means of communication and remaining in touch such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Viber, video call, e-mail and the like, to say nothing of more old fashioned means of communication such as postcard and letter writing and telephone call. There is no evidence to suggest that the Appellant cannot continue to meet her family members in other parts of the world, where they might choose to rendezvous. [my emphasis]

The judge’s use of language is unhelpful. He has already found that the test for family life between adult family members has not been met so it is unclear why he should refer to family life at [55]. In my opinion, it is tolerably clear from his reference to the family staying in touch by video call etc and meeting ‘in other parts of the world’ that the judge is referring at [55] not to family but to the appellant’s private life and her relationships with her adult relatives.

9. The judge’s findings on international protection are not challenged before the Upper Tribunal. The judge’s analysis of the appellant’s private life and her ability to integrate in Nigerian society is legally sound. I therefore dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 2 October 2025