Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004115

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57237/2023
LP/03906/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

11th April 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

DJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F. Yaqoob, Solicitor (Fountain Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Mr S. Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant is a national of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in the United Kingdom (UK) on 19 December 2019 and claimed asylum upon arrival. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim on 13 May 2022. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. First-tier Tribunal Judge Thapar dismissed his appeal on 15 November 2022.
2. On 22 July 2023 the appellant made further protection and human rights submissions. These were refused by the Respondent on 19 September 2023. The Appellant appealed against this decision to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dixon (hereafter “the Judge”) by way of a decision dated 10 July 2024. It is against this decision that the Appellant now appeals.
3. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was initially refused by the First-tier Tribunal on 28 August 2024. However, following a renewed application to the Upper Tribunal, permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst on 24 September 2024.
The error of law hearing
4. The hearing took place by Cloud Video Platform (CVP). It was attended by representatives from both parties. At the outset of the hearing I confirmed with the parties that they could all see and hear each other and the Tribunal.
5. Mr Yaqoob made submissions in line with the grounds of appeal, contending that while the grounds were distinct, they were also interrelated. Regarding Ground 1, he argued that the Judge had failed to properly consider relevant Country Guidance case law, particularly HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC). This case outlines the risks faced by Kurdish political activists, emphasising that even 'low-level' political activity, or activity perceived as political, entails a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment if discovered. While the Judge referenced having considered HB at [7], Mr Yaqoob contended that this was not reflected in the Judge’s actual findings, particularly where the Judge appeared to accept that the Appellant is a sympathiser of the KDPI.
6. In Ground 2, Mr Yaqoob argued that the Judge had failed to properly consider both subjective and objective evidence that was material to the Appellant's case. The Appellant had submitted a letter from the KDPI, confirming his support for the party and explaining that he had been forced to leave Iran due to oppression. The Judge raised concerns about the KDPI letter, suggesting that it should have included details of the Appellant's family members' involvement. However, Mr Yaqoob pointed out that the background evidence, specifically the CPIN Iran: Kurds and Kurdish Political Groups (version 4.0, May 2022), did not indicate that such details would typically be included in KDPI letters. Furthermore, the CPIN noted that such letters can be issued to party sympathisers, which Mr Yaqoob argued would include this Appellant.
7. The Judge had also dismissed the significance of the Appellant’s participation in a seminar widely circulated online (including on the Kurd Channel and the KDPI website) and his presence on social media. Mr Yaqoob argued that, given the high visibility of these activities, the Judge should have considered the risk of Iranian authorities monitoring such sources. While the Judge acknowledged that the Appellant would face questioning about his activities upon return to Iran, Mr Yaqoob contended that the Judge failed to fully evaluate the potential for persecution, particularly in light of the 'hair-trigger' approach outlined in HB.
8. In Ground 3, Mr Yaqoob argued that the Judge had failed to provide adequate reasoning for rejecting the Appellant’s claims, particularly in relation to his family’s involvement with the KDPI and his own anti-regime views. While the Judge acknowledged that the Appellant had presented new evidence that could warrant departing from previous findings, the Judge failed to explain why this evidence, including the Appellant's participation in political events and his continued political activity on social media, did not justify such a departure. Furthermore, the Judge did not adequately address the significance of the Appellant’s ongoing political involvement and failed to provide sufficient reasoning for rejecting the Appellant’s claim of genuine anti-regime beliefs and actions.
9. Mr Walker, appearing on behalf of the Respondent, indicated that he conceded the core grounds of appeal advanced by the Appellant and that the Judge had made a number of material errors. Specifically, he acknowledged that the Judge had failed to properly analyse the KDPI letter in accordance with what was said in the CPIN and had failed to explain why the new evidence produced, including the Appellant's attendance at political events and continued political activity on social media, did not warrant a departure from the previous judgment of Judge Thapar.
10. I indicated to both representatives that I fully agreed with Mr Walker’s concessions and the thrust of the Appellant’s grounds of challenge. I therefore explained that I would set aside the decision of the Judge in its entirety and concurred with the representatives that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal on the basis that the appeal required full fact-finding.
Findings and reasons
11. Although the representatives agree that the decision should be set-aside for material error, it is nonetheless important to explain why the Judge erred and why no findings can be preserved.
12. The Judge acknowledged that, in principle, there was material that could justify departing from the findings of Judge Thapar in the earlier appeal, particularly the KDPI letter and additional evidence regarding the Appellant’s Facebook activity and participation in demonstrations in the UK [9]. It appears the Judge accepted that the KDPI letter was genuine, or at least did not provide sufficient reasons to doubt its authenticity. While the Judge did not accept the Appellant’s account of his engagement with the KDPI in Iran, he nonetheless found that the Appellant was a sympathiser. In light of these findings, I find that the Judge failed to adequately explain why the Appellant would not face a risk upon return to Iran, applying the Country Guidance of HB. HB confirms that even "low-level" political activity, or activity perceived as political, can entail a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment if discovered, and that the Iranian authorities adopt a "hair-trigger" approach towards anyone believed to be involved in Kurdish political activities. I find that the Judge did not adequately assess the Appellant’s risk in light of the Country Guidance provided in HB.
13. Additionally, I find that the Judge erred materially in his assessment of the social media evidence. At [11], the Judge concluded that the Facebook evidence was insufficient to justify departing from Judge Thapar’s earlier findings. However, Judge Thapar described the Appellant’s Facebook activity as follows:
14. The Appellant maintains that there is a risk he will be perceived as being anti-regime due to his sur place activities. The copies of the Facebook posts provided by the Appellant states his account is followed by six people ... [Composite Bundle p394]
14. The evidence presented in the instant appeal included a full ‘Download Your Information’ Facebook printout [CB 220-327], not previously available to Judge Thapar. This printout revealed that the Appellant now has over 4,800 Facebook friends. It is unclear whether the Judge was aware of this development, which raises concerns in itself. I find that the Judge failed to adequately explain why this significant increase in the Appellant’s Facebook following and the providing of a full account download did not warrant a departure from Judge Thapar’s earlier findings about his Facebook activity. I find the Judge did not adequately assess the Appellant’s risk in light of his current social media activity.
15. The Appellant also submitted evidence of his attendance at a KDPI seminar, which was featured on the KDPI’s Kurdistan Media website [CB 328-330]. A video of the same event was shared by ‘Kurd-Channel’ on their Facebook page [CB 331]. The Judge states at [11]:
There is evidence indicating that the appellant took part in a seminar that has had some 528 views. I do not find that participation in that seminar is sufficient to bring him to the authorities’ attention or there being a real risk of that.
16. Upon reviewing the evidence, it is clear that the Appellant can be seen in photographs of the event. The Judge seems to have only referenced the number of views of the seminar video on Kurd-Channel’s Facebook page. He fails to consider the potential risk arising from the fact that the seminar was also publicised on the KDPI’s Kurdistan Media website. I accept the Appellant’s submission that the Judge has failed to adequately analyse this element of the evidence when assessing risk in the context of the guidance given in HB.
17. I also accept the Appellant’s argument that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that there was insufficient evidence to depart from the findings of Judge Thapar, in light of the KDPI letter, seminar evidence and Facebook evidence. The Judge did not adequately analyse the risk faced by the Appellant in light of this evidence in the context of the Country Guidance given in HB.
18. For these reasons I am satisfied that the decision contained several errors of law which are material because they are capable of affecting the outcome of the appeal. Consequently, the decision is set aside in its entirety, with no findings preserved. Both representatives agreed that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal due to the extent of factual findings that need to be made and in the interest of fairness to the Appellant.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The decision is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Dixon.

S. Anzani

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

07 April 2025