Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No UI-2024-004661

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/61836/2023
LP/06468/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE IQBAL

Between

DBA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms C Hyde (Counsel), BHD Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is an Iraqi national born on 19th March 1977 who entered the UK on 18th November 2021, and promptly claimed asylum on 22nd November 2021.
2. The appellant claimed to be of interest to the authorities owing to his brother’s involvement with the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) in Syria. The claim was that his brother went to Syria in 2013 and returned to Iraq in 2021, but four days after his brother’s return his brother was arrested by the authorities because of his involvement with the YPG. The appellant was also now of interest to the authorities for the same reasons.
3. In a decision dated 5th November 2023, the respondent refused his protection and human rights claim. The respondent rejected that claim because it was found to be inconsistent, speculative and lacking in detail. It was not accepted that his activities in his home country or in the UK had come to the attention of the authorities and he was not wanted by the authorities.
4. The appellant appealed the Secretary of State’s decision and the matter came before the First-tier Tribunal (FtT).
5. FtT Judge Manyarara dismissed the asylum claim but allowed the appellant’s appeal on 6th September 2024 on the basis of humanitarian protection and human rights grounds, Article 3 only. The appellant’s appeal was allowed by the FtT only because of the appellant’s lack of documentation (CSID/INID) which would prevent him from travelling safely to his home area without the risk of suffering harm or ill-treatment.
Error of law decision
6. An application for permission to appeal by the Secretary of State was allowed, and the conclusions on humanitarian protection and article 3 set aside because the judge failed to make relevant findings. The findings of Judge Manyarara were preserved save for those conclusions from paragraphs 82 and 83 as follows
‘We set aside the conclusions on the ECHR only, that is [82] and [83] and the notice of decision allowing the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds and human rights Article 3 grounds. The appeal remains dismissed on asylum grounds.’
7. The error of law decision found the key question was whether the appellant would be able to access his CSID (not merely an INID) in Iraq from his family was not addressed.
8. For clarity we explored with the parties whether [55] of the decision had omitted “not” after “would” particularly in the light of the acceptance that the appellant hails from the IKR (see [69]). Both parties agreed this was the case and a “not” had been omitted. It was confirmed at the error of law hearing therefore owing to the overall context and findings, this was a typographical error and a ‘not’ was omitted between ‘would’ and ‘be’.
Summary of grounds preserved from FtT decision.
9. The appellant’s nationality, ethnicity and identity were accepted by the respondent [5].
10. At the commencement of the appeal the appellant’s representative confirmed that he place no reliance on his sur place activities in the appeal [7].
11. The FtT judge found at [26] the appellant
26.1 lived in Iraq with his parents and he has one brother who lived in Syria from 2013;
26.2 worked in his uncle’s shop, and he was not involved in any political activities;
26.3 has never been apprehended by the authorities in Iraq;
26.4 was in contact with his parents in Iraq, as recently as the end of 2023;
26.5 has not received a summons or an arrest warrant in respect of any interest in him by the authorities in Iraq and the authorities have not personally attended his family home since he left Iraq; and
26.6 has only taken part in one demonstration in the United Kingdom and is not involved in any Kurdish political organisations in the United Kingdom
12. The appellant’s account concerning the interest in him in Iraq was based on speculation and was internally inconsistent in various respects [39]. For example, the appellant’s claim in the asylum registration that he was politically active and wanted by the PDK Party owing to his connection with the YPG did not ‘sit well’ with the appellant’s own evidence during registration [42]. The claim was contrary to the background information in The Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’), Iraq: opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (‘KRI’), version 3.0, dated July 2023 [47].
13. The judge added
‘Furthermore, the appellant’s case is that he was in contact with his parents as recently as 2023…’, [45].
‘Fourthly, the appellant’s claim to have not previously contacted his parents for fear of placing them in a climate of insecurity (question 8) does not sit well with the appellant’s evidence that his parents contacted him to keep him updated of things in Iraq. I find that if there were a risk attached to the appellant being in communication with his parents, then it is not credible that his parents would have contacted him.’ [46]
14. At [55] the judge concluded
‘I am satisfied that the UT in SMO2 considered the country situation, and confirms that the appellant would be at risk solely on account of his presence in Iraq.’
15. The judge proceeded to consider risk on the basis of the absence or otherwise of documentation and cited the CPIN, Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, dated October 2023 and noted
‘3.2.1 A person who is unable to retrieve their existing CSID/INID or obtain a new INID is likely to face significant difficulties in accessing services and thus risk being exposed to humanitarian conditions which are likely to result in destitution sufficient to amount to a breach of paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the ECHR.’
…
3.5.3 A person returned without identity documentation is likely to be questioned at the airport and a family member asked to attend to confirm their identity.”
16. The judge held that ‘without a CSID or an INID, the appellant would be returning without documentation’[63], but that
‘that an application for a laisser-passer was considered on a case by case basis’ [64], and that ‘Laissez-passer documents can be issued by the embassy in the UK even where no documents are held. (para. 3.4.7)’.
17. Thus actual return to Baghdad (SA (Removal destination; Iraq; undertakings) Iraq [2022] UKUT 37 (IAC)) was found to be feasible but the judge found that the appellant had no CSID with which to traverse to the IKR [72] and thus, although not at risk on asylum grounds, would be at risk of serious harm in breach of his Article 3 rights [77][78].
The re-making hearing before the UT
18. This decision remakes the previous decision of the FtT. The appellant was permitted to provide further evidence and the appeal hearing relisted with a Kurdish Badani interpreter.
19. The parties agreed at the rehearing before us that the key issue was whether the appellant could access his CSID within a reasonable time frame. In terms of documentation, we were provided with a skeleton argument from Ms Hyde and further documentation, which included the error of law decision in the Upper Tribunal and the appellant’s second witness statement dated 12th February 2025 in addition to the bundle before the FtT, which contained, inter alia, a witness statement from the appellant dated 13th March 2024 and country background information as well as the respondent’s bundle.
20. The appellant gave oral testimony and was asked some questions in examination in chief and was cross examined by Mr Terrell. We only include detail of the oral evidence where relevant in our conclusions as there is a formal record of the proceedings.
Submissions
21. Mr Terrell submitted that there had been previous adverse credibility findings against the appellant and there was also a finding made at [46] of the FtT decision (see above) as to contact with the parents. The appellant had previously claimed highly restrictive contact with his parents owing to the risk and nature of his claim. This, however, had been rejected. There was inconsistency in the level of contact and a remarkable lack of curiosity/effort on the part of the appellant to make contact with his family. That his phone had stopped working was only a claim recently asserted. The appellant claimed he had no friends other than his immediate family and that was plainly not believable for someone who left Iraq in their 20s and he would have had associates or others around him whom he could contact.
22. Ms Hyde advanced that the appellant’s claim had always been that he did not have his CSID in his possession and was unable to secure it. There may have been slight inconsistencies in his account but fundamentally his account had remained the same such that he had sporadic contact with his parents on disposable phones and his number had now changed. The most recent number was not in service and he had been reliant on his parents calling him. He had now lost contact with them. His parents did not have social media and nor did his sister and he could not arrange for his parents to send the CSID or meet him at the airport in Iraq. His overall account pointed in favour of his credibility. He stated in his first witness statement that he last spoke to his father after his asylum interview and in his statement of 12th February 2025 confirmed he had only spoken to his parents twice since entering the UK and this was in conformity with his oral evidence. His parents called him and he was unable to contact them himself. She accepted there was inconsistency in the regularity of the contact but his witness statement and oral evidence were consistent. The social background of the parents should be considered – they were professional farmworkers. He did not have the contact details of his sister. The suggestion that he could contact others was speculative. Should he contact the Red Cross his parents would be brought to the attention of the authorities and not to contact his neighbours was consistent with this fear. He had exhausted all reasonable methods to secure possession of his CSID.
Conclusions
23. SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq (CG) UKUT [2022] 00110 (IAC) is the country guidance on this aspect of the law. The Secretary of State’s guidance is found in the Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns Version 14.0 October 2023 (‘CPIN’) for example at 3.6.4, reflects the point that the question to be answered is either whether the appellant is in possession of his Civil Status Identity Card CSID or whether he is able to access a CSID or an Iraqi Nationality Identity Document (‘INID’) on return.
24. We are mindful of Devaseelan v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UTIAC 00702 and the findings of Judge Manyara are our starting point.
25. The judge found the appellant at [39] effectively not to be credible in his account and stated
‘Having considered the appellant’s evidence in its entirety I find that the appellant’s account concerning the interest in him in Iraq is based on speculation and is internally inconsistent in various respects’.
26. For example and inter alia, at [41]-[42] the judge found that the appellant asserted in his asylum claim that he could not return to the IKR because he was ‘wanted by the PDK Party on having a connection with YPG’ did not sit well with the appellant’s own evidence during the asylum registration process that he was not accused of any offences in Iraq and that he had no political involvement’. Further the judge found at [44] that the claimed interest by the authorities was based on the appellant’s own speculation. As the judge recorded at [45] the appellant’s case was that he was in contact with his parents as recently as 2023.
27. We repeat for emphasis the finding in relation to contact with the parents of the FtT judge at [46],:
“46. Fourthly, the appellant’s claim to have not previously contacted his parents for fear of placing them in a climate of insecurity (question 8) does not sit well with the appellant’s evidence that his parents contacted him to keep him updated of things in Iraq. I find that if there were a risk attached to the appellant being in communication with his parents, then it is not credible that his parents would have contacted him.”
28. In his screening interview, given through a Kurdish Badani interpreter on 29th April 2022, the appellant confirmed at 6.2 when asked about his documents ‘I left my documents with my mother in Iraq’ and at 6.3 ‘I will try to tell her to send my ID’. In his statement of 22nd August 2023 the appellant made no mention of losing contact with his family. In his asylum interview on 25th October 2023 he confirmed that he last had contact with his parents one month ago (he asserted he could not call them because of the government interest). In that asylum interview, over a year from his previous interview, he made no mention that his number had been altered or was no longer in service. His oral evidence was that the mobile phone company would disconnect the number after no use of one year which explained why his number did not work. At question 21 he confirmed that his mother called ‘every 3 months sometimes every 4 months. I have been here 2 years’. In his witness statement of 13th March 2024 he stated that he spoke to his father again after the asylum interview.
29. It is against this background that the appellant gave oral evidence. We do not find the appellant has lost contact with his parents and conclude on the following reasoning that even though he may not already be in actual possession of the CSID he can access it. For clarity we have taken all of the evidence into account together with the submissions of Ms Hyde.
30. We are mindful of cultural differences, but the appellant’s evidence as a whole was inherently contradictory and his oral evidence was simply not believable for the following reasons.
31. First, he told us he had not contacted the Red Cross to locate his parents/family because he was concerned about causing problems for his family in Iraq. The difficulty with this assertion is that his account was disbelieved by the FtT and that adverse credibility finding on his overall account stands. Having been in contact with his parents on a regular basis we find his lack of curiosity or interest in locating them remarkable.
32. Secondly, he had been, according to his asylum interview in regular contact with his family for them to give updates on Iraq whilst in the UK. This would suggest that he was not fearful for his parents on security grounds. It was only in his later witness statement of 12th February 2025, following the error of law decision, that the appellant advanced that his parents called him on ‘temporary pay as you go SIM cards’ and he gave the explanation that contact stopped because his ‘WhatsApp number was no longer valid’ because he was no longer in Iraq. This was not an explanation given prior to 2025. When questioned on this, his answer was that he was not asked but this is not believable bearing in mind this was an important issue and he is legally represented. The further difficulty with the account (explaining lost contact) that every time his parents called him, they disposed of a phone/number for security issues is wholly undermined by the fact that the basis of his own claim had been rejected.
33. Thirdly, under examination in chief he claimed that had he spoken only twice to his parents whilst in the UK. That contrasted sharply with his asylum interview where he stated that having been in the UK for just under 2 years, he had contacted his parents every 3 months sometimes 4 months. That would equate to 6 or 7 contacts by the date of the asylum interview and once more afterwards (as per the witness statement) and not only two contacts. That sharp contrast undermines his evidence.
34. Fourthly, when asked about contacting other friends of neighbours he asserted that he had no friends and had socialised only with his father and uncle. This is just not believable. The appellant is young fit and healthy and according to his own answers in his asylum interview had been to school. In his oral evidence he confirmed again that he worked in his uncle’s teashop/cafe on a seasonal basis and had indeed worked from 2013. When asked if he had tried to get in contact with a neighbour that might assist, he simply said simply that he did not know who to contact. The appellant’s claim to have highly restricted contact was simply unbelievable in the circumstances. Even in his screening interview he referenced his uncle’s café (a social place).
35. We find the appellant’s CSID is in existence and we reject the appellant’s assertion that he no longer retains contact with his family for the reasons given above. We find that the appellant can secure contact with his family and either have his CSID sent to him in the UK or a family member can arrange to provide it to him on entry/return to Iraq.

Notice of decision
36. The appeal remains dismissed on asylum grounds.
37. We dismiss the appeal on humanitarian and human rights grounds.

Helen Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29th May 2025