Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2024-004424
First-tier Tribunal No:
RP/00022/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 1st April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

ASSANE KOITE
(also known as Jamie Minahan)
(nO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Fripp of Counsel instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at the Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the remaking of the decision in respect of the Appellant’s appeal. I do so pursuant to section 12 (2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to make a deportation order.
2. The remaking of the decision takes place before me pursuant to a decision of Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick sealed on 6 October 2025 following an earlier Error of Law hearing.
Preliminary Matter
3. The Appellant did not attend the hearing before me. Mr Fripp said that he wished to make certain submissions about his representation of the Appellant. Mr Fripp informed me that his instructing solicitors had been in touch with him. He informed me that the Appellant had said to his instructing solicitors that he did not wish to be represented. Mr Fripp said that he was not sure if he had instructions to withdraw the appeal because the instructions were equivocal. The e-mail from the Appellant was that he did not wish for his solicitors to continue to represent him and that he was not minded to proceed with his appeal. Mr Fripp said he had seen that e-mail the evening before the hearing before me. Mr Fripp said he was therefore without instructions. Mr Fripp also told me that his instructing solicitors had been having difficulty in communicating with the Appellant and that this was the first positive communication from the Appellant.
4. I thought it necessary to put the case back whilst I dealt with other cases and I invited Mr Fripp to seek further details from the Appellant and/or from his instructing solicitors because I considered it might still be possible for the Appellant to provide instructions and even to attend the hearing. Some time later Mr Fripp returned and explained that further communication had been attempted with the Appellant but he told me that that ‘there was no reason to expect a response from the Appellant’. Mr Fripp said that the attempts at contact were both via telephone call and via e-mail. Mr Fripp then left the hearing of his own accord.
5. Mr Lawson submitted that I ought to proceed with the hearing. He submitted that the Appellant knew about the hearing and he had decided not to attend. I reflected on the matter. I concluded that because the Appellant was aware of the hearing and because the Appellant knew full well what the hearing was about, it was in the interests of justice to continue with the hearing in his absence. The hearing had been listed for some time and had been adjourned previously. I concluded when considering the overriding objective, that it was necessary in the interests of justice for the hearing to proceed.
Background
6. The Appellant was born on 8 August 1997 and arrived in the United Kingdom when he weas aged 13 under the provisions of the Family Reunion Scheme when had had joined his mother here in the United Kingdom.
7. The Appellant has been convicted of serious offences in the UK. The issue in the appeal is whether the Appellant’s deportation to Senegal would breach his human rights. In particular, whether (a) the Appellant’s return would breach Article 3 ECHR, on ‘mental health’ grounds; and/or because (b) when the balancing exercise is conducted, an analysis of the facts, and taking account of the applicable public interest, there are very compelling circumstances, such that the Appellant should not be deported.
8. The offences that the Appellant has been convicted of include possession with intent to supply class A drugs (Heroine and Cocaine) and 2 counts of having a bladed article. On 23 October 2018 he was sentenced to a period of 3 years and 9 months imprisonment for those offences. Additionally, on 4 March 2020 the Appellant was convicted of an offence of rape for which he was sentenced to a period of 6 years and 1 month. Since 29 March 2024 (some of the documents say since January 2024) the Appellant is said to be living with his mother and his 3 half-siblings. The Appellant’s half siblings are all under the age of 18. In view of their ages, I will not refer to them by name in this published judgment.
9. There is a very considerable procedural history to this matter. It is necessary to refer to some of it.
10. A previous hearing of this matter had been listed to take place on 17 November 2025 before Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia. The matter was adjourned by Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia because documents were provided late by the Appellant’s solicitors and to which the Respondent had sought to respond. I shall deal with the costs in respect of that hearing at the end of this decision. A detailed skeleton argument drafted by Mr Haywood of counsel had been provided for that hearing and I have read and taken that into account.
11. There are a large number of documents in this case. The documents include the Appellant’s original bundle of documents for the Upper Tribunal. Alongside that, there was a late Rule 15(2A) application dated 14 November 2025 from the Appellant’s solicitors. I had also been provided with a supplementary 19-paged bundle from the Respondent with details of the medical treatment and facilities which are available in Senegal. There was also a supplementary witness statement from the Appellant. Mr Lawson additionally relied on a written noted dated 7 January 2026 alongside with background about medical treatment facilities in Senegal.
12. This matter had originally been considered by First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes (“the FTT Judge”) who by way of a decision dated 10 July 2024 had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. Permission to appeal was later granted by the Upper Tribunal. A hearing thereafter was adjourned due to the Appellant’s non-attendance whereby he was said to have attempted suicide.
13. An Error of Law hearing then took place before Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick. She by way of a decision sealed on 6 October 2025 found that there was a material error of law in the decision of the FTT Judge. She ordered that the matter remain here at the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision. There were certain retained findings, such as that because there was no challenge to the Appellant’s refugee status being revoked, then those findings would remain. Nor had the Appellant rebutted the presumption of dangerousness pursuant to section 72 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. A hearing was listed but could not go ahead thereafter.
14. The matter then came to be listed for a remaking hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia, but the Appellant’s solicitors had filed their evidence late and the matter had to be adjourned.
15. The matter thereafter came before me on 16 January 2026 with the events that I have referred to above.
The Respondent’s Decisions
16. I summarise the Respondent’s decisions. First is the decision dated 5 November 2018 and it refers to the Respondent having made a deportation decision in view of the Appellant’s serious criminality. Section 32(5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is referred to in the decision. The Respondent decided that section 72 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 applied because the Appellant was considered to constitute a danger to the community of the UK, notwithstanding that he was a recognised as a refugee.
17. Second is the Respondent’s decision dated 3 August 2020 intending to revoke the Appellant’s refugee status. On 24 April 2023 the Appellant’s refugee status was revoked by the Respondent. On that date the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim was also rejected by the Respondent.
Evidence Summarised
18. I summarise the evidence before me. There are numerous witness statements from the Appellant, some are handwritten. There is no utility in setting everything from within them out in this decision. I do refer though to the Appellant’s supplementary witness statement dated 14 November 2025. There the Appellant states in summary that,
“20. To be completely honest, I would not say my mental health has actually improved over recent months. I have really worked hard and tried my best, mainly to develop better coping mechanisms. I have tried techniques such as meditation and breathing exercises, and have engaged with and opened up to Margaret as much as possible. However, what I believe to be the underlying causes of my mental health issues, such as the uncertainty over my immigration status, they still exist, they’re still there and are negatively impacting my life.
21. I feel that my immigration status in particular is preventing me from rehabilitating properly. I go to report on Fridays, but day to day, I am left without anything to do, or any ways to progress or to better myself. I am still not entitled to work or even to study. I have nothing but time at the moment. It is very difficult, being left to dwell on my 6 thoughts everyday. In addition to more comprehensive treatment and support, I feel that in order to really see improvement in my health, these practical issues need to be resolved. Family life
22. As I mentioned, I continue to live with my mother, Rougui Sarr, and my three halfsiblings, []
23. My half-siblings have all been home schooled for well over a year now, since the dismissal of my appeal last year. There were various factors that went into the decision, but it was largely so that my mother could keep a closer eye on them and their mental health. It was difficult for us to explain the outcome of the hearing to them, and they were very stressed in the aftermath. My mother and I, we home school them basically. We have a curriculum that we work on and go through with them, every day.
24. I wouldn’t say that I have felt closer or that my relationship with my half-siblings has necessarily improved in recent months. I was already very close to all of them, and had a good relationship with them, so that’s not how I would describe it. However, naturally, when you spend more time with someone, you do become closer. We’re all in the house every day so I essentially spend all of my time with them.
25. My half-siblings have been aware of my struggles, with my mental health. I do not believe that they are specifically aware of the incident last November, and that I was planning to take my own life. Every time I go to smoke a cigarette outside, they follow me to check on me, so maybe they do know, but I’ve never told them or discussed it with them. I know that my mother did not tell them initially, she tried to keep this from them to protect them, but maybe she has told them since. Regardless, they can obviously tell that I’ve not been well, seeing me around the house and my mood.
26. It’s been a particularly difficult year for my mother. She continues to suffer from ill physical health. Now, the situation with my appeal, my mental health and the responsibility of home schooling my half-siblings, it is an exceptional amount for her to bear. Due to her ill-health, she is unfortunately not able to attend the upcoming hearing before the Upper Tribunal. It was extremely difficult for her last time, when she attended my First-tier Tribunal hearing last June. Giving evidence took a significant toll on her and I don’t want to put her through this again, just for my sake”
19. The Appellant’s mother in her witness statement dated 30 May 2024 explained that she arrived in the UK in 2009 having separated from her abusive husband. She explained that her husband was from a wealthy family which was influential in Senegal. She refers to her 3 other children. She refers to her health problems. She feels housebound and takes strong painkillers such as morphine. Medical evidence relating to the Appellant’s mother has been provided, including from back pain medical practitioners. She has ovarian cancer.
20. In a country expert report dated 11 April 2024 Dr Muzong W. Kodi referred to the risk on return matters from the Koite family. The expert stated though at paragraph 34 that he had not found any information on the extent of the alleged notoriety of the nature an extent of the Koite family in Senegal. The expert concluded that it was unlikely that the Appellant would be at risk from his family, from the Mourides or from the wider Senegalese society on account of being a returnee from the West. There was a risk of being considered a homosexual when he had been sexually abused by a male person. The expert also said that the Appellant could relocate within another area of Senegal, but it would not be easy because of unemployment and because ‘most workers there are miserable’.
21. A substantial amount of background material has been provided. Some of it is older, for example in relation to an Imam who ‘risks jail for insulting’ which is dated from 2016 and more recent background evidence from 2023 of a Senegal teacher accused of multiple rapes. There is also evidence about the stigma of mental health in Senegal.
22. I have an OASys report and I shall refer to that in the context of some of the other evidence.
23. Dr Arvind Kumar Gupta, a consultant psychiatrist, said in his report dated 20 May 2024 that the Appellant has complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and a Mixed Personality Disorder. Treatment is required for these symptoms. He concluded that if deported, the Appellant’s mental health would significantly deteriorate. It was said that the Appellant denied intent or plans to end his life, but that the protective factors of his mother and siblings being removed would lead to an increase in likelihood of suicide risk. The OASys report referred to the Appellant’s risk of harm to the public as being high but Dr Gupta was of the opinion that if the Appellant engaged with ‘evidence based’ treatment and if he remained abstinent from alcohol and if he was in employment and if her engaged in purposeful and meaningful activities then this risk of re-offending might reduce. The Appellant was said to be a vulnerable person, despite apparently refusing, at least initially, to accept his fault for raping a female and even though he was said to have pleaded guilty. Dr Gupta had not seen the Appellant’s medical records.
The Legal Principles Summarised
24. Part 5A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides a ‘complete code’ and structure when assessing whether the interference with the private and family life a foreign criminal has established in the United Kingdom and whether their deportation is proportionate and therefore lawful applying the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. Its purpose is to promote consistency, predictability and transparency in decision making and to reflect the Government’s and Parliament’s view of how as a matter of public policy, the balance between an individual’s right to a private and family life and the state’s right to remove foreign criminals, should be struck.
25. Section 117B (1-5) lists considerations which are relevant in all cases, whilst s117C lists the considerations applicable when the Appellant’s deportation as a “foreign criminal” is proposed. “Foreign criminals” are defined in s117D and include a person who is not British and has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least twelve months. The Appellant is in this category of being a foreign criminal and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of more than 4 years.
26. Section 117C relates specifically to foreign criminals. Section 117C (1) provides that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest and s117C(2) says that the more serious the offence the greater the public interest. S117C (4) and (5) contain two Exceptions to the public interest in deportation which apply in the case of foreign criminals who have been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment. The Exceptions do not apply to foreign criminals who like the appellant have received sentences of four years’ imprisonment or more for a single offence (“serious offenders”) though they remain relevant.
27. Section 117C(4) identifies that Exception 1 applies where the foreign criminal (a) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life, (b) is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and (c) there would be very significant obstacles to their integration in the country to which it is proposed they be deported. Section 117(6) identifies that for serious offenders “the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 & 2” – the “very compelling circumstances test.”
28. Guidance on the application of the very compelling circumstances test for serious offenders is provided in part 4 of the judgment of Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22; The judgment identifies that the test requires a full proportionality assessment, considering all factors that have been found to be relevant by the European Cout of Human Rights and weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee against the public interest in his deportation The assessment must recognise that “great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of [qualifying] offenders but…it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words by a very strong claim indeed…The countervailing considerations must be very compelling to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State”.
29. Jackson LJ’s judgment in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662; deals with the high threshold in respect of Exceptions 1 and 2:
“30. In the case of a serious offender who could point to circumstances in his own case which could be said to correspond to the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, but where he could only just succeed in such an argument, it would not be possible to describe his situation as involving very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. One might describe that as a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 or 2. On the other hand, if he could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 and 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, they could in principle constitute ‘very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of article 8….
33. Although there is no ‘exceptionality’ requirement, it inexorably follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient.”
30. There can be no doubt that the Appellant is a person who received a sentence of imprisonment of 4 years and so he is in the highest category in terms of his offending. Nor can there be any doubt that he meets Exception 1 in view of the amount of time that he has spent in the UK.
31. It is necessary to consider the balance sheet approach referred to by Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) which I have set out above. I refer also to the judgment of Underhill LJ in Yalcin and to consider “what is the “something more” that brings the appellants case “over and above” the Exceptions” Yalcin involved an Appellant with a family, including children. At paragraph 53 Underhill LJ said,
“53. The starting-point is to identify the basic structure of the law in this area. At para. 47 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) Lord Hamblen approved the summary which I gave at para. 29 of my judgment in this Court:
"(A) In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in subsections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.
(B) In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply – that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements – a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment, the decision-maker is required by section 117C (6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that 'the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'."
54. It might be thought to follow from the fact that the Exceptions are a "self-contained" short-cut they have no role to play where a full proportionality assessment is required, and that accordingly in the present case the FTT was right to make no reference to them. But the complicating factor is the requirement in section 117C (6) that the public interest requires deportation unless "there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2". The effect of those words was considered in NA (Pakistan). I need to consider with some care what the Court said in that case.”
32. Underhill LJ explained further that,
“57. NA (Pakistan) thus establishes that the effect of the over-and-above requirement is that, in a case where the "very compelling circumstances" on which a claimant relies under section 117C (6) include an Exception-specified circumstance ("an Exception-overlap case") , it is necessary that there be something substantially more than the minimum that would be necessary to qualify for the relevant Exception under subsection (4) or (5): as Jackson LJ puts it at para. 29, the article 8 case must be "especially strong". That higher threshold may be reached either because the circumstance in question is present to a degree which is "well beyond" what would be sufficient to establish a "bare case", or – as shown by the phrases which I have italicised in paras. 29 and 30 – because it is complemented by other relevant circumstances, or because of a combination of both. I will refer to those considerations, of whichever kind, as "something more". To take a concrete example, if the Exception-related circumstance is the impact of the claimant's deportation on a child (Exception 2) the something more will have to be either that the undue harshness would be of an elevated degree ("unduly unduly harsh"?) or that it was complemented by another factor or factors – perhaps very long residence in this country (even if Exception 1 is not satisfied) – to a sufficient extent to meet the higher threshold; or, as I have said, a combination of the two.
58. There is nothing at all surprising about this, at least in the case of a serious offender. Even if the over-and-above requirement were not explicit, it is in my view inherent in the structure of section 117C that a serious offender will need to meet a higher threshold than a medium offender in order to satisfy the test in subsection (6).”
33. Finally, Underhill LJ made clear in respect of the task of the judge making the decision as follows:
62. As for (ii), it is also logically inherent in such a case that the tribunal will have found the "something more" which is necessary to satisfy the higher threshold under subsection (6): see para. 57 above. I agree that it would in principle conduce to transparent decision-making if the tribunal identified with precision in every case what the something more consisted of; but that will not always be straightforward. The proportionality assessment is generally multi-factorial and requires a holistic approach. A tribunal must of course in its reasons identify the factors to which it has given significant weight in reaching its overall conclusion. It is no doubt also desirable that it should indicate the relative importance of those factors, but there are limits to the extent to which that is practically possible: the factors in play are of their nature incommensurable, and calibrating their relative weights will often be an artificial exercise. It would in my view place an unrealistic burden on tribunals for them to have to decide, and specify, in every case whether the something more consists of the Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree, or of some other circumstance or circumstances, or a combination of the two. There may be cases where for some reason peculiar to the case this degree of specificity is necessary; but I do not believe that there is any universal rule. We should not make decision-making in this area more complicated than it regrettably already is.”
34. The approach in Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47, paragraphs 72-75 has been approved in a number of the leading cases, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Hesham Ali at paragraph 26: ‘… In, the court added that the age of the person concerned can play a role when applying some of these criteria … Some of the factors listed in these cases relate to the strength of the public interest in deportation: that is to say, the extent to which the deportation of the person concerned will promote the legitimate aim pursued. Others relate to the strength of the countervailing interests in private and family life. They are not exhaustive…’
35. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Üner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14 at paragraph 59 observed that: "… not all [settled] migrants, no matter how long they have been residing in the country from which they are to be expelled, necessarily enjoy 'family life' there within the meaning of article 8. However, as article 8 also protects the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's social identity, it must be accepted that the totality of social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitute part of the concept of 'private life' within the meaning of article 8."
36. It is important in this case to consider Article 3 ECHR and the Appellant’s mental health. The impact of the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Paposhvili, was considered by the Supreme Court in AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 17. It is for applicants to adduce evidence ‘capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing’ [on account of ‘the absence of appropriate treatment … or the lack of access to such treatment’] that, if removed, they would be exposed to a real risk of subjection to treatment contrary to article 3 [Paposhvili at paragraph 186] (‘…although not at imminent risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or 8 to a significant reduction in life expectancy...’ [paragraphs 181-3]). It is then for the Secretary of State [paragraph 23 (b) – (d)] to ‘dispel any [serious] doubts raised by it’; to subject the alleged risk to close scrutiny; and to address reports of reputable organisations about treatment in the receiving state [paragraph187]; to ‘verify on a case-by-case basis’ whether the care generally available in the receiving state was in practice sufficient to prevent the applicant’s exposure to treatment contrary to Article 3. The returning state also had to consider the accessibility of the treatment to the particular applicant, including by reference to its cost if any, to the existence of a family network and to its geographical location [paragraph 190]. If, following examination of the relevant information, serious doubts continued to surround the impact of removal, the returning state had to obtain an individual assurance from the receiving state that appropriate treatment would be available and accessible to the applicant [paragraph 191].
Consideration and Analysis
37. Although not cited to me, I also have firmly in mind section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The best interests of the Appellant’s half siblings are a primary consideration. It is not their fault that the Appellant has committed the offences that he has. In my judgment, it is clear that their best interests are to be in the United Kingdom with their mother. The Appellant claims to live with his mother and half siblings. Whilst the Appellant did not attend the hearing, nor did any of his other witnesses or his mother to confirm the living arrangements. Nor did the Appellant or his mother attend for cross examination. I can accept though that it is likely that the Appellant did live with his mother on his release from prison. Whether that remained the case more recently is not so clear.
38. I must turn first to the Appellant’s offending. The Appellant’s offending in this case is very serious. It involved the supply of Class A drugs and a weapon in the form of a bladed article. Following that sentence of imprisonment, then later a serious offence of rape was then recorded. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Appellant’s offending has been very serious. The rape offence led to a sentence of 6 years and 1 month imprisonment. The risk to the public is set out within the OASys report as being high but also reflected upon in Dr Gupta’s report. Dr Gupta did not have the Appellant’s medical records and the Appellant’s written submissions appears to recognise the dilution of the Dr Gupta’s report as a consequence. HA (expert evidence, mental health) [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC) makes clear the need for the expert to have seen the medical records when preparing his report. I conclude that expert’s report is diluted because of that failure. In any event it is for me to assess the evidence as a whole and to be guided by expert evidence which I use as a tool.
39. On the other side of the balancing exercise, there are a number of significant factors militating against deportation. These are that the Appellant meets Exception 1, being the time he has spent in the UK because he has been in the UK for more than half of his life. It is also relevant that the Appellant was as a child when he arrived in the UK as a 13 year old and that he had arrived with leave pursuant to Family Reunion Scheme following problems in Senegal.
40. The comparative assessment of the Appellant’s life in the UK and Senegal is that he was aged 13 when he came here to join his mother who herself had come to the UK as refugee at an earlier time. The Appellant has therefore spent virtually the whole of his teenage years and the whole of his adult life in the UK. These are important factors in the Appellant’s balance. The Appellant’s mother is not well. She has a good relationship with the Appellant. As do the Appellant’s half-siblings. The Appellant has no recorded offending since his release on licence in early 2024.
41. The life that the Appellant will face in Senegal will not be as it is in the UK. The Appellant will not have his mother or half siblings around him. There remain the past issues in respect of the Appellant’s father and his father’s family. There is the different standard of living that the Appellant will face in Senegal compared with the UK.
42. I consider the Appellant’s mental health and references to suicide in the context of Article 8 first. I shall return to the Article 3 assessment. Whilst there is reference to the Appellant having experienced issues relating to his mental health, including PTSD, there has been no updating evidence since the report of Dr Gupta in 2024. That is despite the Appellant being legally represented by experienced solicitors and counsel. Against that I have noted that the Appellant’s more recent witness statement refers to him having had difficulties with his mental health.
43. The Appellant’s mental health can be said to be fragile. The socio-economic conditions, and the absence of family support for him to turn to in Senegal, would make it difficult for his integration. The Appellant’s mother has her own serious health problems. There would be a strain on them all if the Appellant was deported.
44. Whilst I note that the Appellant’s solicitor filed the evidence late for the hearing before Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia, the Respondent’s updating evidence makes clear that the treatment that the Appellant requires is both available and accessible.
45. I summarise the Respondent’s evidence. I prefer it over the Appellant’s more dated and rather general evidence which relates to irrelevant matters too, such as to Imams. The Respondent’s evidence includes the following:
46. Firstly, the Appellant’s reliance on the World Health Organisation (WHO) report is some 5 years old but since that report the Respondent’s more recent evidence shows that there have been various initiatives instigated in Senegal to improve mental health provision. An example of this is the National Health Mental Health Program for the period 2024-2028. I do not need to refer to the document in full, but it is available at: Mental Health and Citizenship: Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko's New Guidelines
47. Secondly the Respondent refers to the Borgen Project which shows an increase, albeit small, in the number of mental health professionals since the WHO report.
48. Thirdly, the Respondent provides documents in form of marketing tools showing the availability of Mental health services in Senegal as of October 15, 2025. There being some 15 and showing a 9.09% increase from 2023. The different regions are also referred to.
49. The Appellant clearly will be able to access medical treatment. It will not as advanced as the UK, but in any event, there is no evidence presented to me since the report of 2024 that the Appellant has been accessing or needing treatment in recent times. Even if he has, he has decided not to use it by choice. It is for the Appellant to provide evidence for his case. He has not attended the hearing to do that. The matter had been adjourned on at least one occasion previously. The Appellant refers to his immigration status as causing him issues. Now that his immigration issues will be resolved, it will give him the ability to focus on the next steps.
50. Whilst there might be stigma in respect of those who suffer with mental health in Senegal, there is clearly treatment available there is an improving situation with new and recent government initiatives.
51. In my judgment, however, there is little in respect of the ‘something more’ which I have referred to above in respect of the case law which the Appellant has to show.
52. Whilst there can be some limited reduction in terms of the public interest when noting the background to the Appellant, I conclude that such reduction is very limited. Especially when compared to the offending and the manner of the offending. In any event, the fact that there has been no offending since January 2024 has been a time that the Appellant has been on licence and therefore being supervised. Even though I accept that the Appellant is arguably socially and culturally integrated in the UK, that is not of itself sufficient either.
53. I again assess the claimed very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Senegal. I do not accept he satisfies this despite his unusual and unfortunate history even when I take a broad, practical approach which appreciates the individual circumstances of his case, including those set out in the expert reports. Whether in respect of the risks from the Appellant’s father’s family or others or indeed in respect of the ‘homosexuality’ which is referred to in the expert report. Whilst I do not doubt that the Appellant will find things difficult, that is not the correct test.
54. I accept that there can be discrimination and stigma for those with mental health issues in Senegal, but that is something that the Appellant will have to deal with in a country which is not as developed as the UK. It will not be as easy for him in Senegal as it is here in the UK, but the test is not whether it will be easy for him. Senegal is a very large country. The Appellant can move within Senegal and there is a sufficiency of protection for him from there, albeit the case was not put on a protection basis before me.
55. In any event, in my judgment the Appellant has not discharged the burden of establishing that he is a seriously ill person. I accept he is ill, but he is not seriously ill. In any event, the Appellant has not adduced evidence which is capable of demonstrating that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that as a seriously ill person that he would face a real risk on return on account of their being (i) an absence of appropriate treatment in Senegal, (ii) of being exposed to (a) to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The Appellant has failed to show that intense suffering would follow, even when considering the matters relating to suicide risk or the PTSD and the like.
56. The Appellant has the advantage of being able to be able to stand up for himself and will have the benefit of being able to use his skills in English too. The treatment in Senegal may not initially be as sophisticated as it has been here in the UK, but in my judgment the Appellant will use his abilities to receive it. His mother and other family will be able to assist him, as they did when he was in prison for several years in the UK. That is including by keeping in touch with him via remote means. They will also be able to give him moral support by such means. There is no evidence that the Appellant’s medication would be unavailable for him in Senegal. The access to the medical treatment even for this Appellant is possible, albeit it will feel uncomfortable for the Appellant to be out of his comfort zone because he is used to the system in the UK. That uncomfortableness does not mean that the high test in law is met. Work is possible in Senegal, albeit not as easy to find as in the UK.
57. Therefore, whilst I accept that the some of the Appellant’s education was here in the UK that and that he has a significant links to the UK, his links to Senegal are still also still significant. The Appellant has spent a very significant amount of time in the UK in prison in any event.
58. The Appellant’s return would not breach Article 3 ECHR, on mental health grounds. Nor when considering Article 8 and when the balancing exercise is conducted are there very compelling circumstances, such that the Appellant should not be deported.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law and was set aside.
I remake the decision.
I dismiss the appeal on all grounds including Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR.
I do not make an anonymity order.

Costs
After the hearing, correspondence and witness statements were provided to me from Mr Michael O’Brien, a trainee solicitor at Duncan Lewis Solicitors. He urged me not to order that the Appellant’s solicitors pay the costs of £330 sought by the Respondent for the hearing which had previously been adjourned. Having read the witness statements provided and noting the decision in Thapa & Ors (costs: general principles; s9 review) [2018] UKUT 54 (IAC) I am prepared on this occasion to make no order as to costs in view of the matters referred to the Appellants’ solicitors having had difficulty in getting instructions from the Appellant. On future occasions however, I will expect the Appellant’s solicitors to keep the Upper Tribunal aware well in advance of any such difficulties. In this instance though, I make no order as to costs.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 February 2026