Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004211

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62608/2023
IA/00508/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

MS
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr D Cox, counsel instructed by Latta & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunal Hearing Centre on 9 July 2025
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Iraq. He also has citizenship of Dominica. On 26 November 2020 he arrived in the UK from Iraq and on 30 November 2020 he made a claim for international protection. The claim was refused by the respondent on 15 November 2023. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Buchanan (“the FtT judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 5 July 2024. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal by Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds on 23 September 2024.
2. The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal was heard by Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle on 2 May 2025. The decision of the FtT judge was set aside for reasons set out in the decision issued by the Upper Tribunal on 2 May 2025 (“the error of law decision”), on Article 8 grounds only.
3. It was accepted on behalf of the appellant before the Upper Tribunal that the appellant has dual nationality and there is no evidence to show that the appellant is at risk in Dominica. The Upper Tribunal concluded that for that reason alone, the appellant’s claim to be a refugee could not succeed. The focus of the appeal before the Upper Tribunal was therefore upon the FtT judge’s assessment of the appellant’s article 8 claim. The Upper Tribunal noted the FtT judge had not made any specific finding that the appellant has established a family life with his mother and siblings, all of whom are adults, within the meaning of Article 8. That failure undermined the FtT judge’s analysis of proportionality, because, the Upper Tribunal said, if an article 8 family life is found to exist between adult child and parent, then the strength of that relationship may well be a weighty factor in any proportionality exercise. The Upper Tribunal said there was also no proper analysis of the mother’s position or of the other siblings, and what the impact of them would be.
4. The Upper Tribunal directed that the decision in the appeal on article 8 ECHR grounds will be remade in the Upper Tribunal. It is against that background that the appeal was listed for hearing before me. This decision must therefore be read alongside the error of law decision.
The Hearing of the Appeal Before me
5. The appellant and his mother attended the hearing and were both assisted by an interpreter to translate the Kurdish Sorani and English languages. I was satisfied the appellant, his mother and the interpreter were able to understand each other and communicate without any difficulty.
6. In advance of the hearing I had been provided with a copy of the Composite Bundle provided by the appellant’s representatives comprising of 904 pages that was before the Upper Tribunal previously. I was also provided with a ‘Rule 15(2A) Bundle’ that contains further evidence including statements from the appellant and the appellant’s mother, who I refer to as [BN], and an update on the appellant’s current caring responsibilities for both his mother and siblings.
The Oral Evidence
7. The appellant adopted his witness statement dated 2 July 2025. The appellant states he lives with his mother and his two brothers who I shall refer to as [MK] and [MZ]. MK is now 21 years old and MZ is 19. The appellant states he is caring for his mother and his brother MK. He is responsible for all of the household finances and manages the benefits his mother receives. He states that ‘Social Security services’ have visited the house and interviewed his mother. They came to the view that she is not capable of managing her benefits. The appellant states he is also responsible for collecting his mother’s medication and making sure that she takes her medication on time. He books doctor’s appointments for her when she is unwell. Because she is unable to speak English the appellant also assists with translation when she has to speak to professionals. The appellant states he also cares for MK who suffers seizures. MK is usually admitted to hospital after a seizure for a few days. There is no particular pattern for the seizures and as MK’s health is unpredictable, the appellant has to be available to care for him at all times, and even goes to the bathroom with him to wash him because of the possibility of a seizure.
8. The appellant states that MK and his brother MZ, recently went to Iran together to see a specialist doctor for MK. The appellant was unable to go with them because of his immigration status. When they were in Iran, MK had a stroke and has lost the use of his left arm as a result. He spent about two weeks in hospital. The appellant states MZ assists him to care for their mother and brother but he is still young and a bit immature. The appellant states both his mother and MK rely on him heavily and that as the eldest male in the family, there is an expectation that he should look after them.
9. In cross examination, the appellant said his mother battles from anxiety and depression and MK has seizures. They both take medication and the appellant makes sure they take their medication on time. He does the shopping and cooking and makes sure the family is looked after. The appellant said he helps both his mother and brother shower and maintained that he is involved in his mother's intimate care, particularly when she is depressed. He was unable to say how often he assists his mother with her personal care. He assists MK with showering almost every evening. He said that MZ is unable to help because he is working and cannot look after the family. The appellant said he has not considered any assistance that may be available from social services or private carers. He accepted the medical evidence concerning the health of his brother is limited. As far as the recent trip to Iran is concerned, the appellant said the trip was funded by MZ who is working and the cost of treatment in Iran is far cheaper than in the UK. The recent visit was the second time the appellant’s two brothers have visited Iran. The appellant said that although there are services available to assist with care in the UK, as a Kurdish Muslim family they are responsible for taking care of each other and would feel uncomfortable for their privacy to be exposed to outsiders. The appellant said that although his younger brother is irresponsible, he was only able to take MK to Iran because the appellant is unable to travel. The appellant accepted there is a letter dated 10 May 2023 in the Composite Bundle that confirms MZ had spoken to the ‘Epilepsy Nurse Service’ regarding MK. He said that he is unable to be registered as the main carer for MK because he does not have status in the UK.
10. The appellant said that the family shopping is paid for in cash and sometimes using a card. He said that the Dominican passports the family have were brought by his father and he cannot go and live in Dominica. He accepted there is no evidence that the medication taken by his mother and brother would not be available in Domonica and said that would not assist with their safety. The appellant said that his family have an entitlement to remain in the UK and he needs to be able to remain to care for them.
11. By way of clarification in response to questions asked by me, the appellant confirmed his mother receives Universal Credit that is paid directly into her bank account. The account is in her sole name and when she needs money taken out of the account he deals with that. MZ works as a Sales Director in a local shop selling sweets and groceries. The appellant does not know the salary he receives, but it is between £2500 and £3000 nett per month. The appellant does not know what account the salary is paid into, but said it is spent by his brother like any other young person. The accommodation the family live in is provided by the Home Office. The appellant confirmed he has no income of his own and that he is totally dependent on his mother and brothers. The appellant maintained that MZ would be unable to care for his mother and brother because he works long hours and only returns home at night.
12. The appellant’s mother, BN adopted her witness statement dated 2 July 2025. She states her mental health remains very poor and she suffers from depression, anxiety and has post-traumatic stress disorder. She states she has poor memory and struggles to sleep. She refers to the medication that she is prescribed and states the dose of mirtazapine she is prescribed has been increased. With the medication and support of the appellant she had been feeling stable until recently when MK had a stroke. She claims she relies heavily on the appellant for support and needs him to remind her to take all her medication. She states the appellant also assists her with cooking, cleaning and washing clothes. He makes appointments for her and takes her out for a walk and other activities to keep her spirits up. She states MK has serious health problems of his own and needs someone to look after him. He is therefore unable to look after her. She said MZ is still a teenager and helps the appellant do some minimal tasks around the house. He is also working and so he is out most of the time. She states she cannot bear thinking about being away from the appellant or any of her children.
13. In cross-examination, BN said that the appellant assists her with taking medication, reminds her of when to eat and other things as well as helping her to move around the house. She claimed that the appellant has to help her move around because she is not familiar with her surroundings and he ensures she attends appointments on time. She accepted she does not have a physical disability that prevents her moving around, but said she is unfamiliar with her surroundings. She explained that sometimes when she goes for a shower, she forgets why she is there and the appellant has to assist her. She was unable to say how often the appellant assists her. She claimed the appellant makes sure that she is safe and he assists her to wash herself. She stated she takes medication and although she has had therapy in the past, she now manages with just medication. She confirmed that the ‘active problems’ recorded in her GP notes are accurate. She was referred to the GP records which only record one consultation with her on 11 March 2023 that concerned tests completed. She accepted there was no reference in that consultation to any mental health problems. Ms Blackburn referred her to the letter sent by the Mental Health Assessment Unit, Stobhill Hospital to her GP following an assessment on 29 January 2021. She is recorded to have presented as “petulant in manner and tearful at times, and evasive with limited responses on questioning”. She said that was their assessment of her and she denied being selective in what she tells people. She denied having a tendency to exaggerate things and she denied that she could receive emotional support from anyone other than the appellant. She stated MZ is not as able and he works. She maintained that she would be unable to live in Dominica because she is safe in the UK.
14. In addition to the written and oral evidence of the appellant and his mother, I have in the consolidated bundle before me, a psychological report dated 3 April 2024 prepared by Dr Mma Yeebo, a Clinical Psychologist regarding the appellant and his mother. Tests indicate BN has ‘severe depression’ and a ‘severe level of hopelessness’, suggesting she would benefit from frequent and regular monitoring. Tests also indicate she has ‘severe anxiety’. She is said to meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD following an attack she experienced in April 2020. Dr Yeebo spoke to the appellant and noted there is no evidence of any mental incapacity. He claimed to be the sole carer for his mother and reported supporting his brother MK and helps him if he has a seizure. The appellant told Dr Yeebo that he is responsible for all the meals for the family as his mother is not able to cook due to her memory difficulties. He said that he administers his mother’s medication and helps his mum to shower. He manages the household finances and assists with reading and responding to letters.
Submissions
15. The submissions made by the parties are a matter of record and I do not set them out in this decision at any length. In summary, Mr Cox referred to the legal principles set out by the Court of Appeal in Rai v Entry Clearance Officer (New Delhi) [2017] EWCA Civ 320 regarding the application of the test in Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31. Whether there is ‘family life’ between adults is in the end a question of fact to be determined on the evidence. There is no presumption of family life and family life is not established between an adult child and his surviving parent or other siblings unless something more exists than normal emotional ties. Such ties might exist if the appellant is dependent on his family or vice versa. What is required is real or committed or effective support. Relevant factors also include identifying who the near relatives of the appellant are, the nature of the links between them and the appellant, the age of the appellant, where and with whom he has resided in the past, and the forms of contact he has maintained with the other members of the family with whom he claims to have a family life.
16. Here, Mr Cox submits the appellant continues to live with his mother and siblings. He has no other family of his own and the appellant maintains a close relationship with his mother and siblings that goes beyond simple cohabitation. He provides care of his mother and siblings and there can be no doubt, Mr Cox submits, that the appellant provides real, committed and effective support to his family. The issue in the appeal is then whether the refusal of leave to remain is disproportionate. The appellant has no real ties to Dominica. He has no connections to Dominica and has never lived there. It would be equally unreasonable to expect the appellant’s mother and siblings to live in Dominica when they have been granted refugee status in the UK. The refusal of leave to remain would in effect result in the separation of the family. It would have an impact on the appellant’s mother and siblings too. Mr Cox refers to the evidence set out in the report of Dr Yeebo and submits that taking all relevant factors together, they cumulatively outweigh the public interest in immigration control.
17. Ms Blackburn adopts the reasons for refusal letter and submits that here the evidence of family life is limited. She invites me to find that the level of support the appellant provides is not as claimed, and that the need for support to the extent claimed has not been established. The evidence concerning the health of the appellant’s mother is limited and much of that set out in the report of Dr Yeebo is self reported by the appellant and his mother. There is no evidence that any of the recommendations made by Dr Yeebo have been followed. The more recent evidence set out in the ‘Rule 15(2A) bundle’ simply confirms the appellant’s mother is prescribed medication but does not state that any mental health concerns are being actively managed in other ways. Ms Blackburn submits there is no evidence beyond what is said by the appellant to support the claim that MK has suffered a stroke during his recent visit to Iran. Ms Blackburn submits that even if article 8 is engaged, it is not disproportionate to expect the appellant to live in Dominica. The appellant’s mother and siblings have passports for Dominica too, and there is no evidence that any medication or treatment they require, would not be available to them. There is in any event no reason why MZ could not assist with the care of the appellant’s mother and MK, and take responsibility for the finances of the household if they remain in the UK. It is clear that he sometimes accompanies his mother to medical appointments.
Decision
18. The issue before me is the appellant’s appeal under article 8 ECHR on the ground that the decision is unlawful under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The burden of proof is upon the appellant to show, on the balance of probabilities, that he has established a family and/or private life and that his removal from the UK as a result of the respondent’s decision, would interfere with that right. It is then for the respondent to justify any interference caused. The respondent’s decision must be in accordance with the law and must be a proportionate response in all the circumstances.
19. I have had regard, in particular to the evidence set out in the appellant’s ‘composite bundle’ and the ‘Rule 15(2A) bundle’. There is a wealth of material before the Tribunal and it is neither practical nor necessary for me to burden this decision by reference to all the evidence before me. In reaching my decision I have had regard to all of the evidence before me whether it is referred to or not.
20. I begin by considering whether the appellant has established a family life within the UK. It is well-established in the authorities that there is no relevant family life for the purpose of Article 8 simply because there is a family relationship between two adults. There must be something more than normal emotional ties. The question whether an individual enjoys family life is one of fact and depends on a careful consideration of all the relevant facts of the particular case. The question is highly fact sensitive. In Kugathas -v- SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 31, at [14], Sedley LJ cited with approval, the Commission’s observation in S v United Kingdom (1984) 40 DR 196: “Generally the protection of family life under Article 8 involves cohabiting dependents, such as parents and their dependent, minor children. Whether it extends to other relationships depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”. There is no presumption that a person has a family life, and the Tribunal must consider a range of factors that are relevant. Such factors include a consideration of matters such as the family members with whom the individual has lived, identifying who the direct relatives and extended family of the appellant are, the nature of the links between them, the age of the applicants, where and with whom they have resided in the past, and the forms of contact they have maintained with the other members of the family with whom they claim to have a family life.
21. The appellant does not have a partner or children in the UK. The appellant lives with his mother and two brothers. Having considered the evidence before me, I am satisfied that although the appellant is now 23 years old, he continues to enjoy a family life with his mother and siblings. Neither the appellant nor his siblings have formed a family unit of their own. Although I do not accept the appellant’s mother is dependent upon the appellant to the extent that she claims or that the appellant provides the level of care to his mother and MK that he claims, I am prepared to accept there is here, something more than normal emotional ties between the adults. Dr Yeebo refers to the family dynamics and states there “appears to be parentification, also known as parent-child role reversal”. The appellant has taken on a parental role in the family unit as a result of the adversity the family has experienced as a unit. Dr Yeebo also states that there appears to be a level of emotional interdependence, evidenced by the emotional and psychological support the appellant describes providing to his mother. The emotional and other support is not, I find, to the extent claimed for reasons that I will address, but I am satisfied the appellant has a family life with his mother and siblings for the purposes of Article 8. He has now lived in the UK for almost five years and although the evidence of any private life established by the appellant is extremely limited, I am prepared to accept that with the passage of time the appellant will also have established at least some, albeit minimal, private life in the UK.
22. I find that the decision to refuse the appellant leave to remain has consequences of such gravity as to engage the operation of Article 8. I accept that the interference is in accordance with the law, and that the interference is necessary to protect the legitimate aim of immigration control and the economic well-being of the country. The issue in this appeal, as is often the case, is whether the interference is proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved.
23. It is not suggested on behalf of the appellant that he is able to satisfy the requirements of Appendix FM and Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules. In Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, Lord Reed emphasised that the failure to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules is a relevant and important consideration in an Article 8 assessment because the Immigration Rules reflect the assessment of the general public interest made by the responsible minister and endorsed by Parliament.
24. The importance of, and weight to be given to immigration control has been underscored by Parliament in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as amended) (“the 2002 Act”). Section 117A provides that, when a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person's right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and, as a result, would be unlawful under section 6 of the HRA 1998, the court, in considering the public interest question, must (in particular) have regard to the considerations listed in section 117B.
25. I accept the appellant can speak at least some English and I am prepared to accept that he has the ability to integrate into society and, if permitted to work, support himself. His ability to support himself will however, on his case, be compromised by what he describes to be his responsibility to care for his mother and MK. One of the reasons given by the appellant for his younger brother being unable to care for his mother and brother is that he is working. If the appellant works to support himself it is difficult to see how he would then manage the care that he claims is required by his mother and MK. As I have already said, I do not accept the appellant provides the level of care that he claims and I am therefore prepared to accept that the could support himself. They are however factors that are at their highest, neutral.
26. S117B(4) of the Act provides that little weight should be given to a private life that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully and s117(5) provides that little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person’s immigration status is precarious. The appellant has been aware throughout that his immigration status in the UK is at the very least, precarious. I therefore attach little weight to what is in any event a peripheral private life established by the appellant.
27. I do however give due weight to the appellant’s family life with his mother and siblings. I have considered whether refusal of leave to enter would be a “fair balance” for the purposes of Article 8(2) ECHR. In reaching my decision I have carried out an evaluative assessment of the circumstances the appellant and his family.
28. Much of what is reported in the report of Dr Yeebo is based upon self reporting by the appellant and his mother. To that extent, where she relies upon claims made by the appellant and his mother, I attach limited weight to what she records. Unlike Dr Yeebo I have had the opportunity of considering the wider canvass of evidence before me regarding the claims made, and I have had the opportunity of seeing the claims tested in cross-examination.
29. I do not accept the appellant’s mother and his brother MK require care and support to the extent that the appellant and his mother claim. Having had the opportunity of hearing from the appellant and his mother and observing their evidence tested in cross-examination, I find that they have each sought to exaggerate the extent of the reliance placed on the appellant. The appellant’s mother accepted in cross-examination that she does not have a physical disability that prevents her moving around. The difficulty is that she is unfamiliar with her surroundings. There is no reason why she could not in the fulness of time, with the assistance of MZ, familiarise herself with her surroundings and integrate more fully in the community. Insofar as she relies upon her poor mental health there are other support services that will be available to her in the community.
30. I do not accept the appellant is responsible for all of the household finances. His claim is undermined by the answers he gave regarding the income of his brother. Although the family live together, it is clear they do not pool their income. The appellant is unaware of his brother’s salary and does not know what account that salary is paid into. It is clear that the appellant’s brother manages his own income and expenditure. I accept the appellant’s mother has a limited understanding of the English language and suffers from anxiety and depression, but her income in the form of Universal Credit is paid into her own bank account and the shopping for the family is paid either in cash or using cards. There is no evidence before me to support the appellant’s claim that his mother has been assessed as being unable to manage her income. If such an assessment has been carried out there would be evidence of that and of the arrangements in place for the management of her income. I find that the assistance provided by the appellant is limited to assisting his mother with shopping and making payment. They are not tasks that could only be undertaken by the appellant.
31. In his evidence before the Tribunal the appellant claims that he also does all the cooking for the family. He told Dr Yeebo that he is responsible for all the meals for the family as his mother is not able to cook due to her memory difficulties. His evidence and what he told Dr Yeebo however is at odds with the evidence of his mother who claims the appellant assists her with cooking and cleaning. She does not claim it is the appellant that is responsible for cooking for the family because she is unable to do so. This is an example of the appellant seeking to portray that his presence is fundamental whereas the reality is quite different. The appellant may well assist his mother, but that is not to say that the family would be unable to look after itself in his absence.
32. The medical evidence set out in the GP records I have been provided with describe the appellant’s mother’s ‘active problems’ as at January 2025 to be a ‘benign looking’ colonic polyp, following an abnormal colonoscopy. She has previously had tests and treatment between 2020 and March 2024, for other conditions. She is currently prescribed paracetamol, mirtazapine, a dry powder inhaler and levothyroxine tablets. The prescribed medication is limited albeit clearly provides her with some stability. As the appellant’s mother accepted, there is no reference to any recent consultation regarding her mental health in the GP records provided. There is no reason why the appellant’s mother’s prescribed medications could not be delivered to her and arranged so that she is aware of what she needs to take and when. Although the appellant may occasionally assist his mother with her personal care, including showering, I do not accept that with the stability provided by the prescribed medication the appellant’s mother requires on-going intimate provided by the appellant in the way claimed, including help to shower. The appellant’s mother does not have a physical disability that prevents her from looking after her own personal and intimate care, and while I accept that her mental health may be such that she sometime requires reminding, I do not accept the appellant provides his mother with physical intimate care in the way he claims.
33. I do not accept the appellant is entirely responsible for booking his mother’s medical appointments and attending appointments with her. The appellant also claims to be responsible for managing the health of his brother MK, but his evidence is at odds with evidence before me that MZ has also spoken to medical professionals including the Epilepsy nurse regarding his brother. There is no credible reason why the appellant and his brother MZ do not share responsibility for assisting their mother and brother when required, and I find that it is more likely that MZ also assists where necessary.
34. I accept MK suffers infrequent seizures and is prescribed medication. I accept the appellant assists with the care of MK when required, but again, I do not accept that the extent of the care required is as the appellant claims. There is no credible reason why the appellant should follow MK to the bathroom to wash him because of the possibility of a seizure. Again the extent of the support and care required from the appellant is undermined by the evidence of the recent visit by MZ and MK to Iran to investigate the possibility of further medical treatment there. That is evidence of MZ having a greater involvement in the care and treatment required by MK than the appellant and his mother are prepared to admit to. They plainly entrust MZ to pay for and look after his brother during a visit to a country some distance away. There is no evidence before me to support the claim that MK has suffered a stroke during his most recent visit to Iran, but even if he has, he is plainly being cared for adequately by his brother.
35. The appellant said he has not considered any assistance that may be available from social services or private carers. Dr Yeebo states that it is likely that if the appellant is removed, it would have a significant impact on the dynamics within the family home given the role the appellant plays in taking care of his mother and managing the household. It is said that the appellant’s mother would likely struggle to meet her physical and psychological needs and manage the household. This will impact on her other sons, especially MK. There is said to be a risk of significant deterioration in functioning for BN given that her current level of functioning, as described by her and the appellant is low. She falls within the severe category for depression and anxiety and any deterioration would likely be serious. The appellant’s removal could contribute to increased hopelessness and could lead to an increased risk of harm to herself. Dr Yeebo recommends the appellant’s mother would benefit from a needs assessment in order to ascertain the exact levels of support she requires for her activities of daily living. This can be completed by an Occupational Therapist. She would also benefit from an intervention for her depression, anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder which is likely to be some form of cognitive behavioural therapy. Dr Yeebo states that a needs assessment for MK should also be considered in order to explore the exact levels of support he requires. To the extent that Dr Yeebo relies upon self reporting by the appellant and his mother I attach little weight to the concerns she expresses. Dr Yeebo has not had sight of any GP records that are likely to be directly relevant to the assessment of the care required by BN and her mental health. Dr Yeebo has taken the claims made at face value but it is naïve to discount the possibility that an individual facing removal from the United Kingdom might wish to fabricate or exaggerate matters. Their account of the support required and provided, is I find, exaggerated. In any event, there is no evidence that the appellant and his mother have acted upon any of the recommendations made by Dr Yeebo.
36. I have no doubt the appellant, his mother and his siblings wish that the appellant is able to continue living in the UK, but that does not equate to a right to do so. In reaching my decision, I have considered the claim by the appellant that he has no connections to Dominica and has never lived there. I accept that, but the appellant is a young able bodied man with no health concerns. He has demonstrated resilience and fortitude by coming to the UK, a country where he and his family have no other connections, and seeking to establish him here. He will be able to rely upon the same resilience to establish himself in Dominica, with or without his mother and siblings. He is able to speak English which is the official language of Dominica. The appellant will face the same challenges to securing employment as he will in the UK, but he is likely to have at least some skills, even if they are the skills acquired from caring for others, that will assist him secure employment. I accept that it will not be altogether easy for the appellant to establish himself in Dominica and I have already referred to the evidence of the family life the appellant has with his mother and siblings in the UK. However, although there will inevitably be some disruption for the appellant to begin with, I find the appellant would be able, within a reasonable period, to find his feet and exist and have a meaningful life within Dominica. Having heard the appellant give evidence, I find that there is nothing that will prevent him from engaging fully in life in Dominica. There will inevitably be a period of adjustment as there was when the appellant arrived in the UK, but in my judgement he could adjust to life in Dominica within a reasonable timescale. I accept life in Dominica will not be easy initially, but I do not accept he could not cope. It will be a matter for the appellant’s mother and siblings whether they live in Dominica with the appellant or remain in the UK without him. I do not accept they would not be safe in Domonica and there is a paucity of evidence concerning other difficulties they may face. As with the appellant, his mother any siblings may initially face some challenges to living in Dominica but I do not accept they are unable to do so. They are in the end nationals of Dominica and will have all the benefits associated with that, albeit different to the UK.
37. I accept there are factors that weigh in favour of the appellant including the family life he has with his mother and siblings and the care and support that he provides to them, albeit it is not to the extent claimed. There is also, as Mr Cox submits the risk of the family being separated if the appellant’s mother and siblings remain in the UK. That will be a matter for them. They are all nationals of Dominica. Factors that weigh against the appellant include (i) the fact that the appellant is not at risk in Dominica and on the findings I have made, he will be able, within a reasonable period, to find his feet and exist and have a meaningful life within Dominica; (ii) The absence of any evidence that the appellant’s mother and siblings will be at risk in Dominica or that that any medication or treatment the appellant’s mother and MK require would not be available to them.
38. In my final analysis and in carrying out the balancing exercise, I have also had regard to the public interest considerations set out in s117B of the 2002 Act. I acknowledge that the maintenance of immigration control is in the public interest. I find the appellant’s protected rights, whether considered collectively or individually with those of his mother and siblings, are not in my judgement such as to outweigh the public interest in the maintenance of immigration control.
39. It follows that in my judgement, the decision to refuse the appellant leave to remain is in the public interest and not disproportionate to the legitimate aim.
40. I therefore dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Notice of Decision
41. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed on Article 8 ECHR grounds. Ther respondent’s decision to refuse the appellant leave to remain is lawful under s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 September 2025