Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004071

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52590/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

16th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SARAH GREY

Between

BT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. In a decision promulgated on 14 February 2025 an error of law was found in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Leonard-Johnston (the ’Judge’) dated 8 July 2024, in which she dismissed the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal which was based on asserted risk arising from his claimed conversion to Christianity. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) was set aside with preserved findings. A copy of that error of law decision is annexed below and does not require detailed repetition herein. The matter was listed for a remaking hearing before me. I set out below my decision with reasons for dismissing the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal on all grounds.
Background including procedural background
2. The appellant is an Iranian national. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in May 2008 and claimed asylum on the basis that he had been in a relationship with a married woman in Iran and would be at risk from the woman’s family and the authorities on return to Iran for adultery. His claim was refused and the appeal against that refusal was dismissed by Immigration Judge Duff on 14 June 2011 finding that the appellant’s claim carried “no credibility whatsoever” and that he was an economic migrant.
3. On 28 April 2021 the appellant raised further protection submissions on the basis of his claimed conversion to Christianity. The appellant’s appeal against the refusal of this asylum claim was heard at Hatton Cross IAC on 26 June 2024 and dismissed by the Judge. At the FTT the appellant was legally represented and called oral evidence from the Pastor at the London Baptist Church, Church of the Book (‘London Baptist Church’) and two of the appellant’s friends.
4. Whilst still legally represented the appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal which was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mills. A Rule 24 response submitted by the respondent stated that the respondent did not oppose the appellant’s appeal and submitted that the Upper Tribunal should proceed to determine the appeal afresh. At this point the appellant’s legal representatives discontinued acting for him for financial reasons. At the error of law hearing the respondent sought to withdraw the previous Rule 24 response and oppose the appeal. For the reasons set out in the error of law decision I set aside the FTT decision with the following findings preserved:
a. The appellant has engaged in Christian activities.
b. At the time of the hearing the appellant had attended church services at the London Baptist Church regularly for a period of approximately four years.
c. In the 16 months prior to the hearing the appellant had attended 42% of church services which was more than other members of the congregation.
d. The various letters in the appellant’s and respondent’s bundle from the London Baptist church were genuinely sent by the church.
e. The appellant undertook an at-home baptism in July 2020 with the “Carelinks Christadelphian Ministries” which appears to be registered in Australia. There is no evidence that this is a genuine church. The time of the baptism was during the Covid 19 pandemic and the appellant’s friends were also undertaking baptism at the same time.
f. The appellant’s previous asylum appeal was dismissed on 14 June 2011 due to the judge finding the appellant’s account was not credible.
5. I explained to the appellant at the error of law hearing that his appeal would be determined at a resumed hearing and that the burden of proof rests with him in respect of his claim. Since he was not legally represented and claimed to be illiterate and to have left school around age 11 years old, I sought to assist the appellant in his preparation for the hearing and advised him as to the evidence he could call at the remaking hearing to potentially support his claim of conversion. In particular, I suggested to him that it would be beneficial to hear oral evidence for his Pastor (DS) given that the grounds for permission contained assertions that key aspects of DS’s oral evidence to the FTT had not been referred to in the Judge’s decision. I indicated that he may wish to call other witnesses who attend his church to give supporting evidence. The appellant stated that he did not attend the London Baptist Church very much any longer because of the travelling distance to the church but that he was in contact with DS and would ask him to attend the hearing. He thought that DS would agree to do so. The appellant also indicated that there were two or three other witnesses from his church whom he would ask to attend to give oral evidence. I stated that he could also provide updating letters or statements for himself and any of his witnesses as well as evidence from his Facebook account.
The hearing and reasons for decision
The hearing
6. At the remaking hearing the appellant attended alone. He communicated throughout via a Farsi interpreter and I did not perceive any difficulties with communication and understanding between them. Prior to the commencement of the hearing I asked the interpreter to read and translate the appellant’s witness statements dated 9 November 2023 and 26 June 2024 into Farsi for him, to assist at the hearing. At the start of the hearing the appellant confirmed the content of these statements were true.
7. At the outset I reminded the appellant that he bears the burden of proof and asked him if he recalled our discussions at the error of law hearing regarding further evidence. He stated that he did but that had no further evidence to adduce and that no witnesses were attending to give evidence on his behalf.
8. In respect of the Pastor, DS, the appellant stated that he “had heard” he was abroad for medical treatment. When questioned further on this he said he thought it was “somewhere like the Philippines”. He stated that DS was an Irish American. On cross-examination the appellant stated that he had learned about DS’s absence from the UK from messages he and his wife had posted in a WhatsApp group that he was part of and that he could read a bit of English. He confirmed that he had not tried to contact DS directly about giving evidence.
9. When asked about the other witnesses the appellant had previously indicated he would call to give evidence, he stated that they were members of the congregation at the London Baptist Church but he had not asked them to attend in the end because DS could not attend. I asked the appellant whether he was seeking an adjournment of the hearing to enable DS and/or other witnesses to attend the hearing and he confirmed that he was not.
10. The only evidence at the hearing was therefore oral evidence from the appellant. He had not provided any updating witness statement and I therefore questioned him at some length before cross-examination to facilitate the appellant in providing updating evidence in his appeal.
11. The areas that I questioned the appellant on included: his living arrangements in the UK; his family in Iran; his church attendance and Christian activities since the FTT hearing; and his beliefs regarding Christianity. In respect of all disputed matters I ensured that I framed my questions in an open manner in an attempt to provide the opportunity to facilitate an unrepresented appellant to provide supporting evidence of his claim. The appellant was then cross-examined by Mr Wain. The appellant declined to make any submissions in response to closing submissions from Mr Wain.
Assessment of evidence and findings
Asylum claim
12. Prior to setting out my assessment of the relevant evidence and my findings, I record that I have taken the judicial findings relating to the appellant’s previous asylum claim as my starting point in accordance with Devaseelan. Although the appellant’s previous asylum claim was on an entirely different basis I take into account the fact the appellant was found to be untruthful in his previous claim. This of course does not mean that he is necessarily not telling the truth on this occasion and I have assessed all evidence before me in the round when reaching my findings.
13. In relation to the appellant’s living arrangements he stated that the address in Hounslow recorded on his witness statements was his correspondence address but that he did not live there full-time. He stated that he also stays in other cities where his friends live and referred to travelling frequently to Brighton and Manchester. He claimed that he does not pay for any accommodation but stays with friends in each location. The appellant stated that he does not work but does some chores for his friends in their homes and gardens and that in exchange they give him money which covers his living and travelling expenses. He states that he only attends church when he is in London. The appellant did not claim to undertake any other Christian activities besides attending church.
14. In relation to his church attendance I asked the appellant whether he recalled stating at the error of law hearing that he did not attend the London Baptist Church very regularly now because of the travelling distance and cost. The church is based in Limehouse, East London (E17) and the appellant lives in Hounslow (TW3). He confirmed that he did recall this and stated that he mostly attends the church online now via WhatsApp rather than in person.
15. When asked when he last went to the church he stated that it was on a Sunday around two or three weeks ago. He said he went because it was a Sunday and not for any specific occasion. In a departure from his earlier answers he then stated that he goes to the London Baptist Church every week or every two weeks. I clarified if I had correctly understood the appellant, reminding him that he had previously stated that he did not go to the church much anymore. He repeated that he goes there in person every week or fortnight. He stated that when he does not manage to go to the London Baptist Church he goes to a church in Hounslow instead. When asked, he was unable to recall the name of this church or provide any other information in relation to it. No evidence has been provided from this church to support the appellant’s account.
16. I find there are a number of difficulties with the appellant’s evidence of his church attendance as follows:
a. His narrative about the regularity of his attendance at the London Baptist Church changed throughout the hearing, at first suggesting he mostly attends remotely and then changing his evidence stating that he attends in person every week or every other week. Not only were there inconsistencies in his answers to questions on church attendance but his account was also inconsistent with his claim to travel regularly around the country to Manchester and Brighton and to have only ever attended church in London. He states that he is sometimes away for as much as a month, although sometimes it is for a few days.
b. The appellant stated that he had been to church around two or three weeks ago. On his revised account on cross-examination this would likely mean that he would have attended church on a few occasions in April. I asked the appellant whether on the most recent visit, he had attended church for any particular event or celebration or if he could remember anything special about his recent church attendance. He said it was for nothing special and he went there because it was a Sunday. He made no reference to it being Easter Sunday less than 3 weeks earlier or to any other notable events in the Christian calendar around this time, such as Palm Sunday. Easter was around the time the appellant claimed to have last visited the London Baptist Church, on what many Christians would consider to be the most significant event in the Christian calendar. One might reasonably expect a genuine Christian to be aware that it was Easter very recently.
c. I do not accept as credible the appellant’s explanation of why the Pastor from the London Baptist Church was unable to the come to the hearing. The importance of his evidence was clearly explained to the appellant previously. The appellant has not provided any supporting evidence in respect of DS’s claimed medical treatment for which he would require treatment in the Philippines and, when asked if he wished to, the appellant declined to request an adjournment.
d. I find the appellant’s explanation that he did not ask the other church witnesses to attend because DS could not attend to be illogical. Without DS’s evidence, the evidence of other church goers from the church he claims to associate with would be all the more important.
17. In conclusion I find there is no credible evidence supporting the appellant’s contention that he has continued to attend Church since the time of his hearing in the FTT at the end of June 2024. This then must call into question his motive for his previous church attendance. I find it is reasonable to conclude that the appellant has not continued to attend church after his appeal was dismissed by the FTT. The appellant’s non-attendance at church since his FTT hearing is, I find, the most likely reason for why DS did not attend the hearing to give evidence.
18. I also find that the appellant was unable to demonstrate any knowledge or understanding of the Christian faith or provide any explanation as to the ‘trigger point’ that caused him to turn away from Islam and start to explore Christianity. I set out below a record of the appellant’s answers to my questions regarding his Christian faith:
“Can you tell me in your own words what it means to you to be a Christian?
It makes me calm and relaxed. I can’t explain.
Can you explain what Jesus Christ means to you personally?
It means affection, calmness and friendship.
Is there anything else you can add about what Jesus means to you as a Christian?
No I can’t.
Can you tell me how you think Christianity has changed you?
Affection. All human beings are equal. Christians are all kind and help each other but in Islam there is no such thing.
Is there anything else that you can tell us about Christianity – for example are there are sermons, lessons or stories that you have heard that have meaning for you?
Lots of stories.
Can you give us an example of one which stood out?
No. My mind isn’t working very well.
Do you need to take a break?
No. “
19. I asked the appellant if he wanted to comment on what DS was recorded to have stated in evidence at the hearing in the FTT in relation to the matter of his baptism. It is recorded in the FTT decision that DS stated that had not seen enough evidence to convince him that the appellant is ready for baptism and that he does not think the appellant “has the faith yet”. The appellant stated that the reason why he had not been baptised at the London Baptist Church was because he had been previously baptised at his friend’s home in 2020. He stated that DS knew this because he had told him and had shown DS his baptism certificate. He stated that he had never asked to be baptised by the London Baptist Church. I find this account to be inconsistent with the evidence DS gave to the FTT which reduces the credibility of the appellant’s account in view of the weight the Judge attached to DS’s evidence.
20. In assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account I also take into account the inconsistencies in the evidence about when the appellant first attended church and with whom. The witness statement of RI before the FTT states that it was he who introduced the appellant to the faith. In a separate witness statement provided to the respondent in support of his fresh submissions, RI stated that the appellant first attended church with him in January 2018. In the appellant's witness statement in support of his fresh submissions it states that he first went to church with RI in early 2019. The evidence from the London Baptist Church indicates that the appellant started attending the church in either later 2019 or early 2020. When presented with the inconsistences between his evidence and that in RI’s earliest statement, the appellant claimed that RI was wrong, that although RI had first introduced him to Christianity in 2018 he first went to church on his own. However, at another point in cross-examination the appellant referred to first going to church with another friend to a church somewhere in Victoria, London; although he could not name the church. At another point the appellant stated that he first attended the London Baptist Church with another Farsi speaker. The appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for these various inconsistencies which were put to him.
21. On cross-examination the appellant accepted that his conversion to Christianity would be a very important reason why he could not return to Iran. Mr Wain then questioned him on the respondent’s attendance note of an exchange with the appellant at Eaton House when he was reporting in March 2020. The evidence is in the form of a screenshot of the respondent’s records and was adduced in evidence before the FTT. It states:
“ 06 Mar 2020 sub states he has no medical issue and is fit and well, he states he live (sic) with his friend who supports him, he states he finacnially (sic) helps his friend with house work and painting and in return he recives (sic) some money. Vol dep was offered verbally but was delicned (sic) due to sub stating he has many problems if he faces going back to Iran due to the government issues that are occurring.”
22. The appellant stated that he did not recall this conversation and that there must have been a mistake because as a Christian convert he could not return to Iran. The conversation in question took place, on the appellant’s account, sometime after he had started attending church and moving to Christianity. In these circumstances I find it is remarkable that this is not a matter the appellant thought to make known to the respondent when offered voluntary return to Iran and when he was providing his reasons as to why he could not return.
23. The final matter of note in relation to the appellant’s evidence relates to his Facebook account which he had put into evidence with his fresh submissions. I indicated that I had looked at the appellant’s Facebook account online since it was a matter raised in the grounds for permission to appeal. As set out in the error of law decision, the key observations from the appellant’s account (which I stated at the hearing) are that there are some publicly accessible posts with religious content largely in the form of Christian related images. The appellant’s posts appear to have started in August 2020 and there has been some limited engagement with his posts in the form of ‘likes’ from a few people. He appeared to have 269 Facebook ‘friends’.
24. The appellant stated that a friend set up his Facebook account for him. He initially stated that the reason he wanted a Facebook account was because everyone has one although when this was put to him on cross-examination he then added that he had the account to “advertise Christianity”. He did not think that the person who set up the account still accesses it but stated that the password had not been changed from when it was set up. He accesses Facebook from his phone.
25. In relation to the printed screenshots of the appellant’s Facebook account provided with his submissions, Mr Wain indicated that a number of posts had the icon of two characters next to the post, indicating that the posts were accessible only to the appellant’s Facebook friends and friends of friends. In response to this the appellant stated that when he had recently received something from the court he had asked his friends to change his account settings so that the account was public. He stated that this change had been made about a month before because he was told by his friends that his account could only be seen by friends so he asked one of his friends to change the settings so that others could see his posts. Although the appellant has not provided any further evidence of his Facebook account, I take into account the fact that he is unlikely to be familiar with the guidance provided by XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00023. However, setting aside that issue, the fact that the appellant only recently changed his account settings to public as a result of something he received from the court, indicates to me that the change was made in an attempt to improve his evidence in support of his protection claim rather than as a genuine expression of his Christian faith. Any recent change to his account settings, I find, reduces rather than improves his claim.
26. I remind myself that the lower standard of proof applies. Greatly assisted by the observations and findings of Judge Leonard-Johnston together with the appellant’s oral evidence before me and my conclusions that there is no evidence the appellant has continued to attend church since the FTT hearing, assessing the evidence in the round, I have no hesitation in finding that appellant’s account of his claimed conversion to Christianity entirely lacks credibility and is not true. I do not find the appellant is genuinely Christian even to the lower standard of proof and even taking into account his previous regular church attendance.
27. I go on to consider whether the appellant would nonetheless face a real risk of serious harm on return to Iran in light of his church attendance over a prolonged period and his social media activity applying the county guidance from PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 00046 (IAC) (PS (Iran)) at [144]:
“In cases where the claimant is found to be insincere in his or her claimed conversion, there is not a real risk of persecution ‘in-country’. There being no reason for such an individual to associate himself with Christians, there is not a real risk that he would come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. Decision-makers must nevertheless consider the possible risks arising at the ‘pinch point’ of arrival:
i) All returning failed asylum seekers are subject to questioning on arrival, and this will include questions about why they claimed asylum;
ii) A returnee who divulges that he claimed to be a Christian is reasonably likely to be transferred for further questioning;
iii) The returnee can be expected to sign an undertaking renouncing his claimed Christianity. The questioning will therefore in general be short and will not entail a real risk of ill-treatment;
iv) If there are any reasons why the detention becomes prolonged, the risk of ill-treatment will correspondingly rise. Factors that could result in prolonged detention must be determined on a case by case basis.
They could include but are not limited to:
a) Previous adverse contact with the Iranian security services;
b) Connection to persons of interest to the Iranian authorities;
c) Attendance at a church with perceived connection to Iranian house churches;
d) Overt social media content indicating that the individual concerned has actively promoted Christianity. “
28. There is no evidence before me that the appellant has received adverse contact from the Iranian security services or has connections to persons of interest to the Iranian authorities.
29. I accept that the appellant previously attended the London Baptist Church on a regular basis and that he was part of a Farsi prayer group with the church. I accept that the church has a diverse congregation of people from various nationalities and who were former Muslims. However, there is no evidence that this church has any connection to Iranian house churches or would be perceived to have such a connection by the Iranian authorities.
30. Although I accept that the appellant has a Facebook account which was set up for him which has some Christian images which may be publicly available, there is no evidence that he has activity promoted Christianity beyond posting these images. In any event the country guidance in XX indicates that the timely closure of the appellant’s Facebook account would neutralise any risk arising from his account as there is no evidence that, and no reason for, his account to have been specifically monitored by the Iranian authorities.
31. Applying the country guidance from PS (Iran) I therefore find that the appellant has not established that he would face real risk of serious harm at the pinch-point of return to Iran as a person who has found to be insincere in his claimed conversion to Christianity and having attended church for a period between 2020 and 2024.
Article 8 ECHR
32. The grounds do not raise any challenge in respect of the FTT decision on the appellant’s Article 8 claim. Having found that the appellant is not a genuine Christian I adopt the reasoning provided by Judge Leonard-Johnston in respect of his Article 8 claim.
33. In summary, although I accept that the appellant has been in the United Kingdom for around 17 years there is no indication that his absence from Iran for a lengthy period would cause him to experience very significant obstacles to his reintegration there. His circle of friends in the UK comprise people from his home country. He will be familiar with the language and culture there. The appellant confirmed that six of his seven siblings still live in Iran. Although the appellant refers to feeling stressed and depressed he has not sought medical support for any mental health condition. The appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
34. I accept that Article 8(1) is engaged on account of the private life the appellant would have established in the UK since 2008. However, I have very little evidence of the depth and nature of that private life and am required to attach little weight to it in any event by virtue of sections 117B (4) and (5) NIAA 2002. The appellant has been in the UK unlawfully for many years. Further, there is no evidence that he can speak English. I attach weight to the public interest in effective immigration controls and the fact the appellant does not meet the requirements of the Rules. I also weigh against him the fact he has been found to have made two false asylum claims. I find that the respondent’s refusal does not amount to a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights and does not give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences for him. The respondent’s decision is not unlawful on human rights grounds.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

Sarah Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 May 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004071

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52590/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

……17 February 2025………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SARAH GREY

Between

BT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Ms S. Mckenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 January 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is an Iranian national. This is an appeal brought by the appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Leonard-Johnston (‘the Judge’) dated 8 July 2024, in which she dismissed the appellant’s appeal in respect of the respondent’s decision of 19 December 2022 to refuse his protection claim.
2. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in May 2008 and claimed asylum on the basis that he had been in a relationship with a married woman in Iran and would be at risk from the woman’s family and the authorities on return to Iran for adultery. His claim was refused and the appeal against that refusal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal on 14 June 2011, Immigration Judge Duff finding that the appellant’s claim lacked credibility. He became appeal rights exhausted on 21 November 2011.
3. On 28 April 2021 the appellant raised further protection submissions on the basis of his claimed conversion to Christianity. The appellant’s appeal against the refusal of this asylum claim was heard at Hatton Cross IAC on 26 June 2024 and dismissed by the Judge.
The decision under appeal
4. The Judge took the previous determination as her starting point in accordance with Devaseelan. The Judge noted that the basis of the appellant’s previous claim was entirely different and the previous judicial findings were therefore not relevant to the present claim. However, the Judge took into account that the appellant was found to have been untruthful in his previous claim.
5. The Judge found that the appellant had been engaged in Christan activities and had attended the London Baptist church for approximately four years since the start of 2020. It was noted that in the 16 months prior to the hearing the appellant had attended 42% of church services which was more that other members of the congregation. The Judge found that the various letters from the church adduced by the appellant were genuinely provided by the London Baptist Church.
6. The appellant’s church leader and two friends gave oral evidence at the hearing. The Judge placed significant weight on the evidence of the church leader, DS, who she found to be an open and honest witness. She placed “reduced weight” on the evidence of one friend, Mr IG, because he was a friend of the appellant and could be expected to support his account, and “very little weight” on the evidence of Mr BB because of his inconsistent account of where he had met the appellant 10 years before.
7. The Judge found that the appellant was not genuinely Christian even to the lower standard and even taking into account his church attendance. In support of this finding she referred to the evidence of DS who stated that the appellant was “on his journey” to becoming a Christian, that he had not seen enough evidence yet that he was ready for baptism as he did not think he “has the faith yet”.
8. The Judge also referred to the fact that the appellant had undergone a home baptism in 2020 with a church which appeared to be registered in Australia but that she had not seen any evidence that this was a genuine church and because the reasons why the appellant had undergone the baptism appeared to be because his friends were doing it rather than for religious or spiritual reasons. In relation to this matter the Judge stated that “an insincere baptism can be an indicator that a conversion is not genuine, and I find that to be the case here.”.
9. With his further submissions the appellant had provided the respondent with some screenshots of his social media account with posts containing Christian content (predominantly pictures of Christ and the Virgin Mary). The Judge found that the Christian themed content was not made public and that this was inconsistent with the appellant’s evidence that he posts for everyone to see. The Judge found that it was reasonably likely the posts were manufactured by the appellant in order to support his appeal.
10. At [28] of the decision the Judge stated that she had given some weight to what the appellant did not say in oral evidence, that there was a gap in his evidence as to his belief in the Christian faith and that he had not mentioned his faith or any spiritual reasons in relation to his decision to attend church, post Christian content on social media and get baptised. Having taken the previous judicial findings that the appellant was found to have fabricated his previous claim, the Judge found that the appellant had been attending church in order to fabricate an asylum claim.
11. Although the Judge found that the appellant was not genuinely Christian, at [32] of the decision she went on to find that if she had found that he was a Christian he would be at risk on return to Iran as an “ordinary Christian rather than a church leader or an activist” applying the guidance from PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 00046 (IAC) (PS (Iran)).
12. In relation to the risk the appellant as an “insincere” person who had attended church the decision states:
“The appellant has not claimed that he would be at risk even as an “insincere” converted person, rather the appeal was put on the basis that the sole issue is whether the appellant is a Christian convert. However, for completeness I have considered paragraph 4 of PS (Iran) and conclude that the factors in paragraph 4(iv) do not apply in the appellant’s case. There is no evidence that leads me to conclude that it is reasonably likely that he would come to the attention of the authorities even at the ‘pinch point’ of return.”
The grounds and permission
13. Permission to appeal was sought by the appellant on two main grounds although there were a number of ‘strands’ to ground one.
14. The first ground of appeal was that the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant had been attending church for four years was inconsistent with finding that the appellant was not a genuine Christian. In respect of this ground the appellant asserts, amongst other things, that his pastor had given evidence that he was on a journey to becoming Christian and that the Judge had failed to indicate what weight she placed upon the evidence that he was on a journey.
15. The grounds also refer to aspects of the oral evidence which it is claimed was given by the pastor, DS, but not referred to in the decision. It is stated that a transcript of the evidence was being requested by the appellant’s previous representatives. One aspect of the oral evidence of DS which the grounds assert was not referred to, was that he had stated that baptism in their church was a very rare occasion which had only occurred once or twice in several years. The grounds assert that this is important context to the pastor’s statement that he did not consider the appellant was ready for baptism. The grounds also assert that DS gave evidence that the appellant has been actively participating in after-service discussions on faith and was assisting the wider community.
16. An additional matter raised in support of ground one was that the Judge had placed weight on the fact that she interpreted his Facebook posts to be private. It is contended that this was an error of fact as there were no “lock” icons present in relation to the appellant’s posts.
17. Ground two contends that that Judge erred in determining that paragraph 4 (iv) of PS (Iran) did not apply in the appellant’s case and had failed to consider that both the appellant and DS had given evidence that there were a large number of Iranians in the congregation of his church.
18. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mills on 2 September 2024. The grants states:
“2. The appellant is a citizen of Iran who appeals against the refusal of his fresh protection claim, based on his claimed conversion to Christianity. The Judge heard evidence from several witnesses, including the appellant’s pastor, but ultimately found that he was not a genuine Christian convert, and would face no risk on return to Iran.
3. The appellant now seeks permission to appeal, contending that the Judge has erred in law in the following ways:
a. Through reaching inconsistent findings on the central material matter, by accepting the appellant to have been regularly attending a Christian congregation for the past 4 years, and to have regularly posted Christian themed material on Facebook in that period, but nonetheless concluding that he was not a genuine Christian;
b. By failing to properly consider the alternative option that, even if the appellant is not a genuine convert, he would still face a risk at the ‘pinch point’ of return because of his accepted factual connection to an evangelical church with a large number of Iranian congregants.
4. I find that the challenge does identify arguable errors of law in the Judge’s decision. In particular, I find it arguable that the Judge may have mistaken the pastor’s evidence that the appellant had not yet been baptised because he was still ’on his journey’ as indicating that he was not sincere, when the pastor’s evidence as a whole, including the context of his church appearing to be one that does not move quickly to baptism, did not support such a conclusion.
5. I also accept that the second ground raises an arguable error, in that the country guidance at paragraph 4(iv) of the headnote calls for a detailed consideration of the possible risk that would come from association with a church and other Iranian asylum seekers who may be of interest to the Iranian regime, even for an individual who is not themselves a sincere convert, and the Judge’s consideration of this is very brief, and does not deal with all of the evidence put forward by the pastor regarding the members of his congregation.”
Rule 24 response dated 12 September 2024 and hearing on 25 November 2024
19. Further to the grant of permission to appeal a rule 24 response was filed by the respondent on 12 September 2024 indicating that the respondent did not oppose the appellant’s application for permission to appeal and inviting the Upper Tribunal to determine the appeal with a fresh oral hearing.
20. The Tribunal records indicate that subsequent to the Rule 24 response the applicant’s legal representatives came off the record and requested that a Turkish interpreter was booked to assist the appellant at the error of law hearing listed for 25 November 2024.
21. The hearing listed on 25 November 2024 to consider whether the decision contained an error of law was not effective and was adjourned. The appellant attended alone. He required a Farsi interpreter not a Turkish interpreter and it was impossible to communicate with him via the interpreter provided.
22. I sought clarification from Mr Parvar who was representing the respondent at the hearing as to whether the Tribunal could proceed to re-make the decision in light of the respondent’s Rule 24 response. It seemed to me that if the respondent accepted that the Judge had erred in concluding that the appellant was not a genuine Christian despite the findings that he had attended church for four years, which appeared to be the case from the Rule 24 response, this would reasonably result in an outcome that the appellant should be accepted as a Christian convert and/or at potential risk on return to Iran at the ‘pinch point’ of arrival because of his long-term attendance at and association with an evangelical church with a large number of Iranian congregants
23. Mr Parvar stated that he disagreed with the Rule 24 response and wanted to take further instructions on the respondent’s position as to the error of law. I indicated that on a fair reading of the Rule 24 response the respondent has conceded the position on the error of law. In the circumstances, if the respondent intended to seek to withdraw the previously made written concession, an application would need to be made to do so which should explain promptly and frankly why the concession was made; why it was mistaken; and why it is now just and fair that she be allowed to withdraw it (see [44] of AM (Iran) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 2706).
Revised Rule 24 response dated 4 December 2024
24. Further to directions issued 25 November 2024 the respondent provided a revised Rule 24 response authored by Mr Parvar.
25. The revised Rule 24 response contained an application to withdraw the previous Rule 24 response stating that the respondent “believes the earlier acceptance of the appellant’s grounds had been made unlawfully and without proper appreciation of the appellant’s challenge”.
26. In summary, the revised Rule 24 response asserts that the Judge had not erred in the manner asserted in the grounds. It contends that the Judge substantiated her findings that the appellant was not a genuine Christian with logical and detailed reasons. The response states that the material time for assessing the appellant’s conversion was the date of the hearing and thus the appellant’s reliance on DS’s evidence that he was ‘on a journey’ was of no consequence because it did not mean he had converted by the time of the hearing. In relation to the appellant’s reliance on Facebook policy the respondent notes that the policy was not in the bundle of evidence before the Judge and had not been produced pursuant to a rule 15(2A) application.
27. Further matters raised in relation to ground one included the appellant’s purported home baptism in 2020, the Judge’s treatment of the evidence of the appellant’s friends who gave oral evidence at the hearing, and the Judge’s application of the Devaseelan principles. I was not addressed further on these matters in submissions at the error of law hearing.
28. In relation to ground two the revised Rule 24 response states that the appellant’s case was not made on the basis that he would be at risk in Iran as a person who had “insincerely converted his religion” and that PS (Iran) was only considered by the Judge for completeness.
Error of law hearing
29. The appellant attended the error of law hearing alone and was assisted by a Farsi interpreter. From speaking with the appellant it was apparent that he did not understand the purpose of the hearing or what was happening. He states that he could not afford to pay for further legal representation. He was unable to make any submissions in response to the respondent’s application to withdraw the original Rule 24 response or the submissions on behalf of the respondent in relation to the grounds of appeal.
30. Ms McKenzie renewed the application to withdraw the original Rule 24 response. She was unable to provide any further information in relation to the assertion in the revised response that the earlier acceptance of the appellant’s grounds was “made unlawfully” and referred to it being “an administrative matter”. In Ms McKenzie’s submission the revised Rule 24 was more cogent and detailed and would be of far more assistance to the Tribunal in understanding the respondent’s position than the previous response. She submitted that the application to withdraw the original Rule 24 response had been made in good time for the appellant to address it.
31. As indicated to Ms McKenzie at the hearing, I do not accept that the revised Rule 24 response can properly be characterised as a clarification of the respondent’s position. In my view it amounts to clear change of direction in relation to the appellant’s grounds of appeal. I do not have any information to enable me to conclude that the original Rule 24 was “made unlawfully” as asserted. It appears to me that the change of approach arose as result of a difference of opinion between the author of the first Rule 24 response and the author of the second.
32. I accept that the application to withdraw the previous concession has ultimately been made in good time as a result of the need to adjourn the previous hearing. However, I also take into account the prejudice caused to the appellant. He was previously legally represented when the first Rule 24 was filed and served. Prior to this, the legal representatives indicated they were seeking a transcript of the First-tier Tribunal hearing to support the grounds in relation to aspects of the oral evidence of DS which were not referred to in the decision. This did not happen and it is reasonable to conclude this may have been as a result of the content of the original Rule 24 response. The appellant is now not legally represented. He does not speak English and is illiterate. I find that the appellant is placed at a significant disadvantage as a result of which he is unable to address the respondent’s revised Rule 24 response.
33. As a result of the prejudice to the appellant I am not persuaded that it is consistent with the principles of justice and fairness to permit the respondent to withdraw the previous concession in respect of an error of law. However, I invited Ms McKenzie to address me on the revised Rule 24 response to enable me to consider the substance of the respondent’s revised position.
34. Having heard submissions on behalf of the respondent I am of the view that the decision involved the making of a material error of law and should be set aside. On this basis I consider that the respondent’s concession in the original Rule 24 response was one that was properly made. In light of my finding an error of law, the matter of whether the respondent is permitted to withdraw the original Rule 24 response is therefore academic.
Discussion and conclusions
35. The Judge determined that DS was an “open” and “reliable” witness on whose evidence she placed significant weight. In finding that the appellant is not genuinely Christian, the Judge’s findings on the evidence of DS in respect of this are set out at [25] of the decision as follows:
“First, the evidence from Mr DS was that the appellant is “on his journey” to becoming a Christian. Mr DS has not yet seen enough evidence from the appellant to convince him that he is ready for baptism. Mr DS’s evidence was that he does not think that the appellant “has the faith yet”.”
36. It is contended in the grounds that the Judge failed to consider the evidence of DS in the context that baptism is a very rare event at the appellant’s church. In the absence of a transcript of evidence from the hearing I am unable to make any findings about aspects of DS’s evidence which the grounds assert were not referred to in the decision and provide important context and detail.
37. However, I am assisted to an extent by the detailed witness statement of DS dated 3 March 2024. The statement records that DS has known the appellant since the end of 2019 or beginning of 2020. It states that the appellant attends services at DS’s church most Sundays, that he remains to have lunch with the rest of the congregation and DS has heard the appellant asking questions about Jesus Christ and has had conversations with him about Christ, Christianity and the church. DS states that the congregation has a number of Muslim background believers in Jesus and that these congregants form “the core witness to people seeking to leave Islam”.
38. At [6] of DS’s witness statement it states:
“Sometimes seekers of Christ are converted instantly like the Apostle Paul in the New Testament. At other times people come to faith over a protracted period of time like Nicodemus who secretly came to Jesus by night to ask him questions. In my experience, [the appellant] is the later (sic) seeker as he is still on his journey to finding Christ. It is evident from my conversations with him that he has rejected Islam and that alone is enough to make him a target for persecution in Iran.”
39. Despite finding DS to be a credible witness on whose evidence the Judge placed significant weight, there is no reference to the matters set out above in the decision and the Judge provided no indication of what weight she attached to various matters addressed in DS’s witness statement. The appellant was likened to Nicodemus as a seeker coming to faith over a protracted period of time. In Ms Mckenzie’s submission the Judge has “applied weight implicitly” in respect of these matters.
40. I find that the Judge has not considered the reference to the appellant still being on a journey to finding Christ in the full context of DS’s evidence and has construed the fact he is still on his journey as equating to a lack of sincerity. There is no indication from the evidence before me that DS doubted the appellant’s sincerity in his religious journey. He states that it is evident that the appellant has rejected Islam. Whilst it is the case that the appellant’s religious leader has assessed him as not ready for baptism in their church, it is the case that many people would consider themselves (and be considered by others) to be Christians without undergoing a baptism in church. There is no evidence of the criteria considered for whether a person is considered ready for baptism in the appellant’s church. In my view the Judge’s finding that the appellant was not a genuine Christian was based, at least in part, on the pastor’s evidence that he is not convinced the appellant is yet ready for baptism in his church. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Judge interpreted this matter as an indication of lack of sincerity on the part of the appellant.
41. I have some difficulty in relation to the respondent’s submission that the material time for assessing whether the appellant had converted to Christianity was the date of the hearing when considering the evidence that the appellant was on a spiritual or religious ‘journey’. This would appear to take a rather ‘cut and dry’, binary approach to the question of religious conversion on the basis there is necessarily an ‘end point’ in a spiritual or religious journey; a point at which it is beyond doubt that a convert has finally arrived at the end goal of being a Christian but before which they cannot be considered Christian. A religious or spiritual journey, for many, such as Nicodemus to use the example used by DS, is likely to be a journey that ebbs and flows and involves a gradual realisation. At what point on that journey can a person be said to be truly Christian would necessarily involve looking into the ‘windows of the soul’ of the claimed convert; a practice which caselaw has cautioned against. As stated by this Tribunal at [10] of PS (Iran):
“That leads to our second point: what we mean by ‘Christian convert’. It is not possible to make windows into men’s souls. Whether someone is, or is not, a Christian is a matter of fact that is impossible to objectively verify. For example, an individual may pay very little attention to scripture or sermon but might fervently believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God; Christians with a long-held and deep belief can still face a crisis of faith at any given moment. It is no doubt for that reason that the Tribunal in Ali Dorodian v Secretary of State for the Home Department (01/TH/1537) preferred to focus on the externally observable: “as we have said, it is church membership rather than mere belief, which may lead to risk”. This difficulty means that in this jurisdiction decision makers must rely largely on the observations of others to determine whether someone is, or is not, a ‘genuine’ Christian. A further complexity arises. There is no doubt for many a path to wholehearted belief, with gradations marked by life events and a deepening understanding. At what point along that path an individual might become a ‘Christian’ is not clearly signposted. There is certainly no theological consensus on the matter; baptism is an indicator, but it should not be regarded as determinative.”
42. Whilst a church leader, overseeing the journey of their congregants, may take a position on whether or not a seeker has reached a point that they are ready for baptism in their church, I do not accept that it is for the tribunal to infer that they had not reached the point of conversion until that point, or that they lack sincerity up until that point. It appears implicit from the Judge’s reasoning that because the pastor’s evidence referenced being on journey rather than arriving at their destination, that the appellant could not be considered a Christian at that point. When taken with the factual findings about the appellant’s objectively ascertainable church activities, I find that the Judge’s conclusion on the genuineness of the appellant’s conversion to be inconsistent with the Judge’s other findings and/or insufficiently reasoned particularly in light of the written evidence of DS. Nothing in the evidence before me suggests that DS had doubts about the sincerity of the appellant’s religious activities.
43. In relation to the appellant’s evidence from Facebook Ms Mckenzie submitted that the evidence was not compliant with XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00023. I note that the social media screenshots in question are included in the respondent’s bundle and appear to have been provided to the respondent in support of the appellant’s fresh asylum submissions. These submissions were made in August 2021 before XX was promulgated on 20 January 2022. There is no indication on the papers that the appellant sought to rely in his appeal upon his social media activity in support of his claim to be a Christian convert. If he did, or had he done so, I find that it is unlikely that much weight, if any, would be placed upon that evidence in its current form and taking into account the provisions of XX which pre-dated his appeal hearing. However, the Judge made adverse findings in relation to the appellant’s account and his social media posts on the basis that his posts were private which was found to be inconsistent with his evidence. In my view this finding was made on a mistake in fact.
44. It is clear from XX that Facebook posts have different visibility settings and visibility will depend on the account holder’s privacy setting as well as those of their Facebook ‘friends’. At [34] in XX is states there are a variety of privacy settings which are complex in nature and as a result people tend to either have their account privacy setting as public or to have posts shared with friends. In relation to posts shared with friends XX states “However, Dr Clayton’s view is that it is to misunderstand Facebook to think that merely because there is a privacy setting limited to friends, that only those friends can view the material posted by an individual user. Access also depends on the privacy settings of those friends”.
45. I consider that it is reasonable for me to take judicial notice of the main privacy settings on Facebook and relevant icons indicating these. The ‘globe’ icon next to a post indicates a post which is accessible to the world at large. The icon of two characters next to a post indicate that the post is accessible to the account holder’s ‘friends’, and potentially, depending on their friend’s settings, ‘friend of friends’.
46. Having regard to the screenshots of Facebook posts in the respondent’s bundle, I note some posts dating back to August 2020 with depictions of Christian images which have been posted publicly, as indicated by a globe icon. There are also a number of posts which are accessible to the appellant’s friends, and thereby potentially ‘friends of friends’. The fact that the posts are almost entirely Christian images rather than text is, I find, consistent with the appellant’s account that he is illiterate. I find that his illiteracy also provides some context to the appellant’s evidence that he is not very familiar with Facebook and how it works.
47. Whilst I would be hesitant about placing weight on these posts in positively supporting the appellant’s case, I am satisfied that the Judge erred in drawing adverse inferences from a perceived inconsistency in the appellant’s account in relation to these. Together with the matters referred to above, I find that ground one is established.
48. At [31] of the decision it states as follows:
“I note for completeness that it was not the appellant’s case that his activities would put him at risk upon return even if his conversion was not genuine. The appellant has not claimed that he would be at risk even as an “insincere” converted person, rather the appeal was put on the basis that the sole issue is whether the appellant is a Christian convert. However, for completeness I have considered paragraph 4 of PS (Iran) and conclude that the factors in paragraph 4(iv) do not apply in the appellant’s case. There is no evidence that leads me to conclude that it is reasonably likely that he would come to the attention of the authorities even at the ‘pinch point’ of return.”
49. Ms Mckenzie did not address me in relation to ground two beyond the matters set out in the revised Rule 24 response. I accept the assertion that the appellant’s skeleton argument did not address the position of an “insincere convert”. I presume this was because his position is that he is a genuine Christian. However, having regard to the appellant’s notice of appeal in the First-tier Tribunal, the basis of his claim is that he is at risk on return to Iran for a Refugee Convention reason. Risk to the appellant could arise from him being a genuine Christian or being perceived to be a Christian. Having found that the appellant was not a genuine Christian, I find that it was incumbent upon the Judge to consider the risk of return to Iran for the appellant in light of the Judge’s factual findings of the appellant’s church activities despite the fact that the appellant did not plead his case in the alternative on the basis that he is not genuine. I find that the bare statement in the decision that the factors in paragraph 4(iv) of PS (Iran) do not apply is insufficient in enabling the appellant to understand why he was unsuccessful in relation to this issue, particularly in light of the evidence before the Tribunal in relation to the number of Iranians in the appellant’s church congregation. I find that ground two is established.
50. In light of the errors above which I consider material to the core issue of the genuineness of the appellant’s faith and his risk on return to Iran I set aside the decision.
51. I preserve the following findings which have not been contested:
a. The appellant has engaged in Christian activities.
b. At the time of the hearing the appellant had attended church services at the London Baptist Church regularly for a period of approximately four years.
c. In the 16 months prior to the hearing the appellant had attended 42% of church services which was more than other members of the congregation.
d. The various letters in the appellant’s and respondent’s bundle from the London Baptist church were genuinely sent by the church.
e. The appellant undertook an at-home baptism in July 2020 with the “Carelinks Christadelphian Ministries” which appears to be registered in Australia. There is no evidence that this is a genuine church. The time of the baptism was during the Covid 19 pandemic and the appellant’s friends were also undertaking baptism at the same time.
f. The appellant’s previous asylum appeal was dismissed on 14 June 2011 due to the judge finding the appellant’s account was not credible.
52. Taking into account various credibility concerns I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to re-make the decision on the basis of the findings and evidence before me. The decision will be made at resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal. The appellant has leave to adduce further evidence in support of his appeal.
Directions
1. The appeal will be re-listed for a further hearing at the first available date. A Farsi interpreter will be required to assist the appellant.
2. To the appellant - Further evidence
a. Please send to the Tribunal all further evidence by no later than 14 days before the date of the next hearing. You should send any further evidence upon which you wish to rely by email to fieldhousecorrespondence@justice.gov.uk. Please refer to the appeal number UI-2024-004071 in the subject line of your emails.
b. You indicated that you would like to call oral evidence from your church leader, DS, at the resumed hearing. The Tribunal has a copy of the witness statement of DS dated 3 March 2024. You may wish to provide an updated statement from DS. If you would like DS to give oral evidence on your behalf you should advise him of the date and place of the hearing when you receive the notice of hearing.
c. You indicated that you would like to call oral evidence from other witnesses at the hearing. If you have not done so already you should provide a signed and dated witness statement or letter from each witness setting out their evidence. You should provide a copy of the identification of each witness. If any witness requires an interpreter other than an Farsi interpreter you must advise the Tribunal what language and dialect interpreter the witness requires by no later than 14 days before the date of the next hearing.
d. If you wish to rely on Facebook evidence you should provide a copy of the information available on the “Download Your Information” function of Facebook.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed. The decision of Judge Leonard-Johnson is set aside. The matter is to be re-listed for a hearing on the earliest available date when the decision will be re-made.

Sarah Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
14 February 2025