Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004400

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/61314/2023
LH/04871/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 18th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

OMAR RAGURAGUI
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Draycott, Counsel instructed by Pristine Law
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes (“the Judge”) heard on 20/06/2024 and dated 23/06/2024. The Judge dismissed his appeal against the respondent's refusal of his Article 8 human rights claim. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato on 30/09/2024.
2. At the hearing before us, we heard submissions from Mr Draycott and Ms McKenzie and following her concession, we gave our decision which is to allow the appeal and now give further reasons.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. The appellant is a national of Morocco whose human rights claim dated 27/05/2022 was refused by the respondent. His first application based on his private life was dismissed and his appeal rejected by an immigration judge on 02/09/2015. The appellant made further submissions on 27/05/2022 which were rejected on 25/05/2023 by the respondent (Appeal Bundle 207; ‘AB’). His application was further reconsidered and refused by the respondent on 05/09/2023 (AB197).
4. The appellant came to the UK on 17/04/2013 with his mother and at the time he was aged 15. His mother left without him, and he was subsequently looked after by a foster family for some 10 years. His father died on 10/01/2012 and the appellant states that he was ill-treated by his stepfather.
5. He relies on the medical report of Dr Lynn Maddern, a clinical psychologist dated 28/07/2023 who diagnoses him as having symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and a Major Depressive Disorder with Moderate Impairment.
6. At the time of application, he relied on his private life arguing that he could meet the requirement of Rule 276ADE, namely that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Morocco. He also relied on refusal of his application constituting a breach of his Article 8 and Article 3 rights pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. Since making his application he has married, and the respondent consented to his relationship with his wife being dealt with in the same appeal as a new matter.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
7. The appellant was present at his hearing before Judge Boyes and his two siblings also attended to give evidence and their statements were relied upon as the respondent had no questions to put to them. The Judge notes that the appellant’s witness statement stood “as the entirety of his evidence” and it is quoted in detail in the decision. Both parties were represented.
8. The Judge also had heard from the appellant’s wife who confirmed that she has joint Italian and Moroccan citizenship and has pre-settled status in the UK. She accepted that the couple’s marriage is genuine and subsisting which was disputed by the respondent. It appears that article 3 was not argued or pursued.
9. The decision does not set out the legal issues as identified in the skeleton argument or by the respondent, although under Discussion and Findings she appears to go through each issue.
10. She states that the appellant’s private life has developed whilst in the UK unlawfully and therefore places less weight on it. She refers to the balancing exercise whilst not setting out any factors on either side of the balance sheet save for his unlawful presence.
11. After commenting on the balancing exercise, she appears to turn to paragraph 276ADE and states that she is satisfied that there are no very significant obstacles, or indeed any obstacles to the appellant’s return.
12. At [18] she sets out the points she has considered including the fact that “the appellant speaks the language, knows the currency culture and how life happens in Morrocco. He is entitled to work there, he can take part in all aspects of life”. She goes on to say “he is in good health and has no disabilities such that would prevent him from working and seeking accommodation. I have no doubt he has friends and families upon whom he can call” as well as his wife. Other than referring to his “good health”, the Judge does not refer to the appellant’s physical or mental health or the evidence of Dr Maddern.
13. The Judge then turns to the exception under EX.2 and states that she is satisfied there are no insurmountable obstacles quoting the definition in the Rules. She finds that despite the appellants wife’s desire to stay in the UK she has no insurmountable obstacles to returning with her husband.
14. At [22] she states:
Maria also has Italian citizenship and can live and work in Italy. I do not see any reason why her spouse would not be permitted to join her in Italy. I would be very surprised if that were the case. In any event, this too remains an option.
15. She says that she appreciates that his wife may wish to stay in the UK, but the couple have always been aware of the lack of immigration status when they met and married.
16. At the end of the decision at [26], the Judge appears to revert back to considerations of Article 8 outside of the rules in concluding that “there are on unjustifiably harsh consequences to the refusal” [we assume the word ‘on’ is a typographical error and should read ‘no’]. She concludes that there are no exceptional circumstances.
17. Mr Draycot appeared in the First-tier appeal and confirmed that the issue of relocating to Italy had only been raised at the hearing.

Grounds of appeal
18. Grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal are dated 23/09/2024 and are adopted by Mr Draycott as well as his reliance on Additional Grounds of Appeal dated 23/04/2025. Upper Tribunal Judge Beach directed that the respondent should file confirmation of whether or not she objects to the additional grounds and additional evidence by 20/06/2023. By way of letter dated 18/06/2025, the respondent set out her position. She submits that the Rule 15(2) notice received 23/04/2025 was not served in compliance with directions but in any event relates to the appellant being removed to Italy which is an alternative finding and not primary finding. The statement reiterates the respondent’s previous position. Before us today, Ms McKenzie objects to reliance on the Additional Grounds.
19. Which Grounds are relied upon is irrelevant to our consideration as the first Ground in both is the main thrust of Mr Draycott’s submissions today. He submits that the Judge materially erred in law in failing to engage with the existence or substance of Dr Maddern’s expert evidence in her consideration of EX.1(b), EX.2 and paragraph 276ADE (vi). He relies on the failure to mention the expert evidence and the reference to the appellant’s “good health” as being irreconcilable with Dr Maddern’s evidence.
20. When asked for the respondent’s view on this apparent failure, Ms McKenzie was pragmatic in conceding this first Ground. Whilst she submitted that the failure is not fatal to the entirety of the decision, she accepted that the expert evidence may impact on any obstacles faced by the appellant (and his wife) in either country.
21. Based on this concession, we need not consider the further Grounds whilst acknowledging the danger of speculating on whether the appellant would have the right to reside in Italy in the absence of any evidence.

DISCUSSION
22. Whilst the first Ground is conceded, we provide brief reasons why the failure to consider expert medical evidence is material. The classic test of whether an appellant faces very significant obstacles is set out in Kamara v SSHD (2016) EWCA CIV 813. It requires a broad evaluative assessment of whether the applicant will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in the country of return is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there. Also to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.
23. We have no doubt that the Judge’s failure to consider or provide a full analysis of her reasoning in respect of the expert medical evidence is a material error of law. We do not accept the respondent’s submission in her position statement that the Judge’s reference at paragraph 14 that she has taken into account “all of the material relied upon by the appellant” satisfies the requirement for a judge to set out all of their reasons why she rejects the expert evidence if that is the case. Alternatively, how she has assessed the impact of the appellant’s diagnoses on his ability to integrate into either Morocco or Italy (if allowed to enter). We agree with Mr Draycott that the specific finding that “he is in good health and has no disabilities” would strongly imply to us that she has either not considered the expert evidence or disregarded it and if this is the case it is necessary for her to set out her reasons why.
24. As indicated, an analysis of the medical evidence may also impact on the ability to relocate in Italy and is therefore material to that issue irrespective of the appellant’s putative status there.
25. We also note that the Judge does not complete a full balance sheet exercise whilst referring to it. It is both helpful and good practice to do so in order to understand a judges reasoning.
26. Having accepted that there has been a material error of law in respect of the first Ground, both parties agree that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing. That Tribunal will no doubt consider appropriate directions on the issue of the appellant’s status to reside in Italy. As no appeal has been made by either party in relation to the Judge’s finding that the marriage is genuine and subsisting, we preserve that finding.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal Judge materially erred in law, and we set that decision aside subject to the one preserved finding mentioned above at paragraph 26.

Directions
The remaking of this appeal to be listed in the First-tier Tribunal before any Judge other than Judge Boyes.

V S Rae-Reeves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

09/09/2025