Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-004300
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61933/2023
LP/03260/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

HME
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, Immigration Advice Service
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnwyz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 8 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Background
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to St Lucia. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. This matter came before me to remake the underlying Article 8 human rights appeals decision following the decision of another judge of the Upper Tribunal to find a material error of law. This remaking decision must be read in conjunction with the error of law decision dated 3 February 2026.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
3. In summary, an error was found on the basis that the judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’), who dismissed the human rights ground of appeal, had not properly addressed his mind to whether the requirements of Immigration Rules were met before he reached the conclusion that the refusal decision was not a disproportionate breach of the family’s Article 8 rights.
4. At the remaking hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I sought to clarify with Mr Diwnwyz the issues which fell to be decided because the only point taken by the respondent against the Article 8 claim in both the reasons for refusal letter and the respondent’s review was whether the appellant and his claimed partner were in a genuine and subsisting relationship so as to meet the eligibility criteria of the rules. The FtT judge plainly and emphatically resolved this factual matter in favour of the appellant in findings which were left undisturbed in the error of law decision. Mr Diwnwyz recognised that this posed a fundamental problem in seeking to resist the appeal. He indicated that he did not intend to cross-examine the appellant or his partner and would not be making any oral submissions to persuade me to dismiss the appeal. I took this to be a concession of the appeal. I explained at the hearing that I would be allowing the appeal on Article 8 human rights grounds with reasons to follow in a reserved decision.
Discussion
5. In Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC), a Presidential panel emphasised the fundamental importance of the parties’ engagement in a process to define and narrow the issues in dispute. The substantive hearing was treated as an important juncture by which time the parties should have a clear understanding of their respective cases and the principal controversial issues to be resolved by the tribunal. It was made clear that judges are not expected to trawl through the papers to interrogate the positions adopted by the parties, the implication being that the parties in this specialist jurisdiction are to be trusted to know what their cases are and to be aware of the relevant legal principles. An exception to this general approach would be where a judge has overlooked a Robinson-obvious point of law.
6. In a further Presidential panel, observations to much the same effect were made in TC (PS compliance - "issues-based" reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023]UKUT 00164 (IAC) where it was emphasised that the procedural machinery of Practice Statement No 1 of 2022 was designed to promote focussed attention on the genuinely disputed issues so as to produce proportionately efficient proceedings.
7. The Senior President of Tribunal’s Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal begins with a reassertion of the principles decided in Lata and TC and provides as follows, at [1.3]:
[1.3] The disputed issues represent the parameters, or scope, of the appeal and will operate as the foundation and structure for all judicial decisions. Subject to ‘Robinson obvious’ matters and the need for extra care when litigants in person are involved in proceedings, judges should not be expected to infer issues which have not been clearly identified and articulated by the parties. The Tribunal will not tolerate a rolling consideration of issues and will not permit the issues to evolve at will for procedural advantage.
8. These principles are of particular importance at the substantive hearing of an appeal. A Judge at a substantive hearing can legitimately expect the parties to have a full understanding of their respective legal and factual cases at this stage of a process in which the issues to be determined should have been undergoing a process of crystallisation throughout.
9. Against this procedural backdrop, it is not difficult to see why Mr Diwnwyz adopted the position he did. In relation to the Article 8 dimension of the appeal, the respondent had only ever challenged the nature and strength of the relationship between the appellant and his claimed partner. It was never suggested that he failed to meet the Immigration Rules in any other way. This position was cemented in an email to the tribunal dated 17 March 2026 which followed the error of law decision. Here, it was confirmed that the appellant did not enter the UK unlawfully because citizens of St Lucia did not require a visa to enter at the time the appellant travelled here.
10. The only issue taken by the respondent against the Article 8 claim was judicially decided in the appellant’s favour. There was no other articulated basis on which it was suggested that the claim fell foul of the applicable Immigration Rules. It follows that Mr Diwnwyz’ position at the remaking hearing was entirely justified and consistent with procedural authority recently endorsed by the Court of Appeal in AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370. I therefore allow the appeal on Article 8 human rights grounds because the refusal decision amounts to a disproportionate interference with engaged family life because the only rules-based objection has been factually resolved against the respondent. The FtT decision to dismiss the appeal on protection grounds stands undisturbed.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Article 8 human rights grounds.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 April 2026