Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004239

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57374/2023
IA/00661/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

OD
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: No appearance by or on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunal Hearing Centre on 13 August 2025
Decision and Reasons
Anonymity
1. This appeal concerns a claim for international protection. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.”
Introduction
2. The appellant is a national of Vietnam. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 14 May 2022 and the following day, made a claim for asylum. His claim was refused by the respondent for reasons set out in a decision dated 27 September 2023. In summary, the respondent accepted the appellant is a Vietnamese national but rejected the claim that the appellant is of adverse interest to the authorities because of his faith or political profile and did not the appellant is at risk of re-trafficking. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Stevenson (“the judge”) for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 4 July 2024 (“the decision”).
3. The appellant does not challenge the decision of the judge to dismiss the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds. Equally, the appellant does not challenge the decision of the judge insofar as it is based on the appellant’s faith or political opinion. However the appellant claims that having fled Vietnam he was subjected to exploitation in Angola and Russia by organised people traffickers. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim that he had been exploited. Referring to the decision of the Upper Tribunal in KB & AH (credibility – structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00492 and the decision of Neuberger LJ in HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, the appellant claims the judge rejected the appellant’s claim to have been subject to modern slavery in Angola on the basis of a wholly speculative approach as to the plausibility of the claim without reference to the objective evidence or to the appellant’s claims to have sustained both physical and psychological injury as a result of his experiences there. The appellant claims that the judge was invited to consider the appellant’s evidence against a checklist of factors indicative of trafficking referred to in the CPIN that was before the Tribunal. The judge made no reference in the decision to that checklist. Furthermore, the judge made no finding as to whether the appellant had been in Angola at all.
4. Permission to appeal was refused by FtT Judge Scott on 4 September 2024. The application for permission was renewed to the Upper Tribunal and permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan on 23 September 2024.
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me
5. Notice of the hearing listed before me on 13 August 2025 was sent to the parties on 8 July 2025. On 10 July 2025, the appellant’s solicitors notified the Tribunal that they no longer act for the appellant. On 14 July 2024, the appellant’s representatives confirmed his address. On 30 July 2025, the Upper Tribunal sent a copy of a bundle containing all of the documents relevant to the appeal to the appellant by post. The covering letter confirmed that the ‘hearing bundle’ is provided in readiness for the hearing of the appeal on 13 August 2025. There has been no response from the appellant.
6. The hearing before me was called on at 11:10 am and there was no appearance by or on behalf of the appellant. There was no explanation for the appellant’s absence and having checked the Tribunal records I am satisfied that the appellant has not made any application for an adjournment. I have had regard to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. I am satisfied that the appellant has had notice of the hearing before me and that it is in the interests of justice and in accordance with the over-riding objective to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in the appellant’s absence.
7. On behalf of the respondent, Ms Blackburn adopted the rule 24 response dated 14 October 2024 that has been filed and served by the respondent. The respondent opposes the appeal and submits there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT. The respondent submits the findings made by the judge as to the credibility and plausibility of the appellant’s account were open to the judge. There were inconsistencies in the evidence of the appellant as to the events that led him to leave Vietnam and travel to Angola. The appellant does not challenge the findings made. The judge considered the account given by the appellant of his being able to leave from the construction site and the grounds of appeal gloss over the fact the appellant having left Angola, returned to Vietnam, where out of choice he claims he enlisted the assistance of the agent again. The appellant gave inconsistent evidence regarding the length of time he spent in Vietnam and Russia. The respondent submits the judge considered the claim as a whole and the appellant does not challenge the findings made that the appellant will not be at risk upon return as a result of his faith and political opinion. The respondent submits the appellant does not challenge the findings made as to the support network that would be available to the appellant in Vietnam, and the appellant will not be at risk of being re-trafficked on return to Vietnam.
Decision
8. The assessment of the risk upon return and the credibility of the claim advanced by an appellant is always a highly fact sensitive task. The judge was required to consider a number of factors. They include, whether the account given by the appellant was of sufficient detail, whether the account is internally consistent and consistent with any relevant specific and general country information, and whether the account is plausible. The ingredients of the story, and the story as a whole, have to be considered by reference to the evidence available to the Tribunal. The judge was required to resolve what had happened in the past, and whether the appellant would be at risk on return in the future.
9. In reaching my decision, I have reminded myself of the restraint which an appellate body must exercise when considering an appeal against the decision of a specialist judge at first instance. Appellate Courts do not lightly interfere with findings of fact made by a trial judge. In Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] UKSC 41, [2014] 1 WLR 2600, Lord Reed (with whom Lords Kerr, Sumption, Carnwath and Toulson agreed) said at paragraph 67:
"in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified".
10. The judge set out the background to the appellant’s claim at paragraphs [17] to [19] of the decision. The claims made by the appellant are summarised at paragraph [20] of the decision. The judge referred to the evidence before the Tribunal and said at paragraph [22]:
“An assessment of the evidence contained in these various sources, and the appellant’s oral evidence, gives rise to several inconsistencies and credibility matters, as follows.”
11. The judge went on in the decision to identify material inconsistencies in the appellant’s account of events and the way in which his claims have developed over the passage of time. Given the limited grounds of appeal before me I do not need to set out in this decision, the matters identified by the judge in the decision. For present purposes it is sufficient to simply say that the appellant rejected the core of the appellant’s claims regarding the events that the appellant had claimed occurred in Vietnam and the interest the appellant claimed the Police had in him. The appellant does not challenge the findings made by the judge regarding those claims. Those findings cannot be entirely divorced from the appellant’s claim that the judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s claim to have been subject to modern slavery in Angola and or Russia. At paragraph [32], the judge said:
“It is the appellant’s claim the (sic) following receipt of the police summonses, his wife arranged for an agent to take him to Angola. The appellant considered that there would be a proper paid job in Angola, but in fact he was held hostage on a construction site. The appellant claims to have received very serious ill-treatment and was held against his will for three years and forced to work.”
12. Close attention to the factual matrix demonstrates that the appellant’s claim is that he had begun to receive summonses from the police, because of an incident in 2017. The first was received by the appellant’s wife on 19 December 2017 and another two on 20 and 21 December 2017. The appellant claims he then had to make arrangements to leave Vietnam and travel to Angola with the assistance of agents, who the appellant claims, then held him hostage on a construction site. The use of the agent is therefore aligned and linked to the appellant’s claim that he was of interest to the authorities for the reasons he claims. Those claims were rejected by the judge and the appellant does not challenge those findings. That at least undermines the appellant’s claims regarding events in Angola and thereafter, albeit is not determinative.
13. It is of course possible that the appellant lied or fabricated his account of events in Vietnam but was being honest about what happened after he had left Vietnam. A person's motives may be different as respects different questions. The appellant relies on the decision of the Upper Tribunal in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan. The Upper Tribunal held that the Credibility Indicators identified in the Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction, “Assessing credibility and refugee status”, Version 3.0, 6 January 2015 (which can be summarised as comprising sufficiency of detail; internal consistency; external consistency; and plausibility), provide a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment. Assessment of credibility is a highly fact-sensitive matter and evidence has to be considered as a whole or “in the round”. That is uncontroversial but does not assist the appellant. In Y –v- SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223, Keene LJ referred to the authorities and confirmed that a judge should be cautious before finding an account to be inherently incredible, because there is a considerable risk that they will be over influenced by their own views on what is or is not plausible, and those views will have inevitably been influenced by their own background in this country and by the customs and ways of our own society. However, he went on to say, at [26]:
“None of this, however, means that an adjudicator is required to take at face value an account of facts proffered by an appellant, no matter how contrary to common sense and experience of human behaviour the account may be…”
14. I am quite satisfied the judge carefully considered the appellant’s claim that he is risk of re-trafficking. Here again, the judge set out the inconsistencies in the appellant’s account and why the account does not stand up to scrutiny:
“33. In his substantive interview at Q43 the appellant states that he attempted to escape and was caught the first time, on the second occasion he “made it”. It was put to the appellant that in his initial statement, at paragraph 30, he stated that he had asked one of the guards if he could leave.
34. When asked why he believed he was helped by the guard, given the severe treatment and forced labour, the appellant stated at Q45 that whilst the mafia controlled the construction site, there are also local people involved and they had made a hole in the fence for him to escape. This was again new information, not contained in his initial statement. I do not accept that after such severe treatment amounting to forced labour and slavery, that the appellant could simply ask to return to Vietnam and be provided with false documents, flights and this would be arranged without delay. The appellant does not report that he was held to a debt for this return to Vietnam, and as his account progresses, he then freely contacted the agent on a further occasion.
35. On return to Vietnam, the appellant claims that he remained in fear of the authorities and therefore contacted the agent again of his own volition. The appellant claims, at Q49, that he spent only two days in Vietnam before his travel to Russia was arranged. This conflicts with his statements in which he claims he was in Vietnam for around one month (from 18 September 2021 until 20 October 2021) after returning from Angola and before travelling to Russia.
36. In oral evidence he was asked why, given the extremely severe treatment he received in Angola, he approached the same agent to travel again, and the appellant appeared to suggest that the agent who arranged travel to Angola was a different agent than that who took him Russia. This is not something said by the appellant in his substantive interview or witness statements, and in my view is a further inconsistency.
37. The appellant claims to have experienced similar mistreatment in Russia, where he was forced to work and lived under a bridge. The appellant recounts an escape from this forced labour with the assistance of another individual, travel via various European countries to France, and eventually to the UK. At Q62 of the appellant’s substantive interview it was put to him that he has stated he was not paid for his work in Russia, but that in his screening interview the appellant said that he had paid for his travel to the UK using earnings from Russia.
38. The appellant answered at Q62 that the money he had saved was not from working but he kept the food he was given in Russia and managed to save around $300. In oral evidence the appellant claimed that he was given money to buy bread and water was able to keep portion of that to accumulate the funds. This again is quite different from the account given in the appellant’s first statement in which he says that the agent would drop off food for him to cook under the bridge, and he might be brought things like bread or rice. The appellant was clear that he was not paid. In the appellant’s subsequent witness statement (paragraph 98) the appellant claims he was given money to buy food, and this is how he accumulated money to leave Russia. This is a distinct difference from the account previously given.”
15. The judge went on to address the appellant’s account of events following his arrival in the UK at paragraph [39] of the decision. Contrary to what is said by the appellant judge reached clear findings and a conclusion at paragraph [43] of the decision:
“I do not accept the appellant’s account as credible. I do not accept that the appellant has been involved in protests, or that he has come to the adverse attention of the authorities in Vietnam. I do not accept that the appellant has been trafficked to the UK. His evidence cannot be accepted even to the lower standard which applies. As a result, I do not consider that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Vietnam, or that there is a real risk of a breach of his rights under articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR.”
16. The decision of the FtT judge must be read as a whole. The judge was not required to reach a decision by reference to a checklist provided it is clear that the judge has reached a decision upon the core elements of the claim, by reference to the evidence before the Tribunal, giving adequate reasons for the decision and conclusions reached. The focus should be on the way the judge performed the essence of their task. It s clear in my judgment that the judge reached a decision that was open to the FtT following an analysis of the claims made by the appellant. The Upper Tribunal should not overturn a judgment at first instance unless it really cannot understand the original judge's thought process when the judge was making material findings. The decision is to be read looking at the substance of the reasoning and not with a fine-tooth comb in an effort to identify errors. It is necessary to guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors, particularly if the judge who decided the appeal had the advantage of hearing oral evidence. A fact-sensitive analysis of the risk upon return was required. In my judgement the judge reached a decision that was open to the Tribunal.
17. It follows that I conclude there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT capable of affecting the outcome of the appeal and I dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
18. The decision is dismissed.
19. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Stevenson promulgated on 4 July 2024 stands.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 November 2025