UI-2024-004700 & Ors.

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 28 Jul 2025
• Promulgation date: 27 Aug 2025
• Publication date: 11 Sep 2025
• Last updated on: 11 Sep 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004700
UI-2024-004697
UI-2024-004701
UI-2024-004702
UI-2024-004703
UI-2024-004704
UI-2024-004705

FtT No’s: HU/60818/2023, LH/03183/2024
HU/60819/2023, LH/03220/2024
HU/60817/2023, LH/03189/2024
HU/60816/2023, LH/03184/2024
HU/60795/2023, LH/03185/2024
HU/60788/2023, LH/03188/2024
HU/60794/2023, HU/60794/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

AA
BB
CC
DD
EE
FF
GG
(Anonymity order made)
Appellants
and

Entry Clearance Office, Turkey
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellants: Ms E Turnbull, Counsel instructed by DLA Piper
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 July 2025

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify them, or any member of their family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellants and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants are all members of the same family. They are nationals of Afghanistan who seek permission to enter the United Kingdom on human rights grounds. They seek to join a relative in the United Kingdom, ‘S’. S has indefinite leave to remain as a refugee. The Appellants are respectively, his father, mother, three sisters, a niece and nephew.
2. Entry clearance was refused on the 8th August 2023. The Appellants appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. That appeal was dismissed on the 23rd July 2024 on the grounds that Article 8 was not here engaged. The Appellants were granted permission to appeal against that decision by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville on the 29th October 2024. On the 14th February 2025 I found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in its approach to what constitutes a ‘family life’, and set the decision aside with the direction that the matter be brought back before me so that the decision could be remade.
3. At the resumed hearing I heard oral evidence from S, and Mr Kevin Perkins, a psychotherapist and mental health nurse with long standing involvement in the treatment of S, and indeed in this case overall. The parties made their submissions and I reserved my decision, which I now give.

Family History and Circumstances
4. Having heard from the witnesses, and having had regard to all of the relevant evidence and submissions, I find the facts to be as follows.
5. S fled Afghanistan in late 2015/early 2016. He arrived in the United Kingdom in May 2016 and sought protection. He claimed on arrival that he was 15 years old, but was later age assessed as being 18.
6. S was refused protection. He appealed. On the 4th June 2018 the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Veloso) allowed his appeal. Having heard the evidence Judge Veloso accepted the following matters of fact about events prior to S’s arrival in the UK:
• Until his departure from Afghanistan S lived with his parent and sisters at their home in the Ghorband valley, Parwan. He was the eldest child of the family, and the only son
• S’s paternal uncle was a Taliban commander who was putting pressure on S’s father [AA] to allow S to come and “join the jihad”. AA refused to permit S to join the Taliban and repeatedly refused his elder brother’s request
• S was sent to Kabul by his father to get away from this uncle
• The family dispute about this matter escalated so that two of S’s paternal cousins were dispatched to Kabul to find him. A fight ensued in which S was stabbed by his cousins. Intervention by people in the neighbourhood prevented him being kidnapped/press ganged
• After S received hospital treatment for his stab wound his family arranged for his departure from Afghanistan
7. Judge Veloso also heard evidence from Mr Perkins. At that time S was receiving weekly individual therapy, as well as other group therapy sessions, at the Baobab Centre. The Baobab Centre is a specialist organisation providing psycho-social support to ‘young survivors in exile’ and Mr Perkins is employed there as a Child and Adolescent Integrative Psychotherapist. He is also a qualified mental health nurse. By the time of the hearing before Judge Veloso in 2018, S had had 34 individual sessions with Mr Perkins. S had been diagnosed as suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD), depression and anxiety. Mr Perkins expressed concern that the effect of the trauma undergone by S at a young age was that he was unable to address his emotional and psychological problems as an adult. His risk of suicide was assessed as being “low to moderate” and Mr Perkins warned that there remained a risk of “psychological collapse”. The Tribunal accepted all of this evidence and found that S had “little ability to manage on his own”. S was consequently granted leave to remain as a refugee on the 23rd June 2018.
8. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan the family continued to come under sustained pressure from AA’s brother, and the Taliban in general. In her statement DD recalls how. in the period after her brother left Afghanistan, her uncle became “even more angry”, and said that AA had disobeyed him. He started putting pressure on AA to “give him his daughters” to marry his sons. AA decided that the family were in imminent danger. They left their family home and travelled to Kabul. They remained in Kabul for one week before travelling by foot and car into Iran, and then into Turkey. Once in Turkey they made their way to Istanbul.
9. The family tried to regularise their position in Turkey but were “just turned away by the authorities”. Their evidence, and that of S, makes repeated reference to their fear of being arrested by the Turkish authorities and being refouled to Afghanistan. Although I do not have any documentary evidence before me to confirm their lack of status, Ms Turnbull refers me to country background information which supports the Appellants’ claims that Afghans in Turkey are not recognised as refugees, face regular large scale round-ups and deportations and are subject to significant hostility. Tens of thousands have been deported or ‘pushed-back’ i.e. prevented from entering. This evidence comprises numerous articles and reports, the gist of which is reflected in the following passage from the 2023 Amnesty International Report : The state of the world’s human rights, Türkiye:
‘‘The country continued to host the world’s largest number of refugees, but violent summary returns of Afghans and others resulted in deaths and other serious injuries, against a backdrop of rising anti-refugee racist rhetoric by politicians and in the media. There were serious and credible allegations of torture and other ill-treatment.”
10. The family rented a small 2 roomed apartment. AA and BB were both unwell after their journey from Afghanistan, and were not fit enough to try and work. At that time their daughters were all teenagers. Despite their young age they went out to find work in order to pay the rent and support the family.
11. CC met an Afghan man whom she subsequently married. He is the father of FF and GG, both of whom were born in Turkey. Shortly after GG’s birth the marriage broke down due to his extreme and regular violent behaviour. In her statement she explains that he is not the man she thought he was when she agreed to the marriage. During their relationship she was regularly subject to violence including being beaten with an iron bar. She returned to the small flat with her two children. Her former husband divorced her and was thereafter deported to Afghanistan by the Turkish authorities.
12. Neither FF or GG can be ‘registered’ in Turkey. They were born in the home with the assistance of a traditional midwife who was paid privately. CC states that she does not receive any support from their father and is unable to provide them with basic necessities such as medicine. Other family members report going without food to ensure that the children are regularly fed. The Appellants’ solicitors commissioned a report from Judith Jones, registered and independent social worker with over 35 years of experience as a practitioner and manager. Ms Jones was able to interview S in person, and conducted interviews with each of the Appellants (except AA), with the assistance of an interpreter by video call. Ms Jones noted CC’s ongoing fear of her ”cruel husband” and his “cruel family”. She records that CC, and indeed other family members, remain extremely concerned about the fate of the children should the family be returned to Afghanistan.
13. Today both AA and BB are unwell. They are both diabetic, and have problems with blood pressure etc but it is AA who gives rise for the greatest concern amongst other members of the family. He has an as yet undiagnosed condition where he has some kind of seizures. In her statement BB describes it as follows:
“My husband has mental health problems and has seizures. His tongue can get stuck, his face droops, his body becomes loose and he cannot move. This upsets me greatly; it makes me mentally unwell.”
14. Other family members refer to AA’s “mental health problems” as involving confusion – sometimes about who people are - and memory loss. Partly as a result of these health problems, but also out of fear of being stopped by the Turkish police, AA and BB are largely confined to the flat. On one occasion he “wandered off” and ended up being detained for a month in “some kind of government institution”. When he came back he had bruises that he could not explain. S sends his family money when he can. Other than that, the family are supported by the wages brought in by CC and DD who are working illegally in Turkey, washing dishes in restaurants. In their witness statements the Appellants state that this brings in about 7000 Turkish lira per month, almost all of which goes on the rent. S explained to me that this work is poorly paid because the bosses know that his sisters cannot argue about it because they are illegal. If they ever dispute their hours or pay the boss can threaten to have them deported so they are in very vulnerable situations. The same happens with the landlady.
15. In their witness statements the Appellants express their concern not just about their own position, and their fear of being returned to Afghanistan, but their constant worry about S. His mother BB describes feeling “heartbroken” by not being able to be with him: she knows that he is very unwell, and alone. She believes that his mental and physical health would deteriorate yet further if it were not for their regular contact.
16. The relationship between S’s mental health and his contact with his family is at the heart of this claim. It comes from a number of sources: from S himself, from his family members, from Consultant Psychiatrist Dr Galathappie, from GP notes and from the three reports and three sessions of live evidence given by Mr Perkins over the years. I have rarely, if ever, heard an appeal in this Tribunal where the evidence was of this breadth and quality. That is not only because the case been conspicuously well prepared, but it is due to the long-standing clinical involvement of Mr Perkins. Described by the First-tier Tribunal as being an “impressive witness”, he has been accepted as being an expert in his field, and his opinion concurs with other mental health professionals involved in the case, notably that of a Consultant Psychiatrist. He began weekly sessions with S in 2017 and although these have now ceased, they remain in frequent and regular contact: he knows S incredibly well. As a consequence I am confidently able to attach a great deal of weight to what Mr Perkins has to say about S, and how he believes he will be impacted by being reunited with his family, or not as the case may be.
17. There is, as I allude to above, a lot of evidence about S’s mental health. Given that none of it has been challenged by the Secretary of State I do not think I need to set it out in any great detail here. In terms of the diagnoses these are, given S’s personal history, perhaps unsurprising. Dr Galathappie and Mr Perkins have both concluded that S continues to suffer from complex PTSD, major depressive disorder and severe anxiety. His symptoms include memory loss, violent nightmares, anger, anxiety attacks, persistent and extreme low mood and “blunted effect”. At times he is unable to eat and if he forces something down he vomits. When his symptoms are particularly distressing he bangs his head against the wall. His conditions are having an impact on his cognitive functioning, particularly in the areas of concentration, attention, focus and memory; his persistent intrusive thoughts leave him feeling depressed and low in mood. Dr Galathappie notes that his introversion and withdrawal have left him “ashamed of himself as a person”. He has suicidal thoughts that are “general in nature” but has not formed any specific plan.
18. The most up to date evidence concerning S was given in his witness statement dated 17 January 2024, and at the hearing before me by both S and Mr Perkins. S has stopped attending the Baobab Centre. After 4-5 years of weekly counselling he has realised that there is no more that Mr Perkins and his colleagues can do for him. S explains that at the beginning the therapy sessions helped him to function, but that over the last couple of years it had stopped having a positive impact. Mr Perkins concurred with this explanation, stating that he and S had become “stuck” because S was unable to get past his constant anxiety about his family, and the objective reality that they are collectively facing significant problems. This worry had recently increased to the point where he does not want to leave his home. He is continuing to take his prescribed anti-depressants Sertraline and Propranolol. Mr Perkins concluded in his most recent statement that S continues to suffer from “anxiety, depression and experiences levels of despair and hopelessness that are strongly associated with increased risks of suicide and self-harm”. He goes on to say this:
6. As a result of his chronic and complex PTSD, [S] experiences disruptions in his cognitive functioning particularly in the areas of concentration, attention, focus and memory. These vary in intensity and duration and are more noticeable in response to elevated levels of anxiety. He is prone to ruminating thoughts and intrusive memories about the knife attack on him before he left Afghanistan. When preoccupied by these ruminations and memories [S] is unable to maintain a present focus and becomes lost in the past. He mourns the loss of the person he used to be and is left feeling sad and depressed. His depressed mood further impinges upon his cognitive functioning and interferes with everyday life, acquiring new skills, learning from experience, and with his ability to study and progress.
[S] continues to experience periods of dissociation. In a hypo aroused state of mind, he can become inactive, introverted, withdraws from contact with others and the outside world. He experiences several psychosomatic symptoms namely severe headaches and bodily aches and pains. He will tend to stay in bed and dissociative state of hypo arousal that affects him, results in inactivity, introversion, social withdrawal, increased need to be somewhere safe and contained and increased dependence on others to help him with activities of daily life. He experiences himself as incapable, lacking agency or function. He feels very ashamed of himself as a person and is unable to see anything of worth or value in himself.
8. [S]’s mental state remains somewhat fragile and unstable. Progress in recovery and rehabilitation has been limited. [S] continues to have symptoms of the above mental health difficulties that are exacerbated by constant worries about his family which will continue to require intervention, care and support. His difficulties are set in a context of past traumatic experiences, cultural dislocation and losses and separation from his family.
19. Mr Perkins explains that he sees the causes of S’s mental distress, and inability to move forward, as complex. On the one hand there are the obvious traumas faced by S at a young age: growing up during a civil war (his home province was a Taliban stronghold), being subject to forced recruitment, being stabbed by his cousins and threatened with death by his uncle, leaving knowing that his family were unsafe, making his way across Europe as a young teenager, being witness and subject to violence along the way. These are the underlying causes of his PTSD. Then on the other hand there is the multi-layered guilt that he carries. He blames himself for everything that has happened to his family – if he had agreed to go and fight for the Taliban, they could all still be at home. He blames himself for being unable to help his family now, and as the only boy this is an expectation and responsibility that weighs heavily on him. S is preoccupied by these thoughts all of his waking hours. He is, in Mr Perkins’ opinion, unable to move forward in his recovery because he is ‘stuck’ ruminating about his failures as a son and re-experiencing his trauma. Mr Perkins has concluded that without S being reunited with his family, his prognosis is poor. He will, absent that support, be unable to develop as an adult and live a meaningful life as a productive member of society. He is constantly “re-triggered” by his worry for his family and his PTSD symptoms re-set to where they were before. I note in this regard S’s evidence that his wish to train as an electrician has been sabotaged by his own inability to cope, and in his present mental state is unable to study; he believes that the presence of his family will give him the strength and motivation he needs. In his oral evidence he told me that the first thing he does when he wakes up in the morning is “update himself” on his family ie by checking his phone. He describes being in constant fear that they will be returned to Afghanistan and killed by his uncle, so every morning he has to begin his day by checking that they have not been detained overnight. If for any reason he cannot get hold of them he is gripped by panic. Even when he is asleep these concerns dominate, giving him nightmares.
20. Mr Perkins bases his assessment not just on his professional expertise, and longstanding therapeutic work with S, but on his own observation of the obvious and immediate improvements in S’s conditions when he was with his family. S has been to visit his family in Turkey twice since they resumed contact in 2019. He has been once with a friend in 2023, but on the first trip he was accompanied by Mr Perkins, who was able to observe first hand the intense and “joyful” reunion. Mr Perkins’ oral evidence on this trip before the First-tier Tribunal was summarised in its decision as follows:
“45. The Sponsor was in a fragile state before they went to Turkey. He was constantly anxious about his mental health, his past and his family members, including his parents’ health and their precarious state as undocumented people. The Sponsor’s anxiety about his family helped to trigger his symptoms of PTSD and made him depressed, which made his mental health worse. During the visit, he noticed that all members of the family were overjoyed. It was an emotional occasion in which the Sponsor became much “lighter” and his headaches reduced markedly. He noticed the Sponsor’s potential for enjoyment and relaxation, as well as relief at seeing his family, and especially his parents about whom he was most concerned. When the Sponsor returned here, his mood plunged into depression, he became more introverted and struggled with sleeplessness. During the visit, there was physical warmth and emotion between the Sponsor and his family. There was mutual concern for what had happened since they last saw each other, as well as joy at being together again”.
21. Before me Mr Perkins reiterated these opinions, pointing out that they are consistent with academic literature and what is understood about recovery in these circumstances. It is well established that individuals must themselves feel safe and secure before they can experience any meaningful recovery from this level of trauma, but it is also extremely important that the individual feels that their loved ones are also safe. In S’s case, he has not been able to move on without that knowledge.
22. S continues to speak to his family in Turkey on a daily basis by whatsapp, and a couple of times per week by video or phone call. He would like to do more but they cannot afford the data for the internet connection. S reports that when he is unable to speak to them he cannot eat or sleep. Sometimes when he eats he vomits. On the days that he has managed to speak with them his appetite and sleep are much improved. S would like very much to go back to Turkey but he does not have the funds to do so. He also told me that there was a problem with the Turkish visa last time he applied, and that his anxiety is such that he cannot contemplate making that journey on his own. He describes the moment when he has to leave them behind to travel back to the UK as “retraumatising”; he cannot face that alone.

The Law
23. These appeals are brought pursuant to s82 (1)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the decisions to refuse the Appellants’ human rights claims. In each case the single ground of appeal, in accordance with s84(2) of the Act, is that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that “it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”. The Convention right asserted by the Appellants is their right to ‘family life’ as protected by Article 8 ECHR.
24. The first question in any such an appeal is whether the Article 8 is engaged on the facts. It is there that I begin.

Family Life
25. In my decision setting aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, I found that the Tribunal had applied an impermissibly narrow reading of the term ‘family life’, as it is understood in the context of Article 8.
26. The Tribunal had begun its consideration by recognising that the Convention does not automatically protect every relationship that an individual might enjoy with their relatives. It is assumed to exist between members of a ‘core’ family – that is to say partners/parents, and their minor children – but beyond that it will always be a question of fact. The authorities, both domestic and European, tell us that where we are concerned with the relationships between adults, family life will not be protected by Article 8 unless “something more exists than normal emotional ties”. In Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 Lord Justice Sedley illustrated the point by reference to blood relatives, for instance aunties, of whom we are “extremely fond”: it cannot have been in the contemplation of the drafters that the Article extended that far. If however, there is between these adults a significant degree of support, for instance mental, physical or financial then the protections of the Convention may be engaged. Sedley LJ framed the test as requiring “real, committed or effective support”. The First-tier Tribunal in this case recognised that, and so properly subjected the relationships in this case to some scrutiny, before finding that the Appellants had failed to show that they enjoyed with S something “more than normal emotional ties”:
“79. I do not accept that the extent of this contact probably amounts to emotional support because I do not accept that it is anything more than a manifestation of the ordinary emotional ties which exist between adult relatives. Close adult relatives are often in frequent and, sometimes, lengthy contact with each other, without having family life together. This may continue over a prolonged period especially, for example, where there is illness or where there are other concerns about their wellbeing. The Appellants and the Sponsor both live in difficult circumstances. The Appellants say that they are living illegally in Turkey and that they fear being deported to Afghanistan. The First and Second Appellants have health problems. The Sponsor has serious mental health problems, does not work, has a limited social network and lives on his own.
80. I accept Mr Perkins’ evidence that the visit to Turkey was a highly emotional event for the Sponsor, his parents and his sisters. However, I do not accept that this joy establishes that family life probably exists because any close relatives who were reunited in similar circumstances would be overjoyed, irrespective of whether family life existed.
…
83. In brief summary, this evidence does little more than establish that the Sponsor is a much-loved member of a close-knit family, that the Appellants and the Sponsor derive much pleasure from their contact with each other, which they value greatly, that this contact helps to raise their spirits, and that they feel whole when they are together. They worry a lot about each other. They feel low when they cannot speak to each other because of their worries about each other, which affects their health. They want to be reunited because this will be beneficial for them all. They would like the Sponsor to take over the role of head of the family from his elderly father but he cannot do this effectively at the present because they are separated. The separation affects the Sponsor’s mental health but he will recover if they are reunited.
84. Insofar as this relates to the present, these are all manifestations of the ordinary emotional ties that exist between close relatives. It does not show any real, effective or committed support over and above this.
…
88. Looking at all the evidence in the round, I do not accept that family life has been reestablished between the Sponsor and the Appellants. The various aspects of their relationship, including their hope that the Sponsor will take over as head of the family, are all aspects of their love, affection and concern for each other viewed from different perspectives and are not therefore separate considerations which change their complexion when they are viewed cumulatively. In the passage I have quoted from Sedley LJ’s judgment in Kuguthas, Sedley LJ said “neither blood ties nor the concern and affection that ordinarily go with them are, by themselves or together, in my judgment enough to constitute family life”. For these reasons, I do not accept that family life exists between the Sponsor and any of the Appellants.
27. Although I recognised that the Tribunal had directed itself to the appropriate authorities, and it had clearly reviewed the evidence with care and some sympathy, I found the passages I cite above to reveal an error in approach:
“The real question here is whether the Tribunal misunderstood what the Court of Appeal meant by ‘normal’. In considering the evidence of daily contact the Tribunal writes “I do not accept that the extent of this contact probably amounts to emotional support because I do not accept that it is anything more than a manifestation of the ordinary emotional ties which exist between adult relatives” (emphasis added). One might ask here whether men in their mid-twenties ‘ordinarily’ spend hours a week talking to their sisters and messaging their parents. More revealingly at its §80 the Tribunal dismisses Mr Perkins’ evidence about the intensity of the reunion by saying “any close relatives who were reunited in similar circumstances would be overjoyed”. This was a clear error. ‘Normal’ does not mean ‘normal for someone similarly situated’. It just means ‘normal’. It is no doubt true that any ‘normal’ Afghan family separated by war, forced migration, trauma, years and thousands of miles would be similarly overjoyed to see each other, but that does not defeat this claim, since that would not be a family living in ‘normal’ circumstances. That the Tribunal misunderstood the test is further illustrated by its reference to families who are brought closer together by serious illness. Again, that is not a ‘normal’ state of affairs. That is a paradigm situation in which Article 8 may be engaged: for instance, where an adult child has to look after an ailing parent. The Tribunal’s search for some ever more extreme emotional attachment meant it failed to stand back and ask itself the simple question: is there here evidence of real, effective, committed support?”
28. For those reasons the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside. I however went on to say the following:
“….The evidence from the point of view of the Appellants was that AA, the father of the family, is elderly and increasingly unfirm. In accordance with his culture he now looks to his son to support his household of women. They are all living under a significant degree of stress, in a foreign environment and in fear of removal to Afghanistan. They have all missed S and worry about him, but at the same time see him as their “only hope”. That is the background to their daily contact, and lengthy calls to him. From the point of view of S himself, the evidence is even more powerful. Mr Perkins has known S, and this family, for a number of years. He was able to speak in detail about the extent of the mental health problems suffered by S and how extraordinarily important it is to him to be reunited with his family. Even more stark was the evidence of consultant psychiatrist Dr Galappathie – unchallenged and accepted by the Tribunal – that “The Sponsor has complex conditions which prevent him developing his own family life here” [from the FTTs own summary at its §62]. For this reason his entire family life is with the Appellants. I am satisfied that the only answer to the question of whether the members of this family show each other real, effective and committed emotional support is yes”.
29. As I indicated to the parties at the resumed hearing, I have since become aware of two relatively recent Strasbourg authorities, in which the European Court of Human Rights considered again the matter of ‘family life’ between adults.
30. In Kumari v The Netherlands (44051/20) the Court reiterates the test I have referred to above: “there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate ‘additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties’” [at 35]. It then reviewed its own jurisprudence for examples of where that test had been found to be met, and where it had not. The Court has made an exception for young adults who are still living with their parents and have not yet started a family of their own; in that situation, “dependency” is assumed [36]. The Court has also accepted dependency where adults had a physical or mental disability or illness of sufficient seriousness and were in need of constant care and support from other family members [38]. The Court had rejected dependency on the facts in cases where medical conditions were not accepted to be sufficiently serious, for instance diabetes, heart conditions or asthma, “none of which conditions were entirely incapacitating” [39]. The Court further recognised that financial dependency can also play a role in its analysis, although noted that financial dependency cannot on its own establish the existence of a family life [40-41].  Other elements that played a role in the Court’s analysis of “additional elements of dependency” in a migration context include, for example, the fact that the person with whom ties were claimed was the only surviving relation, the fact that substantial links with the country of origin continued to exist, and the presence of family members who can provide care – or other viable alternatives – in the country of origin. The judgment further noted that where any parties were minors at the date of application, “the Court will assess the question on the existence of “family life” based on the situation as it obtained on that date in order to avoid that a child ‘ages out’ pending the proceedings”.
31. Applying these principles to the facts in Kumari, the Court were asked to consider the case of a widow from India who sought leave to remain in the Netherlands with her adult children. She had some health complaints of her own, and suffered from depression. The most compassionate aspect of her case was however that she was seeking leave to be with her son and daughter-in-law, who had lost an infant child. The Court recognised that the death of the child would have had a great impact on the son’s well-being, but noted that the most up to date evidence was that his anxiety was abating and that he no longer suffered flashbacks. His condition, at the date of the hearing, was not so severe as to entirely incapacitate him. It could not, in these circumstances, be said that family life existed between these adult parties.
32. In Martinez Alvorado v The Netherlands (4470/21) the court reiterated the same statement of principles as in Kumari. The facts in that case were that a Peruvian man sought permission to remain the Netherlands in reliance on Article 8. His application was sponsored by his 4 adult sisters. The applicant had intellectual disabilities such that he was deemed to have the mental age of an eight year old. He had always lived with his parents but they had both passed away; his sisters now took care of him. The authorities in the Netherlands had refused the claim on the grounds that he could, in effect, live in a home in Peru or with another brother who remained there. The Court noted that although the applicant had lived separately from his sisters for many years, his care had always been provided by family members [48]. Now that his parents had died, his sisters had taken on that role, looking after his daily needs and providing for him financially. In those circumstances it was wrong for the domestic authorities to have primarily focused on the ties between the applicant and his sisters prior to their parents’ deaths. The ‘family life’ they had shared as siblings survived that period of separation. The Court further afforded considerable weight to the fact that, given his disability, the applicant’s perception of society was very limited, and that his immediate family circle “constituted most of his world”. In those circumstances the applicant had demonstrated that he shared “more than normal emotional ties” to his sisters, and the Court found a violation.
33. I have considered these authorities in some detail because it had been brought to my attention that the Secretary of State places reliance upon them in a number of matters currently before the Court of Appeal (Secretary of State v IA and Ors CA-2025-000713). Having done so I am satisfied that my decision on whether there was an ‘error of law’ in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was correct. Nothing in either Kumari or Alvorado is at odds with my reasoning. An applicant is not required to meet any threshold of exceptionality. There is no presumption of a family life between adults, and one will only be established there are “more than normal emotional ties”, or evidence of “real, effective and committed support”. I do not read either case to import a requirement that someone involved must have a condition which leaves them, absent their family member’s care, “entirely incapacitated”; rather that serves to indicate the kind of case where dependency would certainly be found. If I am wrong about that it does not however matter, since in this case such a test would in my view be met. The extraordinary degree to which S has come to focus his attention on the plight of his family is, in the view of Mr Perkins and Dr Galathappie, key to understanding his inability to overcome the severe mental illness that currently impairs every aspect of his life. Only by being reunited with them will he be able to recover and live a meaningful existence (for which, see further my paragraphs 44-46 below).

Interference
34. I did not understand it to be in issue that the decision to refuse entry clearance would, if family life exists, represent a lack of respect for, or interference with, that Article 8(1) right. It is on that basis that the Respondent has treated these applications as human rights claims, and the Appellants have been granted a right of appeal to the Tribunals.

Proportionality
35. The Respondent’s policy entitled ‘Family reunion: for individuals with protection status in the UK’ (version 10.0) 17 July 2023 gives the following guidance in respect of applications such as these, that is to say refugee family reunion claims which are not covered by the Immigration Rules:
Exceptional circumstances under Article 8 ECHR
Where a refugee family reunion application meets the validity and suitability requirements but does not meet the eligibility requirements of the rules, you must go on to consider whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of permission to stay or entry clearance a breach of Article 8 ECHR, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their relevant family member.
This is in line with Appendix FM GEN.3.2 – guidance on making this consideration can be found in the Family life (as a partner or parent) and exceptional circumstances guidance.
Relevant factors under Article 8
You should consider all relevant factors in the light of all the information and evidence provided by the applicant when deciding whether to issue permission to stay or entry clearance under ECHR Article 8.
Extra attention should be given to cumulative factors raised and these should be weighed against the public interest of maintaining effective immigration control and preventing burdens on the taxpayer. Relevant factors include, but are not limited to:
The nature and extent of the family relationships involved, including such matters as:
• The evidence that the applicant and sponsor have a genuine family life together
• If the relationship is between adult family members or wider family members, evidence of an unusual or exceptional level of dependency such that Article 8 is engaged
• How frequently the applicant currently has direct contact with the sponsor, with the consideration of what is practicably possible
Regarding adult family members and wider family members, whether or not family life exists requires a careful assessment of all the relevant facts presented in the application. Caselaw establishes clearly that love and affection between family members are not of themselves sufficient – further elements of emotional and/or financial dependency are necessary. The formal relationship or relationships between the relevant parties will be relevant, although ultimately it is the substance and not the form of the relationship or relationships that matters. The existence of effective, real or committed support is an indicator of family life. Co-habitation is generally a strong indication of the existence of family life. The extent and nature of any support from other family members will be relevant, as will the existence of any relevant cultural or social traditions. Mobeen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 886; Singh v SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 630 ("Singh 2").
If the sponsor has severe mental or physical health conditions which can only be improved by the applicant joining them in the UK, independent medical evidence must be provided to show that the sponsor has exhausted all treatment options and that the medical condition of the sponsor can only be improved by the applicant joining the sponsor in the UK. Consideration should be given to the applicant’s ability to care for the sponsor in the UK.
Given the nature of the route and circumstances of the sponsor, it is likely to be common that the applicant is in a conflict zone or dangerous situation. Where an application raises a protection need, you should be mindful that family reunion is not a protection route and asylum cannot be claimed from outside the UK. Individuals should apply for asylum in the first safe country they reach. You must also assess whether family life within the meaning of ECHR Article 8 can be enjoyed anywhere other than in the UK.
36. With that guidance in mind, I begin by addressing the public interest. There is in this case a clear and undeniable weight to be attached to the public interest in maintaining these refusals. The Applicants do not meet the requirements of the Rules, which in this context only provide for the family reunion of partners and children: see Appendix Family Reunion (Sponsors with Protection). Whether to extend the right of reunion in the Rules to other circumstances is a matter for the Respondent, and as matters stand, no such provision exists. I bear in mind that the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.
37. It is further in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak English are less of a burden on taxpayers, and are better able to integrate into society. None of the Appellants can speak English. This too is therefore a matter that must be weighed against them.
38. For the same reasons, it is contrary to the public interest to give entry to persons who are not financially independent. It is quite clear to this Tribunal, and Ms Turnbull did not argue to the contrary, that the admittance of these Appellants would place a significant burden upon the public purse. S is presently unable to work and is reliant on public funds. It is not only likely, but inevitable, that this too will be the position of his family members once they arrive. Both of the elder Appellants are already unwell. It appears likely that AA at least will require almost immediate medical attention upon arrival. This is therefore a matter to which I attach a great deal of weight.
39. Against these powerful factors in favour of dismissing the appeals, Ms Turnbull identifies the following matters.
40. First I am reminded of the circumstances in which this family came to be separated. None of them chose to leave Afghanistan. CC, DD and EE were being threatened with forced marriage. AA faced retribution from his brother. S was stabbed and was being coerced into joining the Taliban. He was only a child when he faced this serious persecution. This is the context in which this claim has to be viewed: none of the parties involved have chosen to leave their home country, and none of them chose to be separated. At the point that they were, S and his sisters were all children, and all indisputably part of the same family unit.
41. Next I am asked to consider their current circumstances. The Appellants are not living in a war zone; although I accept that they sometimes ‘go without’, they are not starving or destitute, nor are they facing the immediate risk of persecution. They are however in a very precarious situation, in which they may be deported to Afghanistan where any of those things could apply. It is this uncertainty which makes their present situation so hard to bear, for both them and S. I accept that the reality of living with the day-to-day risk of being apprehended and deported to Afghanistan is extremely stressful and frightening for the Appellants (at least the adults), and by extension for S.
42. I have given particular consideration to the best interests of the children, FF and GG. Whilst these children are with their primary carer, their mother, and their wider family, who no doubt provide them with a loving home, it is quite clearly contrary to their best interests that the adults around them are living in a state of constant worry and stress. It would be strongly contrary to their best interests for them to be removed to Afghanistan, and possibly back under the control of their violent father.
43. In her submissions Ms Tariq asked me to bear in mind that at present, family life is enjoyed through the use of video and audio calls, and regular messages. S has twice been able to visit Turkey to see his family. There will be cases where this submission will be a significant factor weighing in favour of maintaining the status quo, but in this case I am not satisfied that it does. First it does not take into account the inherent precarity of the Appellants’ situations in Turkey. Second, it fails to take into account the cultural and social context in which this family life exists, where as the eldest son, S is expected to fulfil a certain role: see Mobeen [2021] EWCA Civ 886. Most importantly, it fails to acknowledge the dilemma at the heart of this appeal, which turns on the mental health of S. This country has recognised S as a refugee and offered him its surrogate protection. He is however quite unable to take advantage of many of the benefits and rights that such status confers, because he is, as Mr Perkins puts it, mentally ‘stuck’. Dr Galathappie was of the view that S would be unable to found a family life of his own unless he was reunited with the Appellants, but the medical evidence speaks to something even more fundamental. In his current state it would appear that he is unable to even enjoy a private life, in all but the most limited of senses. He cannot leave his house to make build new relationships; he is unable to progress his recovery; he is inhibited from developing as a person. Instead he exists in what would appear to be an almost constant state of misery. In those circumstances I do not place any weight on the alternative posited by Ms Tariq, that family life be maintained by modern means of communication.
44. I have carefully considered a further submission made by Ms Tariq. Although the Secretary of State did not challenge any of the evidence adduced in respect of S’s mental health, she asked me to find the conclusions of Dr Galathappie and Mr Perkins to be speculative. Their hope that S will be able to progress his recovery with the support of his family can, she submits, be put no higher than that: it is simply a hope.
45. On the one hand, Ms Tariq is clearly right. Neither of these expert witnesses have a crystal ball. What they do have, however, is many years of experience working in this field, and the recognition by both parties and this Tribunal that they are experts, and that their reports and opinions are to be afforded appropriate weight. I cannot express it any better than Mr Perkins himself:
14. In my view, [S]’s continued separation from his family deprives him of a potential source of emotional and relational support that would act to help him combat his depressed mood. He would I believe (if he and his family are reunited) have a renewed sense of purpose and responsibility that could have positive benefits for his self-esteem. Being with his family would address his on-going feelings of dislocation and together with them he can begin to develop a new sense of home, safety, security and of a future that can be released from the grip of past adversity and trauma.
15. [S] experiences high levels of anxiety and ruminating worries regarding his family. This chronically elevated level of anxiety re-triggers his Complex and Chronic PTSD symptoms. Reconnected to past trauma and no longer in the present, feelings of helplessness, powerlessness, and terror, dominate and overwhelm him. Over time these, act corrosively, undermining and fragmenting his sense of himself as a whole person. The task of recovery and rebuilding himself as a person becoming more daunting and out of reach.
16. The continued separation from his family occupies [S]’s mind to the extent that there is little space for the development of himself as a person. I am of the view that unless this situation is resolved the work needed to effectively address his trauma will be undermined. I think that in [S]’s decision to end his current therapy there was at an unconscious level an understanding by him that he could go no further in addressing his trauma at this time, his attempts to do being undermined by the anxiety about his family, being separated from them and cut off from their emotional support and presence in his life”.
(emphasis added)
46. Whilst it remains true that all of this is, to some degree, speculation, that is the nature of medical prognosis. It is however speculation underpinned by a deep understanding of S’s condition, and many years of expertise dealing with similarly situated patients. It is also driven by both Mr Perkins and S recognising that he has reached the end of the road as far as treatment is concerned in the prevailing circumstances. He has, as the Respondent’s guidance, puts it, “exhausted all treatment options”:
If the sponsor has severe mental or physical health conditions which can only be improved by the applicant joining them in the UK, independent medical evidence must be provided to show that the sponsor has exhausted all treatment options and that the medical condition of the sponsor can only be improved by the applicant joining the sponsor in the UK. Consideration should be given to the applicant’s ability to care for the sponsor in the UK.
47. Finally I have given due weight to the fact that this is not a case in which the Appellants are trying to choose – or dictate- which country they can enjoy their family life in. They have no options. None of the family are able to return to Afghanistan, and on the present state of the evidence, it seems wholly unlikely that S would be able to join them in Turkey and that they could all regularise their position there. Nor does it seem likely that as asylum seekers the family would be able to look to any other European country to facilitate family reunion.
48. I have considered all of these factors cumulatively. Having done so, and having given due weight to the public interest, including the strong public interest in the maintenance of immigration control, I am satisfied that on the particular facts of this case the refusals of entry clearance are “unjustifiably harsh”. I find that the interference is, in these cases, disproportionate and the appeals must be allowed.

Decisions
49. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal has been set aside.
50. The decision in the appeals is remade as follows: the appeals are allowed on human rights grounds.
51. There is an order for anonymity in this matter, made to protect the identity of S, whose personal medical details are a feature of the case.


Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
1st August 2025


Annex


IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004700
UI-2024-004697
UI-2024-004701
UI-2024-004702
UI-2024-004703
UI-2024-004704
UI-2024-004705

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

AA
BB
CC
DD
EE
FF
GG
(anonymity order made)
Appellants
and

Entry Clearance Office, Turkey
Respondent
Representation:

For the Appellants: Ms E Turnbull, Counsel instructed by DLA Piper
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 January 2025

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify them, or any member of their family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellants and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants are all members of the same family. They are nationals of Afghanistan who seek permission to enter the United Kingdom on human rights grounds. Their appeal against a refusal to grant them entry clearance was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) on the 23rd July 2024. They were granted permission to appeal against that decision by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville on the 29th October 2024.
2. The matter in issue in this appeal is whether the FTT erred in its approach to whether the Appellants share a ‘family life’ for the purpose of Article 8 ECHR with their UK-based Sponsor, ‘S’. S is the adult son of AA and BB. CC, DD and EE are his sisters. FF and GG are the minor children of CC.

The Facts
3. S fled Afghanistan in late 2015/early 2016. He arrived in the United Kingdom in May 2016 and sought protection. He claimed on arrival that he was 15 years old, but was age assessed as being 18.
4. S was refused protection but granted Discretionary Leave. He re-established contact with the Appellants in 2019, by which time they were living in Turkey. He went to visit them there in 2020 and again in 2022.
5. S was granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK on the 4 September 2023.
6. The Appellants are currently living in Istanbul. They have no legal status there.

The Law
7. This appeal is brought pursuant to s82 (1)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against a decision to refuse a human rights claim. The single ground of appeal, in accordance with s84(2) of the Act, is that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that “it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”. The Convention right asserted by the Appellants is their right to ‘family life’ as protected by Article 8 ECHR. The first question in any such an appeal is whether the Article 8 is engaged on the facts.
8. In Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 the Court noted that not all familial relationships are protected by Article 8. That case concerned an adult living in Germany who wished to be reunited with a family member in the UK. Lady Justice Arden considered that “family life is not established between an adult child and his surviving parent or other siblings unless something more exists than normal emotional ties… Such ties might exist if the Appellant were dependent on his family or vice versa” [§25]. Lord Justice Sedley agreed that whilst many of us have blood relatives of whom we are “extremely fond”, these were not the kinds of relationships that the state parties had in mind when the Convention was signed. Reviewing the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights he agreed with Arden LJ that some kind of dependency would be required, and held:
“17. If dependency is read down as meaning ‘support’, in the personal sense, and if one adds, echoing the Strasbourg jurisprudence, ‘real’ or ‘committed’ or ‘effective’ to the word ‘support’, then it represents in my view the irreducible minimum of what family life implies.”
9. Kugathas has remained the lead case on adult relationships within the ambit of Article 8, but its effect, and in particular what is required to show “real…committed…or effective support” has been the subject of further commentary by the Court of Appeal. In Singh v Entry Clearance Officer [2015] EWCA Civ 630 Stanley Burnton LJ held:
“24. I do not think that the judgments to which I have referred lead to any difficulty in determining the correct approach to Article 8 in cases involving adult children. In the case of adults, in the context of immigration control, there is no legal or factual presumption as to the existence or absence of family life for the purposes of Article 8. I point out that the approach of the European Commission for Human Rights cited approvingly in Kugathas did not include any requirement of exceptionality. It all depends on the facts. The love and affection between an adult and his parents or siblings will not of itself justify a finding of a family life. There has to be something more. A young adult living with his parents or siblings will normally have a family life to be respected under Article 8. A child enjoying a family life with his parents does not suddenly cease to have a family life at midnight as he turns 18 years of age. On the other hand, a young adult living independently of his parents may well not have a family life for the purposes of Article 8.”
10. In Rai v Entry Clearance Officer, New Delhi [2017] EWCA Civ 320 the Court considered the appeal of a Nepalese man whose father had come to settle in the UK as a former Gurkha. He wanted to join him. At the date that the Court considered the appeal, father and son – by then 31 years old – had been separated for some 7 years. The Tribunal had dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the son could no longer be said to enjoy a ‘family life’ with his father. The Court held that the Tribunal had set the hurdle for engaging Article 8 too high. It approved the commentary of the Upper Tribunal in Ghising (family life – adults – Gurkha policy) [2012] UKUT 00160 (IAC) that Kugathas had in the past been read too restrictively, and underlined that there is no requirement, either by domestic or Strasbourg authority, for some exceptional circumstance to be shown.

The Appeal Before the FTT
11. The hearing of the appeal took place at Taylor House. S attended and gave evidence, as did a Mr Kevin Perkins, a psychotherapist who had been treating S for some time. The Tribunal was in addition provided with a great deal of written evidence, including a report by an Independent Social Worker Ms Jones, a medico-legal report by consultant psychiatrist Dr Galathappie, and S’s GP notes.
12. The Tribunal’s written decision summarises much of this evidence in fair and proportionate detail. It notes S’s own evidence that his mental health is adversely affected by his constant worry for his family. He is extremely concerned about them having no status in Turkey and the fact that they face a real danger of deportation to Turkey. He feels “severe tension” because of this [§12]. Also, they do not have enough money to live on, even though his sisters are working. Discussing these issues with them affects him mentally and makes his condition worse”. S told the FTT that he has long video calls with his family twice a week. They also have a family whatsapp group which is in daily use. Sending and receiving these messages makes S feel happy when he finds out that they are okay, but he feels very uncomfortable if they do not answer because it makes him very worried and stressed that they might have been sent back to Afghanistan. S explained:
“15. His role in the family is like a guardian. All of his family look to him as a father because he does not have another brother and their father is elderly and unable to do anything. They look to him in particular because he is their only hope. They live a very difficult life and want him to recover and take responsibility for them…”
13. Mr Perkins is found by the Tribunal to be an “impressive witness” [§66]. He saw S every fortnight between 2019 and 2023 and continues to support him. He concurred with the conclusions of the consultant psychiatrist that S is suffering from depression, anxiety and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. In many respects he functions as a person in their mid to late teens rather than someone in their mid 20s. Mr Perkins had travelled to Turkey with S when he had gone to meet the Appellants. Mr Perkins told the Tribunal that S had been quite depressed before that visit, and had been suffering from debilitating headaches; both these symptoms had been markedly relieved by being physically reunited with his family. The FTT summarises Mr Perkins’ evidence about that trip as follows:
“45. The Sponsor was in a fragile state before they went to Turkey. He was constantly anxious about his mental health, his past and his family members, including his parents’ health and their precarious state as undocumented people. The Sponsor’s anxiety about his family helped to trigger his symptoms of PTSD and made him depressed, which made his mental health worse. During the visit, he noticed that all members of the family were overjoyed. It was an emotional occasion in which the Sponsor became much “lighter” and his headaches reduced markedly. He noticed the Sponsor’s potential for enjoyment and relaxation, as well as relief at seeing his family, and especially his parents about whom he was most concerned. When the Sponsor returned here, his mood plunged into depression, he became more introverted and struggled with sleeplessness. During the visit, there was physical warmth and emotion between the Sponsor and his family. There was mutual concern for what had happened since they last saw each other, as well as joy at being together again”.
14. Considering this evidence, the Tribunal accepted that the Sponsor and Appellants were in regular contact [§78]. It further accepted the evidence of Mr Perkins that their reunion in Turkey was “highly emotional” [§§80-81], and the evidence of the Independent Social Worker Miss Jones that the family are “bonded by close kinship ties”, and that they “derive much pleasure from their contact with each other, which they greatly value… and that they feel whole when they are together” [§81]. The Tribunal further accepted that S has serious and long-term mental health problems. His PTSD is complex and chronic in nature; he suffers “levels of despair and hopelessness which are strongly associated with increased risks of suicide and harm” . The Tribunal accepts that these symptoms are alleviated by contact with the Appellants, in particular direct, in person contact.
15. Having made these findings, the Tribunal turns to consider the facts. It accepts, at its [§73] that given that S was a teenager at the time, “family life probably existed between the Sponsor and his family before the Sponsor left Afghanistan. They lived together as a family unit in the family home”. This however changed when S left Afghanistan with no intention of returning there. The question, the Tribunal directed itself, was whether that family life had resumed since the family managed to re-establish contact in 2019. Although S claimed to send his family money every four or five months there was no evidence about the extent to which they relied on that money, and the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was here any financial dependency [§76]. Nor was it satisfied that S and his family could be giving each other any practical support, since they were living in different countries [§77]. That left emotional dependency. The Tribunal accepted that the S and his family are in regular contact, including daily whatsapp messages and twice weekly lengthy video calls. It accepted the evidence of Ms Jones and Mr Perkins that the family experienced joy when reunited; they are all living in difficult circumstances and their spirits are understandably lifted by seeing each other. This does not, however, in the view of the Tribunal, amount to an emotional dependency. Whilst everyone might fervently wish to re-establish a family life together, this is not the same as a family life existing now:
“79. I do not accept that the extent of this contact probably amounts to emotional support because I do not accept that it is anything more than a manifestation of the ordinary emotional ties which exist between adult relatives. Close adult relatives are often in frequent and, sometimes, lengthy contact with each other, without having family life together. This may continue over a prolonged period especially, for example, where there is illness or where there are other concerns about their wellbeing. The Appellants and the Sponsor both live in difficult circumstances. The Appellants say that they are living illegally in Turkey and that they fear being deported to Afghanistan. The First and Second Appellants have health problems. The Sponsor has serious mental health problems, does not work, has a limited social network and lives on his own.
80. I accept Mr Perkins’ evidence that the visit to Turkey was a highly emotional event for the Sponsor, his parents and his sisters. However, I do not accept that this joy establishes that family life probably exists because any close relatives who were reunited in similar circumstances would be overjoyed, irrespective of whether family life existed.
…
83. In brief summary, this evidence does little more than establish that the Sponsor is a much-loved member of a close-knit family, that the Appellants and the Sponsor derive much pleasure from their contact with each other, which they value greatly, that this contact helps to raise their spirits, and that they feel whole when they are together. They worry a lot about each other. They feel low when they cannot speak to each other because of their worries about each other, which affects their health. They want to be reunited because this will be beneficial for them all. They would like the Sponsor to take over the role of head of the family from his elderly father but he cannot do this effectively at the present because they are separated. The separation affects the Sponsor’s mental health but he will recover if they are reunited.
84. Insofar as this relates to the present, these are all manifestations of the ordinary emotional ties that exist between close relatives. It does not show any real, effective or committed support over and above this.
…
88. Looking at all the evidence in the round, I do not accept that family life has been reestablished between the Sponsor and the Appellants. The various aspects of their relationship, including their hope that the Sponsor will take over as head of the family, are all aspects of their love, affection and concern for each other viewed from different perspectives and are not therefore separate considerations which change their complexion when they are viewed cumulatively. In the passage I have quoted from Sedley LJ’s judgment in Kuguthas, Sedley LJ said “neither blood ties nor the concern and affection that ordinarily go with them are, by themselves or together, in my judgment enough to constitute family life”. For these reasons, I do not accept that family life exists between the Sponsor and any of the Appellants.
16. It followed that the appeal would be dismissed.

The Grounds of Appeal: Discussion and Findings
17. I have set out the FTT’s reasoning to the extent that I have in order to reflect that this is a case which the FTT approached with care and – although it was not a protection claim – with appropriately anxious scrutiny. I can only interfere with it if I am satisfied that it is flawed for clear error of law. The substance of the challenge is that the Tribunal set the bar too high when considering whether or not Article 8 was engaged. Ms Turnbull makes two, related, submissions in support of that ground. The first is that the Tribunal has misdirected itself to search for some ‘exceptionality’ in the facts; the second is that on those facts, the denial of the existence of a family life here was irrational. Somewhat reluctantly, given the work that clearly went into the judgment, I am satisfied that both these criticisms are made out.
18. I deal first with the repeated allusions to exceptionality. In her written grounds Ms Turnbull highlights several passages in which the Tribunal appears to measure the relationships displayed here against some ‘notional comparator’. The grounds point out that the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the ’notional comparator’ approach: see HA (Iraq), RA (Iraq), AA (Nigeria) [2022] UKSC 22, [40]-[44]. In granting permission to appeal to this Tribunal, Judge Neville had his doubts about the validity of this particular point, and his is a scepticism I share. HA (Iraq) was a case about the approach to be taken in deportation appeals. It seems to me that in this context the test is quite different. The authorities here expressly invite decision makers to evaluate the claimed family life against those of others: “family life is not established…unless something more exists than normal emotional ties (per Arden LJ in Kugathas, emphasis added).
19. The real question here is whether the Tribunal misunderstood what the Court of Appeal meant by ‘normal’. In considering the evidence of daily contact the Tribunal writes “I do not accept that the extent of this contact probably amounts to emotional support because I do not accept that it is anything more than a manifestation of the ordinary emotional ties which exist between adult relatives” (emphasis added). One might ask here whether men in their mid-twenties ‘ordinarily’ spend hours a week talking to their sisters and messaging their parents. More revealingly at its §80 the Tribunal dismisses Mr Perkins’ evidence about the intensity of the reunion by saying “any close relatives who were reunited in similar circumstances would be overjoyed”. This was a clear error. ‘Normal’ does not mean ‘normal for someone similarly situated’. It just means ‘normal’. It is no doubt true that any ‘normal’ Afghan family separated by war, forced migration, trauma, years and thousands of miles would be similarly overjoyed to see each other, but that does not defeat this claim, since that would not be a family living in ‘normal’ circumstances. That the Tribunal misunderstood the test is further illustrated by its reference to families who are brought closer together by serious illness. Again, that is not a ‘normal’ state of affairs. That is a paradigm situation in which Article 8 may be engaged: for instance, where an adult child has to look after an ailing parent. The Tribunal’s search for some ever more extreme emotional attachment meant it failed to stand back and ask itself the simple question: is there here evidence of real, effective, committed support?
20. The answer to that question must, in my view, be yes. The evidence from the point of view of the Appellants was that AA, the father of the family, is elderly and increasingly unfirm. In accordance with his culture he now looks to his son to support his household of women. They are all living under a significant degree of stress, in a foreign environment and in fear of removal to Afghanistan. They have all missed S and worry about him, but at the same time see him as their “only hope”. That is the background to their daily contact, and lengthy calls to him. From the point of view of S himself, the evidence is even more powerful. Mr Perkins has known S, and this family, for a number of years. He was able to speak in detail about the extent of the mental health problems suffered by S and how extraordinarily important it is to him to be reunited with his family. Even more stark was the evidence of consultant psychiatrist Dr Galappathie – unchallenged and accepted by the Tribunal – that “The Sponsor has complex conditions which prevent him developing his own family life here” [from the FTTs own summary at its §62]. For this reason his entire family life is with the Appellants. I am satisfied that the only answer to the question of whether the members of this family show each other real, effective and committed emotional support is yes.
21. I set the decision of the FTT aside and find as fact that there is a family life at play here. The remaining Razgar questions must be considered and determined following a further hearing before me.

Decisions
22. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
23. The decision in the appeal will be remade following a further hearing.
24. There is presently an order for anonymity in this matter, made to protect the identity of S, whose personal medical details are a feature of the case. Should either party consider that this order is not appropriate, an application for its discharge should be made prior to, or at, the resumed hearing.


Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
14th February 2025