Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-004393

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01271/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

UC
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Greer, instructed by Parker Rhodes Hickmotts Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms C Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 10 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.

2. The appellant, born on 4 February 2006, is a national of Albania. He arrived in the UK on 27 August 2022 by small boat, having left Albania in August 2022 and travelled through unknown European countries and France, and claimed asylum on 28 August 2022. His claim was refused on 13 October 2023.

3. The appellant claimed to fear returning to Albania because of problems with his father’s previous employer who had made threats against his father when he queried the delay in receiving his wages. The appellant claimed that his father worked as a lorry driver transporting goods and that his father’s employer, for whom he had worked for two years, was an influential figure in Albania. When his father made repeated requests to his employer for his wages, the employer made threats against the family and so they all fled the family home and left Albania after staying with relatives in a village. The appellant claimed to have left Albania a day before the rest of his family.

4. The respondent considered that the appellant’s claim did not engage the Refugee Convention and did not consider the claim to be credible, given the lack of details the appellant was able to provide about his father’s employer and the lack of information he provided to explain how his father’s employer was influential. The respondent was not satisfied that the appellant’s father’s employer possessed the influence, means and ability to harm him and his family and was satisfied that there was, in any event, a sufficiency of protection and internal flight alternative available to him in Albania. The respondent considered that the appellant was therefore not at risk on return to Albania and that his removal to Albania would not breach his human rights.

5. The appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal was heard in the First-tier Tribunal on 15 May 2024. He was not represented at the hearing but appeared as a litigant in person. He gave oral evidence before the judge. He stated that he had lost contact with his family and thought that they were in Italy. He said that the last time he had contact with them was when his father arranged for him to leave Albania and come to the UK, whilst they went to Italy. He had spoken to them on the phone last Eid but they had changed their telephone number without telling him. The judge did not accept the appellant’s claim as credible, agreeing with the respondent that his account lacked detail and plausibility. The judge found there to be no clear explanation as to why the employer would wish to harm the appellant’s father and the appellant or how the employer would be able to find the appellant if he returned to Albania. The judge noted the lack of any evidence to show that the appellant’s father’s employer was an influential figure as claimed and found it to be pure speculation that the employer would want to harm the appellant or how he would identify him. The judge found in any event that the appellant could benefit from state protection or could reasonably be expected to relocate to another part of Albania. He did not accept that the appellant had lost contact with his family and concluded that they either remained in Albania or alternatively that they could return there with him. The judge found that the Refugee Convention was not engaged, even taking the claim at its highest, and concluded that the appellant was at no risk on return to Albania and was not entitled to humanitarian protection. The judge found further that the appellant’s removal would not be in breach of Article 3 or 8, and he accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 24 May 2025.

6. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the judge’s decision on three grounds, prepared by himself: that the judge had overlooked important evidence; that the judge had failed to consider the background country evidence when assessing credibility, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation; and that the judge had overlooked the evidence that his father's employer would have had access to sufficient information to locate him in Albania if he wished.

7. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal on those grounds and the matter was listed for an error of law hearing in the Upper Tribunal.

8. In the meantime, the appellant instructed solicitors for the hearing and an application was made by those solicitors for the grounds of appeal to be varied, to add four further grounds, namely: that the judge had given inadequate reasons for concluding that the Refugee Convention was not engaged; that the judge had made alternative findings about the appellant’s account without any evidential basis and had failed to explain why the appellant’s account lacked plausibility; that the judge had erred by making adverse findings against the appellant as a result of his failure to produce evidence to show that his father’s employer was an influential figure; and that the judge had made a mistake of fact by considering the appellant’s claims about threats from his father’s employer to be pure speculation.

9. The matter came before me for a hearing.

10. Ms Newton had no objection to the amended grounds being admitted. She conceded that those grounds identified material errors of law in the judge’s decision such that it ought to be set aside and the matter remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.

11. In light of Ms Newton’s concession I see no need to set out any analysis of the grounds, but simply accept that the judge’s decision contains material errors of law as identified in the grounds and grant of permission.

12. In the circumstances, and as accepted by both parties, the appellant’s appeal has to be considered de novo with no findings preserved. Ms Newton confirmed that there would be a need for a full analysis of the appellant’s claim at a fresh hearing. As such, and as agreed by the parties, the nature and extent of the necessary fact finding requires the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

13. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law. The decision is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be dealt with afresh pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and Practice Statement 7.2(b).

Anonymity

The anonymity order previously made is continued.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 March 2026