Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004340

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61298/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 25th of April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RINTOUL

Between

AK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Dougan
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Royal Courts of Justice (Belfast) on 10 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 9 July 2024, dismissing his asylum and protection appeal.
2. The appellant is a member of a minority clan from Somalia. His case is that on 25 December 2011 his mentally ill brother killed two elderly men because they would not let him play in a game. He then ran away but killed a third man who chased them. The men he had killed were from a majority clan and the appellant fears revenge from their clan. He fled Somalia crossing first into Ethiopia and then on to Libya where he was abused and forced to work. The Secretary of State did not accept the appellant’s claim, finding that it was inconsistent and lacking in detail. She considered that he could relocate to Mogadishu and that it would be reasonable to expect him to do so. Having considered the evidence [11] to [14] the judge concluded that there had been an incident which had caused the appellant to flee and that, given the passage of time, it would be unsafe to rely on the relatively minor inconsistencies highlighted by the respondent. He accepted also that the appellant was orphaned at a young age and had had limited opportunities for employment in Somalia. He accepted it was credible [16] that there had been an incident involving his brother and the families of the men killed by his brother would seek revenge on the appellant and his family. On that basis he was a danger in his local area. The judge concluded [18]:-
“Notwithstanding the passage of time, I find there is likely to be a real risk of a revenge attack in his home area from the families of the deceased. However, I do not believe that if he relocated to Mogadishu that this is likely to extend there. I bear in mind that the appellant was not the one who caused the death of the family members. If near their family then they may seek revenge, but I find it improbable in the circumstances that they would persevere if he were in Mogadishu.”
3. Having then directed himself in line with OA (Somalia) CG [2022] UKUT 00033 and noting [20] that the appellant had not lived in Mogadishu; that there was no indication that he will have access to remittances from abroad; but, he would have a relocation package and is fit and healthy concluded [21] that there was an economic boom in Mogadishu where casual day labouring is available the judge concluded [24] that despite the impact of what he had suffered on his mental health, was not satisfied the appellant could not function independently and had sufficient skills and that there would be support to assist him in Mogadishu. Although accepting the appellant had been exploited in Libya, could see no reason why the individuals there would pose a risk to him now and that there was no evidence of any family life, he had only lived in the United Kingdom for a short time and will not have developed a private life and dismissed his human rights appeal also.
4. The appellant sought permission to appeal on the basis that the judge had failed to adequately consider all the country guidance factors particularly the appellant’s limited education and previous unemployment in Somalia, the country he had left in January 2012, and had not made a careful assessment as to the risk on return to Mogadishu to the appellant.
5. On 17 September 2024 the First-tier Tribunal granted permission considering it is arguable whether the judge had had proper regard to OA (Somalia) in that a careful assessment is required of a person facing removal to Mogadishu who had no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return and that those with no clan or family support not in receipt of remittances from abroad and no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return may face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which was acceptable in humanitarian protection terms.
The Hearing
6. Mr Dougan submitted that the grounds were made out whether he accepted this was in effect a reasons challenge. Ms Blackburn submitted that the judge had clearly properly referred to the relevant country guidance and had referred to it in some detail. She submitted that the judge had dealt sufficiently with the matters raised in the country guidance.
7. In reply, Mr Dougan submitted that the judge had failed properly to follow through on the positive findings raised.
8. I reserved my decision.
The Law
9. In assessing the grounds of appeal, I bear in mind that Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]:
26. Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(a) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(b) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(c) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(d) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
(e) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
(f) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].
10. I also bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2]. I bear in mind also what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72], and that the decision must be read sensibly and holistically. Justice requires that the reasons enable it to be apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost: English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 WLR 2409 at [16]. When reading the decision, I am entitled to assume that the reader is familiar with the issues involved and arguments advanced. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed and an appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
11. The core issue in this case is whether the judge has properly applied the guidance given in OA (Somalia). Materially, that guidance is as follows:.
2. The country guidance given in paragraph 407 of MOJ (replicated at paragraphs (ii) to (x) of the headnote to MOJ) remains applicable.
3.  We give the following additional country guidance which goes to the assessment of all the circumstances of a returnee's case, as required by MOJ at paragraph 407(h).
…
13.   If there are particular features of an individual returnee's circumstances or characteristics that mean that there are substantial grounds to conclude that there will be a real risk that, notwithstanding the availability of the Facilitated Returns Scheme and the other means available to a returnee of establishing themselves in Mogadishu, residence in an IDP camp or informal settlement will be reasonably likely, a careful consideration of all the circumstances will be required in order to determine whether their return will entail a real risk of Article 3 being breached. Such cases are likely to be rare, in light of the evidence that very few, if any, returning members of the diaspora are forced to resort to IDP camps.
14.   It will only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes.
…
17. The country guidance given at paragraph 408 of MOJ ((xi) of the headnote) is replaced with the country guidance at paragraph ( 14 ), above. Paragraph 425 of MOJ ((xii) of the headnote) should be read as though the reference to "having to live in conditions that will fall below acceptable humanitarian standards" were a reference to "living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes".
12. The guidance given in MOJ provides:
(xi)  If it is accepted that a person facing a return to Mogadishu after a period of absence has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return, there will need to be a careful assessment of all of the circumstances. These considerations will include, but are not limited to:
· circumstances in Mogadishu before departure;
· length of absence from Mogadishu;
· family or clan associations to call upon in Mogadishu;
· access to financial resources;
· prospects of securing a livelihood, whether that be employment or self employment;
· availability of remittances from abroad;
· means of support during the time spent in the United Kingdom;
· why his ability to fund the journey to the West no longer enables an appellant to secure financial support on return.
(x)   Put another way, it will be for the person facing return to explain why he would not be able to access the economic opportunities that have been produced by the economic boom, especially as there is evidence to the effect that returnees are taking jobs at the expense of those who have never been away.
(xi)   It will, therefore, only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which is acceptable in humanitarian protection terms.
(xii)  The evidence indicates clearly that it is not simply those who originate from Mogadishu that may now generally return to live in the city without being subjected to an Article 15(c) risk or facing a real risk of destitution. On the other hand, relocation in Mogadishu for a person of a minority clan with no former links to the city, no access to funds and no other form of clan, family or social support is unlikely to be realistic as, in the absence of means to establish a home and some form of ongoing financial support there will be a real risk of having no alternative but to live in makeshift accommodation within an IDP camp where there is a real possibility of having to live in conditions that will fall below acceptable humanitarian standards.
13. This is a case where the judge clearly directed himself according to the law. It is clear also that the judge was aware that the appellant had not lived in Mogadishu before and had assumed he would not have access to remittances from abroad [20] but did know that he would have access to the relocation package. He noted the availability of casual day labouring [21] and the lack of evidence as to the nature of the appellant’s clan. He expressed he found the appellant could re-establish himself there taking note that he had engaged in talking therapies and taken account of the fact that his hard and difficult journey over the years has impacted on his mental health. Though I note the submission in the grounds that the judge had failed to take into account the appellant’s limited education and absence from Somalia since January 2012 but there was insufficient material which would indicate that this was put to the judge specifically or that he had not taken into account all the circumstances raised in the evidence. The judge was not required to set out in detail all the evidence, nor all the submissions made. Further, the appellant has failed to establish that the factors he avers were not taken into account would have made a material difference. Or,
14. While the findings are short, that does not mean that the judge had not taken into account all the relevant evidence, or that they can otherwise be impugned. The reasoning is brief, but I am not satisfied that any step in reasoning was omitted, or that it is otherwise vitiated by any error of law or is unsustainable.
15. Bearing in mind what is said in Ullah and Volpi and Volpi I consider that the judge’s findings were adequate and the reasoning is sufficient to justify the outcome. The challenge to the decision is, in reality, simply a disagreement.
16. Accordingly, I am not satisfied the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and I uphold it.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

Signed Date: 14 April 2025

Jeremy K H Rintoul
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber