Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004029

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62994/2023
IA/00559/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

AF
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellants
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr A Heeps, Solicitor, McGlashan Mackay Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunal Centre on 9 July 2025

Decision and Reasons
An anonymity direction has been made. As the appeal raises matters regarding a claim for international protection, it is appropriate for an anonymity direction to be made. Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of his family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.
Introduction
1. The appellant is an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity. His claim for international protection was refused by the respondent for reasons set out in a decision dated 9 November 2023. The appellant's appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Doyle for reasons set out in a decision dated 27 June 2024. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst on 9 September 2024.
2. For reasons set out in my error of law decision issued on 21 May 2025, I set aside the decision of FtT Judge Doyle and directed that the decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal.
The Error of Law Decision
3. In my error of law decision, I outlined that there were three stands to the appellant’s claim for international protection by the time of the hearing of his appeal before the FtT. First, the appellant claimed that he was at risk because he had worked for Ebrahim Haji Rashid, an influential member of the PUK, and reported him to the Security Services after the appellant was unwittingly used as a courier to collect a package containing drugs. Second, the appellant claims he is at risk upon return because of his sur place activities. Third, the appellant claimed he did not have any identity documents and that he has lost contact with his family and friends in Iraq so that if returned, he will be unable to travel to his home area to be re-documented.
4. I directed that the findings made by FtT Judge Doyle at paragraphs [12(e) to (l)], [15], and [17] to [30] of the decision of the FtT are preserved. In summary, the judge found the appellant to be an unreliable witness who had given what was described as a weak and inconsistent account of events in Iraq. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim that he was reluctantly involved in a drugs dispute. The FtT judge found the appellant is a Kurdish, Sunni Muslim, in good health, with no particular profile which would distinguish him from any other healthy male Kurdish Iraqi. The FtT judge found the appellant is not entitled to humanitarian protection. The judge addressed the appellant’s claim that he had a CSID and an INID, which he left with his family in Sulaymaniyah. He found the appellant’s CSID is recoverable and that he will be returned to Erbil of Sulaymaniyah. The judge said the appellant is not an undocumented Iraqi Kurd. His family can post the CSID to him to facilitate his safe travel. The appellant’s return to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah, the judge found, would not breach the appellant’s Article 8 rights. The FtT judge also rejected the appellant’s Article 8 claim and found the appellant has failed to establish that he has an Article 8 family or private life in the UK.
5. I found that the FtT judge failed to make clear findings as to whether the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and activities in the UK represent a genuinely held political belief such that the appellant may be at risk upon return, applying the test set out in HJ (Iran).
6. It is against that background that the decision was listed for hearing before me on 9 July 2025. This decision must therefore be read alongside my error of law decision.
The Hearing
7. In advance of the hearing before me, on 25 June 2025, the appellant’s representatives filed a Composite Bundle of 796 pages together with what is described as a ‘Facebook Download Bundle’ comprising of 3967 pages. The appellant applied for permission for the additional evidence that was not previously before the FtT to be lodged in line with rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. Specifically, the applicant relied upon additional evidence in relation to his sur place activities. Ms Blackburn, quite properly in my judgment, did not object to the appellant’s reliance upon the further evidence.
8. The appellant attended the hearing before me and gave evidence with the assistance of a Kurdish Surani interpreter. He adopted his witness statement dated 13 June 2025 as being true and correct. The appellant confirms that since the decision of the FtT he has continued to be active on his Facebook account and that he has “around 5000 friends”. He posts regularly on his account about the problems that are going on in Kurdistan and photographs of him attending protests. He refers to protests attended by him on 28 June 2024 (to call for the release of Sleman Ahmed), 21 July 2024 (to commemorate a journalist, Sorani Mam Hama)¸ 30 August 2024 (to commemorate the murder of two Iraqi journalists), 16 October 2024 (to commemorate “the 16th October betrayal” organised by ’17 Shubat’), 5 December 2024 (to commemorate the anniversary of the death of Kawa Garmeyani) and on 5 May 2025 (about a murdered journalist). The appellant maintains that if returned to Iraq he “will continue to be active in the same way”. He confirms he is not a member of any political group in the UK and claims that he will be at risk upon return because of his ‘political activities’ and his “public Facebook account”.
9. In cross examination the appellant said that he set up his Facebook account in 2024. He referred to the first post on his account, which was an untranslated post written in the Kurdish Sorani language on 13 May 2024. He said that he created his Facebook account himself, without assistance, so that he could ‘post’ his activities and show the world about the oppression and hardship faced by the community. He acknowledged that the account had been set up about a month before the hearing of his appeal before the FtT (21 June 2024) but denied that he had been told that a Facebook account might assist his claim for international protection.
10. The appellant said that he had a Facebook account before, but he had not been very active on that account. He said that he wanted to set up another Facebook account to post information about his activities. He confirmed that he had not engaged in sur place activities in Glasgow previously. He started taking part in sur place activities in 2024 and decided to set up a Facebook account to post information about his activities.
11. Ms Blackburn referred the appellant to the “story preferences” setting on his account which shows that his “Friends” can see his story, rather than it being available to the public. The appellant referred to the setting on his account that shows that as at 24 June 2025 the settings on his account are that his ‘future posts’ can be seen by the ‘public’. Ms Blackburn referred the appellant to a post by the appellant on his Facebook account at 1:47:45pm on 24 June 2025 that had been ‘liked’ by seven individuals. The appellant sad that most of his ‘posts’ attracts hundreds of ‘likes’.
12. The appellant said that even if he deleted his Facebook account, he has now attended a number of demonstrations and his photograph has been posted on other people's Facebook accounts such that he would be recognised. He claimed that the raw photographs of him at demonstrations on social media pages of organisations such as ‘Dhakok’ and ’17 Shubat’ in particular. The appellant confirmed that he was not one of the organisers of any protest or demonstration but maintained that he has shared information about the demonstrations on his Facebook account. He said that when attending demonstrations they take photographs, make video recordings, and exchange information about what to do next. Ms Blackburn referred the appellant to photographs said to have been taken at a demonstration in Glasgow on 5 May 2025 and suggested that the numbers attending were quite small. The appellant said that he considered that a fair amount of people had attended the protests. The appellant said that he has attended demonstrations since 2022 and attended whenever he could afford to. He confirmed he is not a member of any political party and explained that he does not wish to be bound by any one party or its principles. He wants to be able to attend demonstrations organised by any party. The appellant claimed that he is an ‘influential figure’ but when asked why no-one else had attended the hearing to support his appeal, he claimed that he had not been told that was important. He said that regardless of the outcome of this appeal he will continue his activities until there is a significant change in the running of Iraq so that people have more freedom.
13. In answer to questions asked by me for clarification the appellant confirmed he had a Facebook account before 2024 but she did not post information about any of his activities. When I asked the appellant why he had not simply used the Facebook account he had previously, he said that the previous account was in a different name, adopting the name of his tribe. The account he now uses is in his own name and is used to post information about his political activities. He said that the name used on his previous account was a nickname that he was known by. The appellant said that his previous Facebook account has now been closed. The appellant said that in 2020/21 He had been attending demonstrations but later decided to ‘post’ information on the Facebook account so that the international community could see that the Kurds are being persecuted. He said he felt responsible and that it was his duty to let people know what was going on. I referred the appellant to his list of Facebook ‘Friends’. The appellant accepted he had established his first ‘friend’ on the account on 20 February 2024, but that he did not use the account to ‘post’ anything on the account until May 2024. I also referred the appellant to the information about his ‘imported contacts’ which appears to suggest the appellant imported some contacts since 18 November 2022. The appellant maintained he had not set up the Facebook account until 2024.
14. I went on to hear submissions from both Ms Blackburn and Mr Heeps that are a matter of record and it serves no purpose to burden this decision with a full recital of those submissions. In summary, Ms Blackburn adopted the respondent’s review. She submits there are already adverse credibility findings against the appellant regarding the core of his claim and that on the findings preserved, the appellant is of no interest to the authorities on account of events in Iraq. She accepts there is evidence of the appellant having engaged in sur place activities since May 2024, but no evidence to support his claim of activity before that. Ms Blackburn submits the timing of his activity is suspicious. The appellant set up his Facebook account shortly before the hearing of his appeal before the FtT and although he claim that hundreds of people follow and comment on his posts, that claim is not supported by a review of the account. The appellant is not an organiser of events and has no prominent role. There are modest protests that are not particularly well attended. There is no witness evidence to support the appellant’s claim that he is influential. There is no evidence that the Iraqi authorities are aware of the demonstrations attended by the appellant or that they would have any interest in him. He is not a member or any particular party. Ms Blackburn submits the appellant’s sur place activities are simply an attempt to bolster his claim. He can on any view delete his Facebook account because it does not represent any genuine political belief.
15. On behalf of the appellant, Mr Heeps adopted the skeleton argument dated 25 June 2025. He submits the first issue is whether the appellant has a genuinely held political belief. He refers to the evidence of the appellant’s continued attendance at demonstrations that are critical of the authorities. The appellant’s evidence in his first witness statement dated 20 February 2024 that was before the FtT was that he had attended a protest in Rania in 2017 and was about to be arrested. He was beaten but released because the crowd had put pressure on the authorities. That, Mr Heeps submits, is indicative of a genuine political opinion going back a number of years. The appellant is not required to be a member of any particular party. He has an extensive list of friends on his Facebook account albeit Mr Heeps accepts none of the friends can be described as a prominent figure that the authorities may have a particular interest in. Mr Heeps submits the appellant has a significant number of ‘followers’ although again, he is unable to point to any ‘post’ by the appellant that has attracted hundred of ‘likes’. There is evidence in the Facebook account of the appellant commenting on ‘posts’ and evidence of ‘posts’ by the appellant himself, particularly regarding his attendance at demonstrations. Mr Heeps submits the appellant has a political profile that he is venting to others and that his beliefs are genuine.
16. Mr Heeps submits there is background material that establishes that it is not just those with a political profile that are at risk. The ‘Gulf Centre for Human Rights’ reported on 1 February 2022 that repression and violations including arrests of civil society activists. journalists, and even ordinary citizens continue against those who express their opinions contrary to those of the local government and security authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. The Human Rights Watch World Report (12 January 2023) reports the targeting of demonstrators and critics of the government. The Freedom House report (9 March 2023) refers to assaults on journalists and those involved in education. Importantly, the report claims that commentary on controversial topics, including on social media, is considered to be off-limits with arrests, docking of salaries, torture and criminal lawsuits. There is evidence that the authorities arrest individuals, some of them ordinary citizens with no background in activism shortly after they post messages critical of authorities on social media, including the app Clubhouse, indicating that Iraqi and Kurdish authorities are constantly monitoring online platforms.
17. Mr Heeps submits there are pinch points at which the appellant will be exposed. In MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 the Court of Appeal said that tribunals must not impose an unrealistic evidential burden on asylum applicants who rely on sur place activities regarding evidence of surveillance and monitoring by foreign states of their political opponents' activities in the UK. In SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) the Tribunal said that once at the IKR border an individual would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar the individual would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. Whether the individual would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The Tribunal said that additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. Remaking the Decision
18. The appellant has appealed under s82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the decision of the respondent to refuse his claim for asylum and humanitarian protection. The appellant claims to be a refugee whose removal from the UK would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
19. It is uncontroversial that the appellant is an Iraqi national, of Kurdish ethnicity. The appellant’s claim regarding the events that caused the appellant to leave Iraq has already been considered and the findings previously made, are preserved. Although in cross -examination the appellant maintained that he had been telling the truth before the FtT, there is nothing in the evidence before me that undermines the findings previously made that, even to the lower standard, the appellant has failed to establish that he is at risk as claimed, as a result of events that took place whilst he was in Iraq.
20. In considering the evidence of the appellant, I recognise that there may be a tendency by a witness to embellish evidence. I also remind myself that if a Court or Tribunal concludes that a witness has lied about one matter, it does not follow that he/she has lied about everything. A witness may lie for many reasons, for example, out of shame, humiliation, panic, fear, distress, confusion, and emotional pressure.
21. In his witness statement dated 20 February 2024 the appellant claimed that he had been attending some demonstrations against the Kurdish authorities when he was in Iraq. He states that he was told about protests by friends and that he wanted to get involved because there are no human rights or freedoms in Iraq. He refers to a protest against the government because of a lack of services (electricity and water) that he attended in Rania in 2017. I accept that he attended that protest. He does not claim to have been detained. He claims that he was about to be arrested but the crowd put pressure on the authorities and he was released. I do not accept that by reason of his attendance at that protest, the appellant came to the adverse attention of the authorities. Even on his own account they did not pursue him and I find that the appellant had no particular profile that would mean that he was of interest to the authorities when he left Iraq. The attendance at a protest concerning a lack of services such as electricity and water is not in itself evidence of the appellant having some genuinely held political opinion.
22. The issue for me is whether the appellant would be at risk on return by virtue of his sur place activity. For the avoidance of doubt, I have considered the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK holistically, having accepted that he had attended a protest in Rania in 2017 and both by reference to the activity on his Facebook account and by reference to his attendance at demonstrations in the UK.
23. Although the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations is on the face of it indicative of a political opinion, it is not of itself evidence that the appellant’s sur place activities represent his genuinely held beliefs. I turn to the wider canvass of evidence before me in the form of what he states in his witness statements and oral evidence, and his activity on his Facebook account.
24. In reaching my decision I have had regard to all the evidence before me, whether or not it is referred to. I have had regard, in particular to the evidence set out in the bundles before me. I have heard oral evidence from the appellant, and I have had the benefit of seeing his evidence tested in cross-examination. The appellant’s understanding of the English language is limited but it is clear that the appellant has ‘posted’ comments on his Facebook account and ‘posted’ photographs on that account of his attendance at demonstrations.
25. I begin by considering the appellant’s political opinion. It is useful to begin by considering the appellant’s claim that his sur place activities represent his genuinely held beliefs. I have considered the evidence of the appellant as set out in his witness statements and his oral evidence before me regarding his Facebook account and his attendance at demonstrations. The appellant arrived in the UK in October 2021 and in his oral evidence before me it became apparent that he had a Facebook account previously in a name (using his tribe’s name) that he was known by. On his own account he was not very active on that Facebook account and it was not used to express any political opinion. There is no credible explanation provided by the appellant for setting up a new Facebook account. The appellant’s own account is that he set up the Facebook account that he now uses to post information about his political activities. I find that account was set up in 2024 after his international protection claim was refused by the respondent on 9 November 2023. I find that the sole purpose for which the appellant set up his Facebook account was to ‘post’ about his activities in the UK to bolster his claim for international protection..
26. The posts on the appellant’s Facebook account refer to the Kurdish community and events in the IKR, but many also refer to the actions of the Iranian authorities rather than the Iraqi authorities or the authorities in the IKR. By way of example only, a post on 19 June 2025 concerns a Kurdish political prisoner from the city of Sardasht and a prisoner in Urmia Central prison who was previously sentenced to death by the Islamic Republic of Iran's judiciary being upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court.
27. There is no evidence of the appellant having been involved in any kind of protest, demonstration or other political activity between his arrival in the UK in October 2021 and the refusal of his international protection claim some three years later. The appellant claims that he has become politically active in the UK and uses his Facebook account, which is public, to show the world about the oppression and hardship that the Kurdish community is going through. I accept the appellant has attended demonstrations including demonstrations both before and since his appeal before the FtT. I also accept he has posted photographs of his attendance at the demonstrations on his Facebook account. In his witness statement dated 13 June 2025 the appellant lists six demonstrations that he has attended between June 2024 and May 2025. The focus of five of the six demonstrations appears to be upon the murder of journalists. There is however no reliable evidence before me as to the what the demonstrations were about or why the appellant had chosen to attend those particular demonstrations. The appellant’s evidence about the demonstrations is very vague and general.
28. I have been provided with a copy of the appellant’s ‘Facebook Story Preferences [page 131/30967] which states that his ‘Friends’ can see his story. The “save stories to archive” setting is ‘disabled’. The names of people that the appellant is ‘currently connected to’ has been provided [pages 133 – 545] together with information about the ‘posts’ the appellant has shared and the names of those that he has followed recently [pages 597 – 601 (5 November 2024 to 21 June 2025)]. The appellant’s ‘Story highlights’ are set to ‘public’ but the appellant has not created ay story highlights [page 677/3967]. There is a comprehensive lists of the ‘posts’ of others and ‘pages’ that have been ‘liked’ by the appellant and a list of the ‘posts’ of the appellant that have been ‘liked’ by others. The ‘privacy setting’ show that as at 24 June 2025 the appellant’s “future posts” could be seen by “public” [page 3721/3967] and that only the appellant can see posts that he is tagged in on his profile, and what others post on the appellant’s profile. His ‘Political views’ and ‘Religious views’ settings are set so that they can only be seen by the appellant’s friends. Others are unable to share the appellant’s ‘posts to their story but can share the appellant’s public stories to their own story. The appellant’s ‘Bio’ describes him as a “Political Activist” [page 3723/3967].
29. There is nothing in the evidence before me to demonstrate that the appellant has used his Facebook account, to keep in contact with friends and share other more general topics with them. There are posts on the appellant’s Facebook account but all directed to events in Iran and Iraq and the demonstrations the appellant has attended. A review of the appellant’s activity paints a clear picture of an account that is simply used by the appellant, as he himself accepts in his evidence, directed to political activity. I accept the appellant can be seen in the photographs that he has posted of his attendance at demonstrations, but as the FtT judge said previously, the appellant is nothing more than a face in the crowd, on the periphery of demonstrations. The appellant does not have a prominent or leading role at the demonstrations and as he accepts, he has no particular political affiliation.
30. In XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal provided some general guidance on social media evidence:
“127. Social media evidence is often limited to production of printed photographs, without full disclosure in electronic format. Production of a small part of a Facebook or social media account, for example, photocopied photographs, may be of very limited evidential value in a protection claim, when such a wealth of wider information, including a person’s locations of access to Facebook and full timeline of social media activities, readily available on the “Download Your Information” function of Facebook in a matter of moments, has not been disclosed.
128. It is easy for an apparent printout or electronic excerpt of an internet page to be manipulated by changing the page source data. For the same reason, where a decision maker does not have access to an actual account, purported printouts from such an account may also have very limited evidential value.
31. I have had regard to all the extracts from the appellant’s Facebook account that are relied upon by the appellant and his evidence as a whole. Standing back and considering all the evidence before me, although I accept there is evidence of the appellant having a Facebook account, and there are photographs of the appellant having attended demonstrations, in my judgment the simple fact of attendance at demonstrations does not on its own demonstrate a real commitment to the Kurdish cause. I find the appellant’s evidence regarding his support for the Kurdish community is very vague and in the most general terms. Although I am prepared to accept that some of the material posted on the appellant’s Facebook account is critical of the Iraqi authorities, I find that the appellant’s sur place activities are an attempt to bolster what was a weak international protection claim.
32. Taking all the evidence before me in the round, the appellant has in my judgement failed to establish, even to the lower standard, that his posts on Facebook and his attendance at demonstrations reflect his genuine political opinion or his political beliefs. They are in my judgement a cynical attempt by the appellant to bolster his claim for international protection.
33. The ultimate question however is whether the behaviour of the appellant, no matter how cynical or manufactured, would result in a risk of persecution on return; if so then he may establish his right to protection. Having established the particular behaviour, the next question to be asked is whether that behaviour does place the appellant at risk.
34. In MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688, the Court of Appeal said that the FtT had not placed an unrealistic evidential burden on a Bangladeshi asylum seeker in determining that he had failed to establish that his political activities in the UK against the Bangladeshi government regime were at such a level that he would be at risk of harm if he was returned to Bangladesh. Having reviewed the authorities, Arnold LJ said:
“37. … the FTT (and the Upper Tribunal if remaking an FTT decision) must not impose an unrealistic evidential burden upon asylum applicants who rely upon sur place activities. It is inherently unlikely that an applicant for asylum will be able to adduce direct evidence of covert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state. Accordingly, tribunals are not merely entitled, but required, to use their common sense.
38. … As Elisabeth Laing LJ observed in the passage I have quoted from WAS (Pakistan), a tribunal can, and should, take judicial notice of the ease with which persons attending a demonstration can be photographed and filmed and the resulting photographs and films transmitted abroad. Similarly, a tribunal can, and should, take judicial notice of the fact that publicly-accessible websites and social media postings can readily be monitored by electronic means. Beyond the fact that it is generally understood that targeted monitoring is technically easier, but more resource-intensive, than bulk monitoring, however, the technical capabilities of methods of monitoring is a matter that requires expert evidence, not least because (i) states differ in their capabilities and (ii) such capabilities change over time.
39. Furthermore, as Patten LJ made clear in EM (Zimbabawe), the question of the capacity of the foreign state to carry out surveillance and monitoring cannot realistically be divorced from the questions of whether the person in question is already of interest to the regime and, if not, whether the activities relied on are likely to make the person of interest to the regime. To take a simple example, if there is a large demonstration outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London, then there is a considerable difference between a person who stands at the front waving a placard bearing a slogan hostile to the government and a person who stands at the back with no placard: it is inherently more likely that the former will thereby get themselves noticed by government agents, photographed and targeted for further surveillance and monitoring than the latter.
40. What an applicant for asylum can be expected to produce is evidence to put news media coverage, social media posts and the like into context…”
35. Mr Heeps submits there are at least two ways in which the Iraqi authorities would come to know about the appellant’s sur place activities. The first is through the appellant himself because his political beliefs are genuine. He would continue to be active in Iraq and he cannot be forced to conceal his political views. Second, the Iraqi authorities could come to know about the appellant’s political views before he is even permitted to enter Iraq. Relying upon the country guidance set out in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110, Mr Heeps submits all returns which are made to the IKR where the appellant is from, are subject to a security screening interview on arrival. He submits it would be very surprising if the appellant was not asked about his activities in the United Kingdom and what he has been doing since he left Iraq. The background material establishes that there are problems in the IKR when it comes to, inter alia, freedom of speech and tolerance of government criticism. The security screening process is designed to elicit details about an individual and to assess their character. This is heightened when the individual in question is being returned as a failed asylum seeker.
36. I find the appellant’s role in the demonstrations was no more than as a member of the crowd holding a small sign with no genuine belief in the cause such that, in the absence of any evidence that his presence was noticed or publicised, no risk will have arisen from this attendance. The appellant has no reason to inform the authorities that he has been involved in anti-government activities because any social media activity and attendance at demonstrations is not predicated upon any genuine political involvement. To assert otherwise would be inaccurate. At its very highest, the appellant has demonstrated an interest, at the lowest possible level in the ’Kurdish cause’ but, I find, he is not an individual that has engaged in even ‘low-level’ political activity or activity that is perceived to be political.
37. I reject the appellant’s claim that he would continue to be active in Iraq in a way that would put him at risk. The appellant attended a protest in Iraq in 2017 and despite having been in the UK for several years before 2024 he demonstrated no real desire to engage in political activity until his protection claim was refused by the respondent. He is not affiliated in any way to a particular group or organisation and on my finding that his posts on Facebook and his attendance at demonstrations do not reflect a genuine political opinion or his political beliefs, he would have no reason to attend political protests or demonstrations against the regime in Iraq or the IKR.
38. The CPIN: ‘opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Iraq’ published in July 2023 addresses the treatment of opponents to the KRI authorities in section 14. Although I accept that there is evidence in the background material referred to by Mr Heeps that the authorities in the Kurdish region have clamped down on journalists in particular, the background material does not show that those who undertake participate in protests or demonstrations against the political parties from abroad face a real risk on return. The reality is that as the numbers attending demonstrations are such that the authorities would not be able to take action against all, but rather choose to target those they deem to be a threat to the stability of the ruling parties. There is nothing in the evidence to show the appellant has such a profile, or would have the same imputed to him. He is not I find, a political activist as he claims. he has failed to show a genuine political opinion. The background material does not establish that the authorities in the IKR have the intention or ability to monitor and identify all those attending demonstrations from social media, regardless of their profile or the nature of their participation. In the appellant’s case, as I have said, the appellant does not have any real role in the protest save for his attendance that would arouse the interest of the authorities.
39. On my finding that the appellant’s sur place activities, including the material on his Facebook account, do not reflect his genuine political opinion or his political beliefs, there is, in principle, no reason the appellant should not delete his Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account. The deletion of the appellant’s Facebook account, would not on the findings I have made, equate to persecution. As the appellant’s sur place activities do not represent any genuinely held beliefs, the appellant would not be expected to lie when questioned. The deletion of the Facebook account will not therefore contravene the principles established and set out in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. The closure of the Facebook account will have the effect of removing all posts he has created.
40. I have considered whether, to the lower standard, the appellant’s Facebook account might already have already come to the attention of the authorities. I have considered whether the appellant’s Facebook account might, to the lower standard, have been targeted and whether that may place the appellant at risk before his Facebook account is deleted. There is no evidence before me that even begins to suggest the appellant’s Facebook account has previously been hacked or scrutinised. If his appeal is dismissed the appellant will have sufficient opportunity to delete his account. I accept some of the materials posted on the appellant’s Facebook account are critical of the authorities in the IKR. There is however no evidence before me that any of his ‘friends’ have a significant profile that may be of interest to the authorities. There is no evidence before me to establish whether the appellant’s ‘friends’ have ‘public’ or ‘private’ settings. The appellant does not identify any post or photograph connecting the appellant to any individual that may be of interest to the authorities or that has some form of official role, or profile. I find therefore that the appellant does not have a profile that would put him at greater risk than any other Kurd returning to Iraq as a failed asylum seeker.
41. It is clear from the country guidance set out in SMO & KSP that once at the IKR border (land or air) the appellant would normally be granted entry to the territory. For the reasons I have set out, the appellant will not be at risk during the security screening, or when her registers his presence with the local mukhtar. The additional factors that may increase risk including (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL do not apply to the appellant. In any event, the appellant is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory. The appellant would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governorates for Kurds.
42. Standing back and having considered all the evidence before me, I find the appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proof upon him to the required standard to establish that he will be at risk upon return and his appeal is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
43. I dismiss the appellant’s appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and Article 3 grounds.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 September 2025