Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004103

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/54259/2023
LP/02777/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

NZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Murpara, Charles Edwards Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity because this is a protection claim.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge G D Davison, who dismissed his appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds against the decision of the Secretary of State made on 30th July 2023.
2. The appellant is a Pakistan national born on 27th December 1995 and arrived in the United Kingdom in 2015. He overstayed a visit visa and when found working illegally was detained and subsequently claimed asylum on 16th July 2021. That claim was refused.
Grounds of Appeal
3. The appellant asserted the decision of the Tribunal was legally flawed and should be reconsidered.
4. At [15] the judge stated that he did not find it credible the appellant would not know whether he was around the age of 10 or 17 when his father and mother died but that misrepresented the evidence before the judge, which was that he was either age 9, 10 or 11. The only contrary evidence was the date shown on his passport, which the judge concluded would have made him 17 when his parents died. However, he told the judge that he had lost his documents, including his passport whilst in the UK and that he did not know what date of birth the agent chose to use in the passport application or why. Thus, it was wrong for the judge to say he did not know whether he was 10 or 17. The appellant’s ignorance was about the date used in the passport application by the agent, not about the approximate age and the time the parents died and this was an error of law.
5. At [16] the judge concluded that the appellant’s evidence that he had gone to the police after his father’s death was inconsistent with the answer he gave in interview that “The police is not coming there. All the police are under [Aurangzeb's] orders.” The claimed inconsistency arose only because the Judge did not consider the answers at interview in the proper context. (See questions 100 to 103).
6. At interview he was asked whether anyone was present at the scene of his father’s murder, called the police and the appellant answered ‘no’ because the police would not go to a remote mountainous area and the police in that region would do the bidding of the man responsible for the father’s murder. The appellant told the judge he reported his father’s death to the police station at Peshawar. This was also referred to at question 123 of the asylum interview.
7. It was unreasonable for the judge to conclude there was any inconsistency between what was said at the hearing and the answer at interview that nobody who witnessed the father’s killing called the police.
8. At [18], the judge made a mistake in concluding that the appellant gave inconsistent accounts of his captivity and escape from his first period of captivity between his asylum interview and at the hearing. The judge stated that at interview he had described the location of his captivity as being in the basement and this was inconsistent with the location described as the hearing but the judge did not draw this alleged discrepancy to the appellant’s attention and he would have been able to explain that he had misunderstood the answers given at interview.
9. The relevant questions were 74 to 88. He was taken from the basement in the guest house to the Taliban base from where he escaped.
10. He submitted the order of the questions in the asylum interview were slightly muddled but it was it clear the description being in the basement was only in the guest house and the judge was wrong to conclude that he described the place of captivity in two inconsistent ways and this should have been put to the appellant and was not.
11. At [19] in relation to the judge’s finding of an inconsistency was challenged that it was implausible the appellant was kept alive, given his evidence that Aurangzeb wanted to wipe out his family. This should have been put to the appellant but was not. He was kidnapped by Aurangzeb because of whose son he was and the Taliban were looking for young boys and they were telling the appellant to take the bombs to the mosque and explode them and this was intended his fate, that is a suicide mission.
12. At [19], in relation to his escape from two armed men being implausible, it was incumbent upon the judge to surmise his evidence and explain why it was implausible. In the oral evidence, it was explained that he was in the mountains accompanied by two armed guards and his hands were tied with rope and he surprised the guards by pushing over the men and it was impossible for the other guard to react in time.
13. A summary of the account was set out in the grounds of appeal because the judge had not included it in his determination. The judge was too ready to disbelieve his account.
14. At [20] the judge held that at the hearing the appellant stated he had been detained by the police in Pakistan following the death of his father when he raised the issue with an MP. This misrepresented his evidence. At [37] of his witness statement on 20th May 2024 he stated that although he went to the police station to register the FIR the police did not take the complaint and demanded a bribe, which he could not pay and he went to a local MP who promised to protect him. However, three days later, the same police officers came and arrested and beat him up and threatened him if he would ever go to the MP or other public authorities they would register a false case against him.
15. The appellant explained to the judge as per his witness statement that he had been picked up and did not say that he had been detained by the police. He did not mean that he had been formally detained by the police when he had said that he had been detained. That was unfair. In addition, the judge stated incorrectly his case that he was detained in Afghanistan, that was incorrect and suggested the judge did not properly understand the case.
16. At [21], it was stated that his father was not politically active although he did sympathise with a pro-Taliban party. There was no contraction between describing his political views while stating he was not politically active. That was an unfair finding by the judge and at [20] he explained to the judge that the agent who arranged his trip arranged a visa for Italy from where he travelled to the UK and the judge ignored his explanation in his determination. The judge found there was a discrepancy between his answer at interview and the first time he left Pakistan was to come to the UK and that the fact that his biometrics were found in Italy. The appellant did not hide the fact that he was in Italy for less than a month on his way to the UK but was not asked to explain his presence there. Had he been given the opportunity, he would have explained that he was brought to the UK via Italy by the agent, that the judge put the fact that the biometrics were found in Italy to the barrister who raised the possibility that he was brought to the UK by the agent, which is what happened. But again he was not asked for any further details by the judge and the judge should have asked for clarification.
17. On granting permission UTJ Rastogi merely stated that permission was granted for paragraphs 4, 5,7,8, 9 and 10 of the appellant’s application.
18. Mr Mupara in his skeleton arguments identified the grounds as follows:
Ground 1 the first escape from captivity – basement or house
Ground 2 the second escape – sparing the appellant
Ground 3 the appellant’s age when his parents died
Ground 4 whether the police were called to the father’s death
Ground 5 whether the appellant was detained
Ground 6 inconsistent evidence on his father’s political activities.
Conclusions
19. Mr Murpara submitted a skeleton argument on which he relied.
20. He added that in relation to ground 1, the account of how the appellant was able to escape captivity twice was a significant part of the judge’s findings on credibility but made a material error in relation to the captivity the first time. The appellant did not claim to have escaped from a basement, as indicated at [18]. He was transported to a Taliban base and escaped from there. The judge’s decision was plainly wrong pursuant to Volpi and another [2022] EWCA Civ 464.
21. In relation to ground 2, the judge had not given any reasons or cogent reasons for finding the appellant’s second escape incredible and did not give the appellant an opportunity to address the issue contrary to the courts guidance in Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223. The judge failed to consider why Aurangzeb would spare him and not kill him failing to take into account the appellant’s evidence that he would be forcibly recruited to fight for the Taliban.
22. In ground 3, the judge found there was a contradiction or too wide a gap in age in the appellant’s evidence about the dates of his parents’ deaths. The appellant remained consistent he was about 9, 10 or 11 when they died however the two year gap was not an unreasonable guess from someone so simple and uneducated. The wider gap i.e. seven or eight years or contradictory evidence was not from the appellant’s evidence, it was the material presented by another person, that is the agent who applied for the appellant’s passport and it was unfair to doubt the appellant’s credibility based on evidence from the third party. The judge was wrong to state that the appellant might have a limited degree of formal education. It was the appellant’s evidence and he was consistent that he had no formal education and was brought up as a nomad.
23. In ground 4, the judge was wrong to find that the appellant gave inconsistent answers in relation to whether anyone called the police to report the appellant’s father’s death. In his AIR, question 103, he was asked did anyone call the police and he stated “The police is not coming there. All the police are under his orders”. The appellant attended the police station in person to report the murder a few days after the event and there was no inconsistency between the answer at the hearing and the response at the AIR.
24. At ground 5, and [20] as to whether the appellant was ever detained by the police, the judge stated that at the hearing the appellant stated he had been detained by the police in Pakistan following the death of his father when he raised an issue with an MP but the appellant denied ever saying that he was detained by the police at any point and this misrepresented his evidence. The appellant’s evidence was that he had not been formally detained in accordance with the law.
25. In relation to ground 6 at [21] and whether the appellant gave inconsistent evidence regarding his father’s political activities, at question 10 the appellant stated that none of his family members had ever been politically active in Pakistan and at question 54 the appellant stated his father was not involved with any Pashtun groups. The judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s evidence that the appellant’s father was a supporter of a pro-Taliban party was at odds with question 10 where he said that none of his family were politically active is unsustainable. It was possible to support a political party or idea without being politically active and these positions were not mutually exclusive.
26. At the hearing itself Mr Murpara added that the appellant’s Pakistan passport, citing the appellant’s date of birth as being in 1995 was produced by the respondent and not by the appellant himself, (despite it having his photograph on it).
27. Ms Clewley submitted that when reading [18] the judge was clearly taking issue with the plausibility of being able to escape from the Taliban camp and she referenced the last sentence. It could not be said that the judge was under the impression that the appellant was underground. That said, the judge gave clear reasons that his hands being untied and being able to escape were not plausible.
28. In relation to ground 2 and the second escape whereby the judge found that it was not credible that the captors would take him out to wash when the intended aim was to wipe out the family, the appellant included that this was not put to the appellant was undermined by the fact that the burden is on the appellant to produce the Record of Proceedings and in relation to being a suicide bomber, it was noted that the appellant claimed a threat to be killed there and then, not that he would be forcibly recruited or given to the Taliban.
29. In relation to ground 3, the appellant had declared his birth in 1993 in the screening interview and when asked if he had used another date of birth he replied no. His witness statement recorded he was born in 1995 and his application to appeal the determination, his date of birth was again given as 1995 and it was open to the judge to rely on the date of birth in the passport. When finding the age gap and inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence.
30. In terms of ground 4, simply the appellant stated the police did not attend but the judge noted the police did attend, albeit several days after the event at [16]. The judge did not misunderstand the evidence. The judge was not expected to put every minor discrepancy to the appellant and indeed he was represented.
31. Ground 5, the appellant had accepted he had been ‘picked up’ and this was a question of language.
32. It was submitted at ground 6 that the judge had given clear details and the core of the claim was that the father was being targeted politically.
Conclusions
33. In terms of the ground 1 and the first escape, the appellant, at question 83, describes what occurred to him when he arrived at the house where the Taliban were. Again he states that he was put in a room and yet at the hearing, as the judge states at [18], the appellant described being “held above ground in a straw bail type construction with some form of sheet or netting around it”. At the hearing it appears that the appellant described that he “managed to go through this hole in the netting and then crawl along the ground whilst some shooting was taking place and he managed to escape”. On this basis, the judge was right to state that the account where he was held was inconsistent. Moreover, at question 85 the appellant is questioned about the number of people and he responded at [85]: “I didn't count them. There were lots of people and all of them were armed”. The judge clearly did not accept the appellant’s account of being able to escape under gunfire, and which the appellant described at question 83 in terms of the actual escape and his account at the hearing, that he simply crawled through a hole and ran to safety. It was entirely open to the judge to make the conclusion that he did.
34. Ground 2. Again, the judge found at [19] that the account of his second escape of being able to “run away from two armed men when had his hands tied to together is equally implausible”. The appellant maintained that his hands were tied, that he surprised his guards, pushed over the man who held the rope and then jumped over the side of the mountain and rolled down in an uncontrolled manner. Equally, as the judge cogently reasoned at [19] “despite being tied at the hands, he was able to escape from two armed men and despite them shooting at him he managed to hide in the trees”. That account clearly was clearly found “not to have the ring of truth about it” at [17] and again at [19] as the judge stated, “The account of his escape of being able to run away from two armed men when he had his hands tied together is equally implausible.”
35. Notwithstanding any discrepancy from the muddled asylum interview between being held in a basement and a room, the judge, for sound reasons, found wholly unbelievable the account of the appellant’s detention and escape from the Taliban.
36. The appellant challenges the judge’s finding on the basis that he did not take account of the appellant that the Taliban wanted to use him as a suicide bomber but the appellant states at AIR question 113 that he was seen and an order was given for him to be killed, indeed ‘He ordered them to kill me’ (the present and immediate tense) and further at question 120 that they “wanted to get rid of the whole generation”. The judge had clearly read the asylum interview and was aware of its contents and simply did not accept that he would be helped with his hygiene rather than killed without delay. The appellant’s evidence at [22] of his witness statement was that the Taliban wanted him to help them with “transporting bombs to places such as mosques and other public places and to explode them”. He did not specifically state at this point that he was going to be a suicide bomber and even if he had, it was clear that the judge did not find his account plausible overall
37. In terms of ground 3, it was the appellant’s own evidence that he was consistent that he was 9, 10 or 11 when his parents died but as the judge states at [20], it was not credible that a 9 to 11 year old (having already noted he had no formal education) would raise a complaint directly with a member of Parliament and take it up with the local police force whereupon he claimed to have been detained by the police. The judge records at [15] that the appellant in his asylum interview at Q93 stated his father was killed in 2013 and later in the interview stated that his mother died a few months after the death of the father, owing to stress. The judge records that the second detention was linked to the death of his mother and that detention was in 2013. It was entirely open to the judge on the basis that the appellant had given his date of birth as 1995 in his asylum interview and in his own witness statement, let alone the passport details, as being as 1995. The judge was unarguably entitled to rely on this fundamental discrepancy in the appellant’s evidence.
38. The point as to whether the appellant had education or otherwise was addressed twice by the judge within the decision and it is clear that the judge recognised the appellant had no education.
39. Ground 4. It was entirely open to the judge to criticise the discrepancy between the appellant’s evidence at the hearing that he went to the police station after his father’s death but it was several days before they attended the property and the contrast with his evidence in his asylum interview at question 103 where on, he stated, “The police is not coming there. All the police under his orders”. That is clear. The answer at AIR 123 does nothing to clarify the discrepancy as it is not incident specific. The answer at question 123 of the asylum interview refers to a time that he went to the police station previously but does not refer to the time of the father’s death. The judge cannot be criticised on this basis.
40. There is clearly a discrepancy in the evidence given and the evidence put forward by the appellant at the hearing and also in his asylum interview was known to the appellant and the discrepancy obvious. The judge does not have to give reasons for reasons and question on every detail of the evidence which the appellant is expected to know, as it is his own evidence.
41. Ground 5, the appellant at no point requested a transcript of the proceedings. The appellant now says he was not detained but ‘picked up’ by the police and arrest was not the same as detention and nothing turned on the language used by the judge at [20]. This in effect is a matter of semantics and language.
42. Ground 6, challenged the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s father’s political support noting that at Q 10 AIR the appellant denied that he or any of his family members had ‘ever been politically active in Pakistan. Although the judge may have taken a loose definition of “politically active” the appellant’s statement did contradict his asylum interview at question 10. The appellant in his witness statement in fact stated that Aurangzeb ran a mafia and was related to Jamaat Islamic Party, the Pakistani military and the Taliban and that his father did indeed used to work for him. Quite specifically the paragraph at [13] of the witness statement stated, “My father was a supporter of Jamaat-e-Islam Party which is political wing of the ...”. It was thus open to the judge to find that the evidence was inconsistent as to the denial of “whether his father had any political affiliation/involvement”.
43. It was asserted that should the judge have queries these should have been put to the appellant. The appellant was legally represented and the evidence substantially provided by the appellant himself and who would have been familiar with the material.
44. As held in Abdi v ECO [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 ‘There is, on the other hand no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may relay in reaching its decision (see [10]). Where an applicant can generally be expected to be aware that the tribunal will have to assess their credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the applicant could reasonably expect to be plainly relevant to that assessment (at [11]-[12]).’ That was the case here.
45. The decision should be read as a whole and bearing in mind that the judge confirmed that he considered the evidence in the round and the raft or reasons given for the difficulties with the appellant’s evidence, not least as recorded as [22] of the decision, where the appellant was recorded as stating that the first time he left the country was to come to the UK contradicted and did not explain how his biometrics were taken in Italy. Notwithstanding the fact that he was not educated, the appellant’s estimate of time assessed at [22] was again not explained as to the difference between two to three year and five months. The appellant initially stated he was in hiding in Pakistan for 5 months after escaping from the Taliban. In fact as pointed out at [22] it was five years which was not found credible.
46. Additionally, at [25], it was noted that the appellant only made an asylum claim after many years in the United Kingdom and after he had been arrested for working illegally and that factor served to underline his lack of credibility.
47. In summary, the grounds overall disclose no arguable error of law which is material and the decision will stand.
Notice of decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands and the appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

Helen Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18th July 2025