Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2024-004126
First-tier Tribunal Number: PA/55250/2023
IA/00556/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued

17th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WOODCRAFT

Between

AYUB MUHAMMAD WASMAN
(Anonymity order not made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr S Winter, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Heard at Field House on 4 November 2025

The Appellant

1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq born on 25 November 1996 in Qaladiza in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). He is of Kurdish ethnicity. He appeals against a decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Gillespie dated 5 July 2024 to dismiss his appeal against a decision of the respondent dated 2 August 2023. That decision in turn was to refuse the appellant’s application for international protection. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 16 September 2021 and claimed asylum the same day.

The Appellant’s Case

2. The appellant attended Sulaimaniyah Polytechnic University in Iraq where he completed a course in Petroleum and Energy Engineering. In 2021 he met a fellow student called Soma and they began a relationship which her family, who were very powerful members of the Jaffe tribe disapproved of. Soma became pregnant and the appellant found it increasingly harder to meet with Soma. He was threatened by Soma’s family and disowned by his own. Eventually fearing harm at the hands of Soma’s family the appellant moved to the house of a friend called Hussein and thereafter left Iraq. He has since lost all contact with his family in Iraq. He cannot return to Iraq because he has no identity documents.

The Decision at First Instance

3. At [22] the judge indicated that he did not accept the appellant’s claim to have had no contact with his family in Iraq. The appellant had made no enquiries of the Red Cross not least because he did not need to as he knew where his family was. It was “striking” in the judge’s words that the appellant had made no attempt to contact Soma since leaving Iraq. The respondent had a valid point that no evidence had been seen to show that Soma has been a victim of honour violence herself due to her relationship with the appellant. The appellant’s claim that his father would kill him lacked credibility and was merely an excuse why he could not contact the family to obtain identity documents.

4. At [29] and [30] the judge analysed the expert report of Dr Fatah, relied upon by the appellant. The judge noted that it contained extraneous material which had not formed part of the appellant’s case, for example that Soma’s family threatened to kill the appellant. The report did not address the respondent‘s concerns.

5. At [40] the judge explained why he rejected the sur place claim which the judge found had been made in bad faith to bolster the asylum claim. The appellant could reasonably be expected to destroy any evidence of the sur place claim, such as Facebook entries. The appellant could be met by his family on return who could assist the appellant with identity documents. The judge dismissed the appeal.

The Onward Appeal

6. The appellant appealed against this decision on two grounds. The first ground argued that the appellant could not contact his family because his father had threatened to kill the appellant. No adverse credibility finding had been made against this evidence. That threat also explained why the appellant had made no enquiries about Soma. In relation to identity documentation the grounds talked about the difficulties in obtaining a CSID. I pause to note here that such a document is no longer relevant because it has been replaced by an INID (which the grounds do not mention). The appellant did have a good reason to contact the Red Cross the grounds submitted. The second ground relied on procedural issues. The judge had used the wrong standard of proof, applying too high a standard. The judge had used phrases such as “utmost scepticism” and “highly unlikely” to describe his view of the appellant’s evidence. The judge had not considered the plausibility of the appellant’s claims. The judge was using the wrong standard of inherent implausibility. The appellant could not have patterned his claim in the light of the expert’s report when that report came after the appellant had made his claim to the respondent.

7. The First-tier refused permission but on renewal to the Upper Tribunal permission was granted. The UTJ found that the judge had predicated his findings on the case of Parveen [2018] EWCA Civ 932 which was to do with Article 8 not claims for international protection. Having made Parveen his starting point, this infected the judge’s other findings, many of which were based on the appellant’s failure to contact people in Iraq for updates or evidence. That was material to the judge’s conclusion that the appellant had fabricated his claim. Ground 2 was “less convincing” but the appellant was also granted permission to argue that.

8. The respondent replied to the grant in a detailed rule 24 submission. Although the judge had not referred to the claim that the appellant’s father threatened the appellant “it is not incumbent on the First-tier Judge to comment on all points raised by the parties in order to produce a sustainable decision”. The appellant’s lack of contact with his family and other persons was an issue referred to in the Reasons for Refusal letter dated 02/08/2023. It was a matter that was raised during the appellant’s cross-examination and was part of the appellant’s own assertion. The appellant’s behaviour in not seeking to contact anyone in Iraq (and at the very least enquire about Soma) was inconsistent with the high value the appellant allegedly attached to his claimed relationship with her. The judge’s adverse findings on the appellant’s lack of effort to make contact with Iraq was in line with MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216. Ground 2 was a mere disagreement with the judge’s properly sustainable findings.

The Hearing Before Me

9. In consequence of the grant of permission the matter came before me to determine in the first place where there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal such that it fell to be set aside. If there was then I would make directions on the rehearing of the appeal. If there was not the decision at first instance would stand.

10. For the appellant counsel adopted the grounds and the skeleton argument. The appellant had left his CSID at the family home. It was difficult to understand why the judge criticised the appellant for not contacting his family because they would not have helped him. The judge had failed to recognise that the case of Parveen could be distinguished on its facts. That error undermined the judge’s findings about the safety of Soma. It was irrational for the judge to criticise the appellant for not making contact with the Red Cross when he had made inquiries of them. Describing the appellant’s evidence as self-serving was not adequate reasoning.

11. Counsel indicated he did not have much to add to ground 2. The criticism was the phrasing used by the judge which affected the standard of proof used. The judge at [23] had said he disbelieved the appellant’s claim not to be in contact with anyone in Iraq but had not considered whether that claim was plausible. The case should be remitted back to the First-tier if a wholesale reassessment of the appellant’s credibility was required. The respondent did not say in the rule 24 reply that there had been an adequate finding made of the appellant's relationship with his family. There were material errors in the determination which should be set aside.

12. In reply the presenting officer relied on the rule 24 reply which I have summarised above at paragraph 8. There had been an overall assessment of the credibility of the appellant by the judge who had considered all the evidence. The determination and findings were well reasoned and not irrational. The grounds were a mere disagreement with the decision.

13. Finally, counsel argued that the basis for finding the appellant was not credible was that there was no evidence from the appellant’s family but no inconsistencies in the appellant's case had been identified. That the family had disowned the appellant was a live issue. It was not clear why the judge criticised the appellant for not obtaining supporting evidence. The grounds demonstrated a material error of law. In the event of the determination being set aside and the matter re heard it should be moved to Scotland so it could be face to face.

Discussion and Findings

14. This is a reasons-based challenge against the findings of the judge which were that the appellant was not a credible witness, that he had fabricated his claim and engaged in sur place activities in bad faith. He could be returned to the KRI because he would be able to obtain replacement identity documents with the help of his family with whom he was still in contact. The grounds of onward appeal attacked the determination on the basis that the judge had not made a finding on whether the appellant had been threatened by his father and therefore could not approach his family either for information about Soma, the appellant’s girlfriend or obtain identity documentation to enable him to travel within Iraq including the KRI.

15. I remind myself that the judge had the benefit of seeing the appellant give evidence and was in a position to form a view about the appellant’s credibility. It is correct as the respondent stated in her rule 24 response that it is not necessary for a judge to deal with each and every piece of evidence put before them. The important point here which the judge was dealing with was whether the appellant had in reality lost contact with his family. As the judge granting permission to appeal pointed out the judge gave a number of reasons why he did not find the appellant to be a credible witness. At [11] the judge stated what the appellant’s case was about threats from the appellant’s father and it would be wrong to suggest that the judge had not considered this evidence. It was for the judge to weigh up all the evidence and form a view whether the appellant’s claim (on threats from the father and much else) was or was not credible. The judge found that the appellant was not credible for the reasons he gave and in those circumstances the claim to have been threatened by the father fell away. The judge stated in terms at [28] that the claim that the appellant’s father had threatened to kill the appellant was not credible. The judge gave his reasons at [28] for so finding, for example he did not accept that the years of love and affection within the appellant’s family could be swept away in an instant..

16. It is also worth noting that the appellant has made several statements in this case about contact with his family, some of which are contradictory. For example, the appellant’s statement dated 29 February 2024 says the appellant has had no contact with his family because that would expose them to a risk from Soma’s family. A statement made for the hearing before me, dated 1 October 2025 gave a different reason for no contact with his family which was that they were illiterate and “due to my repeated and ongoing efforts”. I appreciate that the hearing before me was to decide whether the first instance decision contained any material errors of law therein. The appellant was not asked to give evidence to explain any alleged inconsistencies. Nevertheless, the evidence that was before the judge and upon which he based his finding of a lack of credibility was itself inconsistent and implausible as he pointed out. The ground of onward appeal concerning the appellant’s family is merely a disagreement with the First-tier determination.

17. At [11] the judge referred to the appellant’s friend Hussain who was said to have helped the appellant escape Iraq. At [27] the judge noted even if the appellant had been reluctant to contact his family there appeared to be no reason why Hussain could not make enquiries, for example about Soma’s welfare and/or whether time had softened the attitude of the appellant’s father. The judge’s point was that as the relationship with Soma was so important to the appellant it was striking that once in the United Kingdom the appellant made no effort to find out how Soma was. This inaction undermined the appellant’s case and called into question whether Soma herself existed , see the final sentence at [27].

18. The grounds argued that the judge had erred in apparently following Parveen which was said to relate to article 8 claims and could in any event be distinguished on the facts. Parveen was a Court of Appeal decision on whether the appellant in that case could demonstrate the existence of insurmountable obstacles to a return to Pakistan. The judge quoted from [19] of Parveen at [22] of his determination. In Parveen the Court of Appeal were stressing the importance of evidence in support of a contention put forward by an appellant since the bald statement that the appellant in Parveen had no one to return to was insufficient. By the same token and given that the burden of proof rested upon the appellant, the bald statement that the appellant in the instant case had no contact with his family also needed to be explained. Why for example could the appellant not contact Hussain who was the “obvious person” in the judge’s words at [27] to be contacted to make enquiries for example about Soma. The judge has not misapplied Parveen and the citation of that case does not undermine the judge’s findings. The observations by the Court of Appeal in Parveen in so far as they relate to the need for supporting evidence where such evidence could reasonably be expected to be obtained are of general applicability. The judge was aware of the position where evidence could be expected to be obtained but was not, see his citation of MAH.

19. The second ground is that the judge applied the wrong standard of proof. The grounds acknowledge that the judge set out the correct standard of proof at [17]. It is clear therefore that the judge correctly self-directed on the point. The judge was very critical of the appellant’s lack of credibility and expressed that in the determination by way of making comments such as treating with the utmost scepticism the appellant’s evidence on lack of contact with the family in Iraq. These comments were made by the judge in the context of deciding the issue of whether the appellant was credible or not in the light of his self direction as to the standard of proof.

20. As the judge himself observed he had to set out his conclusions in some form of order but he had nevertheless considered all the relevant evidence in the round before setting out his conclusions. In granting permission to appeal the Upper Tribunal said of ground 2 that it was “less convincing”. Indeed, I would go so far as to say it was not convincing at all and had no merit to it. What one is left with is that this onward appeal is a mere disagreement with the determination. The judge was entitled to come to the conclusion he did about the appellant’s credibility. The judge did not accept the appellant’s claim to have no contact with his family.

21. The appellant made two other points it relation to his claim neither of which were argued before me with any great force. The first was that he had engaged in anti government activities since arriving in the United Kingdom. Whether the appellant was or was not acting in good faith in engaging in these activities and whether or not they were cynically designed to improve an otherwise fairly weak asylum claim would not matter if the result of the activities was to put the appellant in danger upon return. However, there was no evidence before the judge of that, the country guidance authorities suggested that the Kurdish authorities did not take an adverse view of those taking part in demonstrations in the United Kingdom.

22. The other matter which the appellate raised was whether he would be in difficulties in travelling around Iraq without identity documentation. This part of the appellant’s claimed was weakened by the fact that no direct submissions were made either in the grounds of onward appeal or in submissions to me about the fact that the CSID documentation is no longer relevant as it has been phased out and replaced by a biometric document the IINID. This document requires personal attendance in order to take necessary details. The appellant would be able to travel to Iraq, again according to CG authority, on a laisser passer document issued by the Iraqi embassy. Once in Iraq the appellant would be able to obtain appropriate documentation with the assistance of his family, the appellants claims that he was not in contact with them having been dismissed by the First-tier. See also “CPIN October 2023 “Internal Relocation, civil documentation and return section 5.1.” The appellant’s claim thus hinged like much of his claim on his argument that he had lost contact with his family which the judge demonstrated was false.

23. The judge was aware of the evidence in the case and gave cogent reasons why he did not accept the appellant’s arguments. The grounds of onward appeal do not demonstrate any material error of law on the judge’s part and I dismiss the onward appeal.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold the decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal

Appellant’s appeal dismissed

The First-tier judge declined to make an anonymity order in this case. I was not asked to make an anonymity order and therefore I too do not make such an order.

Signed this 12th day of November 2025.

……………………………………………….
Judge Woodcraft
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge