Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004708
UI-2024-004718
UI-2024-004717
First-tier Tribunal Nos:
A1 - PA/51760/2023
A2 - PA/51754/2023
A3 - PA/51759/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

A1, A2, A3

(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellants: Mr Winter
For the Respondent: Mr Mullan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh on 29 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The First-tier Tribunal [1-2] has set out the factual background to the appeal:
There are three Appellants. They are A1 [DBH], A2 [KAA] and A3 [MMAA]. Each is a national of Iraq. A1 and A2 are married. A3 is the mother of A1; and the mother-in-law of A2.
Each appellant made a claim for asylum. The claims for asylum for A1-A3 are based on events which are claimed to have happened in September 2018, to A1. In ASA the factual matrix of the claims is set out as follows: “8. It is the appellant’s position that in around September 2018, whilst working at the petrol station, the first appellant was approached by a man in plain clothes requesting petrol. It is the appellant’s position that this man refused to pay, advising the first appellant that he was a member of the PMF. It is the appellant’s position that the first appellant got into an argument with this man who thereafter threatened to kill him. It is the appellant’s position that the first appellant’s colleague, Swara Fwad, confirmed that the man who he had the altercation with was indeed a member of the PMF and that he would likely return to the petrol station with other members to kill the first appellant.
2. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeals. The appellants now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
3. Granting permission to appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce wrote:
This First-tier Tribunal decision appears, when read in isolation, unassailable. I grant permission because I consider it arguable -just- that the Tribunal should have considered whether the second appellant was in fact a vulnerable witness. The Tribunal understood her to be illiterate and uneducated [at its 32] and that she had been referred for trauma counselling [48]. It nevertheless drew heavily upon confusion and discrepancy in her evidence, particularly in relation to dates.
Although I have focused here on what I think is the best point in the grounds, the grant of permission is not limited
4. The parties (and the judge) acknowledged that the appellant A2 was illiterate and uneducated [32.1]. No application was made for A2 to be treated as a vulnerable witness. I note that different lawyers appeared for each of the three appellants at the First-tier Tribunal hearing.
5. A failure to treat as vulnerable a witness who presents with characteristics which plainly indicate vulnerability may amount to an error of law. However, I do not consider that the judge has erred. First, as I have already noted, the A2 was separately professionally represented but no application to treat A2 as vulnerable was made either before or at the hearing. Secondly, this is a case in which the judge has reminded himself more than once that all the appellants were illiterate [31.1] and that ‘each has gone on to develop a factual claim which is different in material facts from that first stated at interview.’ Thirdly, the judge found that the evidence of the witnesses A1 and A2 (which arose from their respective recollection of the same event) was unsatisfactory in addition to inconsistent. At [31.8], the judge wrote:
Putting aside the inconsistency between accounts; there is a notable lack of detail about any discussion between A1 and A2 at the point when A1 says he heard from his colleague at the petrol station. A1 maintains that it was then that he realised he was not safe; and that it was then that he spoke with his boss; and that it was then that a ‘safe-house’ was identified. However, the appellants do not consistently say that they spoke between themselves at that point; or give a consistent account of what was actually said. It is said by A1 and A2 in some sources of evidence that it was only later during a phone call made after A1 fled the home that A1 told A2 about the problems with PMF. I consider it extremely unlikely that A1 and A2 would not have been talking about the problem with PMF or even be discussing between themselves the reasons why A1 was leaving the house. In other sources, such as A2’s Q126 it appears that there was discussion about what happened and even a discussion about whether he could stay in Iraq.
The reasons given in this paragraph by the judge for doubting the veracity of the evidence A1 and A2 are not obviously connected with the claimed educational deficiencies of A2. It is unclear why a lack of education or illiteracy should prevent A2 from discussing with A1 why the latter considered it necessary to leave home or why the same problems should have prevented her from giving a consistent account of past events. Moreover, A2 may have received trauma counselling but without medical evidence detailing the effect of any trauma on A2’s cognitive ability or memory it does not follow that the judge would have been obliged to accept that either had been affected by trauma such as to explain the problems in her evidence. To underline the fact that he had had in mind throughout the appellants’ lack of education but also to explain that he found their evidence unpersuasive in any event, the judge states at ]32.1] (my emphasis):
There is a very striking difference in evidence concerning possession of identity documents. A2 and A3 give inconsistent accounts about when property was destroyed in their claims that PMF appeared at the family home after A1 left the house. Separately, I draw on my discussion about identity documents which I discuss elsewhere; but it is quite clear in my judgement that A2 gave an entirely different account of events when represented by different representatives. Amendments were made to interview for A2 by former representatives which clearly explained (on the account pursued at that time) that the PMF raid and destruction of personal belongings happened long before the petrol station incident. I was not taken to evidence about any challenge to the former representative’s authority. The change in A2’s evidence happened after husband and wife discussed what had happened in Iraq. I am not persuaded that being illiterate or uneducated reasonably explains the significant and material difference in A2’s evidence about such an important matter as destruction of property which either happened before her husband fled from the home; or happened after he did so.
In my judgement, taking all of the evidence in the round, the material inconsistencies in the evidence relate to matters at the core of each claim made by respective appellants. Ultimately, the evidence of the appellants concerning the claimed central events, was left in a state of contradiction and confusion. The inconsistencies are not the sort of matters which might reasonably be explained by lack of education, or by anxiety at the time of recalling events. They relate to important and significant matters of fact.
6. In essence, the grounds of appeal make the very criticisms of the judge which he has anticipated in his decision. He has explained at length why the characteristics of A2 which it is now said amount to vulnerability do not detract from his finding that A2 gave evidence which failed to discharge the burden of proof. Indeed, given the judge’s reasoning, it seems very likely that, had he treated the A2 as a vulnerable witness, he would have still arrived at the same conclusions.
7. The remaining grounds are without merit. The appellants assert that the judge wrongly recorded the oral evidence of A1 (‘In oral evidence, A1 said that he had not told his wife about what had happened’[19]) but there has been no application by the appellants’ representatives to consider the recording of the hearing or to ask the judge for his contemporaneous notes of the hearing. In the circumstances, there is no reason to doubt what the judge has recorded in his decision.
8. The assertion that the judge was ‘overly literal’ in his interpretation of the evidence is not made out. The grounds assert that A1 had said that he ‘went’ to his employer’s friend’s house and elsewhere in the evidence that he had been taken there. At [31.9] the judge wrote (my emphasis):
The evidence about fleeing the home is also inconsistent. On one account A1 was given advice and fled himself; on another account A1 was picked up from the house by someone else and taken to the ‘safe-house.’
First, the judge was entitled to consider A1’s evidence as inconsistent. Secondly, even if the judge has taken too literal an approach, the finding is one of many which led the judge to reject the accounts of the appellant and one which would not undermine the fact finding exercise as a whole.
9. In my opinion, the judge has made a cogent and detailed decision which properly takes into account the characteristics of the witnesses who gave evidence at the hearing. The grounds of appeal fail to show that the judge erred in law. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.

Notice of Decision
The appeals are dismissed.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 2 October 2025