UI-2024-004755
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: Case No: UI-2024-004755
First-tier Tribunal No: PA680702023
IA/01068/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
12th June 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
Between
HA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Jebb
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Royal Courts of Justice (Belfast) on 14 May 2026
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Error of law decision
1. By a decision promulgated on 5 February 2026, I found that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside and I directed a resumed hearing at Belfast which took place on 14 May 2026. My error of law decision is annexed to this decision and marked Annexe A.
Resumed hearing : 14 May 2026
2. At the resumed hearing, the appellant relied on a supplementary bundle of documents. He also gave oral evidence. I have considered the new evidence, including the appellant’s oral testimony, together the evidence which had been before the First-tier Tribunal when remaking the decision. Only Article 8 ECHR was considered at the resumed hearing; as I indicated in my error of law decision, the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on asylum and Article 3 ECHR were not revisited. The standard of proof in the Article 8 ECHR appeal is the balance of probabilities.
Submissions
3. Ms Ahmed, for the Secretary of State, submitted that I should reject the appellant’s evidence of his relationship with Ms HK. She did not challenge the appellant’s claim that he married Ms HK in Belfast in 2025 but she submitted that the evidence of cohabitation of the appellant and his wife was not reliable. An occupancy agreement for the property at which the appellant and Ms HK claim to be living was required to be signed by all individuals over 18 years old resident at the property but the copy filed at the Tribunal bore only the appellant’s signature. Ms Ahmed also submitted that the failure of Ms HK to provide an updated statement indicated that the couple were not cohabiting as claimed. Ms Ahmed submitted that the test for an Article 8 ECHR appeal outside the rules was that of unjustifiably harsh consequences and that the appellant had failed to show that either he or his spouse would suffer such consequences if the appellant were required to return to Iran to make an out of country application for entry clearance. Ms Ahmed argued that there was a ceasefire in the conflict between Iran and the USA and that it would be safe at present for the appellant to return to Iran.
4. Mr Jebb, for the appellant, agreed that the correct legal test is that of unjustifiably harsh consequences. Contrary to the position adopted by the Secretary of State at a earlier stage in the proceedings, he submitted that this is not a ‘durable relationship’ or a ‘sham marriage’ case; he rejected the submissions of Ms Ahmed seeking to cast doubt on the genuineness of the appellant’s marriage or their claimed cohabitation. Given the political and military situation, the appellant would face ‘deep uncertainty’ if he was required now to return to Iran to make an application for entry clearance.
Findings
5. I find that the appellant has given truthful evidence about his relationship with Ms HK. I find that that the couple married in Belfast as they claim. I reject Ms Ahmed’s submissions challenging the genuine nature of the relationship. In particular, I accept the appellant’s evidence that the landlord of the premises where the couple currently live did not, as the appellant states, ask Ms HK to sign the agreement. The document does indicate that it should be signed by all residents over 18 but, frankly, the appellant’s claim that the landlord told him that it was sufficient that he alone signed has the ring of truth. Likewise, I reject the respondent’s submission that the fact that Ms HK has not provided a further written statement in some way indicates that she is concealing the truth of her relationship with the appellant. I accept the appellant’s evidence that his representatives told him that there was no need for Ms HK to provide further evidence. Having been told that, there was no reason for the appellant to provide further evidence from Ms HK.
6. I find, therefore, that the appellant and Ms HK are legally married, are in a genuine relationship and that they cohabit.
Discussion
7. The central issue remaining in this appeal is whether requiring the appellant to return to Iran to make an out of country application for entry clearance would have unjustifiably harsh consequences for himself and Ms HK such that the substantial public interest in the removal of the appellant would be outweighed.
8. Article 8 ECHR does not permit the appellant and his wife (neither are United Kingdom citizens; Ms HK is a national of Iraq, who has refugee status in this country) to choose where they continue their relationship. The public interest in maintaining control of immigration establishes a very high threshold which even significantly difficult consequences for the appellant and his wife will not surmount. I am not persuaded by Ms Ahmed’s submission that a ceasefire in the conflict in Iran indicates that it is safe for the appellant to return; by the time I am writing this decision, the conflict has developed and changed numerous times beyond the news reports upon which Ms Ahmed relied. Equally, Mr Jebb did not refer me to any evidence which might show that the current conflict renders it impossible or unduly harsh for the appellant to return or to make an application out of country. I am prepared to take judicial notice of the fact that the current conflict may have made life for ordinary Iranians very difficult indeed but there was before me no evidence which could legitimately lead me to conclude that it would be impossible or unsafe for the appellant to return and apply. Moreover, the appellant and his wife have no children whilst there was no evidence that being a temporary separation would impact upon the health or personal living arrangements of the appellant or his wife to an extent which could properly be described as unjustifiably harsh.
9. In conclusion, whilst I accept the genuineness of the appellant’s marriage and cohabitation with Ms HK, I find that the consequences of separation for the period it is likely to take for the appellant to apply for entry clearance out of country would not have unjustifiably harsh for the appellant or his wife. It follows that the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds should be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
I have remade the decision. The appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 14 December 2023 is dismissed.
C. N. Lane
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 20 May 2026
ANNEXE A
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a male citizen of Iran. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of the Secretary of State dated 14 December 2023 refusing his claim for international protection. The First-tier Tribunal, by a decision dated 3 September 2024, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
2. Although he did not restrict the grounds of appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman at [3] focussed on the judge’s determination of the appeal on human rights (Article 8 ECHR) grounds. At the initial hearing, Mr Jebb, for the appellant, did not address me at all as regards the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on asylum/Article 3 ECHR. Although, for the reasons I give below, I set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, when the decision is remade the Upper Tribunal shall only be concerned with the appeal on Article 8 ECHR grounds; the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on asylum and Article 3 ECHR shall not be revisited.
3. The First-tier Tribunal’s analysis of Article 8 ECHR begins ay [54]. The judge was aware that the appellant claims both a private life and a family life in the United Kingdom. His claimed partner is Ms HK. As Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman observed when granting permission, the First-tier Tribunal has not made any clear findings as to whether the appellant and Ms HK enjoy family life in the United Kingdom. The judge discusses (briefly and without clarity) exceptional circumstances at [60] and accepts [62] that the appellant has a private life in the United Kingdom but, although he mentions the appellant’s relationship with Ms HK [55] and the fact that the Secretary of State argues that there is no family life [58], he makes no clear finding himself nor does he state whether he agrees with the Secretary of State. The loser in any appeal (the appellant in this instance) is entitled to know why he lost. The First-tier Tribunal’s determination provides no clarity in that regard, as Ms Arif, for the Secretary of State, acknowledged at the initial hearing.
4. The decision is set aside (subject to what I say at [2] above). I shall remake the decision in the Upper Tribunal at a resumed hearing in Belfast on a date to be fixed. The parties may adduce new evidence provided any evidence is filed at the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party at least 10 days prior to the resumed hearing. Any request for an interpreter must be made within 7 days after the appellant and his representatives receive this decision.
Notice of Decision
I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The decision shall be remade by Upper Tribunal Judge Lane at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal on the next date the judge is sitting in Belfast.