Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004406

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62664/2023
LH/04713/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th of May 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

JP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. J. Heybroek, Counsel instructed Direct Access
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and her child are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or her child. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. I have made an order to anonymise the Appellant. An anonymity order was made in the First-Tier Tribunal. Having considered Guidance note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, it is my view that there is a need to protect the identity of the Appellant and her child. This in the light of the fact that she is a victim of domestic violence (and given the nature of the issues that she alleges as part of that violence). She has a child who is part of this appeal. This necessitates a departure from the principle of open justice. It was agreed in the FtT that she should be granted anonymity, based on her child.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria. She was born in March 1993. She entered the UK on 24 October 2021 with leave and has been here since.
3. The issue to decide whether the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) Designated Judge Shaerf (‘the Judge’) erred in law, in a decision dated 19 August 2024, when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Respondent to refuse her application on human rights grounds.
Background
4. The Appellant is a victim of domestic abuse. She had known her husband, OO, since she was aged 18. They married in 2017 in Nigeria. He is a Nigerian citizen born in July 1993.
5. In October 2019 her husband went to Italy for a master's degree programme. She was unable to join him. She remained living with her parents. Her husband returned to Nigeria in November 2020 and they lived with his parents. On 24 October 2021 she entered the United Kingdom with leave as the dependent of her husband who was here as a student. Their child, AA, was born a month later in the UK, in November 2021. AA is being assessed to determine whether he has autism spectrum disorder.
6. The Appellant and her husband had been living together. The Appellant was subjected to domestic abuse. In 2022, the Appellant left with her child and moved to another area. She had contacted an aunt of hers who is based in the United States and who is financially supporting her. Her aunt suggested she moved to the area because she had a goddaughter in the area.
7. On 19 October 2022 the Appellant applied for leave under the Destitution Domestic Violence Concession. This was refused on 26 October 2022.
8. The Appellant’s leave as a student dependant expired on 25 January 2023. On 24 January 2023 (in time) the Appellant applied for further leave to remain on the basis of her family life with her child.
9. Her husband has since been granted leave as a skilled worker under Tier 2 of the Points Based System.
10. On 10 January 2023 the Respondent refused the Appellant’s application. This was on the basis that her child did not meet the residence requirements of Appendix FM paragraph E- LTRPT.2.2(c) or (d). The Appellant did not meet any of the continuous residence requirements of Appendix Private Life and PL 5.1 did not apply because there were no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s re-integration on return with her child to Nigeria. It was in her child’s best interests to remain with their mother and family life could continue in Nigeria where the Appellant had family and there was a functioning education system. The child would be able to adapt to life in Nigeria. There were no compassionate factors warranting the grant of leave to remain outside the Immigration Rules. She appealed this decision.
11. Her appeal came before the FtT, Judge Shaerf, on 19 July 2024 in a hybrid hearing. The presenting officer was the only individual not present in person. Her appeal was dismissed in a decision dated 19 August 2024.
Grounds of Appeal and Grant of Permission
12. The Appellant appealed the decision of Judge Shaerf, raising two grounds of appeal. The grounds of appeal were drafted by Ms Heybroek.
13. Ms Heybroek raises two issues in Ground One. These are summarised as follows:
i. Firstly, the Judge erred in failing to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, and,
ii. Secondly, the Judge erred in considering the Appellant’s account and evidence of domestic violence and in assessing the seriousness of the dame
14. In Ground Two Ms Heybroek argues two issues:
i. Firstly, that the Judge did not give adequate reasons as to why he concluded the Appellant had not given full and frank evidence about her family in Nigeria.
ii. Secondly, that there were insufficient reasons for stating AA could return with his mother and in assessing his best interests. The Judge did not properly consider the evidence on his autism. The Judge did not consider the evidence of social stigma associated with autism in Nigeria.
15. Permission to appeal was refused by the FtT in a decision dated 9 September 2024. The Appellant renewed her application for permission to appeal on 11 September 2024.
16. On 15 October 2024 she was granted permission to appeal by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst. The decision reads as follows:
“3. In considering whether to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, the judge does not appear to have directed himself by reference to the relevant Practice Direction and to consider whether the Appellant required adjustments to enable her to give evidence; his comment that the Appellant’s medication and dosage was “nothing out of the norm for many this jurisdiction [sic]” was arguably capable of giving the impression to a fair-minded observer that he had already formed a view as to the merits of her case and/or was dismissive of her mental health problems.
4. The judge’s reference at [38] of the determination to ‘norms and expectations’ of Nigerian culture in relation to abusive behaviour, whilst concerning, is perhaps understandable by reference to the title of the academic research study relied on by the Appellant and quoted at paragraph 36. However, when taken together with the judge’s finding [46] that the Appellant’s husband’s behaviour could be coercive “by Western European standards”, it is arguable that the judge’s reasoning gave the impression that he was not approaching the appeal in a fair and impartial manner and was wrongly applying a different standard to the risk of domestic abuse in Nigeria as compared to the UK.
5. It is also arguable that the judge erred by failing to give adequate reasons for his conclusions that return to Nigeria would be in the best interests of the Appellant’s son, particularly in light of the medical evidence, and/or that return would not be unduly harsh for the Appellant.
6. Permission is granted on both grounds.”
Submissions
17. The matter came before me in an error of law hearing on 20 March 2025. I heard submissions from both representatives.
18. The documents before myself and the parties included a composite bundle of 558 pages. This included the documents which were placed before the FtT.
Findings and Reasons
19. I consider the grounds advanced below in turn.
Ground One
(i) Vulnerable Appellant
20. Ms Heybroek argued in her grounds of appeal and before me that the Judge erred materially in his failure to treat the Appellant as vulnerable. She said this impacted the conduct of the hearing and the lens through which the evidence was assessed. Mr Tufan said that it was open to the Judge to find the Appellant was not vulnerable and that as the questions she was asked were not opposed it would make no difference.
21. At §12 of the FtT decision the Judge said that ‘the Appellant had been prescribed medication for mixed anxiety and depressive disorder. I noted the prescription and strength of dosage and that it was nothing out of the norm for many this jurisdiction. I did not consider it was sufficient to justify an express ruling that the Appellant was a vulnerable witness and that I was confident that this Ms any [sic] questioning to be unfair or imposing unreasonable pressure on the Appellant she uld [sic] intervene. In the event there was no such intervention by her during the hearing.’
22. The Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child Vulnerable and Sensitive Appellant Guidance (‘Joint Presidential Guidance’) says that some individuals are by definition vulnerable. Reference is made at footnote 2 here to s59(1) of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 which says that a personal is vulnerable if he has attained the age of 18 and he receives any form of healthcare. It is also said that some individuals are vulnerable because of what has happened to them, e.g., they are victims of trafficking or have sustained serious harm or torture. Paragraph 2 of the Joint Presidential Guidance states that factors to be taken into account in assessing vulnerability include mental health problems, domestic circumstances, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Paragraph 3 states that consequences of vulnerability ‘differ according to the degree to which an individual is affected. It is a matter for you to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence before you, taking into account the evidence as a whole.’
23. SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 398 (IAC) provided the following Guidance:
(1) The fact that a judicial fact-finder decides to treat an appellant or witness as a vulnerable adult does not mean that any adverse credibility finding in respect of that person is thereby to be regarded as inherently problematic and thus open to challenge on appeal.
(2) By applying the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010, two aims are achieved. First, the judicial fact-finder will ensure the best practicable conditions for the person concerned to give their evidence. Secondly, the vulnerability will also be taken into account when assessing the credibility of that evidence.
(3) The Guidance makes it plain that it is for the judicial fact-finder to determine the relationship between the vulnerability and the evidence that is adduced.
24. Having heard the submissions of the parties and considered the above and the evidence, I have come to the conclusion that it was a material error of law to not treat the Appellant as vulnerable or that there was a failure to consider relevant evidence, facts and Guidance in making an assessment on the issue of vulnerability. I have come to this conclusion for the following reasons:
a. The Appellant’s medical evidence reads as follows:
i. Letter from GP dated 14 March 2024 which explains that she left her marital home owing to domestic abuse which was psychological. Despite moving, her husband had still been abusing her mentally and making threats. That was emotional abuse and sexual abuse. He would force her to have sex and give her silent treatment if she would not. Whilst her aunt helps her with money, she is using a food bank. She feels she has no support in Nigeria. She has been started on antidepressants.
ii. Consultant information sheet. Entry dated 4 January 2024 in which the Appellant discloses emotional and sexual abuse reliance on charities, her aunt and A food bank, diagnosis is given of mixed anxiety and depressive disorder, she is prescribed sertraline 50 mg, told to self-refer to well-being services and advised to complain about the abuse and the GP notes he will write to social services. Entry dated 22 February 2024 in which there is disclosure of an indirect threat to her via her brother in Nigeria, her feeling that she has no support in Nigeria. A diagnosis is made of mixed anxiety and depressive disorder, the plan is to review her medication dosage in a month and she was given more information about contacting the police or victim support.
b. The Judge rejected vulnerability on the basis that the Appellant’s medication dosage (for mixed anxiety and depressive disorder) was similar to others in the jurisdiction. The fact that some or many Appellants appearing before the Tribunal have mental health issues does not make this Appellant, or any other Appellants, less vulnerable.
c. The Joint Presidential Guidance indicates that the Appellant’s mental health problems were sufficient to treat her as vulnerable. The approach taken is contrary to the definition of vulnerable persons in s59(1) of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006.
d. The Judge appears not to have considered the Appellant’s evidence in respect of being a victim of domestic abuse when considering the question of vulnerability. As the Joint Presidential Guidance makes clear some individuals are vulnerable because of what has happened to them. The Appellant’s evidence of domestic abuse included, for example, the evidence I set out at paragraph 24(a) above and the following:
i. Her detailed witness statement which explained for example her husband would initiate intimate relations with her without consent, or coerce her. That her mother-in-law screamed at her when she refused to wear a particular dress, her in-laws verbally abused her in her pregnancy, the pressure she was placed under after giving birth to pay for her husband’s school fees through work. She sets out his coercive behaviour.
ii. Letter from Safe in Sussex 30 January 2024, which states the author’s professional opinion is that the Appellant is or has been at risk of being a victim of domestic abuse. She was signposted to them by a domestic abuse organisation who support black female survivors of abuse. She is attending a programme which is in about learning about the reality of living with domestic violence.
iii. Letter from Hersana dated 27 February 2024, who explained that they are a support service for black women and girls who have experienced or are at risk of experience any form of gender based violence. The Appellant has been supported owing to her needs as a victim or a person at risk of domestic violence she is or is at risk of being a victim of domestic abuse. A Dash assessment has been completed with the appellant which found her to be at medium risk of harm. She has received support in respect of safety planning, child contact, financial advice and support, family law and immigration advice from rights of women, and is on their waiting list for therapy to support her emotional recovery post abuse. She is experiencing post separation abuse. She is very fearful of being made to return as family are displeased with her and hold power and influence. Two Dash risk checklists are attached to this letter.
iv. Letter from Church Elder dated 2 January 2023. This states that the author has some knowledge of the Appellant’s difficult background in the UK with her now estranged husband. They have been financially supporting her to access counselling. She has also built strong friendships that provide practical and emotional support.
v. Letter from Charis Counselling dated 13 February 2024. The team manager states in this that the Appellant initially presented to them as fearful and anxious, she said she was afraid of her husband owing to domestic abuse and worried he would take their son. She fears returned to Nigeria and the family taking her son away and being left without support. The Appellant disclosed controlling behaviour following the birth of her son, she had no agency to make any decisions. She is on medication for anxiety, the sessions assist her, the church also supports her psychologically and financially and she has friendships through that community.
e. It follows from the above that had the Judge considered all of the evidence and relevant factors in respect of vulnerability, he may have come to a very different conclusion on the Appellant’s vulnerability and the need to treat her as a vulnerable appellant.
f. Whilst the Judge states that Ms Heybroek could have intervened to unfair or unreasonable pressure in the hearing and did not do so, this fails to consider that the Joint Presidential Guidance requires more than this in ensuring the best practicable conditions for a hearing to enable a vulnerable person to give their evidence. The Joint Presidential Guidance also requires that vulnerability is taken into account when assessing credibility. It includes for example allowing the hearing to be heard first in the list (paragraph 5,1), considering requests for single gender Tribunals (paragraph 5.3) ensuring questions are focused and sensitive (paragraph 9), ensuring adequate explanation of the issues, excluding members of the public (paragraph 10.1), demonstrating active listening, use of single issue open questions, use of appropriate tone and vocabulary, ensuring adequate breaks, checking a witness is comfortable (paragraph 10.2). As the Appellant was not treated as vulnerable, no particular measures were put in place. This as such may well have impacted upon her ability to give her best evidence.
g. The second aspect of the Joint Presidential Guidance, requires being aware that the order and manner of evidence may be affected by mental, psychological or emotional trauma (paragraph 10.3). As the Appellant was not treated as vulnerable, no account was taken of vulnerability when assessing the evidence.
25. I have regard to R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at 9(vi) (‘R (Iran) & Ors’) and consider this error was a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a difference to the outcome or fairness of the hearing.
(ii) Domestic Violence
26. Ms Heybroek argued that the Judge erred in his consideration of the Appellant’s application under the Destitute Domestic Violence Concession.
27. At paragraph 47 of the FtT decision the Judge states, ‘The Appellant did not seek to challenge the SSHD’s decision that she did not qualify for leave under the Domestic Violence Concession and quite properly there was no submission to the contrary.’ This fails to consider the evidence in the bundle before the FtT which included the refusal letter on this application dated 26 October 2022. It showed that she was not eligible for the same because she did not have leave as a spouse or partner of a British national or someone present and settled in the UK. There was no finding made within this decision on whether she was a victim of domestic abuse.
28. Ms Heybroek further argued that the Judge failed to understand and/or underplayed the domestic violence the Appellant was subjected to, or the seriousness of coercive control. Mr Tufan said there was not a clear finding on domestic violence and in saying this referred me to paragraph 46 of the decision.
29. I note that at paragraph 38 of the FtT decision the Judge finds that the Appellant is estranged from her husband and that the marriage has been an unhappy one, the husband’s treatment of the Appellant was a reflection of norms and expectations. He says at paragraph 39 she has not complained of physical violence and the Dash assessment says there are no reasonable grounds for referring to a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment. At paragraph 46 it is said that ‘the Appellant’s marriage is an unhappy one and by Western European standards, her husband could be seen as coercive.’
30. I have set out some of the evidence in respect of domestic abuse in the Appellant's case at paragraph 24(a) and (d) above. Coercive and controlling behaviour does of course fall under the definition of domestic abuse in s1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. So does economic abuse, psychological, emotional or other abuse and sexual abuse. The evidence suggests that the abuse the Appellant was subjected to in fact fell under several of these headings.
31. The findings of the Judge do indicate that there has been a failure to consider and apply the definition of domestic violence to the evidence and facts.
32. I disagree with Mr Tufan’s submission. I do consider there was a finding of coercive control. If Mr Tufan is correct than the failure to make a finding on domestic violence is a material error of law as this was a material matter in this appeal.
33. I am also of the view that there was a failure to consider the serious impact of coercive control upon an individual (and indeed upon this Appellant), and/or alternatively, the Judge appears to have applied a different standard to domestic abuse or the risk of domestic abuse and impacts of the same upon the Appellant because of the fact that she was Nigerian. These are material errors; see R (Iran) & Ors at 9(i),(iii)(iv).
34. The Appellant’s case before the FtT was that she was at risk of domestic abuse on return at the hands of her husband or his family (see §20 of her appeal skeleton argument), that there were very significant obstacles to her ability to integrate into life in Nigeria as a victim of domestic abuse and single mother under the private life rules and/or that there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences/a breach of her Article 8 ECHR rights by her return (see §14, §26-27 appeal skeleton argument).
35. As was held by the Court of Appeal in GM (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2019] EWCA Civ 1630 at §32 ‘the list of relevant factors to be considered in a proportionality assessment is "not closed". There is in principle no limit to the factors which might, in a given case, be relevant to an evaluation under Article 8, which is a fact sensitive exercise.’ It follows that a failure to properly consider and weigh the facts and evidence regarding domestic abuse may have impacted the proportionality assessment.
Ground Two
36. I now turn to Ground Two.
(i) Evidence on Family in Nigeria
37. Ms Heybroek states that the Judge did not give adequate reasons as to why he concluded the Appellant had not given full and frank evidence about her family in Nigeria and that many issues regarding her family (such as her mother being a victim of abuse by her father, her brother supporting her husband and her partner influencing her family) were not in dispute.
38. The Judge finds at paragraph 61 that he is ‘not satisfied the Appellant has given frank and full evidence about her own family in Nigeria.’
39. I note that the Judge says at paragraph 40-41 that she has weekly contact with her mother, her father has little interest in his children but he contacted her aunt for financial support for her and reached out to her in-laws to see if she could resolve issues with her husband, she did not provide a statement from her parents or aunt or other evidence about family in Nigeria and gave no explanation for this, she was in contact with an aunt which was contrary to her evidence that she was not in contact with extended family, her family home was occupied by her parents, sometimes her sister and another unidentified person and had insufficient space for her and her child. In considering the adverse credibility finding here I note the following issues:
i. The Judge records the Appellant’s oral evidence on her family at §§13, 12-13 (n.b., the numbering restarts after §13 to §12 FtT decision).
ii. The Appellant frankly disclosed weekly contact with her mother, having much less frequent contact with her father, last having contact with her brother on her birthday and her sister not responding to her message (first paragraph §13 FtT decision).
iii. The Appellant volunteered evidence of support from an aunt in the US (see §15 FtT decision) but clearly said she was not in contact with extended family in Nigeria or the UK (first §13 FtT decision). There is nothing contradictory about this.
iv. The Appellant does not appear to have been asked who the other person was that lived with her family.
v. The Appellant gave evidence that her mother was a victim of domestic violence at the hands of her father. There is no finding made on this issue, which is relevant to the support she and her child would receive on return from her family and her father’s attitudes to her issues.
vi. The Judge finds that the Appellant’s father wanted her to resolve issues with her husband (who had been abusive to her). The Judge records (at second paragraph §13 FtT decision) that she gave evidence that her brother is friendly with her husband and that she provided evidence in support of this. There is no finding on the latter issue in the decision.
40. It follows from the above that it is very difficult to understand from the decision what the Judge considers the Appellant has not been truthful about in respect of her family. As per R (Iran) & Ors at 9(ii), a failure to give reasons or adequate reasons on material matters is an error of law.
(ii) Child’s Health, Best Interests and Stigma the Child would face on Return
41. Ms Heybroek argued that there were insufficient reasons for stating AA could return with his mother. The Judge said AA was not receiving treatment despite there being evidence to the contrary and that whilst the Judge found an assessment of his autism was likely to take years (not weeks) there no evidence to this effect. The Judge did not consider the evidence of social stigma associated with autism in Nigeria, he did not give adequate reasons for rejecting the reports on problems that arise for autistic children and their families, he did not consider AA’s development and welfare as a primary consideration.
42. The Judge noted evidence from Dr Buckey at §45 of the decision and the fact that a referral was proposed to the autism spectrum condition panel.
43. Paragraph 48 of the FtT decision reads as follows: “The child appears to have developmental problems and there is a suspicion that he might have and [sic] ASD. There is no diagnosis because the waiting time for an appointment with an NHS practitioner is measured in years rather than months and the child may still be too young for a diagnosis to be made. … There is no evidence the child is receiving any current treatment or medication: in fact, they are waiting an appointment for an assessment which in practice is not going to be in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
44. The evidence in respect of AA’s needs and health included, for example, the following:
i. A letter from a Child Development Centre dated 25 June 2024 showing he was referred in June 2024 to a specialist nursery nurse team for playskill sessions which would focus on communication, sensory and physical needs to support development and that he was on a waiting list for this.
ii. An assessment by a Child Development Centre dated June 2024 says the Appellant avoids new places as AA becomes upset, he likes routine and is set in it, if the Appellant takes a new direction he freezes, screams and bangs his head and she needs to reassure him. He is non-verbal and not using gestures to communicate, his personal social skills show some delay, his history and presentation is suggestive of autism, he will be referred to the ASD panel, there will be paediatric follow up after this he will be referred to play skills and may also benefit from sensory explorers and the Appellant should be supported by AA’s health visitor on sleep and toileting.
iii. A speech and language therapy service report dated 8 February 2024 which said AA was showing differences with his speech, language and communication development, including his social interaction, and his understanding and use of spoken language. He requires further monitoring and assessment and has been added to the waiting list for a follow up appointment. Attached to this letter are speech and language therapy goals which set out strategies on what can be done to help AA.
iv. A letter dated 7 February 2024 from a Child Development Centre. This says that AA has been referred to the child development services, they aim to offer him an appointment within 18 weeks but owing to the current situation the wait for an appointment is likely to be significantly longer than this.
v. A letter from AA’s health visitor dated 28 February 2024. This said she had been working with the family since 2022, that the Appellant fled an abusive relationship, She has a small network from church, her organisation have supported her with second hand clothes for her son. AA has been referred to local child developmental centre and this owing to showing signs of global delay in all areas. AA may be on the autistic spectrum and is awaiting assessment. The Appellant fears return owing to her son's condition and stigma, lack of support from family and the healthcare system in Nigeria. It is her view that return will have devastating consequences.
45. It follows from a reading of the above evidence that Ms Heybroek is correct to say that that AA was under the care of relevant health professionals and that this evidence was not considered properly by the Judge. The evidence shows AA has been supported by the same health visitor since 2022 (who was most recently assisting with sleep and toileting issues for example), he was being monitored and assessed for autism, there was further a speech and language plan in place which was sent to his mother, his nursery and his health visitor amongst others, he was also referred for playskill sessions to support development.
46. Whilst the evidence from the Child Development Centre referred to waiting lists in February 2024 being significantly longer than 18 weeks for a referral to Child Development Services to see a Clinician it appears that he was seen by a Consultant Paediatrician in this department in June 2024. I was not taken to any evidence which suggested the waiting time was years.
47. As to the final argument made by Ms Heybroek, that the Judge did not consider evidence in respect of stigma and autism I note the findings at §58 of the FtT decision. This says ‘The paper at SB 378 “A Psychologist’s perspective on the Taboo of Autism in Nigeria” is originally dated 2007 and was revised in 2010 and is written, as it expressly states, by a psychologist. It is therefore dated and was written by an individual with an investment in the subject matter. I accept that the facilities provided by the state for treatment and care of those with an ASD in Nigeria are likely far below those provided by the state in the UK and that other treatment is prohibitively expensive. However, at present there is no diagnosis that the child has an ASD or how limiting the child’s particular ASD might be.’
48. This shows some evidence on the issue of stigma was considered. There was however other evidence before the FtT on this issue. This included an article dated April 2022 from Premium Times which said children with autism are rejected, abused, stigmatised and discrimination prevented parents from seeking help. Whilst the Judge was correct to say there was at present no formal diagnosis, there still had to be a consideration of how AA presents and how he may be viewed and treated on return as a result.
49. It follows from the above that the above grounds are made out; there was a failure to give reasons, relevant evidence was not considered in looking at AA and his best interests, incorrect or immaterial considerations were also taken into account by the Judge.
Notice of Decision
50. For the aforementioned reasons, I find that there are material errors of law in this decision. The decision is set aside.
51. The parties agreed that if a material error of law was found on all grounds the matter should be remitted to the FtT. I agree that this is correct considering 7.2 of the Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. I remit this matter to the FtT, to be heard before any Judge aside from Designated Judge Shaerf.

P. Solanki

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 May 2025