Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004510

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56540/2022
IA/09350/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

GLORY OKORE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Aslam of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mrs A Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 December 2024

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First tier Tribunal Judge Haria (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 20 April 2023, dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of a human rights claim.

2. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier tribunal. The renewed grounds were settled by the appellant herself. They are narrative in nature and set out some of the detail of the appellant’s human rights claim. In particular, they make assertions regarding the attitude of the respective tribes of the appellant and her husband to the fact that theirs is an inter tribal marriage and also a childless one, and also regarding the economic situation in Nigeria. The grounds then assert that the Judge erred in failing to take into account all of those matters when reaching her decision.

3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran. She considered that it was arguable that the Judge had failed to consider all the reasons presented by the appellant for there being very significant obstacles to her reintegration into Nigeria (which I shall refer to as ground 1). In particular, it was arguable that the Judge had failed to address adequately the couple’s evidence that the husband’s family were pressurising him to practise polygamy because the appellant had not conceived (ground 2), and also that the Judge had failed to consider the couple’s ongoing attempts to conceive when deciding whether it was proportionate to expect the appellant to return to Nigeria to make an entry clearance application to rejoin her husband in this country (ground 3).

Submissions

4. The appellant was represented at this hearing by Mr Aslam. He submitted that the Judge had failed adequately to consider adequately the evidence of pressure on the appellant’s husband to practice polygamy, albeit that he did acknowledge the Judge’s express reference to the witness statements and to ‘tribal pressures’. He further submitted that the Judge did not address at all the effect on conception of the appellant’s temporary return, given the advice that the couple should practice targeted intercourse. These factors should have considered as part of the Judge’s assessment of undue harshness.

5. In reply, Mrs Nolan submitted that the Judge had considered all matters relied on. It was not clear in any event if the effect on conception of temporary separation was ever argued before The Judge had made specific refence to tribal pressures and found that they could live away from their families or, in any event, that they would not bow to pressures. In short, the Judge had considered all of the factors relied on by the appellant.

6. Mr Aslam responded that Judge Loughran had granted permission on the temporary separation point. The Judge had considered the availability of IVF in Nigeria but not the effect of separation on targeted intercourse. The Judge had inadequately considered the consequences of tribal pressures.

Consideration

7. The Judge made the following findings about the appellant’s ability to find work [26] and otherwise to be supported in Nigeria [27]:

‘26. The appellant does not claim to have any physical or mental issues which would prevent her from obtaining employment. When pressed at the hearing she accepted she could practice as a nurse in Nigeria although she stated that she had not made enquires about her employment prospects in Nigeria. I find that the appellant with her training as a nurse in Nigeria and the additional OCR qualification as well as work experience from the UK has the skills and qualifications to enable her to find gainful employment in Nigeria on her return.

27. On the appellant’s own evidence her parents live in Ututu, Nigeria and she has 3 brothers and 2 sisters who also live in Nigeria. Although the appellant claims that she would not be welcome at her family home as a married woman due to the Ibo tribe traditions, in the absence of any objective or other evidence in support, I do not accept this would be the case. I find that the appellant could upon return to Nigeria seek assistance and support from her family even on a temporary basis until she is able to establish herself. There is no evidence other than a letter from her brother which I address below from her family which suggests they would be unable or unwilling to assisted her. The letter from the appellant’s brother is very supportive of her and although he states that “ …our tradition does not allow a married woman to return home no matter what …” he does not state they will not provide her with other support such as financial and emotional support. If I am wrong about this, in the alternative, I find on the evidence of Mr Badagry, that although he is not be willing to accompany the appellant to Nigeria, he is willing to continue to support her on her return to Nigeria as he has supported her in the UK. The appellant could with the benefit of the support from Mr Badagry and any support from her family in Nigeria would be able to find accommodation and live in Nigeria.

8. At [29]-[32], the Judge considers the couple’s attempt to conceive:

29. The appellant has produced medical letters in support of her claim that she and her husband have been trying to conceive a child. I accept on the evidence that the appellant having been referred by her GP, underwent an open myomectomy at Queens Hospital on 16 November 2018. There is no indication that any further treatment is required in relation to this procedure.

30. The appellant has produced a copy of an appointment letter from the Centre for Reproductive Medicine St Bartholomew’s NHS Hospital. On the basis of this evidence, I find the appellant and her husband had an appointment with this hospital on 30 April 2019 to consider fertility treatment. However, I note as there are no further letters from this hospital and the appellant made no mention of pursuing treatment with this hospital.

31. I accept, the appellant and her husband have been seen by Miss Tozer a Consultant Gynaecologist and Specialist in Fertility on a few occasions. In her letter of 23 December 2020, Miss Tozer states that it may be that the appellant will need to undertake the process of IVF in order to conceive but this is a costly process so in the first place they are trying something simpler. There is a further letter from Miss Tozer dated 25 February 2021 stating that she performed a pelvic scan on the appellant and gave her an injection to ensure she ovulates. In her evidence, the appellant stated that she last saw Miss Tozer in November 2022, this was corroborated by her husband in his evidence and also by a letter from Miss Tozer dated 8 November 2022 which refers to seeing the appellant on 7 November and suggests that the appellant has her GP checks her AMH level to establish her ovarian reserve in order to consider what treatment options might be suitable. The appellant stated and I accept that she has not had any further consultations with Miss Tozer as she stated that it is costly and since they are reliant on her husband’s income they need to save up for the next appointment.

32. On the evidence, I accept the appellant has attended some consultations and had some treatment with a view to conceiving naturally and having IVF in the future if other options fail. However none of the evidence shows that the appellant and her husband have started undertaking any IVF treatment as yet or that they have a confirmed egg donor. The onus is on the appellant and she has not demonstrated that the treatment is not available or not accessible in Nigeria. The appellant’s husband stated that although they have not looked into the treatment options in Nigeria, he accepted the treatment is available in Nigeria. Since the appellant and her husband are paying privately for treatment in the UK, no doubt if they chose to they can pay for equivalent treatment in Nigeria. There is no evidence before me that the appellant would not be able to access medical treatment in Nigeria should she require it. On the evidence, I conclude that any further medical treatment the appellant may require can be obtained in Nigeria.

9. As for the pressure claimed by the couple to come from their families, the Judge found at [33]-[34]:

33. I have considered the appellant’s and Mr Badagry’s claims and that as to the pressures on them due to the expectations of their respective tribes. Firstly, I note that both the appellant and Mr Badagry are Christian and do not themselves agree with or follow the traditions of their tribes. I also note that Nigeria is a large country and the appellant and Mr Badagry (if he chose to return with her) could live away from their tribes amongst other Christians. The appellant at the hearing accepted this is a possibly.

34. I acknowledge correspondence from of Mr Badagry’s uncle in Nigeria who states he is the head of the Badagry family and Mr Badagry’s responses as well as correspondence between the appellant and her brother have been provided in support of the claim. I give little weight to this correspondence as Mr Badagry’s uncle and the appellant’s brother did not attend the hearing and could not therefore be cross examined. The correspondence is not accompanied by any documentary evidence to identify Mr Badagry’s uncle or the appellant’s brother. There is no evidence to show that Mr Badagry is the head of the family. There is no evidence to show that the appellant’s brother is authorised to speak on behalf of the appellant’s parents and other siblings. Other than the correspondence and the claims in the witness statement there is no objective or other evidence in support of the claimed tradition that a son of the Badagry lineage is expected to produce children to continue the family lineage or that a married woman from the Ibo tribe cannot return to her maternal home or family. In any event Mr Badagry and the appellant on their own evidence confirms they are Christians and do not believe in polygamy and that will not bow to the demands of their family in Nigeria.

10. The appellant argued that the Judge failed to take into account these matters when deciding whether she faced very significant obstacles to reintegration into Nigeria. Having carefully analysed these key aspects of the appellant’s case, it would be surprising indeed if the judge did not keep them in mind. Merely failing to rehearse them in detail under the hearing ‘Immigration Rules’ is not enough to evidence an error of law. There must be some proper basis for concluding that the Judge left them out of the equation. As it is, the Judge states the following in reaching her conclusion on the point at [46] (my emphasis):

‘Considering all the factors above, I do not find that there would be very significant obstacles preventing the integration of the appellant into the country of her origin and where both she and her husband have lived and continue to have ties.’

11. It is not argued, nor is it arguable, that the conclusion was perverse. There is therefore no proper basis to doubt that the Judge did in fact take into account all of the findings set out earlier in the judgment, and in particular the factors relied upon.

12. In particular, it cannot be said that the Judge failed to take into account the couple’s claim that the husband’s family would pressurise him into polygamy. She rejected the claim but found that, even if true, they would resist the pressure. Again, these findings are not challenged per se and were in any event plainly open to the Judge.

13. Consequently, grounds 1 and 2 fail.

14. As for ground 3, the Judge’s conclusions on Article 8 outside the rules are set out at [50]-[63]. Having considered in detail at [29]-[32] the couple’s attempts to conceive, the Judge states the following at [52]-[53] (my emphasis):

‘52. I take into account my findings of fact above and in considering the public interest I have regard to the considerations listed in section 117B NIAA 2002. On the side of the balance sheet in favour of the decision still being proportionate as regards her Article 8 family life with her husband, is immigration control which is in the public interest and the appellant does not meet the Immigration Rules. The appellant and her husband have both lived in Nigeria so they are familiar with life in Nigeria and could live there. Alternatively, the appellant can return to Nigeria and make an entry clearance application under Appendix FM, even if her husband remains in the UK and that means a period apart. She can find out before she leaves what documents she will need to provide with that application and take them with her.

53. The appellant has not discharged the burden of proof to show that temporary separation to enable her to make an application for entry clearance will be a disproportionate interference with her rights.’

15. Again, it is not argued nor is it arguable that it was perverse or irrational for the Judge to conclude that the couple could spend a period apart notwithstanding their desire for a child. There are no proper grounds therefore to find that, when reaching that conclusion, the judge did not take account of all her earlier findings, including her consideration of the couple’s attempts to conceive.

16. The judge further records at [61] (in a section headed ‘Conclusion Article 8’):

61. Weighing up the evidence I conclude that the decision is proportionate and the factors raised by the appellant do not outweigh the public interest of immigration control.

17. I am unable to accept that the Judge nevertheless left out of account, when finding that it would be proportionate for the appellant to return to Nigeria to make an entry clearance application, the obvious consequence that the couple could not have sexual intercourse during her period in Nigeria if her husband did not go with her. In the latter regard, it was the Judge’s unchallenged finding at [55] that whether or not to go with the appellant was the husband’s choice and that it was not unduly harsh for the appellant’s husband to have choose between life in the United Kingdom and his relationship with the appellant. These were in any event conclusions reasonably open to the Judge

18. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the Judge did not err as alleged in ground 3.

19. Consequently, I dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, and so stands undisturbed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 April 2025