Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-003998

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/56552/2023
IA/00464/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 20 March 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

Between

MUR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D. Katani, Katani & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A. McVeety, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard via cvp at Field House on 26 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Pakistan. He arrived in the United Kingdom in 2017 in possession of a Tier 4 student visa and made an asylum claim on 20 August 2020, on the basis that he feared the Taliban due to his involvement in the Awami National Party [ANP]. He produced a number of documents in support of his claim, including two First Information Reports, a daily report from a police station and documents he said came from the Taliban in the form of written threats or night letters.
2. The Appellant’s asylum application was refused in a decision dated 30 August 2023. The appeal then came before the First-tier Tribunal for hearing on 17 May 2024 in Glasgow. In a decision and reasons promulgated on 15 June 2024, the First-tier Tribunal Judge dismissed his appeal.
3. An application for permission to appeal was made against that decision. It was submitted that, firstly, the judge erred in relation to her treatment of the letters from the Taliban in circumstances where there was a country expert report from Mr Owen Bennett-Jones, who found nothing inconsistent in the letters emanating from the Taliban and there was no rational basis for finding that a terrorist organisation would necessarily be consistent in the use and form of their threatening letters. The second ground of appeal asserted that the judge reached an irrational decision when considering the report from a newspaper in relation to the Appellant and his father. Thirdly, the Appellant produced a letter from his political party which was in the Respondent’s bundle stating that he could continue to face threats from the Taliban and the judge failed to take account of this letter which was a material error given it supported the Appellant’s risk on return. Fourthly, the judge erred in law in holding it against the Appellant that there was a gap in terms of issues with the Taliban between 2012 and 2017 in circumstances where the country expert stated that during this period of time the Taliban were defensive and many fled Pakistan for Afghanistan.
4. In a decision and reasons dated 28 August 2024, permission to appeal was granted in partial terms in respect of grounds 1, 3 and 4 but refused in relation to ground 2 on the basis that the judge’s findings in respect of the newspaper report were open to him in terms of relying on grammatical errors to reach adverse findings.
Hearing
5. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal I indicated that in light of the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 0038 IAC that all grounds of appeal could be entertained.
6. I heard submissions from Mr Katani on behalf of the Appellant, who sought to rely on the grounds of appeal. He submitted that the expert at [26] and [27] of his report expressly considered the two letters from the Taliban and indicated that these demonstrated the Taliban had animosity towards the Appellant, that the judge in considering those documents failed to take into account the country expert’s view in that respect and that the documents could be relied on as genuine. Mr Katani submitted that the judge erred in expecting the form of the letters to remain consistent, particularly in circumstances where this had not been subject to any adverse comment from the country expert.
7. With regard to the second ground of appeal, Mr Katani asserted that in relation to the newspaper report there were some problematic phrasing issues but this was not sufficient to find it was not genuine.
8. With regard to the third ground of appeal, the Respondent expressly accepted the Appellant was a member of the ANP, there was a letter from that organisation supporting his fear of the Taliban and the risk to him on return to Pakistan. However, the judge failed to make any reference to that letter which was clearly material and was simply not referred to. It was submitted this is a key document in the case and this was a material error.
9. In relation to ground 4, at [19] and [20] of the decision and reasons, the judge failed to take into account what the country expert said at [32] in relation to the delay between 2012 and 2017. This was also consistent with the Appellant’s evidence, yet the judge placed weight on this in reaching an adverse credibility finding.
10. In his submissions, Mr McVeety indicated that there was some acceptance that the judge had made errors but the question was one of materiality. In relation to ground 1, he submitted that whilst the judge may have made errors, given that the letters could be in any form and could have come from anywhere, this was not a material error. In relation to ground 2, he submitted that the judge’s approach to the newspaper article was not perverse or immaterial. In relation to ground 3, Mr McVeety expressly accepted there was no reference in the judge’s decision and reasons to the letter from the ANP. However the judge was not expected to make findings on each or every point in the document. In relation to ground 4, Mr McVeety pointed out the Appellant also asserted that he and his cousin had been attacked in 2014 so that there was, it seemed, an inconsistency between what the country expert had found as to the Taliban having withdrawn and the Appellant’s evidence that he was attacked. Mr McVeety submitted that it was inconsistent also that the Appellant would return to his home area given that he could be tracked down there by the Taliban. Mr McVeety submitted it was not a perfect decision that the errors were not material when all the findings were taken into account.
11. In reply, Mr Katani submitted there was an overlap between grounds 1 and 3 and that the errors were material because of the fear of persecution being from the Taliban. The expert did not raise any concerns about the different format of the night letters and it was submitted that the judge went too far in disregarding them for this reason. In relation to ground 3 Mr Katani submitted that the letter from the ANP was an important document and that the documents viewed overall showed that the Appellant would be still at risk from the Taliban.
Decision and Reasons
12. I found material errors of law in relation to grounds 1 and 3 and reserved my decision in relation to grounds 2 and 4. I now give my reasons for my decision.
13. Ground 1 concerns the treatment by the FtTJ of the expert report and the threatening letters asserted to be from the Taliban. At [14] of the decision and reasons the Judge noted three letters said to be from the Taliban but concluded that: “It is reasonable to expect that documents issued by the Taliban would be consistent in format in terms of title, layout and references. These contradictions weaken the extent to which the Appellant can rely on and the weight I can attach to either document.”
14. At [10] the judge reminded himself that in considering the documentary evidence he must apply the principles in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] IKIAT 00439; that no allegation of fraud had been made in relation to any of the documents and that he had taken into account the report of Dr Bennett-Jones (188) and accepted he had provided sufficient information regarding his relevant experience in relation to Pakistan in order to demonstrate that he is an expert in his field and that he accepted that his addendum report (434) provides robust information on the methodology he adopted in order to determine that certain documents which the Appellant had produced are genuine. At [11]-[13] the judge accepted, in light of the expert report of Dr Bennett-Jones, that the FIRs were genuine.
15. I find that the failure by the judge to consider the letters claimed to be from the Taliban in light of the expert opinion of Dr Bennett-Jones, whose expertise he expressly accepted, does constitute a material error of law. The judge’s approach to this evidence is clearly at variance with his approach to the FIRs, which he accepted on the basis of the expert evidence. As the judge noted, the decision in Tanveer Ahmed mandates that all the evidence should be considered in the round and I find that the judge failed to follow this approach in relation to the impugned Taliban letters.
16. Ground 3 concerns the fact that the Appellant produced a letter from the ANP at RB 141 which states that he continued to face threats from the Taliban. Mr McVeety accepted that there is no reference to this letter within the decision and reasons. I find this is a material error given that the letter was capable of corroborating the Appellant’s fear of persecution yet was not considered as per Tanveer Ahmed as part of the judge’s assessment, which renders unsafe the judge’s ultimately conclusion the Appellant would not be at risk of persecution on return to Pakistan.
17. Ground 2 asserts that the judge’s decision at [15]-[16] regarding the newspaper report is irrational. The judge considered a report from the Daily Newspaper 5.8.22 Swat district (411) which is set out in a report made by the Appellant’s father RU to an officer at Kanju Swat police stations. The judge noted that there was no evidence before the Tribunal that police reports may be made publicly available in complete format in newspapers in Pakistan; that irregular tenses were used in the report and that it jumped from third to first person narrative throughout; that it was reasonable to expect that a police officer would be used to drafting such reports and would therefore be skilled at being consistent and the inconsistencies, lack of professional attention and clarity weakened the weight that could be attached to this document.
18. The Appellant’s account in this respect was not expressly considered by Dr Bennett-Jones but equally at [27] the expert accepted this evidence (the fact that the Appellant’s father went to the police to advise them of the threat was reported in a newspaper) at face value without expressing an opinion that it was unlikely to be true. This may well be because there is no reference in the refusal decision to this document, nor in the Respondent’s review so the veracity or otherwise of the report was simply not raised as an issue in the appeal.
19. Whilst I do not consider that the judge’s approach is irrational, which is a high standard in any event, given that he gave clear reasons as to why he could not attach much weight to this document I do find that this is a point taken by the judge of his own volition without providing the Appellant with an opportunity to comment or taking into consideration that the expert accepted the report. Consequently, I find a material error of law in the judge’s approach to the newspaper report.
20. Ground 4 asserts that the judge erred in law at [19]-[20] in questioning why the Appellant would not be harmed between 2012 and 2017, given that the expert report at [32] states that this was the time when the Taliban were on the defensive and many fled to Afghanistan.
21. The judge at [19] noted the Appellant’s account that between 2012 and 2017 he internally relocated, changing University in 2014 after his uncle was killed and changed his phone number but found it “very significant” that the Appellant did not leave Pakistan after 2014 when he and his cousin were shot at and that he remained in Pakistan for a further three years and at [20] that this significantly weakened his credibility.
22. This was an issue in contention in the appeal, the Respondent in the refusal decision having asserted that the Appellant had failed to give a reasonable explanation as to why the Taliban failed to act upon their threats and that his account lacks sufficient detail and damaged the credibility of his claim.
23. I find it is not reasonable for the Appellant to know or to be able to say why the Taliban did not carry out their threats against him. He did state that they tried and that he and his cousin were shot at in 2014. Whilst it was open to the judge to find that the Appellant’s credibility was weakened by the fact that he did not leave Pakistan earlier I find that he materially erred in law in failing to at least consider the opinion of the country expert that the Appellant’s account had to be considered in the context of the fact that many Taliban fled Pakistan for Afghanistan during this period of time.
Notice of Decision
24. The decision and reasons of the First tier Tribunal Judge contains material errors of law. It is set aside in its entirety and the appeal is remitted to be heard by a different Judge of the First tier Tribunal and re-made.

Rebecca Chapman

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 March 2025