Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004002

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01667/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

8th April 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

Between

FA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Litigant in person
For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of India, born on 30.10.95. She married her husband on 18 April 2017 and on 17 January 2018 she arrived in the UK with a partner visa. The relationship broke down and on 7 September 2018 the Appellant left the matrimonial home. Consequently, having been informed of this by the Appellant’s husband, a curtailment notice was issued on 17 September 2018 and on 17 October 2018, her leave was curtailed with effect from 21 December 2018. On 13 December 2018 the Appellant’s husband divorce applied for a divorce on the basis of the Appellant’s unreasonable behaviour. A decree nisi was issued on 15 February 2019 and on 17 April 2019 the decree absolute was issued.
2. The Appellant’s partner visa expired on 22 September 2020. She made an application for DVILR on 23 March 2021. This application was refused in a decision dated 18 June 2021. Thereafter the Appellant made a private life application on 22 March 2022, which was refused on 16 August 2023. The Appellant appealed against this decision and her appeal came before First tier Tribunal Judge Abdar for hearing on 28 February 2024. The Appellant was unrepresented at that hearing and there was no appearance by a Home Office Presenting Officer.
3. In a decision and reasons dated 16 June 2024, the appeal was dismissed. The Appellant made an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal headed “Statement and Grounds” which was essentially a reiteration of her claim. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst on 13 September 2024 in the following terms:
“It is arguable that the First Tier Tribunal erred in its approach to the question of whether there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into India on return under paragraph 276ADE. The judge accepted that that the Appellant would be returning as a divorced woman and that her family had disowned her as a result [paragraph 27]. Although the judge noted the Appellant’s evidence as to the difficulties she would face on return as a divorcee without family support, he did not make findings of fact nor consider whether those difficulties amounted to very significant obstacles to integration. It is arguable that that infected the Tribunal’s approach to paragraph 276ADE and consequently the consideration of whether interference with the Appellant’s private life in the UK was proportionate and/or whether removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences.
3. The grounds of appeal also raise medical grounds and Article 3 ECHR. The Tribunal noted [paragraph 37] that the Appellant had not raised or argued Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds during the hearing. The Tribunal nonetheless considered the evidence and concluded that the Appellant’s medical condition (depression) was not sufficiently severe to reach the Article 3 threshold. That was a conclusion which was open to the Tribunal and it is not arguable that there was any error in its approach.
4. Permission to appeal is granted on limited grounds, namely paragraphs 276ADE and GEN3.2 of the Immigration Rules and Article 8 ECHR.”
4. Whilst the terms of the grant of permission to appeal would appear to limit this to consideration of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules and article 8 the decision in Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 00388 (IAC) would mandate a wider approach.
Hearing
5. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal the Appellant appeared as a litigant in person. I asked if she wished to be represented but she stated, through the interpreter, that she did not have a job nor money to pay for one and that she wished to proceed. I arranged for the decision and reasons of the First tier Tribunal and the grant of permission to appeal to be copied for the Appellant. The interpreter then translated the grant of permission to appeal and I summarised it for the Appellant. I explained I needed her to tell me where the judge went wrong and what mistakes he made.
6. It was agreed that Ms Isherwood would make her submissions first so that the Appellant would have the opportunity to respond if she wished. Ms Isherwood submitted that there was no material error of law in the decision and reasons of the First tier Tribunal Judge. She submitted that the grounds of appeal are a mere disagreement with the findings. The Appellant has no entitlement to remain and has overstayed her visa and it noted that she did not get permission on article 3. The A does not meet the requirements of the Rules and Article 8 is not a catch all and it is for her to put the evidence – from this determination the judge has considered all the evidence and the grounds amount to a mere disagreement.
7. With regard to very significant obstacles to integration the Appellant refers to family support but the judge found she would have support from people in the UK. In addition to that no background evidence was provided as to the stigma of being a divorced woman in India.
8. At this point the Appellant became distressed and wanted to respond, Ms Isherwood’s submissions having been interpreted to her. I explained to the Appellant that Ms Isherwood was doing her job on behalf of the Home Office and it was agreed that each submission would be translated and the Appellant would be given the opportunity to respond to each one. She stated, with regard to support from people in the UK, that there was no-one in UK who would be able to help her, because her friends and other people she knows have their own family and family members and they are doing as much as they can for their own families. They have told her very clearly they have tried to help her as much as they can but cannot continue to do this in India.
9. Ms Isherwood submitted that the Appellant has been receiving support in the UK from an elderly couple and that she said that her new friends have been crucial in helping her cope with the stress and anxiety caused by her situation. She submitted that the Appellant has used the system to get the divorce and non-molestation order and had solicitors for her family case. She has the ability to seek legal advice so why not do that with her immigration status? The Appellant used solicitors for that. The Judge noted at [19] that it was 2 years before the Appellant decided to make another application knowing perfectly well she had no entitlement to be in the UK.
10. The Appellant responded that Law Lane advised her but she did not seek immigration advice because she was extremely depressed and could not understand. I asked how she knew to make a DVILR application in March 2021 and she said that she was advised to do this by a third person who knew the elderly couple and they were a friends of a friend. Also she used to go to the temple where she found some friends and they talked about it.
11. Ms Isherwood drew attention to [11] of determination where the judge states he has taken a holistic approach and considered all the evidence whether explicitly referenced or not and the submissions. Ms Isherwood drew attention to the fact that the judge went through the Appellant’s history and made direct reference to the non-molestation order at [17] noting the stamp and the draft Order. The Judge explained at [18] that he was far from satisfied of the veracity of the document. On the evidence the judge was entitled to make that finding and the judge noted that the grant of divorce was on the basis of the Appellant’s unreasonable behaviour.
12. The Appellant stated in response that she had fraudulently been brought over to the UK and had been blamed wrongly as to why her husband had to divorce her. Once they got her here she was tortured mentally by her in laws and also by the behaviour of her husband. It was not her who was behaving badly she was suffering. The Appellant confirmed that she obtained an undertaking and a non-molestation order against her husband. The Appellant stated that she had to leave the house because it was so difficult for her to remain and they created all the paperwork and whatever they produced against her was not true but all lies. Her friends told her that the papers had been created fraudulently and she did not understand what was going on. She was asked to sign certain documents which she had refused to do and did not sign. The Appellant stated that she had never received the notice curtailing her leave from the Home Office. Ms Isherwood agreed that there was no evidence of service of the curtailment notice in the Respondent’s bundle.
13. Ms Isherwood submitted that at [21] and [22] the judge gave sustainable reasons for finding the Appellant’s evidence to be unreliable and inconsistent. The judge did not accept the marriage had broken down for the reasons claimed by the Appellant. The inconsistencies relied upon by the judge were put to the appellant, who denied with reference to [21] that she was telling different things at different times. She said (her husband’s family) have done a lot of wrong things against her and she had no understanding as to how to get proof. She tried to do everything by herself but they have never sent her any letters and whatever they have created against her it was not her who was torturing them it was the other way around. They kept phoning her time and again to sign certain papers regarding the divorce but they were not true so she did not sign those papers. I drew the Appellant’s attention to the fact that at [22] the judge noted that the accounts she had given were different at different times to which she responded that she did not understand what was going on. It was not her ability to go through all this.
14. I asked the Appellant if Law Lane solicitors had used an interpreter to take her statement, to which she responded that at that time she did not know what she was supposed to do she was depressed. At that time some people came with her but she had no deep idea what is going on. She said that her husband pushed her a few times. As to how she came to leave the matrimonial home she said she did this by herself she was alone at the time and on the train she met a couple who helped her go to her uncle’s house. I pointed out to the Appellant that this is a third version of events. She said he was not her real uncle he was the uncle of a friend of hers.
15. Ms Isherwood submitted that it was interesting to note that the Appellant at [23] and throughout her evidence states she wants to remain in the UK because she wants to work. At [24] the Judge considered the GP record dated 25.5.19 and noted she said that there was “stress at home” and that this was the highest the medical evidence goes.
16. I asked the Appellant if she went to see the GP on her own and she said she had been with family friends. She said she was not able to communicate freely with the GP and there was no independent interpreter. The daughter of a family friend had come with me sometimes. She had attempted to commit suicide in those circumstances and those same people (her husband’s family) came with her to help her. It was pointed out to the Appellant that this was new evidence not recorded in her statements of the decision and reasons of the First tier Tribunal Judge. The Appellant stated that she was simply saying what happened when she had to go to hospital. As to her suicide attempt she tried to attempt suicide at home, then was taken to hospital at the time when she was living with her husband’s family, sometime in 2018 and another time.
17. With regard to [26] of the decision and reasons in terms of very significant obstacles to integration Ms Isherwood pointed out that she spent her childhood in India and her main language is Gujarati. The Appellant came to the UK at aged 22 and has been here for 6 years. The judge found the Appellant suffered the stress of the marriage breakdown very soon after joining Mr Patel in the UK. At [27] the judge considers the disowning deed dated 14.5.19 signed by the Appellant’s parents. At [28] the judge reminds himself of the holistic view and the Appellant’s background in India given she will not be a stranger; she has been outside India for only 6 years and has retained language skills and is accustomed to the culture and life in India. At [29] the Judge reminds himself of the Appellant being a healthy young woman: there is only one record of stress in the GP records.
18. Ms Isherwood submitted that the judge takes account of her skills and time in the UK and is entitled to find she can use these to help re-integrate herself into India and that, even in the absence of support from the Appellant’s family there was no evidence of her actually not being able to care for herself in India. At [30] the judge noted the support letters at RB 64-70 and finds no reason her friends will not assist and support her to reintegrate into India and that the Appellant’s ability to make good friends demonstrates she would be able to do the same in India.
19. Ms Isherwood submitted that at [33] the judge finds on the grounds of private life that article 8 is engaged, albeit precarious. At [34] the judge found that significant weight should be attached to effective immigration control and that the Appellant does not meet the requirements of the Rules At [35] the judge finds the Appellant has the necessary English language skills and would be financially independent but did not find these considerations to be of any significant weight. At [36] the judge concluded upon a consideration of all factors it would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant. The judge weighed all the relevant factors and was entitled to make those findings and dismiss the appeal.
20. I asked the Appellant if there was anything else she wanted to tell me and she said that if she had to go back to India her mother and father had already sent her in writing that they have disowned her and they told her they do not want to know anyone who will protect her and they will not have anything to do with anyone who protects me. According to her culture if she goes to India she does not know what she will be able to do and she will have no other alternative but to commit suicide and she has nothing to do in India and would have a lot of problems in India. I drew the Appellant’s attention to the fact that there was nothing about stigma for divorced women before the judge. The Appellant confirmed there was no evidence but that her mum and dad will not help her in any way; she will be tortured mentally if she goes there and she will have only one option left and that if sent back she would commit suicide.
21. I explained to the Appellant that I was concerned with whether the First tier Tribunal judge made mistakes and that I would reserve my decision.
Decision and reasons
22. The issue I have to determine is whether the decision of the First tier Tribunal contains material errors of law. The issue identified in the grant of permission to appeal was whether the judge’s approach to paragraph 276ADE was infected by a failure to make findings of fact or consider the difficulties the Appellant would face on return to India as a divorcee without family support.
23. I find that no material errors of law in the decision and reasons of the First tier Tribunal Judge, for the following reasons:
23.1. The difficulty for the judge was that there was simply no corroborative evidence before him as to the likely consequences for the Appellant on return to India as a divorced woman, either in the form of background evidence or a report from a country expert.
23.2. It was entirely open to the judge to find at [26]-[28] of the decision and reasons that, having grown up and attended school in India the Appellant would not be a stranger there; that she had only been outside India for 6 years and has retained the language skills and is accustomed to the culture and life there. It was further open to him to find that the Appellant would be able to use her bilingual skills and experience of living in the UK to re- integrate into India, even in the absence of support from her immediate family.
23.3. At [27] the judge took the “disowning deed” signed by the Appellant’s parents due to being a divorcee into consideration. The judge further took into consideration the Appellant’s oral evidence of the difficulties she said she would face on return to India as a divorcee and without family support. It was clearly open to the judge not to accept that this evidence met the threshold for demonstrating “very significant obstacles” to integration absent further evidence. Whilst it is the case that the judge made no express finding of fact on the Appellant’s evidence at [27] it is clear from [28] that the judge took a holistic view of the case and at [29] he made an express finding that the Appellant had the skills to adapt to life in India even without the support of her immediate family there.
24. Whilst the Appellant also raised the issue of her mental health condition which she stated was a direct consequence of her abusive marriage. This was addressed by the judge as an article 3 medical claim at [37] even though the Appellant had not raised this as a ground of appeal, it had been addressed in the refusal decision. It was entirely open to the judge in the absence of any corroborative evidence in the form of an expert report and in the absence of reference to the Appellant reporting or requiring treatment for her mental health in her GP’s medical records to find that her medical conditions do not reach the high threshold of severity so as to engage article 3 of ECHR cf AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17.
25. Clearly the Appellant found the hearing distressing and would certainly have benefited from legal representation. I note that she made no challenge to the refusal of her application for DVILR and does not seem to have had the benefit of legal representation in respect of her immigration status at any stage. It would clearly be advisable for her to now seek professional legal advice.
Notice of Decision
26. The decision and reasons of the First tier Tribunal Judge contains no material errors of law and is upheld.

Rebecca Chapman

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chapman
Immigration & Asylum Chamber

4 April 2025