Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2024-004487
UI-2024-004488

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/57529/2023
HU/57531/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7th January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DURANCE

Between

CHANDANI PATEL
DHAVAL PATEL
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr M West of Counsel instructed by Leka Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the oral decision that was delivered at the hearing today.
Background
2. The Appellants, nationals of India, appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wolfson (“the Judge”) dated 23 July 2024 following a hearing on 11 July 2024 whereby the Appellants’ appeals had been dismissed on human rights grounds. The Appellants had been represented by Ronald Fletcher & Co LLP Solicitors. They are now represented by Leka Solicitors.
3. The Appellants had sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s dismissal of their appeal. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. The Appellants renewed their application for permission to the Upper Tribunal.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor on limited grounds on 23 August 2025. The learned Upper Tribunal Judge’s grant of permission firstly observed that the application was a day late but he extended time to admit the application. Secondly at paragraph 5 and 6 the Upper Tribunal Judge set out the limit of the grant of permission. He said:
“5. There is no evidence that a discrete application was made to the respondent on the basis that the child was a stateless person. I note too what was said in MK v SSHD [2017] EWHC 1365 (Admin), with particular reference to [10]-[11] and [37]. The renewed application does not include the evidence from Ms Welikala. There is no suggestion that there was expert evidence on the meaning and operation of Indian citizenship law. Thus, in a number of respects, there were obstacles in the appellants’ path.
6. However, it is (just) arguable that the judge overlooked and/or misunderstood evidence relating to contact with the Indian High Commission regarding the potential registration of the child. The materiality or otherwise of any such error may well be yet another obstacle in the appellants’ path, but there is enough here for permission to be granted”.
We also note that paragraph 7 the Upper Tribunal Judge’s grant of permission stated, “In preparing the error of law bundle, the appellant’s representatives must ensure that all relevant evidence is included”. We shall return to this later in our decision.
The Hearing Before Us
5. Ten minutes before the start of the hearing, we received an expert report from the Appellants’ solicitors. The expert report appears to deal with Indian citizenship law. It is a relatively lengthy report. Mr West indicated to us that that report is only to be relied upon if we were to find that there is a material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. Mr West also informed us that he had also only received the report recently. It was therefore not necessary for us to put the case back for us to read the expert report.
6. We note the expert report is dated 18 October 2025, which was a Saturday, today being Monday 20 October. Mr Tufan said he had received the report which had been forwarded to him, a few minutes before the hearing.
7. Mr West is entirely correct that there appears to be no Rule 15(2A) application from the Appellants’ solicitors, but in any event the report can only become relevant if we were to find that there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Therefore, although we have been able to briefly glance at the expert report, it has not and cannot play any part in our assessment of whether or not the Judge had materially erred in law.
Appellants’ Grounds of Appeal: The Arguments
8. The Appellants’ grounds of appeal are dated 27 September 2024 and have been drafted by Ms Sashi Pararajasingam of Ronald Fletcher & Co LLP Solicitors, and if we have understood Mr West correctly, she is the same solicitor who instructs him now although she moved to Leka & Co Solicitors earlier this year.
9. Within her grounds of appeal, Ms Pararajasingam submits as follows (in summary) at paragraphs 9 and 10:
“9) However, despite acceptance of the statement made by Ms Welikala, adequate consideration was not given to the evidence provided by both FTTJ Wolfson and FTTJ Cox. Within this statement, Ms Welikala notes that she contacted the HCI in London on two occasions, once via telephone on 8 December 2023, and once via email to the address listed on the HCI’s website (at their partner’s email address at VFS Global). On both occasions, Ms Welikala was directed to review the list of supporting documents online, and on both occasions, the list of documents required valid visas from both parents. As HCI directed Ms Welikala to the list online in their call of 8 December 2023, and again via email on 11 December 2023, this indicates that the information online is correct (and not the position that the birth can be registered solely with a valid passport).
10) Both FTTJ Wolfson and FTTJ Cox failed to adequately consider Ms Welikala’s evidence. It is noted that reference was not made to the telephone conversation that was had between Ms Welikala and HCI within the decision of FTTJ Wolfson – the decision merely states that Ms Welikala attempted to clarify this with ‘VFS Global’. It is apparently that FTTJ Wolfson only considered the email sent to VFS Global (albeit VFS Global being linked to HCI) and did not consider the call with HCI. Therefore, the determination that the Appellants or their representatives did not contact HCI is incorrect, and the decision made by FTTJ Wolfson (as well as the subsequent decision made by FTTJ Cox) is deficient. FTTJ Wolfson was not in a position to determine that there must be a way to resolve the issue of registering a child’s birth without leave to remain for the parents, while having no concrete evidence behind this assertion to suggest such a way”.
10. Mr West has articulated this, if we may so well, because he says, there was either an error of fact or a failure to consider appropriately the circumstances which pertained at the relevant time. We hope it is a fair observation that the grounds of appeal were not drafted in the most focused of ways. Nonetheless we understand them and Mr West has been able to assist us with how he advances them, in ‘legal terms’, and in terms more frequently elucidated by the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
The Secretary of State’s Rule 24 Response and her Submissions Today
11. There is a Rule 24 response on behalf of the Respondent dated 7 October 2025 which we admit and which Mr Tufan referred to and upon which he had expanded upon during his submissions. The Rule 24 states in part as follows:
“3. The respondent notes the limited grant of permission, which only permits the appellants to argue their first ground of appeal. The respondent is somewhat surprised that the ground has been described as arguable, because the submissions running from paragraphs 3-4 of the grounds do not properly engage with the substance of the FTTJ’s reasoning.
4. The appellants are effectively reiterating their position on the child’s Indian citizenship, and they accuse the FTTJ of failing ‘to clarify’ how they could resolve the issue with the HCI. This is misconceived, as the FTTJ has clearly stated that the HCI ‘has a dedicated consular email and telephone number’, and the first appellant ‘had been advised by the HCI on 7 December 2023 that only his passport would be required, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a way to resolve the issue’. The FTTJ does not need to go further. It is the appellants’ responsibility to exhaust their own options in resolving the matter, and in any event, this is a point which concerns foreign law.
5. As noted in the limited grant of permission to appeal, there was no expert evidence on the meaning and operation of Indian citizenship law, and the appellants’ pleading of this point is contrary to the UT’s guidance in Hussein and Another (Status of passports: foreign law) [2020] UKUT 00250 (IAC), which makes clear that foreign law (including nationality) is a matter of evidence, to be proved by expert evidence directed specifically to the point in issue (headnote 3). The appellants manifestly failed to establish that a grant of leave was strictly required under law for the child to be registered as an Indian citizen, and the witness statement from the representative did not take this any further.
6. As an aside, the respondent is perplexed as to why the appellants have sought to contest what the first appellant was instructed by the HCI during the visit on 7 December 2023. If the HCI official required just a copy of the first appellant’s valid passport, the appellants really ought to have taken that step if they had a genuine interest in registering the child’s birth. The official is likely in a much better position to advise on their own bureaucratic processes, but instead, the appellants seem to have prompted discourse on this point with the HCI purely for the sake of the immigration appeal”.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
12. We turn then to the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision.
13. It is right to observe that the Judge had identified the agreed issues at the head of the decision at paragraph 6, including that the Appellants had entered the United Kingdom as visitors in 2017 and then 2018. Sadly, the couple had lost a child, there being a still birth. On 2 January 2023, the couple then had a daughter born to them and she is referred to by her initials “EP” within the Judge’s decision.
14. On 13 June 2022, the Appellants applied for leave to remain outside of the Immigration Rules, which the Respondent refused on 13 June 2023 and which was then the subject of the appeal before the Judge. In short, the Appellants were overstayers following their visit visa and wished to remain here and they had advanced various reasons for that. The Judge in her decision had set out why the appeal ought to fail. She noted, for example, that the Appellants had resided in India until they were in their 20s and that they have extended family networks in India including a mother, brother, sister-in-law, their children, grandparents, sisters and the like.
15. Permission to appeal was granted on limited grounds, as we have stated, and the focus was with reference, in particular to, paragraph 16 of the Judge’s decision. That refers to a Ms Welikala. She, Mr West has confirmed to us today, was a paralegal at Ronald Fletcher & Co. She left that employment, we were told, around a month or so after a witness statement had been provided by her in January 2024. The Judge said at paragraph 16, page 6 of the 183 paged bundle:
“16. Ms Claire Welikala, of Ronald Fletcher & Co, had provided a witness statement explaining that the First Appellant attended an appointment at the HCI’s London office on 7 December 2023 to register his daughter’s birth and was instructed that the HCI could register her birth if he supplied a copy of his valid passport. This was different from the advice on the HCI website which states that evidence of valid visa status is required and Ms Welikala attempted to clarify this with VFS Global. Ms Welikala’s witness statement predated the Appellants visit to VFS Global. I accept the Appellants’ evidence that they were unable to register EP’s birth at VFS Global nor obtain an Indian passport for her there, without presenting evidence of their own valid visa status. However, neither the Appellants nor their solicitors have made any further enquiries at HCI as to how this matter might be resolved. The HCI has a dedicated consular email and telephone number and as the First Appellant had been advised by the HCI on 7 December 2023 that only his passport would be required, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a way to resolve the issue of EP’s birth registration and passport directly with the HCI”.
16. In submissions before us today, Mr West, who has said and done all he possibly can on behalf of the Appellants, took us to Ms Welikala’s witness statement. Although it is unsigned, we are prepared to accept that it was indeed similar to the statement which was placed before the First-tier Tribunal Judge. There is additionally a witness statement which has been provided by Ms Sashi Pararajasingam dated 8 October 2025 (therefore dated 12 days ago) in which there are, in effect, submissions made as to why this appeal ought to succeed.
17. Returning to Ms Welikala’s witness statement dated 15 January 2024, Mr West had taken us to that at length and we cannot do justice by setting out all of his submissions again, but what he submits in summary is that it was clear that Ms Welikala had had extensive involvement with the HCI including by way of telephone calls and emails and, by way of example, there was contrary information on HCI’s website compared to what it was that HCI were suggesting ought to occur.
18. So, for example, paragraph 5 of Ms Welikala’s witness statement refers to what is required for parents wishing to register the birth of a minor child born in the United Kingdom. Ms Welikala says that on 8 December 2023 she sought to confirm whether this information was correct with a telephone call to HCI and that she was referred to a website. On 11 December she had emailed VFS who deal with HCI and within that she set out what the position was and that she was concerned that her client had been advised incorrectly. She invited a response which was provided it appears the same day on 11 December 2023 and she was referred to the document check for birth registration applications along with a telephone number.
19. Ms Welikala referred to the link itself and that she did call VFS on 13 December and she set out the name of the person to whom she had spoken and she was invited to email with a specific email address and within that she stated that she was yet to receive a reply as of 13 December 2023 (her witness statement being dated 15 January 2024). She says finally at paragraph 14, not having received a response to the previous query, she then emailed the Home Office requesting passports to allow them to register the Appellants’ daughter’s date of birth as well.
20. Mr West was able to make some enquiries at our request as to whether Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor’s order that “all of the relevant documents be provided in the error of law bundle” had been complied with or not. In particular if there had been further responses to Ms Welikala’s e-mails. Mr West explained to us that his instructing solicitor had moved from the previous firm to the current firm, Leka & Co, and Ms Welikala had left employment in around February 2024 and although it might be possible to try to interrogate the email addresses to ascertain whether or not there was a response from HCI/VFS, that would not be immediately possible today.
21. We observe at this stage that there are three aspects which really should not be occurring in cases especially with solicitors professing to be experienced in immigration law.
22. Firstly, there has to be compliance with orders the Upper Tribunal. When an Upper Tribunal Judge orders that all relevant documents are to be provided, then they must be provided. Not only is that necessary for transparency purposes, it also is required to ensure that there is procedural rigour and that directions orders are not just ignored.
23. Secondly, it does not appear appropriate for there to have been a witness statement from the Appellant’s new solicitor on 8 October 2025, which for example, invites the Upper Tribunal to allow the appeal. Submissions are made by advocates at the hearing and/or via skeleton arguments and not via witness statements of instructing solicitors.
24. Thirdly, it was unsatisfactory that we received an expert report 10 minutes before this hearing and then without a Rule 15(2A) application. That is not the way things are done at the Upper Tribunal. Judges of the Upper Tribunal are under considerable pressure to get through cases. Directions and the Rules must be complied with. The Principal Resident Judge’s directions make clear when documents have to be provided and when Rule 15(2A) applications must be sent to the Upper Tribunal.
25. Returning to the Appellants’, their situation is one which calls for considerable sympathy and we express our sympathy to them as they sit here in court in front of us today. As we said previously, very sadly the couple lost a child late on during Mrs Patel’s pregnancy and we have every sympathy for her and for her husband.
26. We are compelled to consider cases at the Upper Tribunal in a way which is in accordance with the law. We have to assess whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. This is not a rehearing of the case which was before the First-tier Tribunal. There is very extensive case law which makes clear that we must respect the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal and indeed the First-tier Tribunal had the advantage of hearing from the Appellants and from their advocate at that hearing. Today is not a re-run of that case. We know Mr West knows these things, but we say them so that the Appellants can hear them and say then can understand the parameters within which we must consider their appeal.
27. We remind ourselves that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
28. The legal test to be met by the Appellants to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R (Iran). Mr West also referred us to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Detamu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 604. We note the judgment of Moses LJ, with whom the other members of the Court of Appeal agreed, including paragraphs 14 and 18. In effect, that the test of immateriality that the Respondent must show is a high one.
Further Consideration and Analysis
29. We return to paragraph 16 of the Judge’s decision on page 6. Mr West focuses on a sentence in particular within that paragraph which states “However, neither the Appellants nor their solicitors have made any further enquiries at HCI as to how this matter might be resolved”, and Mr West says one only needs to look at Ms Welikala’s statement which refers to the emails and telephone calls to be able to see that the Judge had got that wrong. However, in our judgment it is vital to look at the whole of the Judge’s decision and not merely pick one sentence out of context from within the Judge’s very lengthy decision.
30. As has been highlighted by the Respondent in the Rule 24 response and amplified by Mr Tufan, it was also said, “The HCI has a dedicated consular email and telephone number and as the First Appellant had been advised by the HCI on 7 December 2023 that only his passport would be required, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a way to resolve the issue of EP’s birth registration and passport directly with the HCI”. That really is the end of the matter. ‘All’ that was required therefore was for Mr Patel to provide his passport and EP’s birth registration to the HCI. Even if the e-mails and telephone calls between the paralegal and HCI/VFS said otherwise, it is not possible to decipher why the simple step of presenting the passport/birth registration were not completed by the Appellants. The confusion, if there is any, was for the Appellants and their solicitors to resolve. It was not for the Judge to try to resolve these issues.
31. Additionally, the Respondent’s Rule 24 response correctly states, in any event these were matters of foreign law. As was made clear in the decision of the Vice President in Hussein, “Foreign law (including nationality law) is a matter of evidence, to be proved by expert evidence directed specifically to the point in issue”.
32. Although we accept that the paralegal has provided a witness statement, it is not for us to decide these points of foreign law. Hussein made it clear to the Appellants’ solicitors that these were matters that ought to have been dealt with specifically and clearly in advance of the hearing at the First-tier Tribunal by the Appellants and/or their solicitors. That would then have enabled the First-tier Tribunal Judge to come to a conclusion and decision in respect of them. It was simply unacceptable to leave the resolution of foreign law issues to the First-tier Tribunal Judge. It was wholly inappropriate and incomplete for the Appellant to merely refer to the emails and telephone calls which had been made by the paralegal in the hope that somehow the Judge would resolve matters. These were not matters for the Judge to resolve in any event, as the caselaw on expert evidence makes clear.
33. We discern no error of law in respect of the limited basis upon which permission to appeal was granted, however those grounds are now rephrased before us. Contrary to the drafted grounds of appeal, the Judge clearly had considered and taken into account the paralegal’s witness statements and the submissions. The fact that the Judge decided against the Appellants is not a reason to conclude that there was a material error of law in her decision.
34. In our judgment, despite the eloquent submissions made by Mr West it is clear that when read as a whole the Judge clearly took into account all of the evidence that was before her and came to a conclusion that she was entitled to. The submissions made to us are an attempt to reargue the case and are a mere disagreement with the decision which was made. The expert First-tier Tribunal’s decision was made with the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellants and their advocate at the hearing.
35. In the circumstances we conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a material error of law.
Accordingly, the decision which had dismissed the Appellants’ appeal on all grounds remains.
No anonymity direction is made.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 October 2025