Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2024-004538
UI-2024-004542
UI-2024-004543

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/58317/2022
LH/04149/2023
HU/58138/2022
LH/04150/2023
HU/58140/2022
LH/04151/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

ANNA IFTIKHAR
IZZA IFTIKHAR
MUHAMMAD MURTAZA AHMED
Appellants in the First-tier Tribunal
And

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent in the First-tier Tribunal

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr J. Martin, Counsel instructed by Connaught Law Limited
For the Respondent: Mrs A. Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 February 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. In a decision promulgated on 10 January 2025, an error of law was found in the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Anthony dated 12 January 2024 in which she allowed the appellants’ appeal against the decision to refuse their applications for entry clearance. A copy of that decision is annexed below and the contents of which will not be repeated. This is the re-making of the appellant’s appeal.

Preserved findings

2. The following findings from [7] to [18] of Judge Anthony’s decision were preserved:

a. The appellants failed to meet A39 of the Immigration Rules, a mandatory requirement to present a valid TB test certificate at the time of the application.
b. Responsibility for the appellants’ care has always been shared between the sponsor and the appellants’ mother.
c. The appellants have never lived apart from their mother and this indicates that the sponsor did not have sole responsibility at any stage.
d. The sponsor has been financially responsible for the appellants. The regular and important decisions regarding the children were taken by their mother.
e. Caring for the appellants took a toll on their mother but she did not abdicate her responsibilities. The circumstances became a catalyst for change, namely that she married the sponsor and came to the UK as his spouse. The sponsor did not have sole responsibility, this is a two-parent case where they share responsibility for the appellants’ care.
f. The appellants have been well cared for throughout their lives. There have been stable arrangements for the appellants’ physical care since the sponsor left Pakistan 17 years ago.
g. Taking into account the appellants’ age, health, education, social and economic situation, there is nothing to indicate a risk of neglect. There are no serious and compelling family or other considerations which make the appellants’ exclusion undesirable.

The hearing and the evidence

3. The only issue for the us to determine is whether there are exceptional circumstances in which the respondent’s refusal gives rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences which amount to a disproportionate interference with the appellants’ Article 8 rights.

4. The appellants filed and served further evidence in advance of the hearing. This consisted of an updated witness statement from the sponsor dated 6 January 2025, a statement from the appellants’ mother dated 6 January 2025, a letter from Dr Waheed Iqbal dated 8 October 2024 and three letters from the appellants’ respective schools and college variously dated November 2024.

5. The appellants are 19, 18 and 12 years of age at the date of the hearing.

6. We heard oral evidence from the sponsor with the assistance of an Urdu interpreter. The appellants’ mother did not attend the hearing and we were informed that she was in Pakistan. The sponsor explained that he had been in a relationship with his wife, the appellants’ mother, since 2004 and he came to the UK and started living here in 2006 when the first and second appellants would have been around 1 years old and a few months old respectively. His wife was granted entry clearance and arrived in the UK in January 2024, but she had returned to Pakistan 3 times since then and stayed for about 3 months on each occasion. He agreed with the calculation put to him by Mrs Nolan that since coming to the UK in January 2024 his wife had spent a total of nine months in Pakistan. There was no evidence of her travel in the material before the Tribunal because the sponsor was never asked to provide it.

7. When the appellants’ mother was not in Pakistan their maternal grandparents come to stay and take care of them. The sponsor stated that the appellants live in a rented property and have lived there for 7 years but the visa application forms were incorrect to describe the property as owned by their grandparents.

8. The sponsor has parents, two brothers and a sister that live in the village in Pakistan. His wife has her parents, two sisters and a brother who also remain in Pakistan.

9. The sponsor was asked how the appellants’ education was disrupted as he stated in his witness statement, and he explained that when he and his wife were not present there was a big problem about taking and picking the children up from school. The grandparents are currently taking them, but they are quite elderly. It was pointed out that the letters from their schools do not mention that the appellants are struggling, and the sponsor was asked why that was. His response was that if the parents are not present in the children’s life, then there are going to be problems around taking them to school and eating.

10. The sponsor was unable to say how often the appellants had been to see Dr Iqbal. He was unable to say why Dr Iqbal’s letter does not mention the grandparents looking after the children, but it was correct that because they are elderly, neighbours and the wider community are asked for support.

11. When asked how Dr Iqbal was able to say that the sponsor’s wife has had to travel to support the sponsor for “certain personal reasons”, the sponsor replied that he was their family doctor and the sponsor has high cholesterol and high blood pressure.

12. The sponsor was asked that since he has maintained a relationship with his children through visits and modern means of communication since they were born, why could that not continue now? He explained that he would like to spend some time with them since they are getting older, and they need each other in their lives. Although nothing bad has happened in Pakistan the sponsor feels safer in the UK and wants his children to be with him.

13. The eldest appellant, Anna, attends Millenium Universal College studying the accountancy course ACCA. The sponsor explained that the college is in Islamabad and is about 150 miles away from home and that she lives in an all-female hostel in Islamabad during term time and returns home for vacations. The other two appellants attend the Roots Millennium School which is 3-4 miles from the family home.

14. The sponsor was asked why he described the appellants as currently “living independently” in his witness statement (para 9) if in fact the grandparents come to stay when their mother is in the UK and his response was that he was referring to the property. He further explained that although his two oldest children were adults now, as females it is not appropriate for them to go out alone.

15. Mrs Nolan on behalf of the Entry Clearance Officer submitted that Article 8 does not confer a right to choose where to enjoy family life. There are no exceptional circumstances. The appellants had always lived in Pakistan without the sponsor and they were able to maintain the relationship. The appellants’ mother was only granted entry clearance towards the end of 2023 and came to the UK in January 2024, which was her choice and is not a factor that goes to whether there are unjustifiably harsh consequences. Even then, the appellants’ mother has spent 9 out of the last 12 months in Pakistan with them.

16. There is an inconsistency in the evidence about whether the property in Pakistan is owned by the grandparents or rented, but on either view the appellants are living in stable accommodation. The grandparents are there to support the appellants and although it is said they are elderly, there is no medical evidence about their health, two of the appellants are adults and the youngest is 12 years old so it is not the case that they are young children that require care. All the children are in education and despite the sponsor’s suggestion in the witness statement about the negative impact on their education this is not supported by the letters from the schools. Taking his oral evidence at its highest, the only problem he referred to was taking and picking the children up from school but there is no issue with attendance mentioned in the school letters.

17. Mrs Nolan submitted that little weight should be attributed to the letter from Dr Iqbal because it was unclear how he has the information in the letter, there is no mention of the grandparent’s involvement and the letter does not detail how many times the Dr has seen the appellants since the mother went to the UK or what assessment was carried out.

18. The sponsor and his wife can continue their relationship with the children even if they both choose to remain in the UK. The sponsor can continue supporting the appellants as he has done for nearly 20 years. It is open to them to make an application under Appendix FM for the youngest child who remains under 18 years old to join them in the UK if they wish.

19. In conclusion Mrs Nolan submitted that the appellants do not meet the rules, there are no exceptional circumstances, at the highest there is a wish for the appellants to live in the UK and there is a public interest in maintaining immigration control.

20. For the appellants, Mr Martin, submitted that there was clearly a strong article 8 family life because for all the children they have had an existence where their father has not been a daily presence in their lives and that he had done his best from overseas. The appellants have a strong connection with their mother, she has been part of their lives on a daily basis until last year. The First-tier Tribunal judge accepted that they had been well cared for.

21. In those circumstances the appellants have a close bond with their mother and each other for material things and moral guidance. The fact that she has spent 9 months in Pakistan is indicative of the bond.

22. Whilst it is correct that two of the appellants are now adults, family life does not just stop when they turn 18 years of age, especially when they are in full-time education and they are reliant on their parents and live in the family home. It is not their fault that the appeal process takes time.

23. We were invited to take the following factors into account as exceptional circumstances:

a. The sponsor has lived in the UK for 19 years, it is his home and he has built a life for himself here.
b. There is no issue about the financial circumstances being met.
c. The appellants’ mother would have applied with them but she was struggling with the English language requirement.
d. The failure to submit the TB certificates was a solicitor error.

24. The result is that the two older daughters would not meet the rules. The combination of circumstances has led to the situation that the only place that the family can be together is in the UK. The father can’t be forced to return to Pakistan, he has chosen that his life is here.

25. We were invited to accept Dr Iqbal’s evidence that the children are struggling, it must be hard when both parents are overseas. It is not the appellants’ fault that they find themselves in this situation. All of these factors overbear the respondent’s submissions that the rules are not met, the appellants meet the spirit of the rules.

26. We reserved our decision.

Analysis and decision

27. We cannot ignore the fact that the applications made on behalf of the appellants, which led to this appeal were advanced on what appear to be an entirely false basis. At the date of the applications it was said that the mother no longer wished to care for the children and as such the sponsor had sole responsibility and by the time of the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal the situation had changed, the mother had married the sponsor and had been granted entry clearance as his spouse (FTT decision paragraph 11). In submissions before us, Mr Martin states that, but for the mother’s difficulty with passing the English language test, she and the appellants would have all applied for entry clearance together. Therefore, it would seem that the suggestion that the father had sole responsibility was advanced in order to get around the impending 18th birthday of the eldest appellant and the mother’s inability to pass the English language test before then.

28. The prevalence of giving the appearance of one thing in the written material versus the reality of the situation has continued in the proceedings before us. Whilst we accept that in the main, the sponsor gave honest answers to the questions asked of him at the hearing, his oral evidence highlighted some substantial inconsistencies or important details that were absent from the written evidence. For example, the sponsor adopted his latest witness statement, dated 6 January 2025 which continued to assert that his wife had refused to continue looking after the children which led to the applications being made on the basis of sole responsibility and says nothing about his wife being unable to pass the English language test which was the reason for her separate, later application. The witness statement describes the appellants as currently “living independently” (para 9) and “The appellants, who are young children, currently reside alone in Pakistan…The children are left to manage their daily lives without the constant support and guidance of both parents”(para 27). The statement says nothing about the grandparents coming to stay with the children and their involvement with day-to-day care when their mother is in the UK or that the eldest appellant is in fact living 150 miles away in a hostel in Islamabad during term time. Two of the appellants are now adults and the youngest is 12 years old, they are not young children, and they don’t and never have lived alone.

29. The letter from Dr Iqbal does not mention the grandparents’ involvement and states that in the mother’s absence she has “felt compelled to rely on the neighbors (sic) and school staff for day-to-day support”. Dr Iqbal does not give any indication as to how long he has been the family physician, how many times he has seen the appellants, for how long and what assessment he conducted to form his opinions. There is no distinction in his letter between the three appellants or their circumstances. The academic difficulties which have apparently manifested (or the source of his information in this regard) and the day-to-day support apparently provided by school staff is not corroborated by the letters from the school and college.

30. The letters from the school and college (all dated November 2024) make no mention of the appellants struggling in any way and no mention of problems with attendance or the mother’s request for and reliance on school staff for day-to-day support. On the contrary, the first appellant is described as a student in good standing and the second and third appellants are described as having been attending regularly since 21 August 2024 and 23 June 2023 respectively. In respect of all the appellants, it is noted that their father is currently abroad, but their mother is identified as an active engaged parent, who regularly attends school and college meetings and events and demonstrates a commitment to the appellants’ academic and social development. We find that if the appellants were struggling academically, had difficulty attending school/college and school staff were supporting them in their day-to-day lives in the absence of the mother, the letters would have said so. In common with the First-tier Tribunal judge, we find that the appellants continue to be well looked after in Pakistan and are thriving in their academic pursuits, which is a testament to both their parents.

31. As such, we place little weight on the letter from Dr Iqbal. We are prepared to accept that the appellants may have felt a degree of disruption to their lives when their mother has travelled to the UK. However, any disruption is minimal because we find that their mother was only absent for a total of 3 months (not consecutive) over the last 12 months. They remain living in their home, where they have lived for the last 7 years. They continue attending their school/college without interruption and their day-to-day needs are met by their maternal grandparents who come to stay with them and the continued support from their father in the UK, which has been the case for the last 19 years. The first appellant is in a slightly different situation since she is living independently in Islamabad during term time.

32. We accept that family life is engaged in this case. This was undisputed by the respondent at the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal (FTT decision paragraph 5), was not challenged in the grounds of appeal before us, and we have no reason to depart from that position.

33. We do not accept that there are exceptional circumstances that result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellants or their parents for the following reasons:

a. The appellants are not being forcibly separated from their parents, this situation is their parents’ choice. The sponsor chose to live in the UK 19 years ago when the first and second appellant were very young and before the third appellant was born. He has maintained a parental relationship with them at a distance for most or all of their lives. Their mother relatively recently obtained entry clearance to join their father in the UK, which again was her choice and a choice made at a time when she knew her children did not have the right to join her.

b. The appellants are well looked after by their parents and their grandparents in their absence. The eldest two appellants are adults and do not need looking after as such, but they continue to be well supported by their parents and grandparents. The youngest appellant is not a young child who needs constant physical care. Taking his best interests into account as a primary consideration, we find that remaining in the primary care of his mother is in the third appellant’s best interests but uprooting him from his home, school, grandparents and older siblings is not. As above, if the third appellant’s parents want to take him to the UK, that is their choice, subject to meeting the Immigration Rules but in our assessment that eventuality is not dictated by the assessment of his best interests.

c. The UK is not the only place the appellants can live with their parents. The appellants’ parents would now prefer the whole family to live in the UK but that does not prevent them living together in Pakistan, nor would it result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for them to do so. Or the family could continue their family life in the same manner as they have for the last 19 years through visits and electronic communication. This has been the status quo for effectively the appellants’ whole lives. There are no reasons, other than the mother has obtained entry clearance and the parents would now prefer to live together in the UK, why the status quo cannot continue and certainly none that would amount to unjustifiably harsh consequence for those affected by the refusal of entry clearance.

d. The appellants do not meet the Immigration Rules under the category they applied for at the time. We are obliged by s.117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to afford weight to the public interest in maintaining immigration control. If the appellants wish to join their parents in the United Kingdom there are potentially other options available to them. As suggested by Mrs Nolan, the youngest appellant could apply as a child under Appendix FM now that his mother has leave to enter as a spouse under those provisions. If the older appellants wished to pursue their education in the UK, as suggested was the first appellant’s desire in the sponsor’s witness statement (para 32), they have the option of applying for visas on that basis.

34. In conclusion, we do not consider that the weight attached to the interests of the appellants and their parents outweigh the weight attached to the public interest in maintaining immigration control. Or in other words, there are no exceptional circumstances that result in unjustifiably harsh consequences to those affected by the refusal of entry clearance to these appellants.

Notice of Decision

The appellants’ appeals are dismissed on Article 8 human rights grounds.

E Daykin

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 February 2025
Annex

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2024-004538
UI-2024-004542
UI-2024-004543

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/58317/2022 HU/58138/2022
HU/58140/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DURANCE

Between

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Appellant
And

ANNA IFTIKHAR
IZZA IFTIKHAR
MUHAMMAD MURTAZA AHMED
Respondents

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A. Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr J. Martin, Counsel instructed by Connaught Law Limited

Heard at Field House on 10 December 2024

DECISION AND REASONS

1. We shall refer to the parties as they were in the First-tier Tribunal.
2. This is an appeal brought by the respondent against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Anthony (‘the Judge’) dated 12 January 2024 in which she allowed the appellants’ appeal.

Factual Background

3. The appellants are nationals of Pakistan and are the three children of the sponsor, Mr Iftikhar Ahmed, a British citizen. The appellants were born in June 2005, October 2006 and March 2012.

4. On 8 August 2022 the appellants applied under paragraph 297 of the Immigration Rules (‘the Rules’) to join their sponsor father in the United Kingdom. At this time the appellants were 17, 15 and 10 years of age. On 19 October 2022 the respondent refused the appellants’ applications because the respondent was not satisfied that the appellants were related to the sponsor as claimed and was not satisfied that the appellants met the requirements of paragraphs 297(i)(e) or (f) of the Rules.

5. Following submission of a DNA report from an approved provider the respondent accepted the relationship between the appellants and sponsor was as claimed but maintained the refusal decision in all other respects. The appellants brought an appeal which was heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 5 January 2024 and the appeal was allowed by a decision promulgated on 12 January 2024. At the time of the appellants’ appeal the eldest child was 18 years old.

6. The appellants are now 19, 18 and 12 years of age.

The decision under appeal

7. The Judge found that the appellants’ applications fell for refusal under paragraph A39 of the Rules because at the time of their applications they did not present valid medical certificates confirming that they had undergone screening for active pulmonary tuberculosis and that they were free from this disease. The appellants had submitted medical certificates but these had expired on 30 May 2021. Further medical certificates were obtained but these were issued on 8 August 2023 with an expiry date of 8 February 2024 and had not been submitted at the time the applications were made.

8. Further, the Judge determined that the appellants did not meet the requirements of paragraph 297(i)(e) of the Rules. She noted that at the date of the application the appellants’ position was that their mother no longer wished to care for them and it was their father in the United Kingdom who had sole responsibility for them. However, by the date of the hearing, either their circumstances or the appellants’ position on their circumstances had changed and the appellants’ mother had now married the sponsor and been granted entry clearance to enter the UK as the spouse of the sponsor.

9. The Judge accepted that the sponsor has been financially responsible for the appellants but found the evidence strongly indicated that the sponsor had never had sole responsibility for the appellants’ upbringing and the appellants had continued to reside in the same household with their mother since birth. The Judge found at its highest, the position was that responsibility for the appellants’ care had been shared between the sponsor and the appellants’ mother. Having regard to the evidence before her the Judge also determined that the appellants had failed to demonstrate that there were serious and compelling family or other considerations for the purposes of paragraph 297(i)(f) of the Rules.

10. The Judge’s findings in respect of paragraph 297 of the Rules have not been challenged.

11. In allowing the appellants’ appeal the Judge found there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences arising from the respondent’s refusal. She noted the appellants’ mother had been issued with a spouse visa in respect of which she would need to travel by 21 February 2024. The Judge found on the basis of the financial information available to her, that had the appellants applied for entry clearance under Appendix FM as children of the sponsor they would have met the financial requirements of the Rules.

12. The Judge concluded that there was no utility in requiring the appellants to submit new entry clearance applications pursuant to Appendix FM under a different immigration category because “the requirements of the Immigration Rules have now been met at the date of the hearing” and that if the appellants were required to submit new entry clearance applications the first appellant would not succeed in her application because she was now over the age of 18 and would be separated from the rest of her family which would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences.

The grounds of appeal

13. In the grounds of appeal the respondent noted that the Judge had found that the first appellant is now over the age of 18 and a new application under Appendix FM would therefore not succeed. The respondent asserts that the Judge failed to give any reasons as to why these circumstances amount to unjustifiably harsh consequences in the absence of a finding that the eldest appellant could not live independently as an adult.

14. Following the issue of a notice under Rule 35 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum) Rules 2014 and having received submissions on behalf of the appellants, permission to appeal was granted on 21 September 2024 by Resident Judge Feeney of the First-tier Tribunal, on the basis that the Judge had arguably erred in failing to provide adequate reasons as to why the circumstances of the eldest child amounted to unjustifiably harsh consequences in the absence of a finding that she could not live independently as an adult with financial support.

Analysis and decision

15. Having heard submissions from the representatives, we indicated at the hearing that we found the Judge had made material errors of law in the manner asserted and provided summary reasons which we now confirm together with directions.

16. As stated, the Judge found that the appellants had failed to demonstrate that they met the requirements of the Rules under which they applied for entry clearance. However, the Judge went on to find that had the appellants applied at the time under different provisions pursuant to Appendix FM they would probably have satisfied the requirements of the relevant Rules, including the financial requirements, and there was no utility in requiring the appellants to make fresh applications because the requirements of the Rules had been met at the date of the hearing and the first appellant would not be successful now that she was over 18 years of age.

17. We note that the only circumstances the Judge refers to in reaching her conclusions on Article 8 at [22] and [23] of the decision, are that the appellant is now over 18 and she would be separated from the rest of her family.

18. The Judge’s findings that the appellants did not meet the Rules at the time of their applications are not challenged. Where the Rules are not met, in order for an appellant to succeed in respect of Article 8 ‘outside of the Rules’, it needs to be demonstrated that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’; “that is to say, unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual such that the refusal of the application would not be proportionate” (R (on the application of Agyarko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017]UKSC 11) at [73]. Thus a high threshold needs to be met for the appellants to demonstrate that the respondent’s refusal amounts to a disproportionate interference with their Article 8 rights, having regard to the weight to be attached to the public interest in effective immigration control.

19. Mr Martin submitted on behalf of the appellants that it was implicit from [22] and [23] of the decision that the Judge had conducted a proportionality assessment for Article 8 purposes and in so doing would have had regard to her earlier findings that the appellants lived with and were cared for by their mother, as well as evidence adduced by the appellants in the appeal that they were in full-time education and dependant on their parents.

20. Whilst we note that there was evidence before the Tribunal evidencing the appellants’ attendance at school in the summer of 2020 and in July 2023, the Judge made no findings on whether the appellants, and in particular the eldest child, were all in full-time education at the date of the hearing.

21. In relation to her consideration of paragraph 297, the Judge made findings in relation to the appellants’ living circumstances, who provided care for them and took responsibility for their upbringing, and financial support for the appellants.

22. We accept that the Judge may be taken to have considered and taken into account her previous findings when considering the issue of unjustifiably harsh consequences without necessarily making specific reference to these matters in a proportionality balancing exercise.

23. However, in the absence of making specific reference to any previous findings regarding the appellants’ circumstances, other than the age of the eldest and the prospect of her separation from her family members, it is not possible to discern what in the mind of the Judge amounted to unjustifiably harsh consequences in this case.

24. We are not persuaded that the fact the appellant is now over 18 and would not succeed in a fresh entry clearance application as a child of the sponsor, when her siblings probably would have (on the Judge’s findings), is in and of itself sufficient to establish exceptional circumstances without more. If the Judge did have in mind other matters or her previous findings, there was no specific reference to these. In particular, the Judge did not make any findings in relation to whether the eldest child would be able to live independently as an adult with financial support from her parents and whilst maintaining contact through visits and modern means of communication, without giving rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences.

25. The Judge’s assessment of Article 8 makes no reference to the weight to be attached to the public interest in the balancing exercise. We are not persuaded that it is implicit from the Judge’s reasoning at [22] and [23] of the decision, or at any other part of the decision, that the Judge conducted a proportionality balancing exercise as submitted by Mr Martin. Whilst there is no requirement for the Judge to undertake a balance sheet approach in assessing Article 8, there is a statutory requirement applicable in all cases under section 117B(1) NIAA 2002 to consider the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls. The Judge’s reasoning fails to provide any indication as to the weight she has attached to the public interest in the appellants’ case.

26. It is a long-established principle that a party is entitled to know the reason why they were unsuccessful in litigation. We are not persuaded that the respondent would understand from the decision why the appeal was decided as it was. Further, we find that insufficient reasons have been provided to enable us in our appellate jurisdiction to determine whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law. Thus we find the failure to provide adequate reasons amounts to a material error.

27. The decision that the appellants’ appeals are allowed on the basis of unjustifiably harsh consequences is set aside.

28. There has been no challenge to the Judge’s findings that the appellant’s failed to meet the provisions of A39 and 297 of the Rules. These findings at [7] to [18] of the decision are preserved.

29. The decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal on the matter of whether the respondent’s refusal gives rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences which amount to a disproportionate interference with the appellants’ Article 8 rights.

30. At the hearing the appellants were granted permission under Rule 15(2) of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to adduce updating evidence in relation to their family circumstances. The Tribunal was informed that the appellants’ mother had travelled to the UK further to her grant of entry clearance. It was also noted that the second appellant is also now over the age of 18.

Directions

31. The appeal will be listed for a face to face hearing on the first available date from 13 January 2025 at Field House with a time estimate of 2 hours. An Urdu interpreter will be required.

32. The appellants shall file and serve any further evidence on which they wish to rely in an indexed and consolidated bundle by no later than 6 January 2025.

Notice of Decision

The respondent’s appeal is allowed. The decision of Judge Anthony involved the making of an error of law and is set aside. The findings at [7] to [18] of the decision (inclusive) are preserved.

Sarah Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 December 2024