Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004104

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00482/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CLARKE

Between

Hannah Aderemi James
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Afzal, legal representative from IIAS Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 March 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a decision promulgated on 18 February 2025 (copy annexed), an error of law was found in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hussain which was set aside by the Upper Tribunal. The error of law related only to the assessment of the Appellant’s Article 8 claim, with preserved findings of fact from paragraphs 58 to 65 and 68 to 73 of the First-tier Tribunal decision in relation to her protection claim. The sole issue on re-making is whether the Appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom would be a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private and family life contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria, born on 2 May 1965, who first entered the United Kingdom on 15 April 2003 with a multi-visit visa. She returned to Nigeria after a short time (referred to as around two months in some of the papers) on an unknown date and then returned to the United Kingdom on an unknown date in 2005 (likely further to being granted a further entry clearance visa in February 2025). The Appellant claims to have remained in the United Kingdom since, making various applications for leave to remain on human rights grounds in 2010, 2011 and 2013; all of which were unsuccessful. An appeal against the refusal dated 9 May 2012 was dismissed on 27 July 2012. The Appellant made a number of further submissions to the Respondent, the last of which was treated as a fresh claim on 7 June 2016, however her appeal against the refusal was dismissed on 8 January 2018. The Appellant claimed asylum on 1 August 2018, which was refused on 3 March 2022. That decision is the subject of the present appeal.
3. The Respondent refused the application in a decision dated 3 March 2022, with detailed reasons given in relation to the protection claim (which are no longer relevant) and considered the Appellant’s family and private life under the Immigration Rules as well as outside of them. The Appellant did not meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules as she had not lived continuously in the United Kingdom for 20 years at the date of her application and there were no very significant obstacles to her reintegration in Nigeria. In particular, the Appellant was born, raised, educated and married in Nigeria where she lived with her family until 2003. Apart from a brother in the US, the Appellant’s family remained in Nigeria. The Appellant is Christian, a majority faith in southern Nigeria and speaks Yoruba and English, both of which are languages spoken in Nigeria. Contact could be maintained with friends and family in the United Kingdom from Nigeria. The Appellant did not have a qualifying family member in the United Kingdom so could not meet any of the requirements of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules. Further, the Respondent did not consider that there were any exceptional or compassionate circumstances to warrant a grant of leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules, and medical treatment for the Appellant’s health conditions (high blood pressure and arthritis) would be available on return to Nigeria.
The appeal
The Appellant’s evidence
4. In an undated and unsigned written statement, the Appellant set out her background and details of her claim, primarily in relation to protection matters, but included additional details about family and life in the United Kingdom. So far as not covered in the latest statement before us, this referred to her daughter who has leave to remain in the United Kingdom and her two grandchild, one who was 10 years’ old at the time (and a British citizen) and the other who was 16 months’ old at the time. The statement refers to care for her grandchildren consistent with her later statement referred to below.
5. In her written statement signed and dated 12 March 2025, the Appellant sets out her background in Nigeria and her arrival to the United Kingdom in 2003 and again in 2005. Although this re-making was specifically only on the Article 8 issue, the latest statement includes details relevant to her protection claim which has already been dismissed. In relation to the outstanding issues, she states that since her first grandson was born in 2012 she has been looking after him on a daily basis, with the practical responsibility of his upbringing being on the Appellant while her daughter worked long hours. This included making meals, helping him dress, ensuring he attended school on time, taking him to the doctor and dentist and generally being a day-to-day parent.
6. The Appellant has an extremely close bond with her grandson, beyond that of her just helping out. She supports him with homework, his emotional needs and provides comfort and guidance. In the absence of consistent involvement from his father, the Appellant provides her grandson with stability and reassurance. If the Appellant were removed from the United Kingdom, it would be devastating for her grandson given how much he depends on her and would be harmful for his future development.
7. In the United Kingdom, the Appellant has become part of her local community and church, including volunteering, through which she has developed strong friendships which provide her with emotional and spiritual support.
8. The Appellant states that soon after her return to the United Kingdom in 2005, a large fibroid near her left kidney was found which caused an infection. It was discovered that the Appellant only had one functioning kidney and she had to be hospitalised at the time, as well as undergoing a hysterectomy and had a stent put in for a few months. The Appellant has ongoing high blood pressure and due to this and her history, requires regular medical check-ups. She states that her conditions would be hard to manage if she had to leave the United Kingdom.
9. The Appellant has no reliable family in Nigeria who could help her, with most family either having passed away, are unreachable or are fearful of her in-laws. In Nigeria, the Appellant would not have any stable income or support, including for her health problems and it would be unsafe, harsh and extremely hard to survive there.
10. The Appellant attended the oral hearing, adopted her written statement and gave oral evidence in English. In cross-examination, the Appellant stated that she lived with her daughter in Chatham, the latter moving to that address in 2022 and the Appellant joining her in 2023 after having to leave accommodation she previously had with a friend.
11. At the date of hearing, the Appellant’s daughter was not working. The Appellant’s eldest grandson is now 12 years old and sometimes he is taken to school by his mum, sometimes by the Appellant. The Appellant is financially supported by friends in the United Kingdom who are mainly church members, but they would not continue to do so if she returned to Nigeria as they would not see her or know her situation there, nor would they want to help her in Nigeria. The Appellant does not have any church connections in Nigeria, nor is she in contact with anyone there.
12. In Nigeria, the Appellant does not have any property, nor did she have one before she left. The Appellant’s daughter went on holiday to Nigeria once around 2019, but did not visit any family, she visited her boyfriend. The Appellant has not tried to contact anyone in Nigeria because she does not want to go back and when asked if she would if she had to return, she stated that she has never talked of going back as she has nothing there. When asked if she would stay in touch with friends and family, she stated her only family is in the United Kingdom and she can not do without them.
13. We asked the Appellant some questions as to her time in the United Kingdom in the past. She stated that she was living with her daughter up to around 2016 but could then not be together for accommodation and financial reasons. The Appellant went to live with a friend in 2016, but that friend could not accommodate all three family members, so her daughter moved out around 2019 or 2020 when she got a job and the Appellant remained with her friend. At present the Appellant lives with her daughter and two grandchildren, her daughter does not have a partner and the father of her eldest grandchild was last seen when his birth was registered, so there is no contact and no financial support from him. The Appellant moved back in with family in 2023, although had been living close by for three or four years before that and had frequent contact with them while the Appellant’s daughter was working.
The documentary evidence
14. The bundle before us contains a variety of letters and other documents in relation to the Appellant, not all of which are relevant to the outstanding Article 8 issue and not all of which it is necessary to refer to individually in this decision. We have however considered all of the evidence before us, even if not specifically referred to herein.
15. There is photocopy of a handwritten note from Oluwatomiwa James, the Appellant’s daughter. It is not in the form of a witness statement as it is undated, unsigned and does not include basic details such as the Appellant’s address, although there is a copy of the identity page of her passport to accompany it. The note states that the Appellant has been a great help to Ms James and her children, including caring for her son while she went back to university by taking him to school and other activities and now helping with both of her children. The Appellant is like a mother to them and they always want to be around her. The Appellant is also described as a source of strength and encouragement and life would be difficult without her.
16. There is a photocopy of a handwritten note from the Appellant’s eldest grandson, J, (also unsigned and undated), which states that the Appellant takes care of him when his mother goes to work. The Appellant sometimes drops him off at school and picks him up from school, sometimes puts CBeebies on the TV for him, gives him snacks and lets him buy sweets at the shop. J loves the Appellant who is always there for him when he wants to talk to her, gives him advice and is like a mother to him; as she is for his younger brother. J would like his grandmother to stay in the United Kingdom to be by his side as he is very fond of her.
17. There are a variety of documents with various dates in 2010 and 2016; including copies of cover letters to earlier applications and supporting documents submitted with those. The latter includes letters from the Church and from individuals with statements of support, including a couple who in 2010 were financially supporting the Appellant and who said they would continue to do so, and from her grandson’s childminder in 2016 who she used to drop him off to/collect from. There is also an NHS letter from 2013 indicating the Appellant had normal left kidney function following past difficulties in 2010 and medication for raised blood pressure. The Appellant was to be reviewed in six months.
18. The Appellant’s asylum interview record from 24 March 2021 refers to her having high blood pressure (which started seven years ago and for which she had been on medication for two years) and arthritis in her knees (escalating in the previous two years). The Appellant stated that she required ongoing check-ups. The interview also refers to the Appellant being the guardian for her grandson whilst her daughter was at university. At the time of the interview, the Appellant lived separately to her daughter and grandson (the Appellant in Chatham and the others in Gillingham), her daughter was not working at that time. The Appellant still picked her grandson up from school, babysat him and took him swimming and to football.
Closing submissions
19. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Everett relied on the reasons for refusal letter so far as it related to the remaining Article 8 issues. She accepted that in the almost twenty years that the Appellant claimed to have been in the United Kingdom since sometime in 2005, that she had built up some degree of private life here with her daughter, grandsons and friends; some of whom had provided letters of support for the appeal. However, overall, it was submitted that there was a lack of supporting evidence from those people, in particular there was no recent statement from the Appellant’s daughter and she did not attend the hearing to give evidence on behalf of the Appellant, despite the main thrust of the claim being about their relationship and that between the Appellant and her grandchildren. As to their relationship, even on the Appellant’s oral evidence the family had not lived together continuously and the Appellant had only moved back in with her daughter and grandsons when other accommodation with a friend came to an end.
20. Ms Everett accepted that the Appellant has a relationship with her grandson and it is likely that she provides some care and support for him, but that no relationship of dependency had been established and there was nothing at all to suggest any detriment to the children if the Appellant returned to Nigeria. Although it could be reasonable to assume that would have an impact on them. Overall, the evidence available does not support an assertion that the Appellant is a primary carer for either of her grandchildren and shows nothing more than normal family ties. It is also to be expected that the care in relation to the eldest grandchild would diminish as he grows older and he already needs less support now at the age of twelve. Ms Everett submitted that the Appellant had not established that she was a primary carer of the children.
21. In terms of support on return, Ms Everett submitted that there was no cogent explanation as to why friends who had been supporting the Appellant would not continue to do so and there was no reason why the Appellant would not be able to reintegrate in Nigeria, particularly with some ongoing support. Although the Appellant had been absent from some time, there is no risk on return and she had previously lived in different parts of Nigeria. Overall, no very significant obstacles to her reintegration had been identified. The Appellant’s daughter had visited Nigeria relatively recently and the Appellant could re-establish contacts there and explore avenues for support.
22. The Appellant can not meet the requirement for twenty years’ continuous long residence in the United Kingdom and since being here, she has at best only had precarious status such that little weight should be attached to her private life. Overall, her removal would not be a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private and family life.
23. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Afzal relied on the Appellant’s evidence of strong family bonds and long residence of at least twenty years, if not more. The Appellant has been living with her family since 2023 and close by prior to that, she has consistently contributed to her grandson’s upbringing and family life. It is in the best interests of the children for the Appellant to remain here and not be uprooted from them. Finally, it would be unrealistic for the Appellant to continue to receive support from friends in the United Kingdom if she returned to Nigeria.
Findings and reasons
24. We consider first whether the Appellant meets any of the requirements of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain. There is no suggestion that she has any qualifying family members for the purposes of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules and although there was no positive submission that the Appellant met the private life requirements in paragraph 276ADE, we consider those as an appropriate starting point.
25. Although reference has been made to the Appellant having lived in the United Kingdom for twenty years or more continuously, she is unable to meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(iii) because even on her own claim, she had not reached this point at the date of her application in 2018, nor had any express application been made for leave to remain on long residence grounds. In any event, we do not find that the Appellant has established continuous residence since 2005, her last claimed date of entry being unknown in that year and the evidence before us is wholly inadequate to show continuous residence. At best, we only have sporadic documentary evidence from 2010, 2016 and 2018 to which can be added some further isolated dates upon which applications were made and her previous appeal in the United Kingdom. These fall very far short of establishing the lengthy period of continuous residence claimed.
26. The only other possible relevant provision is that in paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) that the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to reintegration in Nigeria. Whilst we accept that the Appellant has had a likely significant period of absence from Nigeria (even if she has not established this continuously from 2005), she has failed to identify any very significant obstacles to her reintegration there in accordance with the guidance in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 as to the application of this requirement. In particular, the only matters relied upon by the Appellant are as to not having anyone remaining in Nigeria to support her and her medical conditions would be difficult to manage.
27. In relation to medical conditions, there is no current medical evidence at all (the only NHS letter dating back to 2013) and no detail at all from the Appellant as to what, if any medical treatment she currently requires, nor anything to suggest it would not be available or accessible to her in Nigeria. To the contrary, the Respondent did consider in the decision under challenge the availability of medication and treatment for high blood pressure and arthritis in Nigeria, showing both could be accessed by the Appellant.
28. The Appellant has lived in Nigeria for the majority of her life and there is nothing to suggest that she would not retain sufficient familiarity with life there to be able to re-establish herself on return. There are no identified needs for which she needs any support at all. She has previously lived in different parts of Nigeria, would be able to continue practising her Christian faith there and speaks English and Yoruba, both of which are spoken in Nigeria. There is nothing to suggest that the Appellant, as a national of Nigeria, would not be able to find accommodation and employment on return to Nigeria and no cogent reasons as to why those who currently support her financially and otherwise in the United Kingdom would not continue to do so. We note that previously (albeit some years ago) others have confirmed that they would continue to support her and we do not accept that members of the Appellant’s community currently doing so would cut her off simply because they do not see her in person, at least not in the short-term. The Appellant could also keep in touch with friends and family in the United Kingdom by means of modern communication and visits, noting that the Appellant’s daughter has visited Nigeria in the past to see a boyfriend.
29. Overall, whilst we acknowledge that the Appellant has no wish to return to Nigeria and no incentive for her to return, we do not find that there are any very significant obstacles to her reintegration there. Taking into account all of her circumstances, the Appellant would be able to re-establish herself in Nigeria and the consequences of doing so would not be harsh, nor for the reasons already given in the dismissal of her protection claim, unsafe. For these reasons, the Appellant can not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 276ADE for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds.
30. We turn now to an assessment of the Appellant’s private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which we undertake in accordance with the five stage test in the case of Razgar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27, with reference to the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 when considering the public interest as part of the proportionality balancing exercise.
31. In terms of family life, whilst it is not in dispute that the Appellant has a daughter and two grandsons in the United Kingdom with whom she has good relationships, we do not find that the Appellant has established family life in the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 8 for the following reasons. Overall, there was very little evidence before us at all as to the nature and strength of the relationship between the Appellant and her daughter, and between her and her grandsons; either at the date of hearing or over time. There were, at its highest, brief statements of general support and care for the grandchildren without any real detail or substance.
32. The Appellant’s written statements and oral evidence are not specific as to the times at which she had any particular role with her grandchildren (and refer almost exclusively only to the eldest grandson), which must have changed over time as the eldest in particular got older and on her own account fluctuated depending on her daughter’s circumstances. There is reference to the Appellant taking on a parental role when her daughter was at university (which although the dates were not specified, seemed to be many years ago) or when working, but there are references at points in the past to her daughter not being employed and it was stated that she was not working at the date of hearing. The Appellant had also taken her grandson to a childminder when he was young rather than providing direct care herself and there is no evidence at all, for example from her grandson’s school as to her having any direct or formal role in education, being an emergency contact or the like. The Appellant made no substantive reference at all to her youngest grandson or any relationship or involvement with him.
33. The handwritten note from the Appellant’s daughter is very brief and only really contains generic assertions of support from the Appellant, without any substantive examples or timeframes. It is unknown when this was written and it offers little insight in to the relationship with the Appellant or between the Appellant and her grandchildren either at the date of hearing or historically. We were told at the hearing that the Appellant’s daughter had intended to come to support her, but not to give evidence; although for practical reasons she had not in the end come in (due to difficulties parking). The absence of any formal written statement and her failure to attend the hearing to give evidence significantly undermines the claimed close and supportive relationships. We are unable to attach any real weight to this document.
34. The handwritten note from the Appellant’s eldest grandson is similarly very brief and there is no indication of when this was written either; although it does appear to be from a child younger than the age of 12 given its references to watching CBeebies (whose target audience is children under the age of 6), being given snacks and being allowed to buy sweets; such that it may have been written some time ago. In any event, it only gives a brief account of his relationship with the Appellant and we can only attach little weight to this.
35. We have separately considered the Appellant’s grandsons’ best interests in accordance with section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 but find this to be to remain in the United Kingdom with their mother as primary carer. Although it has been asserted that the eldest grandson would be harmed by the Appellant’s return to Nigeria, no detail was given as to the nature or seriousness of any such harm and we find that in any event he would be able to keep in touch and maintain a relationship, even if not a face to face one as presently. Beyond the existence of her youngest grandson and his date of birth, there was no evidence before us about him at all on which to make any meaningful assessment of his relationship with the Appellant or any impact on him of her return to Nigeria. It is however reasonable to assume that at its highest, he would be in a similar position to his brother, albeit with a much shorter relationship given his younger age.
36. The Appellant’s evidence was unclear as to when she was living with her daughter and grandson(s) and there is no documentary evidence to support the claim that they are currently living together or had always been close by and within minutes of each other. When not living together, there was no evidence at all as to frequency of contact. Even if living together now, which we do not find has been established on the very limited evidence before us, the Appellant’s evidence was that her move to do so was essentially due to needing to move out of other accommodation with a friend rather than choosing to live with family for family reasons.
37. There is no evidence of any financial dependency either way between the Appellant and her daughter. The Appellant states that she is supported by friends and church members and there are indications in the papers that they have had independent finances in the past, for example with different living arrangements depending on the Appellant’s daughter’s employment status. Other than the brief assertions referred to above, there is nothing to show any particular emotional dependency or support beyond what one would normally expect between adult family members.
38. In these circumstances, we do not find that the Appellant has established family life in the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 8. At its highest, the very limited evidence before us establishes a family relationship which goes no further than ordinary emotional ties between adult family members and grandparents/grandchildren with no elements of dependency. We do however take into account these relationships as part of the Appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom.
39. Although the Appellant has failed to establish her continuous residence in the United Kingdom since 2005, we accept that she has been here for a not insignificant period of time and during that time she would have built up a degree of private life here – as above with her family members but also within the local community. The Appellant in particular refers to attending church, volunteering and friendships within the church membership; for which there is some, albeit limited documentary evidence in support from 2010 and 2016. There is however no up to date evidence from any friends, any members of the church or any organisations that the Appellant may be involved in as at the date of hearing; none of whom have come forward to support her appeal. This does not suggest any current relationships of any particular strength or significance. Further, there is nothing to suggest that the Appellant has ever worked in the United Kingdom or has established any other ties here. Overall, despite the length of residence, there is only very limited evidence of a fairly limited private life established in the United Kingdom.
40. The Appellant’s removal to Nigeria would be an interference with the private life she has established here. Her removal would be in accordance with the law as she does not meet any of the requirements of the Immigration Rules and would be in pursuit of the legitimate aim of immigration control. We turn finally to whether that interference would be a disproportionate interference with her private life.
41. On the public interest side of the balancing exercise, we take into account the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 that the maintenance of immigration control is in the public interest. We are satisfied that the Appellant can speak English, but that is only a neutral factor and although there is no evidence of any employment, there is no suggestion that the Appellant is not financially independent having been supported by friends. Again, this is at best a neutral factor. Finally, we taken into account that little weight should be given to the Appellant’s private life established at a time when she was in the United Kingdom unlawfully and at any time her immigration status was precarious. The Appellant’s status in 2003 and 2005 was at best precarious, having arrived with a visit visa and since then she has remained here unlawfully throughout. Her poor immigration history with such a lengthy period remaining unlawfully is also a factor to be weighed in to the public interest.
42. On the Appellant’s side of the balancing exercise, we take into account the Appellant’s relationship with her daughter and grandsons and her limited private life established with friends in the community and within the church; as well as her length of residence in the United Kingdom; as set out above.
43. Overall, balancing the Appellant’s right to respect for private life and the public interest, we find that there is no disproportionate interference with the former on the facts of this appeal. The very limited evidence before us of the Appellant’s private life is very clearly outweighed by the significant public interest in this case.

Notice of Decision

For the reasons in the annexed decision, the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it was necessary to set aside the decision.

The appeal is remade as follows:

The appeal is dismissed on protection grounds.
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6th May 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004104

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00482/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KUDHAIL

Between

HJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Afzal, Legal Representative
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 January 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a Nigerian national who entered the UK in 2005 and has remained here since. She has made various human rights applications which were refused by the respondent. On 01 August 2018, she applied for asylum on the basis that she feared her in-laws because she failed to provide her husband with a male child. She additionally claimed that she feared the country situation due to the Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen. On 03 May 2022, the respondent refused the asylum claim as the appellant had been inconsistent about the events leading to her fleeing Nigeria, her reasons for returning to Nigeria within 3 weeks of arriving in the UK, her husband’s whereabouts and the nature of the abuse from her in-laws. The respondent further did not accept the appellant’s account that she sought assistance from the police and referred to objective evidence which indicated there was an effective functioning police force in Nigeria. Thus, the respondent’s position was there was sufficiency of protection and in the alternative, the appellant could internally relocate.
2. The appellant appealed this decision and in a determination dated 17 May 2023, Judge Hussain refused the appellant’s claim on all grounds.
First Tier Tribunal Decision
3. Judge Hussain dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds. He concluded in respect of her protection claim, the appellant’s account of risk from the Boko haram and her in-law’s was not credible. In the decision he set out the appellant’s fear of the Boko Haram and Fulani herdsman was based on witnessing the killing of a friend and the consequent trauma. The appellant did not have a current fear and could avoid the Fulani herdsman/Boko haram by avoiding areas in which they operate. Nigeria was a vast country and so the appellant had other options.
4. With regards to the fear of in-law’s, the appellant by her own admission has had no contact with them since 2003 and remained in the country until 2005. The appellant’s failure to claim asylum in 2005 was damaging. The appellant’s husband left her in 2012 and so it was not credible that she still feared them given they no longer have familial ties. In the alternative, the appellant could internally relocate, as she had her own family who could help her.
5. Judge Hussain accepted the appellant lived with her daughter and the daughters two children. He accepted she provided supportive care to the grandchildren. However, this was not sufficient to find that there were very significant obstacles to reintegration or a breach of article 8 ECHR.
The Appeal
6. The appellant appeals with permission on two grounds. Firstly, the decision was flawed with respect to the protection findings as Judge Hussain, placed undue weight on the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum. Further his findings on fear from in-laws and internal flight, had not considered the cultural context. Secondly, that his findings in relation to Article 8 lacked adequacy of reasons.
7. The oral and written submissions at the hearing before us are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. We had access to all of the relevant documents. The following summary of the parties’ positions is helpful.
8. For the appellant, Mr Afzal sought to argue that Judge Hussain had failed to assess the appellant’s asylum claim with her African background in mind. He argued that the appellant’s in-law’s “had it in” for her because she had not given birth to a male heir. That the judge had erred in failing to take account of this background and the animosity. The judge, he argued had brushed aside the African way of life and assumed a western standard, particularly in his conclusions that following the end of her marriage, it was implausible that they would have any continuing interest.
9. At this juncture we asked Mr Afzal to set out how this narrative fit within the refugee convention. He was unable to do, only submitting that the appellant’s personal circumstances made it impossible for her to live in Africa. We also enquired whether the cultural context/background was argued before the First Tier Tribunal judge, and if so, how. In this regard Mr Afzal took us to the appellant’s witness statement, specifically paragraphs 4-5. We asked him to expand on the argument on delay, to which he initially replied he had nothing to add, but at the end of submissions added that the judge had failed to take account of the reasons for delay. Mr Afzal could not however identify the evidence before the First tier Tribunal on any reasons for delay.
10. On the Article 8 ground, Mr Afzal argued Judge Hussain had not taken into account material facts namely the appellant’s length of residence and her childcare responsibilities for her grand children. He argued it was an error of law not to consider the rights of the children.
11. Ms Everett argued there was no error in law within Judge Hussain’s decision on the first ground, as the appellant’s claim did not fit within the refugee convention, as there was no convention ground. She referred us to paragraph 62 of the decision and argued the judge’s approach to delay was open to him, thus there was no perversity and the ground had not been made out.
12. She submitted that the cultural context/country background argument was vague as there was no specific evidence which the judge should have taken to account but failed to do so. The reasons given at paragraph 63-64, by the judge were properly open to him based on the appellant's version of events. The reasons given were cogent and adequate.
13. She argued in terms of internal flight alternative, the judge had taken into account health conditions, particularly that the appellant had one kidney, a hysterectomy and high blood pressure. She argued there was no evidence before the judge as to how these medical conditions impacted her ability to relocate internally.
14. On the Article 8 ground she argued that the judge was aware that the appellant had been in the UK a long time, lived with her daughter and grandchildren and that she was the carer for her grandchildren. She argued the judge had little evidence from the daughter who did not attend the hearing and there was no evidence of the best interests of the children before the judge. Thus, the findings he made were properly open to him.
15. We reserved our decision at the end of the hearing.
Decision
16. At the outset we make clear that we found Mr Afzal’s submissions incomprehensible particularly with regards to the refugee convention. Despite this Tribunal raising the issue of the refugee convention reason, Mr Afzal did not address how the appellant’s claim fell within the refugee convention. The argument that the appellant’s circumstances made it difficult for her to live in Nigeria bore no relevance to any convention ground.
17. On the protection grounds, Mr Afzal directed us to paragraphs 4-5 of the appellant’s witness statement, which he argued set out the cultural background. However, we do not find this to be the case as no mention is made of such factors within these paragraphs or indeed the statement. With regards to undue weight being placed upon delay, we find the findings at paragraph 52, were properly open to the judge given the evidence before him that the appellant arrived in 2005 but did not claim asylum until 2018.
18. On the issue of internal flight we note the grounds argue differences in languages in regions of Nigeria were not considered by the judge and the skeleton sought to argue the judge failed to take into account the appellant’s health conditions. We note the judge did not find any localised risk and in the alternative, he considered the appellant could move internally[§62]. It is unclear how the language would have been material to this, as there was evidence before the judge that the appellant spoke English and Yoruba. Further that English is the official language and Yoruba a native language in Nigeria [§31]. At paragraph 52 the judge set out the appellant’s medical issues and we agree with Ms Everett, there was no evidence before the judge as to how these medical conditions impacted her ability to move internally. Thus, we find there is no error in law on the protection findings. In any event, taken at its absolute highest, this is not a claim which could ever have succeeded under the Refugee Convention, such that the matters raised could never have been material to the outcome of the appeal.
19. The grounds also argue the judge’s reasons as to the appellant’s private and family life as per Article 8 ECHR were inadequate, amounting to an error of law. At paragraph 62, the judge does not adopt a structured approach to the assessment. There is no express consideration of the weight to be given to the appellant’s length of residence, her private life or her relationships with her daughter and grandchildren despite evidence that the appellant was a carer for the latter. The judge has not carried out a proper balancing exercise taking those factors into account. We find some force in Ms Everett’s point that the evidence before the First tier Tribunal was very thin and there was no evidence at all from the appellant’s daughter. However, we find the lack of identification and balancing of these factors is material to the article 8 assessment and it was incumbent upon the judge to adopt such an approach. Thus, we find the judge has erred in law in this regard.
20. In these circumstances, we set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. As there is no error of law in relation to the appellant’s protection claim, the findings in paragraphs 58 to 65 and 68 to 73 are preserved. The sole issue on re-making is whether the appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom would be a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private and family life contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
21. Given the limited extent of fact-finding required, and the fact that the effect of the errors was not to deprive either party of a fair hearing and having regard to paragraph 7.3 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement, the proper disposal of this appeal is to retain it, in the Upper Tribunal.
22. We emphasise on remaking that it remains open for the appellant to adduce additional evidence, should she so wish on the live issues to be determined.

Notice of Decision
23. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.
24. We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Listing Directions
i. The remaking of the appellant’s appeal is to be relisted for a face to face hearing on the first available date after 14 March 2025 before Judge Jackson with a time estimate of 2 hours.
ii. The appellant shall inform the Tribunal promptly if she requires an interpreter.
iii. No later than 21 days before the re-listed hearing, the appellant to file and serve upon all parties:
(a) a composite bundle that should be paginated, indexed, bookmarked and text searchable.
(b) Any further evidence upon which the appellant wishes to rely. For any person intending to give oral evidence, this must include a written statement accompanied by a statement of trust and be signed and dated by him/her to stand as evidence in chief.
iv. No later than 7 days before the re-listed hearing, the respondent to file and serve upon all parties, any further evidence in response the appellant’s bundle.

Judge Kudhail of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
06 February 2025