UI-2024-003930

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 20 Mar 2025
• Promulgation date: 29 Apr 2025
• Publication date: 14 May 2025
• Last updated on: 14 May 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003930

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50623/2022;
IA/01762/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 29 April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

L K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: David Jones, instructed by Oliver & Hasani Solicitors
For the Respondent: Julie Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer


Heard at Field House on 20 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his family, are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and background
1. The appellant “LK” is a national of Albania who appeals against the respondent’s decision dated 3 February 2022 to refuse his protection and human rights claims. His wife and two daughters we shall refer as “AK”, “BK” and “CK” respectively in descending order of age. AK is formally a dependent on the appellant’s claim, however his daughters, who are now adults, are no longer treated as dependents.
2. The procedural history of this case bears setting out in some detail.
3. The family entered the United Kingdom and claimed asylum in December 2014.
4. On 29 May 2015 the appellant underwent an asylum interview.
5. On 9 June 2015 the appellant’s asylum claim was refused and certified as “clearly unfounded”.
6. On 14 December 2016 the appellant made further submissions which were refused without right of appeal on 23 December 2016. He did attempt to appeal that decision, with his appeal being formally dismissed at a case management hearing on 17 March 2017.
7. On 5 February 2018 the appellant made further submissions.
8. On 18 March 2021 the respondent again refused the appellant’s human rights and protection claim without right of appeal. He brought judicial review proceedings.
9. On 5 November 2021 following a judicial review claim the respondent agreed to reconsider the decision of 18 March 2021, finally resulting in the decision that is the subject of the present appeal.
10. On 3 February 2022 the respondent again refused the appellant’s human rights and protection claims. This is the decision under challenge.
11. On 6 April 2023 the appellant’s appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Juss.
12. On 25 October 2023 the appellant’s appeal against that decision was allowed by Upper Tribunal Judge Symes, and it was remitted to be heard de novo.
13. On 17 June 2024 the appellant’s appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge French.
14. On 21 January 2025 Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt set aside the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge French. Given that the matter had been heard twice in the First-tier Tribunal it was retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
15. On 20 March 2025 the matter came before us. We are grateful to Mr Jones for the skeleton argument he produced in accordance with the directions of UTJ Bulpitt. The respondent had not, in breach of those same directions, produced a skeleton argument, or responded to the direction to agree a schedule of relevant issues to be decided. We were nevertheless grateful for the assistance of Ms Isherwood who agreed the appellant’s list of issues before us.
Factual background
16. The appellant’s factual case is as follows. In Albania he was a security guard in a hospital in which his wife AK also worked as a nurse. He also owned a shop. They were reasonably well off; they owned their own home and their children attended a private school.
17. LK intervened in a fight in a cafe in April 2009. This was an altercation in which a senior political figure in the local area (whom we shall refer to as “CS”) was confronted by a man recently released from prison who was a member of a powerful family (which we will refer to as the “L” family, and the man in question as “AL”). CS it transpired had been stabbed (and in fact almost died); however when the appellant successfully separated the two, possibly saving CS’s life, CS produced a gun and shot AL dead. There was a criminal trial and CS admitted to the killing, but said that it was in self-defence.
18. On the appellant’s case there were no further issues arising from this incident, apart from the fact that he and his family were not invited to the funeral to pay their respects to AL as they would have expected. It transpired that AL’s nephew, who had also been living in Italy (and whom we shall call “ML”) committed suicide following AL’s death. However several years later, in January 2014, the appellant was made aware that another nephew of the deceased (whom we shall refer to as “PL”), who had been in prison in Italy during the earlier event, had just been released. The appellant was told that PL wished to seek revenge against the appellant and his family for the killing of AL, for which he had decided the appellant was to blame. The appellant attempted to negotiate with the L family but without success.
19. The appellant states that he then went into hiding. However, in Easter 2014 the family home was bombed while his wife and daughters and his mother were present. Then, in May 2014, the appellant’s cousin, whom we shall refer to as “DK”, who had been assisting the family by taking the eldest daughter BK to school and back, was murdered. The family fled Albania, claiming asylum in the United Kingdom in December 2014. Thereafter followed the convoluted procedural history detailed above.
20. The appellant and his family have since then been living in the same home in the United Kingdom now for ten years. BK has qualified as a nurse; CK is working as an administrator in the local hospital.
Issues
21. Mr Jones had produced a list of issues, which as we noted above Ms Isherwood accepted as agreed. These were as follows:
“The Protection claim
• Is the Appellant’s claim to be in a blood feud with the [L] family credible?
• If so, can the Albanian State provide a sufficiency of protection?
• In the alternative is there a safe and reasonable (i.e. not unduly harsh) internal relocation option?
The Article 8 Claim
• Are there very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration on return (para 5.1 Appendix Private Life)?
• Would it be unjustifiably harsh to require the Appellant’s relocation to Albania. In responding to that issue in particular: (1) Does the Appellant enjoy family life with his adult daughters; (2) if so, would it be unlawful or disproportionate to split the family in the event the Appellant was removable and his daughters were not.”
The hearing
22. We heard evidence over the course of a day from the appellant and his wife and his two daughters. The appellant and AK gave evidence with the assistance of an interpreter whom they confirmed they could understand. BK and CK gave evidence in English. The key parts of their evidence are detailed below.
23. The appellant adopted his witness statement and gave evidence.
24. The appellant was cross-examined about the interpreter issues he said that he had had with his asylum interview, and the fact that he had not raised those issues at the time of the interview. He said that he had only become aware of the interpreter problems later when he received his answers in writing. He was asked why he had said in his screening interview that his profession was a security guard if he owned a shop. He maintained that his profession was as a security guard at a hospital, and that he also owned a shop. He was asked extensive questions about who else worked in the shop.
25. The appellant was asked probing questions in respect of his ability to obtain evidence from CS. He was also asked questions about the number of people involved in the fight between AL and CS. Ms Isherwood pressed him on why he was not mentioned in a newspaper article describing the fight, and he replied that he could not control what the journalists wrote. He confirmed that the information detailed in the letter from the hospital setting out his involvement in the rescue of CS had been provided at his request. However he did not know the person who wrote the letter on a personal level. He was asked why the author of this letter had not produced an identification document, and responded that all of the author’s contact details were included in the letter.
26. The appellant was asked how he knew that ML had committed suicide. He said that he became aware because he was told. Also, ML had been brought from Italy to Albania for burial.
27. The appellant was asked why the L family had waited five years before pursuing the blood feud against him. The appellant said that it was because of PL returning from Italy, and that PL had essentially taken on the blood feud and pursued the idea himself. He could not say exactly why. The appellant accepted that in those five years nothing had happened to him and the family had been able to live safely.
28. The appellant was asked why he would be the target of the blood feud when CS was the one who had actually carried out the killing of AL. The appellant said that revenge was required by PL under the Kanun law, and that when CS had been found not guilty in the criminal trial someone would have to be held responsible, in effect to pay for the not guilty verdict. The Kanun and the justice system were two different things that did not work together.
29. The appellant was asked about his ongoing contact with CS. He said that CS had shown him sympathy but was unable to help further. He was asked questions about who kept the shop open after he went into hiding and explained that another shopkeeper who had a shop next door dealt with it on his behalf. He left his job as a security guard without resigning and fled into hiding.
30. The appellant was asked why he had not mentioned in his asylum interview that he stayed with friends as well as family members and said that it was because the interview was short and there was not much time for elaboration. He was asked why he said in his interview that he was not moving around a certain town when he said he was staying with his sister and his uncle. He replied that his sister and his uncle did not live in that town.
31. The appellant described in some detail his attempts to involved the Peace Resolution Missionaries and others in negotiating a resolution to the blood feud. He accepted that he had no evidence from the mutual friends he said that he had enlisted. He explained that he had obtained the letter from the Peace Resolution Missionaries by request.
32. The appellant was asked about the bombing. The bomb had gone off at the front door of his house. While there had been damage to other houses it was relatively minor damage such as broken glass. His mother had been in the house at the time. He confirmed that he had sold the house.
33. Ms Isherwood put to the appellant that the bombing of the house went against the principles of the Kanun because of the targeting of women. The appellant noted that there had been cases where females have been killed even though this was not in accordance with the Kanun law. It was put to him that it was only his evidence that supported his cousin having been murdered. The appellant responded that was in the media as well.
34. The appellant was asked if he had been in contact with the authorities when he was in hiding. He explained that he had contacted the police and spoken to them and had expected something to be done. However this had not transpired and then his home had been bombed.
35. When asked about his daughters BK and CK, the appellant said that they all still live together as a family unit. They had been through everything together. There had been three recent deaths in the family. They could not think of going back to Albania. He only has one sister there who is married and has her own life and would be unable to support the appellant and his family. Equally his wife's parents have passed away; her brother and sister are in Italy and they have no one else in Albania.
36. In re-examination the appellant confirmed that they had all lived together as a family unit in the United Kingdom since 2014. They had a very close relationship and there was no expectation of the family being broken up by any other circumstances. He was very proud of his daughters’ academic work and now their employment. The family all rely on the same income because BK and CK have permission to work while he and AK did not. The only thing that he is proud of after everything that has happened is that they are still together as a family. They have never previously been separated except when he went to America for five to six months in 2007, which he found very difficult. He described vividly his terror when he heard the family home had been bombed.
37. AK adopted her witness statement and gave evidence, including brief updating evidence in chief.
38. AK is the appellant’s wife and the mother of BK and CK. She spoke about having lived together as a family at their current address since 22 December 2014, more than 10 years ago. AK gave extremely compelling evidence about the disruption caused to the family by having to leave Albania. The family had not had a luxurious life, but had a good life, a comfortable life where LK and AK both worked and BK and CK were both in private school. She spoke about when the appellant first went into hiding and how they had not realised that the entire family was in danger until the bombing. She described the fear caused by the bombing. She spoke about trying to explain the risks that they faced to the girls, who were young at the time, with as little detail as possible so as not to upset them more than necessary. She spoke about the distress of the young girls at having to leave the family dog behind when they fled.
39. In cross examination Ms Isherwood focused heavily on the lack of corroborating medical evidence of the continuing impact on her of what had happened in Albania. AK explained that she had been taking antidepressants until relatively recently, for many years. She had also been to see a counsellor. She had stopped taking antidepressants because she was going through menopause and the doctor had given her other things that might help. Ms Isherwood noted that she had not mentioned her medical problems in her witness statements.
40. AK was asked about whether her daughters help support her and replied that they did. She explained that she did not have family in Albania. She confirmed that she worked in the hospital at the time, though she said that there were in fact two hospitals very close together. The Doctor who wrote the letter confirming the appellant's involvement in the incident with CS worked in the other one. She was asked if she had helped the appellant to obtain these letters and said she had not.
41. AK was asked about the time that her husband was in hiding. She denied that they had been living a normal life. She had tried not to work during the day so that she could be with her daughters as much as she could, and worked at night instead. She said CK led a more normal life because she could take the bus to school; for BK it had been more dangerous. She had exams and she missed school as well. DK had to accompany her to school. AK was asked why she did not mention BK missing school in her witness statement and she said it was because she had not been asked. She agreed that she was not at that stage in hiding herself, because she believed that only her husband was at risk. Although she was scared of course, she thought that the risk mainly applied to him. When the bombing happened things changed.
42. AK confirmed that she had spoken to reporters at the scene of the bombing. When asked if that could have placed her family at greater risk she said that she had not spoken much and they were filming there anyway. She had wanted to keep her daughters away. She was asked why she had chosen to leave her mother-in-law in the family home and she said that they had not made that decision; her mother-in-law did not want to come.
43. AK was asked how she knew it had been a bomb, and if she had seen the bomb. She replied that everything had been destroyed; she had seen the damage. The police had said it was a bomb. She was asked how she knew they were the target of the bomb on their doorstep, and that it was not a “general bomb”. She said that it was at the door of their house. She confirmed in re-examination that bombs were not a regular feature of the neighbourhood.
44. BK adopted her witness statement and gave evidence. She is currently working as a nurse in an NHS hospital. She is working in ambulatory care, in the same hospital where her sister is working as a clinical administrator. She confirmed that she and her sister help the family financially.
45. She described the events of January 2014. She was a child but it was a big change. She described how her father went away and would only return for a few hours at a time. DK had to take her to school and drop her off. She had to stop socialising; she just went to school and went home. She described in detail how terrified she was when DK was murdered. She said that her mother had not talked to them very much about what was happening. DK’s death made everything much more real. She also described in detail waking because of the bomb and how frightening it was.
46. In cross examination she said that she spoke Albanian at home. She did not really have any Albanian friends in the United Kingdom though she knew some from her volunteering at a refugee forum. She did however know Albanian customs and traditions. She had not thought about leaving home at this stage. She accepted that if circumstances had been different, especially at her age, she would probably leave home, but they all lived together because of their circumstances.
47. BK was asked how she knew that DK had been murdered and said that she had seen it online and in the news. She was asked why she had not put details of how she knew he was dead in her witness statement and said she was not asked to. She also said that she finds it quite difficult to go over it. She was asked whether she had received any medical treatment and she said that she had spoken to mental health support workers but had not been on medication. She was asked if she had put that in her statement or produced evidence of it and confirmed that she had not. She was asked if she had spoken to the police and journalists at the time of the bombing and said that she had not. She said that she had not thought about going back to live in Albania. She has only one aunt there with whom she is not in contact.
48. CK adopted her witness statement and gave evidence. She is currently working in the same hospital as BK, undertaking administrative work. She started very recently. She described the family as very close. They try to support each other. The circumstances of their leaving Albania have brought them a lot closer together. The family is not used to spending time apart, most of the time they are together. The only time any of them was not living at home was when her sister went to university and she visited very frequently.
49. CK spoke about how traumatic the transition had been to the United Kingdom. She initially had counselling both because of the difficult change to life in the United Kingdom and because of what had happened in Albania. She was not sure how school worked when she arrived and found it difficult to find people to spend time with. She had had therapy in college as well though the NHS. She accepted that was not in her witness statement.
50. CK was cross examined. She gave more details about the counselling that she had had regarding what happened in Albania. She explained that she had had counselling through the NHS as well as through her college. She said that she spoke English at home. When asked if they spoke any other language at home she said Albanian. She was asked what language she speaks to her parents in and said that she speaks to them mostly in English, though she also spoke to them in Albanian. She said they mostly speak English as a family. When it was put to her that her sister had said that the family speak Albanian she said that she prefers to speak English because she is used to speaking it in school and college, and cannot express herself very well in Albanian anymore unfortunately. However she does speak Albanian with her parents and she does understand it.
51. At the hearing we also watched footage of what was said to be a local news report of the bomb attack on the family home in 2014. This was translated to us by the court interpreter. The video shows clearly the aftermath of a serious event. It appears to be a bombing, or at least some event that caused serious physical damage to property. Police are at the scene. The news report refers to the appellant’s family in terms as the victims of an attack.
Submissions
52. The parties made lengthy closing submissions. Ms Isherwood relied on the refusal letter. She appeared at one stage to be making submissions that the documents relied on were fraudulent, a matter that had not been put the appellants, though ultimately she simply said that they should be considered in accordance with conventional Tanveer Ahmed [2002] Imm AR 318 (starred) principles.
53. Ms Isherwood submitted that the appellant had been evasive, in particular in respect of his answers about what he said in his asylum interview about staying with his sister. She noted that the appellant was not mentioned in the newspaper reports and was not mentioned in the court reports of the incident in 2009 either. His account had changed significantly since his original account.
54. Ms Isherwood noted the gap of five years between the originating incident and the incident that caused the family to leave. She noted that we only have the appellant’s evidence for why they had to leave. She said that there was no evidence anywhere that CS had paid for the judgement exonerating him. Her core submission was that: (i) in respect to the incident in 2009, if it happened the appellant was not involved; and (ii) in respect of the incident in 2014 it was not possible to say on the evidence what had happened.
55. Ms Isherwood noted that there was no evidence from the appellant's uncle. There was only the appellant’s evidence that he had been involved in the fight in 2009, and there was no evidence that CS had ever been threatened. She asked the question rhetorically why a doctor would produce a letter saying that the appellant had brought CS to the hospital. She also said that the letter could not be relied on because the appellant had asked for it. She said that where a letter had been notarized that did not mean that its contents were inevitably accurate.
56. Ms Isherwood submitted that the letters produced could not be relied on because of the absence of identity documents accompanying them. She said that the evidence of the appellant being in hiding was very limited.
57. Ms Isherwood relied on what she said was a contradiction between questions 57 and 62 of the asylum interview record. She said that the family had been able to continue to live safely between 2009 and 2014. She said that it was contradictory that the appellant's daughters remember him coming to visit the family in the late evenings or afternoons where his wife said he did so at night.
58. Ms Isherwood said in summary that the appellant had not been involved in the 2009 incident; that there was no evidence of threats and no clear evidence of his having been in hiding. Who the bomb was really aimed at she submitted, we do not know.
59. Ms Isherwood was initially very clear that she was not seeking to go behind in the country guidance decision of EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 348 (IAC) and was happy for us to apply that. However she then changed her mind and said that we should in fact depart from it on the basis of the CPIN which showed a durable change. When we put to her that we would need to be taken directly to the evidence showing that there had been such a durable change she referred us to paragraphs 1.1.4, 3.1.1, 3.1.8, 4.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.2.2, 7.2.5 and 7.4.
60. Ms Isherwood was critical of the report of Antonia Young. She said that Ms Young did not look at recent sources. She said that there were later sources cited in the CPIN. She also noted passages in Ms Young’s report showing action being taken by the state to address blood feuds.
61. In respect of Article 8 ECHR she noted that the appellant's daughters are now adults and building independent lives. They speak Albanian. The weight that we can place on their private lives was inevitably limited. Their relationship with their parents did not reach the Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 threshold.
62. Mr Jones provided us with a detailed skeleton argument in accordance the directions of Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt for which we are grateful.
63. Mr Jones noted the respondent’s preoccupation with the veracity of the documentation in his closing submissions. There was no basis, he submitted, for making vague and unsubstantiated assertions that the documents were fraudulent, in particular when that suggestion was not put to the witnesses.
64. Mr Jones noted that there was no determined challenge to the credibility of the four witnesses except as regards one reference to the asylum interview where it was insinuated that there was a lack of clarity regarding his internal movements as between whether or not he spent time in hiding with family members and friends or family members only. There was no challenge to the consistency of the appellant’s testimony. The appellant’s testimony was moreover backed up by three other witnesses.
65. Mr Jones submitted that in his description of the event in 2009 the appellant did not overplay his role. He was in reality a bystander who had intervened to save someone's life. The incident happened; he went home and told his wife; she has now given evidence of it. The only challenge in cross examination to the substance of his account was in respect of whether he returned to visit the family in the afternoons or only in the evenings.
66. Regarding the documents Mr. Jones noted that the appellant expressed surprise that he was not referred to in the trial transcript. The transcript available is however from the appeal and not the original. The appellant cannot explain why he is not mentioned in the transcript. However he did produce a witness statement for the police. The precise nature of the appellant’s role is not actually essential; the point is that there is a record that he was present and involved. As to the fact that CS was acquitted, despite the fact that the account does not fit well with self-defence, it is notable that corruption is rife in Albania and on the appellant’s account CS is a man of considerable influence. Ms Young in her expert report records that Albania's corruption index ranking has fallen again.
67. Mr Jones referred to Annex B of his skeleton argument as demonstrating that there were still major problems with sufficiency of protection. The evidence does not support the Secretary of State's position regarding EH. Access to justice is compromised and affected by agents of harm. Nothing has in that respect changed. Ms Young suggests variations in protection provided in different contexts, but does not accept that blood feuds as a phenomenon no longer cause problems. It is notable that the statistics on the number of blood feuds are uncertain. NGOs and UNICEF have a different view to state bodies. As is clear from the July 2024 CPIN at s9, whether the evidence shows that blood feuds are actually in decline or not depends on which source is spoken to. The figures are not clear.
68. Mr Jones noted the level of consistency that has been maintained throughout the appellant’s account, his wife’s account and his children's accounts. He gave a detailed statement of the steps that they had taken to secure protection. PL was the antagonist who held them responsible. Antonia Young said that was credible; the issue was the loss of honour to the family. It was not simply the word of the appellant that something had changed in 2014; the Tribunal also had before it the statements of those sheltering him; CS’s letter; the letter from the Reconciliation Commission; the accounts of his wife and children. Given the fact that CS is indisputably the mayor and obviously a man of influence it was perhaps unsurprising that he had not been made the subject of the dispute, but the requirement for the honour to be satisfied remained.
69. Looking at the low standard of proof, and the evidence not challenged, the account was clearly credible. The news report refers to the appellant and his family. Clearly it would have been a bigger news event if it had not been a targeted attack. The timeline is clear. PL arrives from Italy; he will not be mollified by the appellant’s attempts to resolve the issue; there follows then the attack. There was then a very clear and consistent description of a developing situation. There is then the murder of DK. The family associate his killing with his proximity to BK. The murder of a male family member fits with the blood feud traditions.
70. Even allowing for aspects of the evidence where there are imperfections the appellant is entitled to the benefit of paragraph 339 L of the Immigration Rules HC 395.
71. On the basis that the appellant is credible there is an active blood feud. It is clearly notorious; a prominent man is involved. There has already been media attention. It concerns the L family. There has already been extraordinary and rapid escalation. The L family has demonstrated that it is determined to exact vengeance and careless as to who may be injured.
72. The appellant removed himself from the scene. In north Albania there is no state protection as has been confirmed by his experience. This was a very serious incident with serious property damage. Explosives were involved, possibly containing triton which is radioactive. There has been no apparent follow-up.
Decision and reasons
73. All of the evidence in the bundle (which was some one thousand pages, some of which was unfortunately repetitious) has been taken into account by us in reaching our decision. The fact that a piece of evidence is not expressly referred to does not mean that it has not been considered by us.
74. The parties, as noted above, agreed that the issues to be determined are these:
“The Protection claim
• Is the Appellant’s claim to be in a blood feud with the [L] family credible?
• If so, can the Albanian State provide a sufficiency of protection?
• In the alternative is there a safe and reasonable (i.e. not unduly harsh) internal relocation option?
The Article 8 Claim
• Are there very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration on return (para 5.1 Appendix Private Life)?
• Would it be unjustifiably harsh to require the Appellant’s relocation to Albania. In responding to that issue in particular: (1) Does the Appellant enjoy family life with his adult daughters; (2) if so, would it be unlawful or disproportionate to split the family in the event the Appellant was removable and his daughters were not.”
75. We have no hesitation in finding that the appellant’s claim to be in a blood feud with the L family is credible on the lower standard of proof applicable in asylum claims.
76. First, the appellant and his wife and children gave evidence before us over the course of a full day. Despite extensive cross-examination none of their accounts was seriously shaken. The key suggested inconsistency Ms Isherwood relied on in respect of the appellant was that he had stated that he had not been “moving around” the specific area mentioned in the interview when he also says he was staying with his aunt and uncle. However nowhere is it said, and the appellant denies, that his aunt and uncle did live in this area and therefore no inconsistency is apparent. It is right that he referred to staying with his sister and his uncle in interview and did not mention staying with friends, but his account of having stayed with a wide number of people including both friends and family is hardly inconsistent with having stayed with those two. Moreover, it appears from the context of the question that the expression “moving around” refers more to moving openly rather than hiding.
77. We do not agree that the appellant was evasive in his answers. On the contrary he gave clear evidence, answered all of the extensive questions asked and appeared to be trying to help the tribunal.
78. There is more substance to the submission Ms Isherwood makes that the appellant and AK’s account of the time he tended to return in the evenings while in hiding is inconsistent with the accounts of his daughters. However given that BK and CK were children at the time, and the events being described are over a decade ago, any inconsistency as to precisely which hours he tended to visit the family at cannot bear any real weight.
79. This brings us to a key aspect of our consideration of this case. Critically, this is not a case where the appellant appears alone describing the events that caused him to leave Albania. His wife and children all directly experienced the bombing; all give evidence of the appellant’s fear and their own; all give evidence of his time in hiding; all give evidence of the murder of DK. AK describes being told by the appellant of the incident with CS at the time that it happened in 2009. The evidence of AK, BK and CK was particularly compelling in respect of their lives in Albania and the fact that they did not want to leave. AK’s account before us of the distress of the children suddenly having to leave the family dog behind and flee, while hardly central to the factual issues of the case, certainly had the ring of truth. None, as Mr Jones rightly submits, had their evidence on any of these issues seriously challenged in cross-examination.
80. Second, there is considerable evidence, whether it might be described as truly objective or not, that there was a bombing. We have seen the report on what appears to be local television news. The report refers to the appellant’s family. The refusal letter suggests that the news report is inconsistent as it does not refer to the death of DK, but that is an error on the part of the respondent because DK died in a later incident. Of more substance is the criticism that the specific journalists are not identified. However, the production values of the video are such that the cost of faking it would have been enormous and it is on its face plainly credible. Indeed, Ms Isherwood, in our view realistically, did not suggest that the bombing of the family home did not take place, but rather that it was not possible to say whether the motivation for that bombing was really a blood feud.
81. We accept that the bombing took place. On any view, the fact of the bombing of a residential building where the family lived is highly corroborative of the appellant’s account that he was in some kind of potentially deadly dispute.
82. Third, we consider that we can place weight on the papers adduced by the appellant, having considered them in the round applying Tanveer Ahmed. We place weight on the letters from friends asserting that the appellant and his family stayed with them while in hiding. We note Ms Isherwood’s submission that he referred only to family members in his asylum interview, but what was said there is not inconsistent with his having also stayed with friends. Given the length of time during which he was in hiding, it is unsurprising that he stayed in different places.
83. We place some weight on the letter from SC supporting his account of the appellant’s actions in bringing him to hospital, though we do accept Ms Isherwood’s submission that the fact that it is a notarised copy does not inherently mean that what is contained therein is reliable.
84. The letter from the doctor was the subject of sustained criticism from Ms Isherwood. However we do consider that we may place weight on it taken in the round. The appellant was clear that this letter was produced at his request, although he did not know the doctor personally. It is consistent with his account and the accounts of others. The fact that a piece of evidence is produced following a request by an appellant does not make it inherently unreliable: see e.g. R (SS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department ("self-serving" statements) [2017] UKUT 164 (IAC). An appellant is not to be penalised for seeking official confirmation of his factual account.
85. We also place weight on the letters from the Peace Reconciliation Missionaries of Albania in respect of the blood feuds of the L family and the appellant’s attempts to resolve the blood feud. The provenance of those letters is reasonably clear and, again, they are broadly consistent with the rest of the evidence.
86. Where Ms Isherwood’s criticisms of the evidence have the most force is in respect of the fact that the appellant is not actually mentioned in many of the documents that specifically refer to the 2009 incident. He does not feature in the newspaper report of the killing of AL. He is not mentioned in the newspaper reports on the election of SC, though perhaps this would not be expected. He is omitted entirely from the trial documents. The appellant’s explanation for the latter is that SC was a man of influence operating in a society containing significant corruption, and as a result the events of 2009 were framed legally such as to exonerate him, and the appellant, given what he saw, simply did not fit in the story. Mr Jones notes that the judgment available is from an appeal court, but one would still expect the appellant to feature somewhere. The impression or suggestion is of a “stitch-up”.
87. This brings us to what is undoubtedly the weakest part of the claim. Why was the appellant targeted when he was not actually responsible for the killing? Why was SC not targeted? Why was revenge under the Kanun law not sought against the appellant until PL returned? The appellant’s explanation for this insofar as he has one is, again, that SC was a man of influence and matters appear to have been arranged so that the appellant, who was not a man of influence but was involved in the incident, was treated as responsible. He says that it was PL who decided that the issue must be raised and pursued.
88. In a passage quoted by the IAT in Kasolo v SSHD 13190, and again approvingly by Keene LJ in Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223, Sir Thomas Bingham said this:
”An English judge may have, or think that he has, a shrewd idea of how a Lloyds Broker or a Bristol wholesaler, or a Norfolk farmer, might react in some situation which is canvassed in the course of a case but he may, and I think should, feel very much more uncertain about the reactions of a Nigerian merchant, or an Indian ships' engineer, or a Yugoslav banker. Or even, to take a more homely example, a Sikh shopkeeper trading in Bradford. No judge worth his salt could possibl[y] assume that men of different nationalities, educations, trades, experience, creeds and temperaments would act as he might think he would have done or even - which may be quite different - in accordance with his concept of what a reasonable man would have done.”
89. It might be considered somewhat illogical that the appellant and his family were able to live safely between 2009 and 2014 before being relentlessly pursued because of a killing for which the appellant was not even responsible. However, as noted by Lord Bingham, one should be very cautious before assuming what actions would be taken by others living in very different circumstances. That reasoning must apply a fortiori to circumstances in which people are prepared to engage in a blood feud that could lead to multiple deaths. The illogicality of such actions is of little comfort to the murdered or bereaved.
90. It might also be said that if the appellant’s account were a fabrication, and if the documents were falsified, one might expect the facts to be more a little more convenient than they are. In that respect the lengthy delay in the onset of the blood feud, and the fact that the family were able to live safely in their own home for several years, has the ring of truth.
91. We do not, therefore, consider that the concerns justifiably raised by Ms Isherwood about this aspect of the claim are sufficient to make a finding that the appellant’s account is not credible, taking account of the evidence in the round.
92. Ms Isherwood also argues that the appellant’s account has evolved somewhat. In his original screening interview he does not mention the bombing or DK’s murder. However his account in the screening interview is consistent with his account in the asylum interview, and there under further questioning he does refer to the bombing and DK’s murder as reasons for his departure. It is not at all unusual for further details of a claim to emerge at a full interview that are not elicited in a brief screening interview (compare YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 at [19-20]). We accept Mr Jones’s submission that there is in fact a remarkable degree of consistency in the appellant’s core account from when he first made his claim to when he came before us.
93. We have taken account the factors in s8 of the Asylum and Immigration (treatment of claimants etc) Act 2004 although they were not expressly relied on by Ms Isherwood. The failure of the family to claim asylum in the countries they passed through on the lorry to the United Kingdom carries little weight in assessing the appellant’s credibility on these facts.
94. It follows that we find that the appellant’s account of being in a blood feud is credible and we accept it in full as detailed above.
95. It also follows, applying EH and paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules HC 395, that the appellant is at real risk of persecution for a convention reason (membership of a particular social group) subject to the questions of sufficiency of protection and the possibility of internal relocation. We note the evidence in the expert report of Antonia Young of murders in blood feuds taking place in some cases decades after the previous incident. There is no reason to believe that, should the appellant and his family return to their home area where the L family live, the risk would not remain.
96. The second agreed question is whether the Albanian state can provide a sufficiency of protection.
97. Sufficiency of protection is dealt with in EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 348 (IAC) as follows in the headnote:
“The Albanian state has taken steps to improve state protection, but in areas where Kanun law predominates (particularly in northern Albania) those steps do not yet provide sufficiency of protection from Kanun-related blood-taking if an active feud exists and affects the individual claimant. Internal relocation to an area of Albania less dependent on the Kanun may provide sufficient protection, depending on the reach, influence, and commitment to prosecution of the feud by the aggressor clan.”
98. Critically, on the facts as we have found them the appellant already sought the assistance of the police without success. The bombing was attended by anti-terror police but no arrests were made. Following that event DK was murdered. The appellant approached the police for help and they told him to go into hiding with his family. We accept Mr Jones’s submission that the position described in EH reflects the appellant’s own experience. Whatever the situation might be in other cases, on the facts of this particular case, it is tolerably clear on the evidence that there was no sufficiency of protection for this family.
99. That does not necessarily mean that the same situation now obtains, though it is a powerful indicator. Ms Isherwood invited us to depart from EH on the question of sufficiency of protection in reliance on the February 2025 CPIN Albania: Actors of Protection. She relies on 1.1.4, 3.1.1, 3.1.8, 4.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.2.2, 7.2.5 and 7.4.
100. Following SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940 we may only depart from EH if satisfied that there are “very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence” [47] for doing so. Any demonstrated changes must be “durable” (EM and others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC)).
101. We note that the CPIN is a statement of the respondent’s policy and not an expert report, though it is undoubtedly of value where it refers to and quotes independent sources. Having examined the sections set out above, we consider that there is insufficient evidence in them to justify us departing from the findings in EH in respect of either sufficiency of protection or internal relocation.
102. We have also had regard to the report of Antonia Young which Ms Young stated:
“While there are laws in place in Albania to punish offenders, the Albanian state is not capable of operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm. Corruption at all levels is an additional factor hampering the system.”
103. We place weight on the report of Ms Young which is in many respects consistent with the CPIN as regards e.g. the presence of significant levels of corruption in the police force and judiciary. This is also supported by the US State Department report. We also note the relatively recent decisions in BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania CG [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC) and TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092, each of which raises concerns about sufficiency of protection to a greater or lesser degree.
104. In Kinuthia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] INLR 133, the Court of Appeal, per Tuckey LJ, noted that recourse after mistreatment does not provide adequate protection. In the appellant’s experience to date there has not even been any recourse after persecution.
105. We consider therefore that the position remains as in EH: where there is, as we have found, an active blood feud, there is no current sufficiency of protection, at least for this appellant, within his home area.
106. The third issue to be considered is the possibility of internal relocation. The question here, applying EH, is the “reach, influence, and commitment to prosecution of the feud” by the L family. In EH the Tribunal held [70]:
“A crucial factor in establishing whether internal relocation is a real possibility is the geographical and political reach of the aggressor clan: where that clan has government connections, locally or more widely, the requirement to transfer civil registration to a new area… would appear to obviate the possibility of 'disappearing' in another part of the country, and would be likely to drive the male members of a victim clan to self-confinement in the home area as an alternative. Whether internal relocation is reasonable in any particular appeal will always be a question of fact for the fact-finding Tribunal.”
107. On the appellant’s case, which we have found to be credible, the L family appears to be one of considerable power and influence. The appellant’s account is that the L family had connections with both the police and the local authorities. This is reflected in the approach of the police to the appellant’s requests for assistance. The suggestion is that AL, who was killed in 2009, had been accused of trying to interfere with elections using intimidation, which suggests that he was not simply a petty criminal.
108. We accept the evidence of Antonia Young that the appellant and his family would be highly visible wherever they returned to in Albania because of the need for civil registration, the size of the country and the fact that family connections are likely to become known. This is consistent with the findings of the Tribunal in EH detailed above. We also accept that the blood feud in question appears to be a notorious one: there have been two killings and a bombing; SC is reasonably well-known and a figure of importance; the L family itself appears to be well-known and involved in numerous such feuds.
109. We accept on the evidence therefore that there is no safe internal relocation option within Albania for this particular appellant given the particular risk he faces.
110. We moreover consider on the facts that it would be unduly harsh to expect the appellant to internally relocate. This is because of the genuine subjective fear that we have found that the appellant and his family have. The evidence they gave of the impact on them of the bombing and the murder of DK was profound, particularly the evidence of AK, BK and CK. We also take into account our findings above that it was this genuine fear that led to them abandoning what was a comfortable life in Albania. We also take account of the fact that the police had, as we have already found, failed to protect them, and their genuine belief that the police cannot protect them.
111. In those circumstances, even if the appellant was ultimately able to remain anonymous on return to another part of Albania, whether alone or with his wife and children, and was therefore able to avoid the risk from the L family, he would spend the rest of his life looking over his shoulder with the risk of being killed at any time. That would in our view be unduly harsh to the Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426 standard.
112. The fourth issue for consideration is whether or not there are very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into Albania. This, in our view, stands or falls with the asylum claim. The appellant speaks Albanian, has a considerable employment record and is clearly a man of some capacity. Even after an absence of eleven years we have no real doubt that he could reintegrate successfully into Albanian society.
113. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 Sales LJ held as follows [14]:
“The idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.”
114. The only plausible obstacle to the appellant’s reintegration here is the risk from the L family. That however, on the findings above, is on any view a very significant obstacle to reintegration. Even if he were to remain anonymous in another part of Albania, perpetually looking over his shoulder, his ability to access support and employment would be critically limited by the need to remain anonymous. This fear would also operate as a “chilling factor” limiting his willingness to even attempt to access housing or employment for fear of discovery by the wrong person. We therefore consider that there are, to that extent only, very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Albanian society.
115. The fifth issue is described in the agreed list as follows:
“Would it be unjustifiably harsh to require the Appellant’s relocation to Albania. In responding to that issue in particular: (1) Does the Appellant enjoy family life with his adult daughters; (2) if so, would it be unlawful or disproportionate to split the family in the event the Appellant was removable and his daughters were not.”
116. We have been told that the respondent has accepted that the Article 8 ECHR claims of BK and CK must be considered separately and that those considerations have yet to take place. Certainly the refusal letter states that as they are adults they are no longer treated as dependents on the appellant’s claim. They have permission to work and have been here now for more than ten years, having arrived as children. Their position will fall for further consideration and we proceed on the basis that it is not determined whether they are to remain in the United Kingdom or not. We therefore, artificial though it may seem, must proceed to consider the position as it affects the appellant and his wife whether the appellant’s daughters are ultimately required to leave or permitted to remain.
117. We first address the question of whether or not the appellant has family life with his adult daughters. In our view that is not a straightforward matter.
118. In Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 Sedley LJ approved at [14] the Commission decision in S v United Kingdom (1984) 40 DR 196 where it was held that:
“Generally, the protection of family life under Article 8 involves cohabiting dependents, such as parents and their dependent, minor children. Whether it extends to other relationships depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Relationships between adults, a mother and her 33 year old son in the present case, would not necessarily acquire the protection of Article 8 of the Convention without evidence of further elements of dependency, involving more than the normal emotional ties.”
119. At [24], Arden LJ summarised the approach to be taken to assessing whether family life exists in such circumstances as follows:
“The court has to scrutinise the relevant factors. Such factors include identifying who are the near relatives of the appellant, the nature of the links between them and the appellant, the age of the appellant, where and with whom he has resided in the past, and the forms of contact he has maintained with the other members of the family with whom he claims to have a family life.”
120. It was Ms Isherwood’s submission that this threshold, of a dependency amounting to more than normal emotional ties, is not reached in the present case.
121. In AA v United Kingdom [2012] INLR 1, the Strasbourg Court found at [49] that a young adult still living with his family could be regarded as enjoying a family life with them. However the Court also considered that it was not necessary to decide the question because the young person’s private life was engaged. The relevant line of authorities was summarised by the Court of Appeal in Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] Imm AR 1 at [25-26]:
“24. I do not think that the judgments to which I have referred lead to any difficulty in determining the correct approach to Article 8 in cases involving adult children. In the case of adults, in the context of immigration control, there is no legal or factual presumption as to the existence or absence of family life for the purposes of Article 8. I point out that the approach of the European Commission for Human Rights cited approvingly in Kugathas did not include any requirement of exceptionality. It all depends on the facts. The love and affection between an adult and his parents or siblings will not of itself justify a finding of a family life. There has to be something more. A young adult living with his parents or siblings will normally have a family life to be respected under Article 8. A child enjoying a family life with his parents does not suddenly cease to have a family life at midnight as he turns 18 years of age. On the other hand, a young adult living independently of his parents may well not have a family life for the purposes of Article 8.
25. However, the debate as to the whether an applicant has or has not a family life for the purposes of Article 8 is liable to be arid and academic. In the present case, in agreement with Sullivan LJ's comment when refusing permission to appeal, the issue is indeed academic, and clearly so. As the European Court of Human Rights pointed out in AA, in a judgment which I have found most helpful, the factors to be examined in order to assess proportionality are the same regardless of whether family or private life is engaged…”
122. BK and CK are now aged 28 and 25 respectively. In the general run of things, on any view, adults that age would not have family life with their parents. However, in the general run of things they would not still be living together and assisting with the financial support of their parents either. They have always lived together as a single family unit save when the appellant travelled briefly to the United States some decades ago, when he was in hiding, and when BK was at university. They have been living in the same family home for the past decade. They have, the evidence shows, been driven together by their extreme circumstances – the manner in which they had to flee Albania and the decade since that they have been attempting to regularise their status.
123. On the other hand BK rightly accepts that she would have expected to leave home by now but has not been able to do so because of their circumstances. Both BK and CK have jobs and social lives that are outside the orbit of their parents.
124. This is in our view a finely balanced issue. We were left with the impression that there is a level of dependency that goes beyond normal emotional ties, but that it is largely situational: if the appellant and AK were granted leave we would expect BK and CK to relatively rapidly develop their own lives away from their parents. That is accordingly our finding.
125. That is not to underplay the closeness of the relationships which we fully accept. Ultimately, our view is that this is, as in Singh, an “academic and arid” debate. The appellant and BK have family life with their daughters, or if we are wrong about that private life worthy of considerable respect. What is beyond doubt is that BK and CK share a relationship with their parents which, as a result of the challenges they have faced together is of unusual depth and quality. The real question for us is whether the removal of the appellant and his wife would be disproportionate having regard to their connections to the United Kingdom.
126. We have considered the factors set out at paragraph 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. We accept that the appellant and AK speak English, notwithstanding that they gave evidence in Albanian because they wished to ensure precision. It was clear that they understood what was being said in English and the evidence of CK is that she prefers to speak to them in English. That is a neutral factor. They are not financially independent, notwithstanding that the appellant is capable of work whether here or in Albania. That weighs against them.
127. Applying s117A(2) and s117B(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act, we are required to have regard to the need to give little weight to a private life formed when a person’s presence in the United Kingdom is precarious or unlawful. The appellant and his wife have never had leave to remain in the United Kingdom. Guidance on the application of these provisions was given by the Court of Appeal in the case of Rhuppiah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 803 where the Court resolved the potential conflict between Article 8 ECHR and the provision as follows [53]:
“Although a court or tribunal should have regard to the consideration that little weight should be given to private life established in such circumstances, it is possible without violence to the language to say that such generalised normative guidance may be overridden in an exceptional case by particularly strong features of the private life in question, where it is not appropriate in Article 8 terms to attach only little weight to private life...”
128. That approach was endorsed by the Supreme Court ([2018] UKSC 58 at [49]).
129. There are features of considerable strength here: the very close relationship the appellant and AK have with their daughters (whose status remains undetermined); the fact that they have been living in the same family home for the past decade where inevitably they have put down roots.
130. Nevertheless, had their presence in the United Kingdom been the consequence of repeated efforts to delay lawful removal following spurious or unmeritorious applications, or lengthy periods of absconding, there would be little doubt that the public interest in maintaining an effective immigration control would comfortably outweigh that private and/or family life.
131. But that is not the case. As we noted at the beginning of this determination the procedural history of this matter bears some consideration. This hearing, at which the appellant’s appeal is being heard de novo, is dealing with an asylum claim made in 2014. Some part of that delay is due to the trials and tribulations of the tribunal system, for which no one is to blame. However the Respondent resisted giving the appellant a right of appeal for the first seven years of the family’s presence in the United Kingdom. During that time the family will inevitably have built up substantial connections to this country, as vividly described in e.g. the evidence of CK who now speaks to her parents in English because she is more comfortable speaking it than Albanian.
132. In EB(Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] 1 AC 1159 Lord Bingham held as follows [14-16]:
“14. It does not, however, follow that delay in the decision-making process is necessarily irrelevant to the decision. It may, depending on the facts, be relevant in any one of three ways. First, the applicant may during the period of any delay develop closer personal and social ties and establish deeper roots in the community than he could have shown earlier. The longer the period of the delay, the likelier this is to be true. To the extent that it is true, the applicant's claim under article 8 will necessarily be strengthened. It is unnecessary to elaborate this point since the respondent accepts it.
15. Delay may be relevant in a second, less obvious, way. An immigrant without leave to enter or remain is in a very precarious situation, liable to be removed at any time. Any relationship into which such an applicant enters is likely to be, initially, tentative, being entered into under the shadow of severance by administrative order. This is the more true where the other party to the relationship is aware of the applicant's precarious position. This has been treated as relevant to the quality of the relationship. Thus in R (Ajoh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 655, para 11, it was noted that "It was reasonable to expect that both [the applicant] and her husband would be aware of her precarious immigration status". This reflects the Strasbourg court's listing of factors relevant to the proportionality of removing an immigrant convicted of crime: "whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship" see Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50, para 48; Mokrani v France (2003) 40 EHRR 123, para 30. A relationship so entered into may well be imbued with a sense of impermanence. But if months pass without a decision to remove being made, and months become years, and year succeeds year, it is to be expected that this sense of impermanence will fade and the expectation will grow that if the authorities had intended to remove the applicant they would have taken steps to do so. This result depends on no legal doctrine but on an understanding of how, in some cases, minds may work and it may affect the proportionality of removal.
16. Delay may be relevant, thirdly, in reducing the weight otherwise to be accorded to the requirements of firm and fair immigration control, if the delay is shown to be the result of a dysfunctional system which yields unpredictable, inconsistent and unfair outcomes. In the present case the appellant's cousin, who entered the country and applied for asylum at the same time and whose position is not said to be materially different, was granted exceptional leave to remain, during the two-year period which it took the respondent to correct its erroneous decision to refuse the appellant's application on grounds of non-compliance. In the case of JL (Sierra Leone), heard by the Court of Appeal at the same time as the present case, there was a somewhat similar pattern of facts. JL escaped from Sierra Leone with her half brother in 1999, and claimed asylum. In 2000 her claim was refused on grounds of non-compliance. As in the appellant's case this decision was erroneous, as the respondent recognised eighteen months later. In February 2006 the half brother was granted humanitarian protection. She was not. A system so operating cannot be said to be "predictable, consistent and fair as between one applicant and another" or as yielding "consistency of treatment between one aspiring immigrant and another". To the extent that this is shown to be so, it may have a bearing on the proportionality of removal, or of requiring an applicant to apply from out of country. As Carnwath LJ observed in Akaeke v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 947, [2005] INLR 575, para 25:
"Once it is accepted that unreasonable delay on the part of the Secretary of State is capable of being a relevant factor, then the weight to be given to it in the particular case was a matter for the tribunal"
133. In our view the delay in permitting the appellant and his family to exercise their statutory right of appeal can be laid at the door of the Secretary of State. The claim was not clearly unfounded, as we have concluded. The most recent set of representations took more than three years to be considered, following which judicial review proceedings were brought resulting in the respondent having to concede that they would need to be yet considered again.
134. While we have no hesitation in saying that, had their asylum appeals been heard and decided in 2015 or 2016 there would be no Article 8 ECHR claim to speak of, they were not. It has taken more than a decade for the appellant and his wife to reach the hearing that took place before us. It took over seven and a half years before they were afforded a right of appeal at all, and throughout that time their connections to the United Kingdom have strengthened and the weight that may properly be accorded to the public interest in maintaining an effective immigration control has reduced. Those circumstances, in our view, make this claim exceptional. We consider that the appellant’s removal would, taken in the round, be disproportionate.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on protection grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.


Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


 21 April 2025