Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004505

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51158/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

SR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Iqbal of Counsel, instructed by Westbrook Law
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the remaking of a decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent's decision dated 13 February 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claims made on 30 July 2021. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born on 27 December 1980.
2. The appellant’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal had been dismissed in a decision promulgated on 5 March 2024. However, the Upper Tribunal found, in a decision and reasons sealed on 27 January 2025, that the decision for the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law in considering the risk that arose on return from sur place activities, and held that such matters would need to be considered afresh, with up-to-date evidence on internet surveillance capabilities in Bangladesh, what was likely to happen at the airport upon return and also the current political situation there.
3. The First-tier Tribunal’s findings that the appellant would not be so at risk were set aside, as were its finding that authorities would be unable to connect the appellant to the criminal case against him. However, the following relevant findings were preserved: that appellant’s sur place activities constituted a cynical and opportunistic attempt to gain asylum; and that the activities he had undertaken had been at a low level and not likely in themselves to have brought him to the attention of the Bangladesh authorities. The error of law decision is Annexed.
The Hearing
4. The appellant provided a bundle of his proposed additional evidence on 11 September 2025. In addition to the evidence invited in the error of law decision, his bundle included a witness statement from the appellant himself (most of which comprised the appellant’s own opinion on the risk he faced) and evidence of subsequent sur place activity. The latter comprised activity on a new Facebook account related to criticism of the interim government (in respect of which further submissions could, but do not appear to, have been made to the respondent, and so have not been considered as a fresh asylum claim).
5. Mr Iqbal accepted that the new statement and sur place evidence went beyond the issues to be reheard and made no application to rely on them. Ms McKenzie objected to the admission of the remaining new evidence (an updated expert report and further background evidence) on the basis that it took the appellant’s case no further; however, she accepted that she could deal with the evidence in submissions. Consequently, I granted permission for the appellant to rely the updated expert report and further background evidence (pages 40 onwards of the supplementary bundle) save to the extent that it dealt with subsequent sur place activity.
6. It was agreed that, given the ambit of the issues to be reheard and that of the preserved facts, it was unnecessary for the appellant to give oral evidence. The representatives made oral submissions which I refer to below only to the extent necessary to understand my decision but which I took into account in their entirety.
First-tier Tribunal Findings Not in Issue
7. The following findings of the First-tier Tribunal were either unchallenged or are preserved. Regarding his online activities, the First-tier Tribunal found:
‘30. The Appellant says that he runs a Facebook page with more than 29,000 followers on which he regularly posts anti-government comments/articles (he also has a Facebook profile but does not seek to rely on that). Until recently the page was in the name Syed Tareq - but he says that he has now included his surname ‘Rashid’. He also says that as a result of his comments/articles he has received threats on his Facebook page from Awami League supporters.
31. There is clear evidence to support what the Appellant says about his Facebook activity. Screenshots of his Facebook page are included in the main bundle commencing at page 1468, in the 72 page supplementary bundle commencing at page 15 and in the 29 page supplementary bundle commencing at page 3. In summary he has posted numerous comments/articles critical of the Bangladeshi government and the Prime Minister and individuals have responded with comments of their own in opposition to what the Appellant has said. That is the nature of online activity.’
Regarding his offline activities, it found:
36. The Appellant says that his attendance at various demonstrations has been reported in newspapers which identify him as having a significant role with the UK BNP and as an opposition politician generally. For example, he refers to articles at pages B198 and 281 of the Respondent’s bundle. Page 281 of the Respondent’s bundle (1918/2234) is an online article from dailynayadiganta.com dated April 2009 titled “Need to focus on character traits in teacher recruitment: speakers in London” and appears to relate to a protest regarding the murder of a student. The translation does not make sense in places and does not refer to the Appellant (although it does mention a Syed Barek Rashid which is possibly the Appellant with an incorrectly spelt middle name). It is an event which took place nearly 15 years ago – and no explanation has been offered as to why it is of significance in this appeal. Page B198 (1622/2234) includes a photograph but the text has not been translated and it is not a newspaper article (and if it is a continuation of the article which begins on page B197 it is from an organisation called sangramtv.com, although no information has been provided about sangramtv.com as to whether it is a leading Bangladeshi broadcaster or a niche broadcaster of programs unlikely generally to come to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities).
37. Whilst I accept that the Appellant has attended numerous demonstrations (there is clear photographic evidence of that) and that he has addressed the crowd at some of them, his overall profile has not been high - in broad terms he has merely been a member of the crowd doing much the same as other demonstrators such as holding banners and chanting, and just one of many dozens of speakers when the megaphone is passed around. For example, the translated article on page 13/29 – which relates to a demonstration on 4 January 2024 - has a very long list of speakers in which the Appellant’s name does not feature until the 14th line. Furthermore, this does not appear to be a newspaper article - it is a page from a website in the name of Jonotar Awaz, and the Appellant has offered no explanation as to how and why this website is likely to have come to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities. Another example appears on page 16/29 relating to a different demonstration with a similarly lengthy list of individuals – in this case attendees rather than speakers and in which the Appellant’s name features towards the end. This is also an article on Jonotar Awaz’s website. I note that on both lists the Appellant’s name is given but there is no reference to him being a vice-president of the Secchashebok Dal UK, indeed there is no suggestion that he is a member of any political party at all.
38. The manner in which some of the material relied on by the Appellant includes such lengthy lists of attendees/speakers at demonstrations troubles me – it is not what would be regarded as a normal journalistic technique. Instead, one of the main objectives appears to be to identify individuals who have attended a demonstration/protest, rather than to report the event in question as a newsworthy item and as such I do not find this material to be genuine media reports.
39. In summary, I do not find that the Appellant has been identified as a demonstrator against the Bangladeshi government or Prime Minister in any media articles which are likely to have come to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities.
40. As to whether the Appellant’s role as a vice-president of the Secchashebok Dal UK is likely to have brought him to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities, the issue is whether it is a sufficiently prominent role. He relies on evidence from Mr Sahin Ahmed, the President of the same organization. Mr Ahmed says that he met the Appellant in February 2018 and they became known to each other attending many BNP programs and demonstrations together. He has provided a letter dated 11 August 2021 confirming the position which the Appellant holds - but he has given little other information about what the Appellant actually does for the organization. Much of his witness statement relates to broader political matters and risks faced by opponents of the Bangladeshi government. He refers to the Appellant’s Facebook activity – but that is in his own name rather than in the name of the organization. The Appellant also relies on evidence from Mrs Tahmina Hassan, the Women Affairs Secretary of what she describes as the East London BNP. Whether that is the same organization as the organization in which the Appellant holds his role is unclear. She says that she met the Appellant in April 2018 at a demonstration and says that he is actively involved in BNP politics. However, she does not refer to him as being a Vice-President of the Secchasebok Dal UK, and her evidence is much the same as Mr Ahmed’s in that she gives little information about what he actually does other than run a Facebook page and goes on to comment extensively about broader political matters and risks faced by opponents of the Bangladeshi government.
41. On the face of it one might think that someone who is the vice-president of the UK BNP is likely to have come to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities because it sounds like an important role. The BNP is the main opposition party and the vice-president might be regarded as second in charge of the ‘face’ of that political party in the UK. However, on closer scrutiny that is not the situation at all. Firstly, although the UK structure of political opposition to the Bangladeshi government is unclear the Appellant does not appear to be vice-president of the UK BNP itself – he is described as vice-president of the Secchashebok Dal UK, which he says in his own evidence is the volunteer organization of the BNP, whatever that means. Whether this is different from the ‘East London BNP’ – in which Mrs Hassan holds her role – is unclear. It is for the Appellant to prove his case – albeit to the lower standard – and the evidence he has presented does not demonstrate that the organisation in which he holds his position is a large and important one politically - it is just as likely to be a relatively small and low-profile local branch of the UK BNP. Secondly, the Appellant is one of 14 vice-presidents of the same organization – which dramatically reduces the apparent importance of the position he holds. Why 14 vice-presidents are considered necessary has not been explained. Thirdly, although the Appellant says that he has voting rights at meetings and that a vice-president may be required to undertake the work of the President in his absence, neither of those things has ever actually happened.
42. I find therefore that the Appellant’s role as vice-president of the Secchashebok Dal UK is a minor one of no real significance and is not one which is likely to have brought him to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities. It may sounds important but it is not.’
As for the criminal case that the appellant faced in Bangladesh, the First-tier Tribunal found:
‘44. I accept the evidence of the expert Mr Mahbub that he has personally attended the court building and has verified that there is a genuine case lodged against the Appellant (and 4 other individuals). A translation of the relevant document is at pages 1927 and 1928 of the main bundle. It is not clear when the case was lodged but it is likely to have been shortly before the date of the translation being 30 July 2021. The precise nature of the case is unclear – it refers to the Appellant’s Facebook page which is said to have spread “various kinds of anti-national propaganda” but goes on to claim that the Appellant and his co-defendant’s visited the home of the complainant on 12 June 2021 demanding a sum or money or he would be killed. That is plainly nonsense because the Appellant was in the UK not Bangladesh.’
8. The Tribunal’s finding at [25] that ‘all of the political activities in which the Appellant has engaged has been nothing more than a cynical and opportunistic attempt to gain refugee status in the UK’ was also preserved.
9. I should note at this point that neither the First-tier Tribunal nor I were asked to depart from earlier judicial findings rejecting the appellant’s claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution because of any politically activity in Bangladesh (per the decisions and reasons promulgated on 27 February 2018 and, following further submissions, on 3 March 2020). Instead, the alleged risk in this case arises solely from the appellant’s sur place activities.
The Issues
10. The questions for me to resolve are:
a. whether the appellant will be perceived as a genuine political activist,
i. either because his online activities have already come to the adverse attention of the Bangladesh authorities or
ii. will be discovered by them on his return;
b. if so, whether the current situation in Bangladesh means that he would be at consequential risk of persecution or serious harm;
c. further or alternatively, whether he would be at risk of persecution or serious harm arising from the criminal case against him.
11. For each of these issues, the burden falls on the appellant to prove his case to the lower standard (a real likelihood).
Consideration
12. Given that the criminal case against the appellant is said to be connected to his sur place online activities, it is convenient to deal with issues a)i) and c) together.
13. Mr Iqbal did not submit that the nature of the regime in Bangladesh at the material time was such that it was unnecessary to adduce positive evidence of effective internet surveillance of opposition political activists in the United Kingdom to infer a real risk that the appellant’s online activities were known to the authorities (as appears to be suggested in the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, relying on YB (Eritrea) [2008] EWCA Civ 360). This is perhaps understandable, given the preserved findings that the appellant’s participation in demonstrations and role as vice-president of the Secchashebok Dal UK were not likely to have brought him to the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities. Instead, Mr Iqbal submitted that there was such evidence of effective internet surveillance, relying in particular on the various reports of Mr Mahbub, and the Respondent’s CPIN.
14. In section 13 of his report of 29 July 2021 (‘Crackdown on Social Media’), Mr Mahbub details the Bangladesh authorities’ approach to anti-government views expressed online. These are assertions of fact, most (if not all) gleaned from other publications for which references are given. It was not suggested by Ms McKenzie that this section of his report was inaccurate, but rather that it was out of date.
15. In essence, the cited sources report that the Bangladesh has enacted the Digital Security Act 2018 (DSA) which, amongst other things, creates imprisonable offences for using digital media to intimidate individuals or cause damage to the state. Consequently, the government announced on 9 October 2018 the formation of a 9-member monitoring cell to ‘detect rumours’ on social media, including Facebook. The government ordered security agencies, including the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) to intensify surveillance of online expression. It is also said that the ruling party has established an “anti-cybercrime” cell which operates as the Bangladesh Computer Security Incident Response Team (BD-CSIRT), and is headed by three cybercrime specialists who have been working since its inception against contents on various websites that spreads “national, social, political and religious hatred”, although Mr Mahbub does not make clear if this is the same or different to the 9-member monitoring cell mentioned above. According to the cited sources, the RAB detained 5 social media users on 19 January 2019 on charges under the DSA, and another cited source reports a journalist being arrested.
16. In section 17 of that report, dealing with his assessment of the risk facing the appellant from his online activities, Mr Mahbub says:
17.14 Mr Rashid’s political activism on social media render him particularly vulnerable. Mr Rashid’s extensive display of political activism on social media where he actively and strongly criticizes the AL administration is likely to draw the attention of, and expose him to a risk of persecution by, the ruling party, AL and the state apparatus, such as the police and RAB. He is likely to attract the attention and hate of supporters of AL as well.
17.22 Mr Rashid’s alleged involvement with the activities of ICS, BNP and his social media influence and presence gives rise to a credible concern for his safety as his posts criticising the AL are publicly shared and are likely to aggravate the ruling party and/or their followers. His activities would likely draw the attention of government agencies of Bangladesh and AL and state agents will be interested to monitor his online and Facebook activities. It is likely that due to the type and volume of content shared by him on Facebook, when inspected by a Bangladeshi court in trial, it would not be difficult to establish a case against him. Furthermore, the content would be found by law enforcement agencies to be attracting the penal provisions of the Information Communication Technology Act, 2006 and the Digital Security Act, 2018 for having caused criminal defamation and “causing instability and deterioration of law and order”. He could potentially face the highest criminal penalties, i.e., life imprisonment. Furthermore, besides imprisonment he can also be fined Tk10 million (approx. GBP 95000). If he is so arrested, it is possible that he may be tortured in custody where he may be indefinitely held.
17.24 Since Mr Rashid has made public political posts on social media, and attended public demonstrations against AL in the UK, it is highly likely that the specialized cyber cell of RAB and Police of Bangladesh Government has already noticed his online activities and identified him through online sources. It is also possible that alongside the case already filed against him, several other unsubstantiated criminal cases may be filed against him for breach of the Digital Security Act, 2018 as harassment techniques commonly used by the police.
17. In his supplementary report dated 19 July 2023, Mr Mahbub states at paragraph 2.16:
‘Eighty-three percent of the 225 Digital Security Act cases lodged between January and November this year were filed over social media posts and individuals' online expressions. Individuals affiliated with the ruling party filed 40 percent of these cases, and 40 percent of the cases were filed against people for allegedly criticising the prime minister, ministers, members of parliament, and 166 people were arrested immediately.’
However, he does not say how many of these cases or arrests resulted in detention for any significant (meaning more than a trivial) period, let alone conviction. Moreover, despite claiming these statistics to relate to 2023, the source quoted was actually published in December 2021.
18. In the same supplementary report, Mr Mahbub comments on the respondent’s position that the appellant’s Facebook page is not widely followed (19,750 followers) given the population of Bangladesh (165,158,616) by saying that a large amount of the population live below the poverty line. Nevertheless, according to the Human Rights Watch report dated 19 October 2018 cited by Mr Mahbub in his original report, Bangladesh had at that time 28 million Facebook users. Of course, it is not suggested (nor is it inherently likely) that all of the appellant’s followers reside in Bangladesh.
19. In his latest report, dated 11 September 2025, Mr Mahbub states that a recent speech from General Waker-Uz-Zaman, Chief of the Army, shows that the surveillance systems previously reported remain active and important. He also reports that, whilst the Cyber Security Act 2023 (CSA) had been repealed by the enactment of the Cyber Security ordinance 2025, a significant number of cases brought filed under the CSA continued to exist by virtue of saving provisions, raising concerns about the continuing harassment of BNP and opposition activists. Sadly, no transcript of that speech is provided by Mr Mahbub or was otherwise drawn to my attention. Moreover, Mr Mahbub does not appear to refer in earlier reports to the CSA (either as an existing or prospective statute) nor does he explain the extent to which cases brought under the DSA continued under the CSA.
20. Mr Mahbub describes his expertise as follows
1. I am an independent expert on the Bangladeshi law and justice system (EIN Profile - https://www.ein.org.uk/experts/mahbub). I am a Bangladeshi national and a practising lawyer, with rights of audience in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, where I regularly appear as an advocate. Apart from my commercial practice, I have represented clients in numerous cases of a political nature from root level activists to senior opposition leaders. In the run up to the elections of 2018, I was the lead counsel in a judicial review application challenging the appointment of government officials as returning officers. Post-election, I was a counsel in another judicial review application challenging the legality of the oath-taking of Members of Parliament.
21. As noted by the First-tier Tribunal, the respondent accepted in her decision that Mr Mahbub was an expert ‘in his field’. However, even on his account, Mr Mahbub’s expertise does not security, intelligence and surveillance matters. Moreover, as is clear from above, I consider that his methodology leaves much to be desired. Consequently, whilst I accept that any quoted information has accurately report, I am not persuaded that Mr Mahbub has the expertise necessary to give a reliable opinion on the Bangladesh authorities ability to have detected, let alone surveil the appellant’s online activities in the United Kingdom. In any event, he has not cited any persuasive evidence of internet surveillance outside Bangladesh.
22. In addition, Mr Iqbal relied on material in the following CPINs: ‘Bangladesh: Journalists, publishers and internet bloggers’, published in July 2017; ‘Bangladesh: Political parties and ‘, published in September 2020; ‘Bangladesh: Journalists, the press and social media’, published in January 2021, which he submitted remained relevant, there being no superseding material in the most up-to-date CPIN, ‘Bangladesh: Political situation’ (published in December 2024 and reproduced in the appellant’s supplementary bundle). He also relied on selected extracts of a Home Office Fact-fining Mission to Bangladesh conducted in May 2017.
23. These add little to what Mr Mahbub reports. It is evident that some internet surveillance takes place; however, the reports, even if reliable, do not establish a real risk that a particular individual’s internet activity overseas is monitored, and certainly not if the individual is located overseas. Evidence that the Bangladesh Army has purchased mobile phone signal intercept equipment does not take the issue of internet surveillance (especially outside Bangladesh) materially further.
24. Mr Iqbal additionally relied on a notice (undated) said to have been promulgated by or on behalf of the RAB, which states (my emphasis):
‘It is informed to all concerned internet users that in the social media (Facebook, Twitter etc) or among the blog users an anti-government group in the social media and blogs are carrying out propaganda against the government and the recent political development which the law enforcement agencies have come to know.
Therefore in view of the possible affray and disorder on the initiative of Bangladesh Police and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) Cyber Crime Monitor Committee (Cyber Crime Monitor Committee) has been formed. Therefore the personal accounts of all suspected people are under strict surveillance.
If any information or photograph which is anti government, anti state or political propaganda found in anyone's account he would be brought under legal process.’
25. The highlighted wording strongly suggests that it is only those already suspected by the authorities of anti-government activities whose social media accounts will be under surveillance.
26. In any event, it is illustrative to see what the complaint relied upon as a connected (and alternative) source of risk actually says. The same can be found at p1972 of the 2525 page pdf of the consolidated error of law bundle. In it, under case number 143/2021, the complainant, Md Mohiuddin Akondo, identifies five defendants: an individual whose name is the same as the appellant’s two forenames, Shobjul Uddin, Khallur Rahman, Mosammat Majeda Ahmed Koli and Raji Ahmed. In each case, the defendant’s father and address are given as ‘unknown’. It appears that the appellant is the only one whose surname is not given. The text of the complaint in its entirety is (my emphasis):
‘Here is a polite statement on behalf of the complainant
1. The plaintiff in this case is a respectable, simple seeker of truth and a true patriot, a permanent citizen of Bangladesh. The petitioner has completed LLB graduation from Derby University in England and is a trainee lawyer. The petitioner is a former Organizing Secretary of Bangladesh Awami League and its President. The organization's sponsored campaign is organized.
The above accused will go public and the unknown activists will also have public relations with them. The petitioner has been harassing the left.
2. No 1 Defendant of this case Syed Tareq Father unknown, address unknown As an online activist, he has been introducing himself in all quarters and as the admin of a Facebook online page called Chittagong Dhaner Shish top supporter group, he has been spreading insulting information against the other accused. No. 4 accused Moshammet Majeda Ahmed Koli, father unknown, address unknown. Jessore Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal Sylhet Moglabazar Union Juba Dal and Bangladesh Jatiyawadi Dal BNP Dakshin Surma Shakha respectively run a Facebook page. Accused No. 2 Sabuj Uddin used his Facebook page to spread various kinds of anti-national propaganda.
3. The plaintiff Shaheed, who filed the petition here, in the wake of the bitterness of the activities of the appropriate respondent group, On 12/06/2021 they came to defendants house which is in Red crescent city Mirpur 1, Thana Sha Alli, District Dhaka and threatened that If you don't give us (5,00,000) five lakh Taka, you know, I will kill you.
4. In such a situation, the plaintiff has become intimidated by the violent and arbitrary terrorist activities of the defendant masses. Although the petitioner tried to lodge a complaint with the nearest police station but the police station refused to take up the case, the petitioner did not find any other way without bringing the case to the wise court. The accused has committed a cognizable offense under Section 383/506/34 of the Penal Code by threatening to kill the petitioner.
Due to the above reasons and circumstances, the wise court took cognizance of the allegation to make the applicant plaintiff and it is the sole discretion of the wise court to punish the accused under Section 383/506/34 of the Arrest Warrant Penal Code against the accused.’
27. Whilst the complaint is, on the face of it, politically motivated, it is apparent from the highlighted passage that the authorities refused to proceed with it themselves. This undermines any suggestion that the complaint is evidence that the authorities have themselves seen the appellant’s social media activity (and certainly suggests that there is no real risk in any event of an intention to prosecute him for that activity).
28. Turning to the risk to the appellant from the complaint itself, a letter from the appellant’s lawyer in Bangladesh, Md Reazur Rahman, dated 9 September 2025 confirms that the case ‘is still pending and in the investigation phase.’ The letter says that Mr Rahman will let the appellant know of any updates, but does not state that any attempts have been made to have the investigation closed on the basis that the appellant was (provably) outside of Bangladesh at the time of the alleged crime. In any event, the appellant is identified in the complaint merely by his forenames. His surname is not specified and his father and address are stated as ‘unknown’. No evidence has been led that the appellant’s name is particularly uncommon in Bangladesh. It is not reasonably likely that the appellant will be identified on return as the subject of this complaint. I should add that the complaint is not evidence of an intention to prosecute him for online activities, rather to the contrary. Therefore, the fact that recent changes to cyber crime laws has preserved outstanding prosecutions, is irrelevant to this case.
29. In summary, I do not accept that the evidence establishes even an reasonable likelihood that the Bangladesh authorities have the assets and ability to conduct widespread online surveillance. At its highest, the evidence establishes that surveillance is conducted of those living in Bangladesh who are suspected of anti-Government activities. Even if I had been prepared to accept that there is a non-trivial chance that an individual already suspected of anti-Government activities might have been the subject of surveillance overseas, I would still have not been satisfied that there was any real risk of detection by the Bangladesh authorities of the anti-government online activities an individual not already ‘on the radar’. In short, I do not accept that there is a real risk that the appellant’s online activities have come to the attention of the Bangladesh authorities.
30. Neither do I accept that there is a real risk of persecution on return because of the outstanding complaint relied upon by the appellant.
31. Consequently, issues a)i) and c) are resolved against the appellant.
32. As to whether the appellant’s online activities would be discovered on his return, despite being invited to adduce additional evidence of what the appellant is likely to be asked at the airport on return to Bangladesh, he has not done so. I am not, therefore, persuaded that the appellant would be asked about online activity about which had not already come to the adverse attention of the authorities As it is, the appellant’s activities have been wholly contrived. When finally faced with return, and if truly believing that his online activities would create a real risk of harm, the appellant would delete all trace of those online activities. I am certain of that. In other words, there is no real risk that he would do otherwise. Moreover, he would not volunteer their existence when interviewed. Furthermore, his acting in this way would not be unreasonable or constitute persecution (per XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC)).
33. Issue a)ii) is thus resolved against the appellant.
34. In the circumstances, it is not strictly necessary to consider issue b). However, for the sake of completeness, I find as follows.
35. Mr Mahbub, in his most recent report opines that the Awami League has continuing significant influence in Bangladesh, both within mainstream politics, through overseas influence, and through loyalists remaining in the Army, Police and Judiciary. I am unpersuaded that he has the expertise necessary to give reliable opinion on such matters, being a self-professed expert on the Bangladesh law and justice system, with a particular specialism in secularism and the Bangladesh constitution.
36. In any event, in accordance with my findings above, I find that there is no evidence of any real risk that the appellant is already the subject of an investigation let alone prosecution for anti-government activities online. Even if he were asked on return about his activities in the United Kingdom and fully disclosed the matters he relies on (and which have previously been found to be contrived) they concern protests against a former regime. Despite what Mr Mahbub says about the Awami League’s continued influence (either from abroad, or arising from) there has been no (or certainly no persuasive) evidence that a prosecution would be launched against a returning BNP supporter, even one who had been vocal online. On the contrary, applying MU v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 812, it is clear that such an individual would not be so at risk.
37. Consequently, if necessary I would have resolved issue b) against the appellant.
Notice of Decision

1. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. Upon remaking, the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent is dismissed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 November 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004505

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51158/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

SR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Symes of Counsel, instructed by Westbrook Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 December 2024

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Loughridge (the judge), dated 5 March 2024, dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims.
2. Following refusal of permission by First-tier Tribunal Judge Pickering, the appellant renewed his application on the following grounds: the judge failed to take into account relevant evidence; the judge unfairly failed to clarify the appellant’s evidence; the judge made irrational findings; the judge took into account irrelevant considerations; and, the judge unfairly failed to seek clarification of the appellant’s written submissions.
3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor on 7 October 2024. Whilst he considered some grounds to have more merit than others, he granted permission on all pleaded grounds. However, he noted that the issue of materiality might well arise given the recent significant political upheaval in Bangladesh.
Submissions
4. At the start of the hearing, Mr Wain’s conceded that grounds 1 and 4 constituted material errors of law. Otherwise, the appeal was opposed. He indicated that he would make no submissions on overall materiality arising from the political changes in Bangladesh, having led no evidence about it or its consequences.
5. Mr Symes submitted that it was wrong for the judge to find that the organisation of the UK BNP, and its relationship with the organisation of which the appellant was a member, was unclear without seeking further clarification on the point. Therefore, ground 2 should succeed. As for ground 3, the judge should have taken into account the possibility that the appellant would be asked about the existence of charges against him on return. Mr Symes confirmed that ground 5 was not being pursued as a stand-alone point.
6. Mr Wain submitted that the judge had taken a perfectly permissible approach to the evidence, had accepted that the appellant was involved with the BNP, and yet was entitled to find that it was low-level involvement. Ground 2 should therefore fail. As for ground 3, the judge had clearly suspected that the false charges were another attempt by the appellant to create a false narrative. In any event, whether they would be discovered would depend on what appellant would be asked on return, about which the appellant had provided no evidence.
Conclusions
7. As accepted by Mr Wain, the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note ‘Bangladesh: Political parties and affiliation’ was extensively referenced in the appellant’s written submissions. Whilst ordinarily such an expert Tribunal can be expected to have been aware of and taken into account relevant country guidance cases and CPINs, it is impossible to reconcile the judge having taking into account this CPIN, and in particular the cited passages dealing with state monitoring of online activities, with the judge’s finding at [33] that (our emphasis), ‘there is no evidence that the Bangladeshi authorities have the resources to identify a Facebook page simply on the basis that it includes some anti-government material.’ Whilst it might have been open to the judge to consider the evidence relied upon by the appellant and reject nevertheless his claim to be at real risk of having come to the authorities’ attention, we accept Mr Wain’s concession that the judge instead overlooked material evidence.
8. We even more readily accept Mr Wain’s concession that the judge misapplied in the same paragraph the authority of XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00023. Whilst XX gives guidance of general application regarding the treatment of Facebook evidence, the cited passages specifically concerned Iran. That in itself is a material error of law. In any event, it is insufficient to note, as the judge did, that ‘there is no indication that the position is significantly different for Bangladesh’ without evidence to the point. The judge does not refer to any such evidence, or alternatively reached that conclusion materially on the basis of the error identified in our paragraph above.
9. Consequently, grounds 1 and 4 are made out.
10. Ground 2, however, is not. The judge details in [22], [40] and [41] matters which had not been sufficiently clearly set out: the precise structure of political parties operating in the UK in opposition to the Bangladeshi government; whether Mrs Hassan holds a position in the same organisation as the appellant; and what it means precisely to be a ‘volunteer organisation of the BNP’. That they had not is not challenged in the grounds. Instead, it is submitted that the judge was consequentially obliged to raise that lack of clarity with the appellant.
11. We disagree. The appellant was professionally represented at the hearing. It was for him to prove his case and to present it in a sufficiently comprehensible fashion. No unfairness arose from the judge not giving the appellant a further opportunity to explain his case.
12. In any event, we do not consider the lack of clarity to have been material. The judge accepted at [22] that the appellant was ‘a member and vice-president of the UK Secchashebok Dal UK, which has an association with the BNP political movement in the UK.’ The judge’s finding that that role was a minor one of no real significance’ was made not because of the lack of clarity but because the appellant did not appear to be a vice president of the UK BNP itself, was one of 14 vice presidents of the same organisation, and did not claim ever to have exercised voting rights or undertaken the work of the president in his absence [41]. None of those findings are challenged.
13. Turning to ground 4, Mr Symes accepted at the hearing that, contrary to the grounds, none of the court documentation details the appellant’s address or father’s name. He accepted, therefore, that the appellant could not be identified as the subject of a criminal case brought using only his forenames. He submitted, however, that the appellant could not be expected to lie about the existence of such a case and that there was a real risk he would be asked questions on return which would require him to disclose it.
14. As it is, the appellant has pointed to no evidence before the judge that he would be asked about any extant court action against him let alone one which has no apparent link to him. Consequently, we do not find that the judge erred as alleged in ground 4.
Disposal
15. We have found above that the judge erred in considering the risk that arose on return from sur place activities, and so such matters will need to be considered afresh, with up-to-date evidence on internet surveillance capabilities in Bangladesh, what is likely to happen at the airport upon return and also the current political situation there. We have not found any error in the judge’s conclusions that the appellant’s sur place activities constituted a cynical and opportunistic attempt to gain asylum nor that the activities he has undertaken have been at a low level and not likely in themselves to have brought him to the attention of the Bangladesh authorities. Therefore, we preserve those findings.
16. We considered whether to preserve the finding that authorities would be unable to connect the appellant to the criminal case against him. However, given that it will be necessary to reconsider whether there is a real risk that the appellant’s online activities will have come to the attention of the Bangladesh authorities, and given that until shortly before the hearing below the appellant’s Facebook page was in the name as that in which case has been brought, we consider it appropriate to set that finding aside also.
17. Mr Symes invited us to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal, and Mr Wain had no positive position on the matter. However, we have preserved all of the findings concerning the appellant himself, and all of the findings we have set aside concern Bangladesh itself. In the circumstances, we consider it more appropriate to retain for remaking in the Upper Tribunal.
Notice of Decision

1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The judge’s decision involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
3. The appeal will be reheard in the Upper Tribunal with the judge’s findings preserved on the extent and motives for appellant’s sur place activities and the existence of a criminal case against him in Bangladesh which refers to him only by his forenames.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 January 2025