Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004756

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60499/2023
LP/03784/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

20th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RICHARDS

Between

DE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Collins, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr M Parver, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant, who is a citizen of Albania, appeals against the respondent’s decision dated 1 November 2023 to refuse her protection claim made on 18 May 2022. The respondent found that the asylum claim, the humanitarian protection claim, and the Article 8 ECHR claim all fail.
2. The appellant’s appeal was originally heard and dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 15 August 2024. However, on 13 January 2025 we set aside that decision on the basis that it contained a material error of law, whilst preserving some findings that are detailed below. We reserved the remaking to ourselves. A copy of our error of law decision is appended to this decision.
Anonymity
3. The First-tier Tribunal made an order for anonymity and no application has been received to set that aside. In making an order for anonymity, we have considered the strong public interest in open justice. However, in this case it is outweighed by the appellant’s interests, as her case relates to the risk of harm she would face if her identity and the issues in this case were to become known to those who pose a risk to her.
Background
4. The background to the case is set out at [3] to [6] of our error of law decision which appears in the Appendix and is not therefore rehearsed here.
Preserved findings
5. In our error of law decision, we set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision in its entirety except for the preserved findings at [12] to [18].
“12. The appellant says that she was offered work by some Albanian women, but this turned out to be sexual exploitation. She was there for about a week before she managed to escape. There were a number of inconsistencies between the two interviews relating to her time with these people and the manner of her escape, but although raised in the refusal letter, these were not explored in cross-examination. In any event, the respondent accepts that the appellant was a victim of trafficking.
13. The appellant then says that she called her mother after her escape. Her mother contacted the appellant’s cousin who collected the appellant and took her to her aunt’s house. From there she managed to enter the United Kingdom via Ireland in early January 2024, making her asylum claim in May 2024.
14. I find that the appellant was only in Italy for a matter of days before being exploited and held against her will. She did have time to go to the relevant place to claim asylum but backed out, however she never had another chance to make a claim before the exploitation. She was though in Italy for a further fortnight after her escape before leaving. She failed to claim in Ireland and delayed her claim in the United Kingdom for a number of months. I find that this conduct could engage sections 8(2)(c) and 8(4) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimant’s etc.) Act 2004. However, when determining whether the appellant’s credibility should be affected as a result, I take into account the following:
(a) The appellant was a young woman when she left Albania. Some hesitation about going to the authorities initially could be understandable. She was then trafficked before having a second chance to make a claim in Italy. I therefore do not hold this point against her.
(b) In the two weeks after her escape where she was still in Italy, I find that she was likely to have been traumatised and therefore some delay was acceptable. She was then offered help to move her to a country where she had not been sexually abused rather than staying in a country where she had not been safe. I therefore do not hold this point against her.
(c) She claims not to have claimed in Ireland because she has family there who she feared. She has given no evidence of these family members, but I accept her claim as it was not challenged in cross examination. I therefore do not hold this point against her.
(d) In terms of the delay in claiming in the United Kingdom, I find that some delay is acceptable. A person arriving in the United Kingdom who has not gone through passport control is entitled to take a period of time before claiming without it affecting their credibility. How long is appropriate would vary from person to person. She would have had to find out how to make an asylum claim, having not encountered border staff on her arrival, and would have needed time to recover from what was, I find, a traumatic period of time for a young woman to have gone through.
15. Therefore, whilst I find section 8 could potentially be engaged, I find that it is not in this case due to the explanations given by the appellant.
16. I find from the evidence given that the appellant is a member of the LGBT+ community and that she has an objectively well-founded fear of her father, uncle and some other family members as a result of her membership of this particular social group.
17. As to whether she is at risk more generally I find that whilst there are still pockets of discrimination and non-acceptance of LGBT+ people, the CPIN shows that the authorities do not discriminate. Same sex marriage is legal, discrimination against members of the LGBT+ community can be considered a hate crime. I further remind myself of IM (Risk – Objective Evidence – Homosexuals) Albania CG [2003] UKIAT 00067 which says “there is no country background evidence which supports a reasonable likelihood that homosexuals as such in Albania are subject to any action on the part of either the populace or the authorities which would amount to persecution for the purposed of the Refugee Convention or would be in breach of their protected human rights.” As such, I find that the risk of harm does not extend past her family members.
18. I find that the appellant is a victim of trafficking, having been forced into sexual exploitation in Italy.”
Evidence, failure to comply with directions, and the hearing
6. Both parties sought to introduce documents out of time in contravention of our directions contained in the error of law decision. These were an additional evidence bundle on behalf of the appellant, a skeleton argument on behalf of the appellant, a skeleton argument on behalf of the respondent, and asylum documents relating to the appellant’s family members put forward on behalf of the appellant.
7. Further, there was no formal application by the appellant’s legal representatives to introduce their additional evidence as is required by rule 15 (2A) of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
8. Such actions and inactions we find to be contrary to the parties’ duties under rule 2 (4) of these Rules.
9. In considering our duty to deal with this case fairly and justly, and considering the potential ramifications for the appellant of making an inaccurate decision, we allowed all the documents to be admitted and allowed Mr Parver the time he requested to consider the additional documentation that he had not previously seen.
10. Thus in addition to the evidence before us at the error of law hearing, we also considered the documents discussed above in [6].
11. The case proceeded then by way of submissions from both parties and the oral evidence of the appellant, who was assisted by an interpreter.
12. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision.
Issues in dispute
13. In his skeleton argument, Mr Collins sets out that the appellant’s case is that the live issues are: the risk of re-trafficking, sufficiency of protection, internal relocation, very significant obstacles integrating in Albania, and Article 8 ECHR in relation to private life.
14. The respondent made no concessions in relation to these issues.
Legal framework
15. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. In this case there is the preserved fact that the appellant has such a fear by reason of being in the particular social group of the LGBT+ community, and that the risk stems from her father, uncle, and some family members but that this risk does not extend past her family members. However as well as this, for the appeal to succeed the appellant must also show that there is not a sufficiency of protection available to her in Albania relating to this risk. In assessing this, the risk of the appellant being re-trafficked is relevant, and the issue of internal relocation may be relevant.
16. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds an appellant must show a real risk of serious harm at the date of the hearing. In assessing this risk, we note that the standard required is less than a 50% chance of persecution occurring and that even a 10% chance that an appellant will face persecution for a Convention reason may satisfy the relevant test, as discussed in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] Civ 216. This lower standard of risk assessment is sometimes referred to as a reasonable degree of likelihood or a serious possibility.
Findings of fact
Risk of re-trafficking
17. In considering this issue we have applied the Country Guidance case of TD and AD (Trafficked Women) GC [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) as follows:
a. The social status and economic standing of her family: The appellant has not had contact with her father for several years, however her most recent knowledge of him when she was in Albania was that he worked as a seasonal worker in Greece and as such is unlikely to have a high level of economic resources or social status The appellant’s mother is no longer in Albania and also unlikely to have significant social status or economic resources.
b. The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family: We find that the appellant has an above average level of education for her country as there is insufficient evidence before us to refute the respondent’s evidence that the average length of schooling in Albania is 9.7 years and the appellant has completed 10.1 years. Further, the appellant was able to obtain a place at university in Albania which demonstrates aptitude and motivation, albeit that she had to drop out of university. The appellant did work as a hairdresser in Albania, has obtained further training as a hairdresser in the UK, and would be capable of undertaking further vocational training should she wish to practice in a different profession.
c. The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health: Although the skeleton argument of the appellant states that her mental health is not good, the only evidence put forward to support this was the oral evidence of the appellant which we find to be vague and lacking in detail. There was no medical evidence of any kind put forward at any point in these proceedings relating to the appellant’s mental health despite her ongoing claims that she does suffer from adverse mental health. We find that any adverse mental health condition that the appellant does suffer from is not so severe that removal to Albania would significantly increase the risk of her health deteriorating. We also accept the respondent’s submission that in any event, there is sufficient medical resources that would be available to her in Albania to support her health needs.
d. The presence of an illegitimate child: The appellant does not have any children.
e. The area of origin: The appellant is from an outer suburb of Tirana, the capital and largest city in Albania. This is also the area of the country with the greatest level of support available to victims of trafficking. There was no dispute before us that there are NGOs operating in Tirana that are able to offer specialised support, include housing, for victims of trafficking.
f. Age: The appellant is a woman in her early twenties who, although outside the age bracket that is most at risk of re-trafficking according to the CPIN, remains of an age where individuals may be at risk of re-trafficking.
g. What support network will be available: There will be no or little family support available to the appellant, since the risk posed to her comes from some of her family members and other family members including her mother now live outside Albania. However the appellant has demonstrated the ability in this country to develop and maintain relationships and it is likely that this ability will continue to hold, particularly in a culture with which she is familiar and speaking her native language. Additionally, as discussed above, there are specialist NGOs available to provide her support in the short and medium term. We note that traditionally it has been unusual for a single woman to live on her own in Albania, this was commented on in BF v SSHD [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC) (which was upheld on appeal) at [243] as follows:
“We do not accept the assertion that a single gay man could not live alone and we find that it is an option that is reasonably open to him. The evidence of the Albanian Ombudsman to the Home Office Fact-Finding Mission is that Tirana in particular is experiencing a cultural change and “rapidly advancing” to a Western way of life where single people (in that context single women) do live alone. Ms Young accepted that the position of a single woman living alone would be more challenging than that of a single male. “
It is now some 6 years after that judgement was made and absent any persuasive countervailing evidence, we find it likely that the “rapidly advancing” contention in that judgement will have continued and that it is increasingly less challenging for a single woman to live alone in Tirana. The appellant also has the advantage of being able to draw on her experiences of successfully living alone in more than one location in the UK.
h. The location of the original trafficking: It is of significance that the trafficking did not take place from Albania, but instead from a non-neighbouring European country. Although the appellant asserts that the traffickers have criminal links within Albania, there is no persuasive supportive evidence of this, and in particular no persuasive evidence that any links are substantial, sophisticated, or are likely to pose a particular risk to the appellant in Albania.
i. The appellant’s sexuality: It is a preserved finding of the FTT at their [17] that in Albania there remains “some pockets of discrimination and non-acceptance of LGBT+ people.” It is likely that in Albania the appellant will experience a degree of discrimination from some people, and also that she will have a degree of reluctance in engaging with new people and institutions because of a fear of potential discrimination. This does result in an increase in her vulnerability, however it needs to be balanced with all the other factors.
18. Mr Collins on behalf of the appellant raises the cultural issue of ‘kurva’, in particular as referred to in AM & BM (Trafficked women) Albania [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC) and commented on in TD and AD. He submitted that the appellant if returned to Albania would be treated as ‘kurva’, i.e. a whore, and that this was a significant relevant factor that went to risk of re-trafficking as well as the other issues in this case.
19. We disagree with Mr Collins on this point. This is because firstly these authorities are primarily referring to what was the case some years ago in areas outside of Tirana and other metropolises – see for example in AM & BM at [59]
“…the social mores within the rigid patriarchal culture of much of Albania particularly the rural areas and among the rural areas particularly in the north”,
and in TD and AD at [111]
“…kurva, in the context of the tenacity of Northern Albanian traditions”.
Secondly, TD and AD goes no higher in relation to its relevant to the risk assessment than to say at [111]
“Women living on their own are likely to be socially distinct. Whilst discrimination and stigma certainly exist they will not generally constitute persecutory "serious harm" or breach Article 3, but this it nevertheless a factor to be considered cumulatively when assessing whether internal flight is reasonable for any given appellant.”
20. Considering all of these factors and balancing them judicially, we find that the appellant has failed to show that there is a reasonable likelihood that she is at risk of being re-trafficked. In particular we rely on the finding that she was not trafficked from Albania, that there is no persuasive evidence that any of the original traffickers have relevant connections with Albania or the appellant, and that the appellant is an educated and vocationally trained healthy adult capable of living on her own. Thus we find that the appellant does not have an objectively well-founded fear of being re-trafficked.
Sufficiency of protection
21. Having considered the risk of re-trafficking, in light of the preserved finding that the appellant has an objectively well-founded fear of her father, uncle and some other family members as a result of her membership of a particular social group, we then considered whether there was a sufficiency of protection for her.
22. We accept that, as a gay woman, the appellant would likely have to return to Tirana in order to obtain sufficient state protection for the reasons given in BF. We also take into account that her father lives in the surrounding area to Tirana and that Albania is a small country. It is not therefore inconceivable that her father, if he has returned from Greece, could learn of her presence in the city. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the appellant could obtain sufficient protection from the authorities against her father. Our reasons are set out below.
23. The appellant has claimed that she has seen her father and uncle in company with members of the Albanian police and that they were friends. There is however no indication that these police officers were anything other than a small number of local police officers. Taking this at its highest, and absent any cohesive suggestion that the appellant’s family members have contact with senior police officers, or a wide network of police officers, we find it is likely that the appellant’s family members do not have significant sway over the Albanian police. We also note and put weight on the information contained in the Country policy and information note : Actors of Protection, Albania, February 2025 that states in the Executive Summary that “the state is both willing and able to offer sufficient protection to persons fearing non-state, including ‘rogue’ state actors”, and at 2.1.8 that “whilst instances of corruption, misconduct and inefficiency have been reported, the scale and extent of these issues do not, in general, indicate a police system that is unwilling or unable to offer effective protection.” Although the appellant at various stages of this case has made claims relating to her father having connections with Albanian authorities and police, we find that the appellant has given varying and vague accounts. We note that whilst it is often difficult for an asylum seeker to obtain corroborative evidence from a country they have fled, as discussed in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD, there is insufficient evidence to satisfy us, even to the lower standard, that the appellant’s contention that members of her family have significant influence or contact with the Albanian police force is made out.
24. We considered all the evidence in, and referred to, in the documents before us. The omission of a specific reference to a specific document is not an indication that we did not consider it. In particular we relied on BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania CG [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC); Country Policy Information Note, Albania: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, December 2022; Country Policy Information Note: actors of protection, Albania, February 2025; and Country Policy and Information Note Albania: Human trafficking, February 2023. These documents are the most authoritative in our view of all the relevant documents before us as they represent the most recent and similar reported case from this Tribunal, and the well-researched and balanced Home Office reports that have strong persuasive value.
25. These documents set out that:
a. same-sex relations are legal in Albania, 2.4.6 of CPIN December 2022;
b. that discrimination against a gay woman is considered a hate crime, 3.1.3 of CPIN December 2022;
c. that the police are generally willing and able to provide protection for people in a similar situation to the appellant, 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 of CPIN December 2022;
d. that corruption in the police does exist but appears to be improving, 2.1.4 and 2.1.8 of CPIN February 2025;
e. in general it will not be unduly harsh for an openly gay man to relocate to Tirana, (vi) of BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania CG, and we infer that in the circumstances of this case that finding applies to the appellant who is an openly gay woman; and
f. that there are specialist departments within the Albanian state designed both to provide support victims of trafficking and combat issues relating to trafficking and re-trafficking, 4.2 of CPIN February 2023.
26. It is accepted by both parties that there is a greater degree of support available to a person in the appellant’s situation in Tirana than in other parts of Albania, and also that there would be a greater police capacity to protect the appellant in Tirana than in other parts of Albania. We also infer from the CPINs that Tirana is likely to be the area of Albania with the least discrimination against LGBT+ people.
27. Although it is unknown where the people who pose a risk to the appellant live, it is likely based on the evidence that we do have, that her father and possibly other family members live at least for some of the year in an outer municipality of Tirana. We also bear in mind our finding that the appellant’s father is of limited social and economic means and without significant ties to the Albanian police, other authorities, or criminal gangs. We are therefore satisfied that any continuing risk that the appellant’s father might pose to the appellant can be sufficiently mitigated by the appellant seeking the assistance of the authorities in Tirana: see headnote (iv) of BF.
28. Tirana is the largest city in Albania with more than 500,000 people living there. Should the appellant choose to live her life, including as an openly gay woman, and including her working life which is likely to be hairdressing at least initially, in Tirana we find that it is not likely that she will come to the attention of anyone involved in her initial trafficking. Further, whilst we acknowledge the possibility that by chance she may come across her father, or someone who alerts her father to her presence in Tirana, we find that she would be able to go to the police and obtain a sufficiency of protection from them such that she is not at a real risk of harm.
29. As such we find that even if she were to come to the attention of those who pose a risk to her, which we concede is a possibility, that based on the documents referred to above, there is sufficiency of protection for her in Tirana.
Internal relocation
30. Having found that there is a sufficiency of protection in the appellant’s home region of Tirana, it is unnecessary for us to consider the issue of internal relocation. However we have chosen to go on and consider whether the appellant would be able to relocate within Albania, in particular to another city that was not Tirana. We note in particular from the executive summary of the CPIN: human trafficking, Albania, July 2024:
“Female victims of trafficking may be able to internally relocate. They may face discrimination because of their gender and the fact they have been trafficked. However, in general, this is not in itself sufficiently serious by its nature and repetition, or by an accumulation of various measures, that it amounts to persecution or serious harm in the place of relocation, or that relocation would be unreasonable.”
31. Furthermore at 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 the CPIN sets out:
“5.1.1 In general, female victims of trafficking may be able to internally relocate, but women and girls identifiable as victims of trafficking may face discrimination from societal actors, including family rejection and discriminatory labels, because of their gender and the fact they have been trafficked (see Perceptions).
5.1.2 However, in general, this is not in itself sufficiently serious by its nature and repetition, or by an accumulation of various measures, that it amounts to persecution or serious harm in the place of relocation, or that relocation would be unreasonable.”
32. Whilst the CPIN goes on to list factors that may pose more of an issue to integration such as having a child, or having regard to the reach of the initial traffickers, none of these are an issue in the particular case of this appellant. We accept, however, that her sexuality is an important factor to take into account. In BF it was accepted by the Secretary of State that the situation outside of Tirana for an openly gay man “may be “more challenging and isolating””: see [230]. We are satisfied that it would likely be more challenging still for a single openly gay woman with no family support.
33. In the circumstances, we are satisfied to the lower standard that it would be unduly harsh were the appellant required to relocate away from Tirana. However, for the reasons already given, we are satisfied that there is no need for her to relocate away from Tirana.
Immigration rules
34. Having made the findings that we have above, we also find that there are not very significant obstacles that the appellant would face reintegrating in Albania, even though she is a victim of trafficking, a member of the LGBT+ social group, and her other circumstances.
Article 8 ECHR
35. Similarly, based on our findings, we find that it is not disproportionate to return the appellant to Albania, as she will be able to enjoy her Article 8 rights to a private life, in particular expressing her sexuality, in Albania.
36. In making this finding we have regard to the four-step process outlined in Razgar v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27. We find that although the appellant has established a private a life in the UK, that this is limited. In particular that whilst there are now members of her family in the UK, the appellant described only bumping into her mother by accident and having no ongoing contact with members of her family in the UK. We are not therefore satisfied that this amounts to family life for the purposes of Article 8(1). Secondly that whilst she said she now has a partner, no evidence from them has been adduced, and the appellant said this is a different partner to the one she had at the time of a previous hearing in this case and thus the current relationship is not of longstanding duration. Thirdly she has recently moved to an area in the south of England and there is no evidence that she has established a particularly weighty private in the short time she has been there. We also take into account that her presence in the UK has always been precarious. Interference in any such right the appellant has by returning her to Albania does have a clear legal basis and serves the legitimate aim of controlling immigration and in our judgment is not disproportionate in all the circumstances. We are satisfied that she could reasonably be expected to resume her private life in Tirana, where she would be able to live as an openly gay woman, find work and support herself.
Application of the law to the facts
37. The appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
38. The appellant has failed to show that there is a reasonable likelihood that she is at risk of being re-trafficked and she does not have an objectively well-founded fear of being re-trafficked.
39. There is a sufficiency of protection for her in Albania.
40. There are no very significant obstacles that she would face integrating in Albania.
41. The removal of the appellant to Albania is not a disproportionate interference with her Article 8 ECHR rights.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

A Richards

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15th May 2025

Appendix: Error of law decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004756

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60499/2023
LP/03784/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RICHARDS

Between

DE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Panagiotopoulou of Counsel, instructed by Sentinel Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Nwachukwu, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 December 2024

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge D J Wright (“the judge”) promulgated on 15 August 2024 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 1 November 2023 to refuse her protection claim made on 18 May 2022. The judge found that the asylum claim, the humanitarian protection, and the Article 8 ECHR claim all fail.
2. We note that the First-tier Tribunal made an order for anonymity and no application has been received to set that aside. In making an order for anonymity, we have considered the strong public interest in open justice. However, in this case it is outweighed by the appellant’s interests, as her case relates to the risk of harm she would face if her identity and the issues in this case were to become known to those whom she says pose a risk to her.
Background
3. The appellant is a citizen of Albania born in 2003. She claims to have left that country for Italy in 2021 because of having being abused by her father because of her sexuality, where it is accepted by the respondent that she became a victim of sexual exploitation and trafficking. After escaping from that situation, she travelled to a further European country and then entered the United Kingdom illegally in January 2022.
4. The judge summarises her claims at [4] and [5] of their judgement:
“The Appellant asserts that she would be at risk on return due to their membership of particular social groups (namely the LGBT+ community and as a previously trafficked woman) or alternatively that they are entitled to humanitarian protection. The appellant says that she would be at risk from members of her family due to her sexuality and that she feared being re-trafficked and sexually exploited in Albania.

The Appellant also makes an Article 8 claim on the basis of her relationship with an individual in the United Kingdom.”
5. The judge found inter alia in dismissing her appeal that:
(a) the appellant is a victim of trafficking, having been forced into sexual exploitation in Italy;
(b) the appellant is a member of the LGBT+ community and has an objectively well-founded fear of persecution from some of her family members as a result of her membership of this particular social group;
(c) the appellant does not have an objectively well-founded fear of being re-trafficked;
(d) there is sufficiency of protection from the authorities in Albania and that internal relocation outside of Tirana is a viable option; and
(e) there is not a real risk of serious harm on return to Albania.
6. The judge also dismissed her Article 8 claim as they found that she fails to meet the requirements of GEN.1.2 of Appendix FM and rule 276ADE, and that the balancing exercise falls in favour of the public interest in enforcing immigration control.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellant subsequently applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Horton on 15 October 2024. The reason given was that the judge made an arguable error of law in how sexuality was considered as part of re-trafficking risk and in the adequacy of their reasons.
The grounds of appeal
8. The appeal was put forward on the basis of a single ground that judge had come to flawed conclusions, albeit put forward in three parts.
9. Ground 1a – The judge failed to consider the appellant’s sexuality as part of her vulnerability when applying the risk factors set out in TD and AD (Trafficked Women) GC [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) that led in part to the judge’s finding that the appellant has failed to show that she is at risk of being re-trafficked. This is essentially founded on the absence of the explicit mention of sexuality in [19] which is the paragraph where the judge considers the risk factors in TD and AD.
10. This is resisted by the respondent on the basis that the appellant’s sexuality is considered by the judge earlier in their judgement, and explicitly in relation to vulnerability in [12] and [13], and that it was therefore not necessary to explicitly mention it in [19].
11. Ground 1b – The judge fails to consider section 9.1.3 within the Country Policy Information Note, Albania: Sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, December 2022 (“the CPIN”) in relation to how any discrimination that may arise as a result of the appellant’s sexuality may intertwine with any discrimination she may receive as a victim of trafficking.
12. This is resisted by the respondent on the basis that the CPIN does not state that the combination of the risks of discrimination due to sexuality and of being a victim of trafficking are greater in likelihood or severity than the risks of these factors when considered in isolation. Thus, the respondent says, the judge did not materially err if they separated their consideration of these factors.
13. Ground 1c – The judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding in [24] that there was sufficiency of protection and internal relocation options that countered her fear of persecution from family members, and particularised this failing as that the judge didn’t give adequate reasons as to how as a lone, gay female, she could internally relocate outside of Tirana in light of the findings in BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC).
14. This is resisted by the respondent who notes that the judge explained in [23] that the CPINs indicate that there are NGOs and charities who would be able to support the appellant and that this support would mitigate the risk of harm to her.
Findings – Error of Law
Ground 1a: Failure to consider the appellant’s sexuality as part of her vulnerability when applying TD and AD (Trafficked Women) GC [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC)
15. The judge was right to apply the Country Guidance case of TD and AD when considering the risk of her being re-trafficked. In the headnote to that case at [h] it states that:
“Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available. “
16. In [19] the judge explicitly applies and addresses these seven factors, as well as the additional factor that the actual trafficking did not take place in Albania, albeit the abusers were Albanian.
17. The stem of the final sentence of [h] in TD and AD explicitly indicates the risk of persecution and sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend on individual circumstances and that these are not limited to the 7 factors specifically listed.
18. We find from [19] that the judge understood and applied this as they did specifically address the 7 factors and the additional factor of the location of the initial trafficking.
19. They did not however include any reference to the appellant’s sexuality in [19].
20. The judge does refer to the appellant’s sexuality in [16] and [17] when discussing risk of harm from family members and risk of harm more generally. Although these paragraphs are proximate to [19], [19] begins by stating “In relation to the risk of re-trafficking…”. From this we infer and find that the judge in [19] was considering the risk of re-trafficking as a separate consideration to the paragraphs that precede it.
21. We find the appellant’s sexuality is a factor that should be considered when assessing the risk of re-trafficking as it may possibly lead to an increase in her vulnerability to re-trafficking in light of the judge’s findings at [17] that there remains “some pockets of discrimination and non-acceptance of LGBT+ people.” It is also relevant to the question of the appellant’s ability to internally relocate given that the judge accepted at [19(e)] that it was unlikely the appellant could return to Tirana given her fear of her father.
22. As such we find that the failure to consider the factor of sexuality when applying TD and AD to the risk of re-trafficking as well as considering the reasonableness of internal relocation is a material error.
Grounds 1b and 1c
23. Having identified a material error of law in relation to Ground 1a, it is unnecessary for us to examine Grounds 1b and 1c.

Remaking
24. We have considered paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, and note that: there was no procedural irregularity in the First-tier Tribunal proceedings; that the majority of the findings are preserved; and that it was said on behalf of the appellant that in any remaking proceedings the appellant may want to call their partner to give evidence as part of a renewed Article 8 claim.
25. We find that this is not a case where the extent of the judicial fact-finding requires the appeal to re-heard by the First-tier Tribunal and are satisfied that it is appropriate for the appeal to be retained by the Upper Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The findings of the First-tier Tribunal set out at [12] to [18] are preserved.
Directions
1. The remaking hearing is to be relisted before Judge Hoffman and Deputy Judge Richards if convenient.
2. The remaking of this appeal is to be listed for the first available date at Field House with a time estimate of 3 hours.
3. Any updating evidence either party wishes to rely upon must be electronically filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party 21 days prior to the remaking hearing.
4. The appellant is to file and serve a skeleton argument, if so advised, no later than 14 days before the resumed hearing.
5. The respondent is to file and serve a skeleton argument, if so advised, no later than 7 days before the resumed hearing.

A Richards

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24th December 2024