Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004258

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00972/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

11th April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Norman, Counsel, instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. We have made an order to anonymise the Appellant. An application was made before us by the Ms Norman, on behalf of the Appellant. Having considered Guidance note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, we agreed that the need to protect the identity of the Appellant in the light of his asylum claim necessitates a departure from the principle of open justice.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iran of Kurdish ethnicity. His date of birth is 1 January 1989.
3. The issue for us is whether the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Manuell) erred in law when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Respondent on 7 February 2024 to refuse his application under the Refugee Convention and on human rights grounds. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal by the Upper Tribunal (Judge O’Callaghan).
The Appellant’s evidence before the First-tier Tribunal
4. The Appellant gave evidence before Judge Manuell and adopted his witness statement as his evidence-in-chief. We set out a summary of his evidence.
5. Before coming to the UK the Appellant lived in a village called Doletta in Iran with his parents, wife and their children. He has not had a formal education. He learned the Kurdish alphabet and Quran at his local mosque. From the age of 15 he was employed as a kolbar to carry goods across the border. His earnings were sufficient to support his family and his parents. He learnt of his father’s support of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) when working as a kolbar. The appellant became interested in the KDPI. He said that his father had warned him that it was dangerous to have such interests but he later agreed to his involvement.
6. The Appellant started to help the KDPI as he supported the self-determination of the Kurdish people. He helped the KDPI with goods, food and distribution of leaflets, sometimes storing the leaflets at his home. On 4 May 2022 when returning from the Iraqi border the Appellant was in a group of kolbars who were ambushed by the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran). The opened fire upon them. The group was shot at and two or three were arrested. The Appellant managed to escape. Two of the men who were arrested knew the Appellant.
7. The Appellant managed to escape to the mountains. He called his father who advised him to go to a friend’s house. The next day the Appellant’s home was raided. His father was arrested and questioned. He was released after twelve hours. His father told the Appellant that the authorities had information that he was part of the group of kolbars. His name had been given to the Pasdaran by the men arrested. He told the Appellant not to return. He said that he would send the Appellant’s cousin to him with money to pay for an agent so that he and his family could leave Iran.
8. During the ambush the Appellant abandoned what he was carrying. His load was confiscated by the Pasdaran. Within it were KDPI leaflets. Leaflets were also found at the Appellant’s home.
9. Since coming to the UK, the Appellant said that he had participated in sur place activities and posted extensively on Facebook.
10. The Appellant was cross-examined and he confirmed that he had worked as a kolbar in Iran for twenty years. He was illiterate so that he did not know what the leaflets said. He was asked how that could be when his evidence in his witness statement was that he had been taught the Kurdish alphabet and to read the Quran. In response the Appellant said that he could not read everything and the papers for the KDPI were closed so that he could not open them. The judge recorded the Appellant’s evidence that he had help from friends with his Facebook posting and he was asked in cross-examination how that could be given that he had supplied copies of hundreds of pages of postings on his account. The Appellant said that he had previously been in a hotel where there were Kurdish people and he contacted them and they posted for him. They sent him texts which he posted.
11. The Appellant was asked in cross-examination why in his SEF interview he had mentioned transporting electrical items as a kolbar but not the KDPI leaflets. He said in response that the kolbars’ everyday job was the transportation of these goods and that they did not transport leaflets every day. The Appellant’s evidence was that he had had no contact with his parents since he left Iran.
12. The Appellant said that he had attended fourteen or fifteen demonstrations since he came to the UK. However, he had not organised any of the demonstrations or given speeches. He did not belong to any political group in the United Kingdom. His Facebook account was public. He had not seen any journalists at the demonstrations.
The Findings of the FtT
13. The judge made findings at [22]–[37]. The judge noted that it was accepted by the Respondent that he was of Kurdish ethnicity, that he had left Iran illegally and that he had engaged in low level sur place activity in the UK. The reasons given by the judge for dismissing the appeal on asylum and humanitarian grounds are as follows:
1) The Appellant’s account of political involvement in Iran was vague and implausible, almost in all aspects.
2) It is improbable that the Appellant would suddenly start participating/ supporting the KDPI at the age of 32 or 33 if his father had warned him against it and if he was too afraid of the authorities to have a Facebook account in Iran. The Appellant was already in a precipitous situation bearing in mind his work as a kolbar.
3) The Appellant’s claim to be illiterate was improbable because he admitted to having received an education in the alphabet and reading the Quran and it was not likely that anyone would have the time or the patience to help the Appellant create indeterminable Facebook pages since his arrival in the United Kingdom. Many hundreds of pages were produced.
4) It is unlikely that a functionally illiterate person would be able to use social media applications on a mobile telephone to the extent which the Appellant has plainly done.
5) It is implausible and improbable that he would have been able to escape or that there would be any survivors of an ambush by the Pasdaran.
6) It is improbable that only three or four arrests were made and that only one person was injured by gunfire, given that kolbars were supposedly carrying heavy packages which it is reasonable to infer that they were reluctant to surrender. The heavy packages would be difficult to discard with speed.
7) The Appellant did not describe a secret route away from the ambush and he gave a vague account of going to the mountains
8) The treatment of the Appellant’s father was “mild” by Iranian standards – his father was released without charge. It is improbable that his mobile phone was not seized given the interest in the Appellant.
9) The Appellant did not explain how he or his father was able at short notice to raise the substantial sum needed to pay the people smugglers to take the Appellant, his wife and children to the UK.
10) The Appellant did not explain how his father was able to make contact with the criminal people smugglers so easily and quickly.
11) It is not reasonably likely that the Appellant is of interest to the Iranian authorities. He attended demonstrations simply as a participant and there were thousands present at each event.
12) The Appellant’s political commitment is not genuine and he will not thereby be “compromised in his conscience”. He is able to delete or close his Facebook account.
13) The Appellant’s failure to claim asylum at the first reasonable opportunity further detracts from his credibility.
14) His Kurdish ethnicity and illegal exit do not create real risk given the findings on his political activity.

The Grounds of Appeal
Ground 1
14. The judge made adverse credibility findings on matters that were not raised in the refusal letter or put to the Appellant during evidence. Furthermore they were not relied upon in submissions.
15. Paragraph 4 of the grounds set these out as follows:-
(a) Findings at [24] that it is improbable that he would “suddenly” start participating in the KDPI if his father had warned against it.
(b) Finding at [24] that he was “too afraid” of the Iranian authorities to have a Facebook account. The Appellant had said he did not have a Facebook account but was not asked why.
(c) Finding at [25] that it was unlikely that anyone would have time or patience to help him create Facebook posts.
(d) Finding at [26] that there would not have been any survivors from a Pasdaran ambush. The Respondent did not go so far in the refusal letter as to suggest that it was implausible that there would have been survivors. The Appellant could have sought background evidence about measures taken by the kolbars to evade ambush and whether or not this was plausible if he had been aware that this was likely to be an issue.
(e) Finding at [27] that the kolbars were carrying packages which “it is reasonable to infer that [were] difficult to discard with speed”. The Appellant was not asked how quickly this could be removed.
(f) Finding at [27] that the Appellant described “no secret route”. The Appellant was not asked about whether there was a secret route.
(g) Finding at [28] that it was improbable that the Appellant’s father’s mobile phone was not seized.
16. It is unfair to rely upon matters which were not put to the Appellant during the course of the hearing as reasons to reject his evidence.
17. None of the other matters save the ambush were raised in the reasons for refusal, nor were they relied upon in submissions by the Presenting Officer.
Ground 2
18. The judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that it is improbable that the Appellant would participate in the KDPI activities if his father had warned him against it. The Appellant explained in his interview that his father did not agree with him doing it, “at the beginning,” but stated in his initial screening that “in the end he agreed” (Respondent’s bundle p17). If the judge rejected this explanation, reasons should have been given to explain this.
19. The judge found at [25] that it is unlikely that a functionally illiterate person would be able to use social media on a mobile phone. However, the Appellant explained that he had learned some English and his Kurdish had improved in the UK, and that he “sometimes” needs help from friends. He also had help from another asylum seeker who is Kurdish and was an English teacher in Iran. The judge does not indicate what part, if any, of this explanation he found unsatisfactory.
20. The judge finds at [26] that it is implausible that there would be survivors from a Pasdaran attack. However, the Appellant explained in his witness statement that “All the kolbars were walking in a line separately. The routes are narrow mountainous routes. We could not all walk together. The group who fell into the ambush were in front of us. Luckily I managed to drop my load and escape”. The judge does not indicate what part, if any, of this explanation he found unsatisfactory, or why.
Ground 3
21. At paragraph [31] the judge found that the Appellant could delete or close his Facebook account, however he stated in his witness statement that he would not do so. He was not cross-examined on this by the Respondent, nor was it submitted by the Respondent in closing that he would be someone who would close his account. It does not matter whether the Appellant would not close his account due to genuine political belief or whether this is “opportunistic” or even “bad faith”: Danian v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] EWCA Civ 3000. The judge did not make a finding about whether the Appellant’s evidence was credible on this point.
Submissions
22. We heard submissions from both representatives. Ms Norman’s submissions were in the context of the grounds of appeal (save in respect of one matter upon which we will discuss).
23. There was no Rule 24 response. At the start of the hearing Ms Ahmed conceded that she was content to proceed on the basis that the Appellant had not been cross-examined on the issues raised at para 4(a)–(g) of ground one. Her primary submission was that this is not material. She referred to the Reasons for Refusal Letter (“the decision”) and stated that the issues were raised therein.
24. Ms Norman relied on the case of Abdi & Ors v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 to support procedural unfairness.
Relevant principles
25. The Court of Appeal in Abdi set out a number of authorities on the circumstances in which failure to raise a point at a hearing amounts to procedural unfairness. In this appeal the Appellant was represented. We will summarise the salient principles derived from HA v SSHD (No 2) [2010] SC 457 [2010] CSIH 27, SSHD v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173, set out in Abdi at [31] and [32] as follows:-
1) What fairness demands is fact sensitive.
2) General principles can be identified but they cannot be applied by rote identically in each case.
3) The Tribunal may identify an issue which has not been raised by the parties but it will be unfair ordinarily for it to base its decision upon its view of the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to address it.
4) The Tribunal is entitled to reject evidence notwithstanding that the evidence has not been challenged before it.
5) There is no general obligation on the Tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may rely in reaching its decision
6) A failure to put to a party a point which is decided against him can be grossly unfair and lead to injustice because he must have a proper opportunity to deal with it.
7) Where much depends on credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the applicant could reasonably expect to be relevant to that assessment.
26. We remind ourselves of the following principles that the law says must apply when considering whether there is an error of law. We summarise these, having considered: KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693, AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, AA (Nigeria) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1296, MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:-
i. The First-tier Tribunal is an expert Tribunal, and an appellate court should not rush to find a misdirection merely because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
ii. The UT should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong. The UT should not be astute to characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the UT's assessment of the facts.
iii. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account.
iv. The UT is an appellate court, and it is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the First-tier Tribunal judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that the First-tier Tribunal does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
v. Experienced judges in this specialised Tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically.
vi. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appellate court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
vii. Decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that the First-tier Tribunal has misdirected itself in law.
viii. The focus should be on the way the First-tier Tribunal performed the essence of the task required.
Findings and reasons
27. We will engage with grounds one and two together as they are similar or there is repetition.
28. The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal turned on credibility. We do not agree with the Appellant that the sole credibility issue raised by the Respondent in the decision letter relates to the ambush. We find that the grounds do not accurately represent the decision.
29. The Respondent said in her decision that the Appellant had provided inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation and there was a lack of detail in his account. It is said that there is a lack of detail about the Appellant’s work as a kolbar. The issue of the Appellant’s illiteracy was raised. The Respondent queried the Appellant having said that he could not read the leaflets he was delivering on behalf of the KDPI because this did not sit with his alleged Facebook activity. The Respondent said that it was unlikely that the Appellant could have escape the ambush unharmed. The decision maker said that it was unclear why the Appellant’s father had been released by the police when they discovered KDPI leaflets at his home.
30. We do not accept that the findings of the judge listed at [4] (a) and (b) of the grounds disclose procedural unfairness despite the Appellant not having been cross-examined on the issues. The finding at [24] of the decision that it is improbable that the Appellant would suddenly start participating in KDPI activities, if his father had warned him against it, was open to the judge. While the Appellant was not cross-examined on this specific issue, his evidence was that his father had said that it was dangerous (see [15] of the Appellant’s first witness statement). While the evidence was that he initially said it was dangerous but then agreed to the Appellant’s involvement with the KDPI, the point the judge made is that the Appellant had been warned against it which accurately represents the Appellant’s evidence. Whether his father ultimately agreed to the Appellant’s involvement with the KDPI does not take away the risk and danger involved and his father’s warning. We will deal with ground two at this point because it relates to and repeats ground one in this respect, only it is expressed as the judge not taking into account what the Appellant said about his father agreeing to the Appellant’s involvement with the KDPI. His father’s change of heart was not material to the judge’s consideration of the issue, which was to do with the risk involved as supported by what the Appellant stated his father had said to him. Whether his father ultimately agreed to his involvement with the KDPI, is not in conflict with the judge’s findings. In any event, a proper reading of [24] discloses that this was not the sole reason for finding that the Appellant’s evidence in this respect was improbable.
31. The judge in summary said as follows:
It is improbable that the Appellant would suddenly start participating and supporting the KDPI at the age of 32 or 33 if his father had warned him against it and he had been too afraid of the authorities to have a Facebook account in Iran considering that his work as a kolbar was largely illegal and he was already in a precipitous situation with family members to support.
32. Ms Norman said that the above did not represent the Appellant’s evidence in respect of Facebook. We do not agree that any error arises from this. In the Appellant’s asylum interview he was asked (q70) whether he posted on Facebook in Iran and his answer was, “No we couldn’t because if we done something like that they will arrest us and kill us, because we are free here, in a free country”. The Appellant was not cross-examined on the issue; however, there is no procedural irregularity arising from this. The findings of the judge reasonably flowed from what the Appellant said in his asylum interview. In respect of Ms Norman’s submissions, we find that what the Appellant said could be construed as either he had a Facebook account and did not post on it or he did not have a Facebook account. The judge reasonably inferred from what he said in interview that he had been too afraid to have a Facebook account in Iran. . (We note the grounds of appeal say that the evidence was that the Appellant did not have a Facebook account). In any event there is no material difference. The judge was entitled to interpret this as one and the same. The point the judge made is that the Appellant’s decision to involve himself with the KDPI did not chime with other aspects of his evidence.
33. In respect of [4] (c) of ground one, the Appellant was not challenged on the finding that it is unlikely that anyone would have time or patience to help him create Facebook posts. However, this is not an error of law. The issue is directly related to the issue of literacy which was raised in the decision letter in relation to the Appellant’s Facebook evidence. The issue was a live one as is clear from the Respondent’s decision and the judge was entitled to make an adverse finding despite the Appellant not having been cross-examined on the issue.
34. In respect of the second ground, where it overlaps with ground one in this respect, we do not find that the judge did not consider the Appellant’s explanation because he did not refer to his evidence at [3] of his witness statement where the Appellant stated that while he is illiterate, his Kurdish and English language ability has improved while in the UK. He said that he needs help sometimes with what he is posting and writing in Kurdish. He said that his friends at the hotel help him post sometimes but before they do that they explain to him what the posts are about. They read posts to him and he then chooses what to post and he tells them what to write. He says that he can recognise the posts by the photographs sometimes. He said that there is another asylum seeker who is Kurdish and was an English teacher and he also helps him. There is nothing in the finding of the judge that would support that the evidence was not taken into account when concluding at [26] that it was not likely that anyone would have the time or the patience to help the Appellant create interminable Facebook page. The finding is not incompatible with the Appellant’s evidence. It was reasonable to infer, even in the light to the Appellant’s evidence, that it would take a lot of time and patience to help notwithstanding the improvement in his language skills. We remind ourselves that the judge did not need to set out each and every piece of evidence. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned we should be cautious about inferring that it has not been taken into account. The mere fact that the evidence has not been mentioned does not mean that it has been overlooked. We have regard to the fact that the Judge notes at [7] that the Appellant’s witness statement dated 19 June 2024 was adopted and that he reminds himself at [22] of the need for anxious scrutiny in considering the claim.
35. At [4] (d) of the grounds it is said that because the Appellant was not cross-examined about the ambush, it was unfair of the judge to find at [26] that his account was implausible and improbable. We accept that the judge went beyond what is set out in the decision letter as regards his reasons. However, the issue of the ambush was not accepted by the Respondent. It was an issue that the judge had to resolve. The Respondent’s position is that the evidence of the ambush is not accepted because it is not likely that the Appellant would have escaped unharmed. The judge found this to be the case and he relied on background evidence in support of this. There is no challenge to the background evidence that supports that the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) are a privileged group and well equipped. From this the judge reasonably inferred that their equipment includes automatic weapons, night viewing apparatus and any other necessary equipment for the apprehension of smugglers. The judge said that it was also reasonable to infer that they are well-trained and ruthless. He relied on a report from Amnesty International which supports that the authorities adopt a militarised response to perceived law breaking. The judge attached weight this to support a finding that the Appellant’s account of the ambush was not credible. There is no unfairness because the Appellant was not cross-examined on this issue. The issue in this appeal was credibility. This is clear from the Respondent’s decision.
36. Ground two says that the judge did not take into account the evidence that the kolbars were walking separately in a line and the routes are narrow and mountains. They could not walk together. The group who fell into the ambush were in front. We do not find that there is support for the judge having not considered this response because he did not record it. In any event, we find that it would not be material in the light of the unchallenged background evidence that was before the judge and his findings in respect of the effectiveness and might of the Pasdaran.
37. Ground two is a reasons challenge. In so far as it relates to the escape issue, Ms Norman addressed us on the judge having made findings based on plausibility. This was not raised in the grounds. There was no application to amend the grounds. We were reminded of HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at [28] and [29].
38. While the Appellant does not have permission to rely on the submission raised for the first time at the hearing, we find than in respect of the ambush the findings were grounded in the background evidence and not based on customs and circumstances of which the judge may have experience. We observe for ourselves that the judge made a number of findings based on plausibility; however, the issue is not raised in the grounds. The nature of the findings in any event are not such as to support that the judge strayed in a dangerous area.
39. In respect of the finding at [27] of the decision and which is the subject of ground one [4] (e ) of the grounds, while the Appellant was not cross-examined on the issue of the kolbars carrying packages, the ground ignores that in the asylum interview the Appellant stated in answer to q54 that when the Pasdaran opened fire they dropped their loads and ran. While the matter is not specifically raised in the decision letter, the Respondent does not accept that the Appellant was ambushed and therefore it is implicit that the detail that the Appellant gave about this in his interview is not accepted. The judge was cognisant of what the Appellant said in his interview and he was entitled to draw a reasonable inference that the packages would be difficult to discard with speed. This must be considered in the context of the Appellant’s evidence that the kolbars caried electronic goods, alcohol and KDPI leaflets. The ambush and escape were matters that were not accepted by the Respondent and it was incumbent on the judge to resolve these issues. He was entitled to take into account that the Appellant had not described a secret route, which should be considered in the light of the judge’s findings about the risk involved in having been ambushed.
40. In the decision letter the Respondent queried the Appellant’s father’s release by the police. This can only be understood as the Respondent having not accepted that the Appellant’s father was arrested for the reasons given by the Appellant. There is no challenge to the actions of the regime in response to dissidents. This was another matter raised by the Respondent in her decision which the judge rightly sought to resolve. The judge was entitled to attach weight to the father’s mobile phone having not been seized, especially when the Appellant’s case was that there were KDPI leaflets found in his home and there was interest by the authorities in the Appellant.
41. We do not agree with the Appellant that the sole matter raised in the decision letter was the ambush. Moreover, the Appellant was aware that credibility was in issue and that no part of his claim was accepted by the Respondent other than his nationality, ethnicity and his political activity on social media.
42. We also observe that there were other adverse credibility findings made by the judge which are not the subject of challenge, relating to the funding of the Appellant’s journey to the UK and s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. The findings of the judge flowed from the Appellant’s evidence. The Appellant was not taken by surprise. He had ample time to engage with the matters raised in the decision and to address credibility generally. The fact that he was not cross-examined on the issues identified at [4] of the grounds does not amount to a procedural irregularity. The findings of the judge are grounded in the evidence and adequately reasoned. The grounds ignore that credibility was central and the findings that judge made concerned issues which were raised in the decision and/or they were issues about which the Appellant could reasonably have been expected to be relevant to his appeal.
Ground three
43. This ground is narrow. It does not challenge the judge’s assessment of the Facebook evidence or the application by the judge of the country guidance decisions in looking at the Facebook evidence. It concerns one issue only which is the judge’s finding that the Appellant was able to delete or close his Facebook account. The challenge is simply on the basis that the Appellant was not cross-examined on this and the Respondent did not submit that he would close his account. The Appellant’s unchallenged evidence, set out in his statement, was that he would not close his account. The Appellant relied on Danian v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3000.
44. There is no challenge to the finding that the Appellant’s sur place activities would not bring him to the attention of the authorities. The judge also found that the Appellant’s political commitment is not genuine. The judge found that the Appellant was not credible in respect of political activities or any previous interest in him in Iran.
45. The judge did not find that the Appellant’s Facebook account would bring him to the attention of the authorities. While he is critical of the regime, the judge did not find that the Appellant had at any time been a person of significant interest to the authorities which would put the Appellant at risk whether or not he deleted his Facebook account. There was nothing to support that the Appellant had been the target of on-line surveillance.
46. The judge said that the Appellant is under no obligation to disclose his Facebook activities in the event that he may be asked about this on his return. The judge found that he is able to delete or close his account as a further protective measure and he would not be compromised in his conscience by doing so.
47. Whether the Appellant would close his Facebook account or not volunteer information as to his Facebook account was a legitimate consideration. We set out the relevant aspects of XX (PKAK -sur place activities- Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023, here:
3) Where an Iranian national of any age returns to Iran, the fact of them not having a Facebook account, or having deleted an account, will not as such raise suspicions or concerns on the part of Iranian authorities.
6) The timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had a “critical” Facebook account, provided that someone’s Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure.
9) In deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution, as there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
48. We find that the findings of the judge are in line with this. The reliance on Danian is misconceived because as the Upper Tribunal found in XX (PKAK -sur place activities- Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023, it is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution as there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform as opposed to the right to political activity.
49. We note that the Appellant said that he would not delete his Facebook account. However, bearing in mind the findings that the judge made about sur place activities and the Appellant’s lack of political commitment, the point made by the judge is that he was able to delete or close his account. This was a finding that was open to the judge properly applying XX.
50. Whether the Appellant would do so was a matter for him. In response to the assertion that the judge did not make a finding on credibility, we do not accept this. It is clear that the judge did not accept any of the Appellant’s evidence and the findings made on this issue flowed from and took into account those credibility findings.
51. There is no error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal is maintained.

Joanna McWilliam

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 March 2025