Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004791

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/63269/2023
LP/03736/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JARVIS

Between

BB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Patyna, Counsel, Doughty Street Chambers
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. This is because of the nature of the matter under appeal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge K Degirmenci, (‘the judge’), promulgated on 1st September 2024 refusing the first appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his and his family’s, asylum and human rights claim.
2. The appellants are nationals of Morocco and are husband and wife and their three dependent children were born in 2004, 2007 and 2015 respectively.
3. It was asserted that as a result of the first appellant’s work for the UN (MINURSO) as a field security assistant, he had come to the attention of the Polisario Front, a group responsible for human rights abuses in the region and branded a traitor, beaten and threatened and further that the appellant’s wife was gang raped by the same Front in May 2021 and received medical treatment as a result. It was advanced that the main appellant was unaware of this incident until after the UK Home Office refused their asylum claim.
4. On 20th May 2025 the appellant’s representative made an application to amend the grounds of appeal and that was granted by UTJ Loughran on 27th May. On review of the bundle, it came to light that the caseworker with the conduct of the matter, who left the firm on 9th July 2025, submitted the wrong version of the amended grounds and yet further grounds were submitted the day before the hearing on 10th July 2025.
5. No objection was raised by Mr Walker on behalf of the Secretary of State to the late amendment to the grounds and as such we took no objection ourselves.
6. The grounds of challenge as amended were as follows:
Ground 1
7. An erroneous approach to the expert medical and country evidence.
8. In two psychiatric medicolegal reports dated 18th August 2024, Dr N Galappathie diagnosed the main appellant and his wife with PTSD, depression and anxiety. He explained that the appellant’s case avoidance relating to PTSD may help to explain why he had been reluctant to report the full extent of his claimed experience of trauma and PTSD symptoms to his GP. Dr Galappathie found the PTSD symptoms clinically plausible and consistent with the account of trauma and that given the appellant reported a significant history of trauma and suffered from depression, that his mental health condition may have an impact on his memory, recall and consistency and that the appellant was at risk of self-harm, which would increase if he were returned to Morocco. Dr Galappathie considered any other possible causes of the symptoms and concluded that they were not just caused by him being an asylum seeker.
9. Similar findings were made in relation to the appellant’s wife.
10. The grounds asserted that despite those findings by Dr Galappathie, the judge decided not to place weight on his reports or recommendations and by readily dismissing the appellant’s accounts, the judge:
“solely placed significant weight to Dr Galappathie’s words, namely that should the tribunal make negative credibility findings about their accounts, then there would be no grounds for a diagnosis of PTSD in their case and instead s/he ‘may just have an adjustment disorder’ (para. 18 & 22).”
11. It was submitted that the judge too readily placed little weight on both medicolegal reports dated 18th August 2024 based on a premade decision about the appellant’s lack of credibility. The decision put the cart before the horse, contrary to Mibanga [2025] EWCA Civ 367 and placed no weight on the medical reports.
12. Dr Galappathie stated that there were no indicators of the appellant’s feigning or malingering with their symptoms and their diagnoses were consistent with the events occurring in Morocco. That should have fed into the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility and the weight ascribed to the rest of the expert’s reports.
13. The judge also failed to consider the country situation objective evidence as a whole, in particular [12], [15], [22], [30], [39], [49] and [50] of the country expert report of Dr Hasan Hafidh dated 5th August 2024 determining there was no well-founded fear of persecution, risk of persecution and harm on return to Morocco.
14. Further the Home Office Presenting Officer made no submissions on either report at the hearing and it was incumbent upon the judge to put the appellant on notice of her own concerns about the reports, for example, by putting questions about them to the appellant’s representative in order for him fairly to be able to respond. That rendered the hearing unfair.
Ground 2
15. Failure to consider the vulnerability as relevant to credibility.
16. It was accepted by the judge that the appellant was a vulnerable witness, but the judge failed to consider the effect of vulnerability when assessing the case before her.
17. The appellant’s vulnerability was conspicuously absent, particularly at [14] to [21], [23] and [24] in the judge’s assessment on credibility. The judge did not take into account the appellant’s diagnosis on his memory and ability to be consistent.
Ground 3
18. Erroneous approach to credibility generally. The appellant’s witness statement clearly set out that it was intended to clarify previous inconsistencies made in relation to when the problems started in Morocco, which meant that the appellant wished to maintain his account provided in his statement dated 22nd July 2024. The statement was prepared using an Arabic interpreter, whose dialect the appellant understood and when he was under no pressure. Instead the judge treated this statement as yet another inconsistent account in comparison with his previous answers.
19. At [25], the judge mischaracterised and misjudged the evidence relating to the attacks made against the main appellant’s parents in November 2023 and the home in Casablanca in December 2023 and did not consider the translated document at page 15 of the appellant’s bundle, which stated that the appellant’s home was attacked. The attack against the appellant’s parents was separate to the attack on the appellant’s house and the judge failed to give due weight to the reports at pages 11 to 15 and 26 to 29 of the appellant’s bundle and made negative findings about events the appellant claimed to have occurred in Morocco.
20. The judge also placed little weight on the documentary evidence from Morocco because they were handwritten and contained “almost identical words”. First it was plausible that words could be repeated. Secondly the judge failed to consider that not all states or parts of states type their reports. The judge was required to consider that aspect of the appellant’s and her approach was contrary to HK and SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 such that Immigration Judges should not assess credibility with reference to what they personally deemed plausible or reasonable given that individuals from different societies and circumstances would be dealing with unfamiliar issues.
Ground 4
21. Failure to consider the best interests of the children.
22. The judge failed to consider the best interests of the children, as required by Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Although the appellant’s Article 8 rights were not in issue the judge should still have considered the children’s best interests.
The hearing
23. The Secretary of State provided a Rule 24 response which highlighted reliance on Lata (principal controversial issues) [2023], UKUT 00163 (IAC) and in relation to the appellant’s vulnerability when assessing credibility the respondent relied on [59] to [62] of SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 398.
24. At the hearing Ms Patyna relied on her grounds as they were amended the day before the hearing and confirmed that although she was not abandoning ground 4 in relation to best interests of the children, she acknowledged CAO [2024] UKSC 32.
25. She submitted that the judge made two material errors in relation to the expert report. First she made negative conclusions about credibility prior to considering both reports and secondly failed to put her concerns about the reports during the hearing, such as to deprive the appellant of a fair hearing.
26. Ms Patyna took us through Dr Galappathie’s report or at least the section she considered relevant and confirmed that Dr Galappathie had complied with HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC). The judge still had to look at the report before assessing credibility. Secondly, the concerns were not put to the Counsel and Ms Patyna relied on Abdi v the Secretary of State [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, [30], to illustrate the point that there was no proper opportunity to deal with the case.
27. In terms of the Hafidh report the judge identified that the number of incidents of harassment were not the same and found thus the sources did not support his claim but this again, Ms Patyna submitted, should have been flagged by the judge so that the expert could have provided an addendum to his report.
28. Mr Walker submitted there were no material errors made by the judge and it was for the judge to consider the reports and to arrive at the conclusions which she did.
Conclusions
Ground 1
29. On reading the decision of the judge as a whole, we are unpersuaded that there is any material error of law. We referred Ms Patyna to S v the Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1153 which held at 32 as follows:
“32. I would also refer to the AIT determination of 25 November 2005 in HH Medical Evidence Effective Mibanga Ethiopia [2005] UKAIT 00164. The tribunal there said:
‘20. In the present case it is manifest that the immigration judge has arrived at his conclusions as to credibility by looking at the evidence in the round. At paragraph 16 of the determination he reminded himself that ‘I must look at the case in the round in light of all the relevant circumstances’. At paragraph 20 the immigration judge confirmed that he had 'considered the appellant's evidence in the round together with the background evidence and her interview record'. Plainly the medical report was part of the appellant's evidence.
21. The tribunal considers that there is a danger of Mibanga being misunderstood. Judgments in that case are not intended to place judicial fact finders in a form of forensic straightjacket. In particular the Court of Appeal is not to be regarded as laying down any rule of law as to the order in which judicial fact finders are to approach the evidential materials before them. To take Wilson J's cake analogy, all its ingredients cannot be thrown together into the bowl simultaneously. One has to start somewhere. There is nothing illogical about the process by which the immigration judge in the present case chose to approach his analytical task.’
I would approve those comments and emphasise how close the present case is to the circumstances of HH as distinct from those of Mibanga.”
30. We conclude that as in S we would not expect the judge to be placed in a judicial fact-finding forensic straightjacket. There is no rule of law as to the order in which judicial fact-finders are to approach the evidential materials before them. A judge has to start somewhere.
31. As the judge states in her opening paragraph on her findings, at [13], “For the reasons set out below, I do not find that the appellant has provided a credible account of the events that he claims occurred in Morocco and since he has arrived in the UK.” That sentence indicates that the judge had taken all of the evidence and considered it holistically when arriving at her conclusions. She proceeds from [13] to explain her reasoning in full in each section but that is finally brought together at [31], where she states: “In the light of my findings above, I do not find the events the appellant and his wife describe are credible”.
32. The judge noted that the appellant had provided an inconsistent account at [14] but clearly at [17] recorded that she had taken into consideration Dr Galappathie’s report that the appellant (who was the only appellant who gave evidence) was in his opinion suffering from PTSD. As the judge reasoned, effectively notwithstanding the report, that the appellant did not explain the discrepancies outlined by reason of his mental health ‘but instead blames the interpreter’. He states that he noticed these discrepancies when his solicitors read over his interview records to him. There is no explanation why this was not mentioned or addressed before his appeal hearing.
33. It was thus entirely open to the judge, who was clearly considering the appellant’s statement with his mental health issues and the report of Dr Galappathie in mind to find that:
“the metamorphosis from his claim that he was threatened in October 2021 to a claim that he was brutally attacked is not a question of an inability to date an event or to place an event in chronological order. The appellant has provided no explanation for the difference in this account.”
That the word credible was omitted prior to explanation is not to the point because that can easily be inferred.
34. The judge also at [18] took into account the observation by Dr Galappathie himself that:
“if the court finds that the trauma he reports did not actually occur, then there would be no grounds for a diagnosis of PTSD in his case and instead he may just have an adjustment order which is more of a natural response to distress and not as severe as a mental disorder”.
35. Thus it was entirely open to the judge to conclude, on the basis of Dr Galappathie’s own evidence that there were no grounds to find that the appellant suffered from PTSD. The judge also identified that Dr Galappathie was not aware of some of the discrepancies in the evidence because he did not have the AIR (asylum interview) which was served later by the respondent separately. The weight to be attributed to Dr Galappathie’s various opinions was a matter for the judge who cannot be criticised for adopting and preferring a section of the report written by the expert himself.
36. The assessment of the wife’s evidence, followed on from consideration of Dr Galappathie’s reports, and the assertion of a failure to consider the wife’s evidence (she did not appear before the First-tier Tribunal) in the light of any vulnerability is not sustainable. A variety of reasons are given for rejecting her account. She did not mention a fundamental point that she was taken to hospital and received any treatment [19] although she produced a medical report for the same day she claims she escaped. The judge gave cogent and unarguably cogent reasons as to her rejection of the wife’s evidence, not least that she found it incredible:
“that the appellant’s wife did not mention that she had had any psychiatric or psychological treatment in Morocco to Dr Galappathie, when reciting her past psychiatric history which is recorded at [40] if (sic) his report”.
37. Further, the judge went on after consideration of Dr Galappathie’s report to consider that the appellant gave evidence that his wife had photographed her medical evidence and he had not provided any explanation for why he had not produced evidence that the photographs were forwarded to him from his wife or that she had them on her telephone [20]. As such, it was open to the judge to find the medical certificates relating to the appellant’s wife were unreliable documents.
38. Of fundamental importance, as the judge found at [21], was that the judge did not find it:
“at all credible that the appellant would have been completely oblivious to the fact that his wife was missing for a day that she did not return home that night and that when she did return home the following day, that she had both physical and psychological trauma”.
39. According to the appellant’s evidence, her husband (the lead appellant) did not know about the kidnapping and assault of his wife until after his protection claim was refused and that he was not aware what had happened to her because he had his own problems.
40. The judge nevertheless took into account that the appellant’s wife had a diagnosis of mixed anxiety and depressive disorder by her GP “and the similarity between the findings and the report in relation to the appellant” but again that Dr Galappathie reported that should the court find that the trauma the wife reported did not actually occur, then again there would be no grounds for a diagnosis of PTSD, instead an adjustment disorder.
41. It was open to the judge to consider that the appellant was upset by her current living situation in a crowded hotel room with her husband and children. As such, it was entirely open to the judge to find that the mental health conditions that both the appellant and his wife were suffering from, were likely to be caused by their difficult circumstances.
42. Not only is consideration of Dr Galappathie’s report woven throughout the credibility findings in relation to the appellant and his wife, but also, it is clear that the judge had taken it into account, both at the opening and the close of her decision and in relation to the variety of negative credibility findings made against the appellant and his wife, not least that he was not aware that his wife had been raped until after his asylum decision was refused.
43. The judge properly took into account the expert report of Dr Hasan Hafidh. It was not, however, merely the report of Dr Hasan Hafidh which led the judge to disbelieve the appellant’s account of the attack by the Polisario because at [26] the judge found that it was not credible that the Polisario would continue to threaten the appellant and attempt to burn his home and attack his parents given that he had left the country and was clearly no longer working as a security officer for the UN (MINURSO) bearing in mind, as the judge recorded, in October 2021 “he was given a week to leave his job, which he did”. Simply the judge did not accept that if the appellant was threatened in such a manner the Polisario would continue to take “drastic action against him when it was clear that he was no longer at his job or even in his home” [26]. Indeed his evidence was that his neighbours had told the Polisario he had left. The judge specifically addressed the expert report of Dr Hasan Hafidh at [27].
44. It was entirely open to the judge, bearing in mind the previous findings, to set out the section of the Hafidh report on the nature of the reported incidents against the UN personnel as she did. Indeed the judge recorded that the expert stated, “There have been no new direct or explicit threats against the Mission since 2017” and “in 2019 the Mission implemented additional security measures at its team sites east of the berm”. It was the contrast between the appellant’s individual claim and the fact that the Polisario had used “targeting, harassment, violence, abuse, and killings against their opponents in Morocco” and notwithstanding Dr Hafidh concluded that the violence the appellant described was “generally consistent with the abilities and actions of the PF”. It was open to the judge to conclude that she did not find that the sources cited by Dr Hafidh supported the appellant’s claim of the targeting in the way he described “or that he would continue to be targeted in his absence”. It is this second part of the sentence which, linked with [26], undermines the expert’s report in the view of the judge, which was entirely open to her.
45. As a logical consequence it was open to the judge to conclude that the appellant may have been harassed by people in his local area for working for the UN but this did not reach the level of persecution. It is worth noting that the judge also found that the appellant obtained a visit visa in September 2021 and prior to his departure, which indicated that it was more likely that the appellant planned to travel to the UK at the time he obtained the visas with no intention of returning and which was nothing to do with any threat made.
46. In terms of the raising of concerns, as to the various reports, to enable, for example, Dr Hafid to submit an addendum, we consider this to be tantamount to obliging the judge to give reasons for reasons. Abdi, at [30], confirms that as follows:
“29. HA v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2010] SC 457 [2010] CSIH 28 was a decision of an Extra Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session presided over by Lord Reed (now PSC), who delivered the Opinion. It made a number of general points about procedural fairness in the context of immigration cases, amongst which the following emerge at [4]-[13]. Subject to the procedural rules governing first instance tribunals, the tribunal has power to decide the procedure it adopts, but in doing so must act fairly. What fairness requires is essentially an intuitive judgment which is dependent on the context of the decision; although it is possible to identify a number of general principles, they cannot be applied by rote identically in every situation. An overall judgment must be made in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case. Whether there is procedural unfairness is fact-sensitive. See [4] and [13]. The tribunal may identify an issue which has not been raised by the parties to the proceedings, but it will be unfair, ordinarily at least, for it to base its decision upon its view of the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to address it upon the matter (see [7]). As an expert body, the tribunal is entitled to reject evidence notwithstanding that the evidence has not been challenged before it. Fairness may, however, require it to disclose its concerns about the evidence so as to afford the parties an opportunity to address them (see [8]). There is, on the other hand no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may relay (sic) in reaching its decision (see [10]). Where an applicant can generally be expected to be aware that the tribunal will have to assess their credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the applicant could reasonably expect to be plainly relevant to that assessment (at [11]-[12]).
30. In The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173 [2004] 176 Imm AR, Schiemann LJ delivered the judgment of this court. He drew attention to the difficulties often faced by those sitting at first instance in immigration cases. Of relevance to the present appeal are the following observations. There are innumerable decisions which have stressed that the requirements of fairness are very much conditioned by the facts of each case (at [6]). A failure to put to a party a point which is decided against him can be grossly unfair and lead to injustice because he must have a proper opportunity to deal with the point (at [4]). Where much depends on the credibility of a party which has made several inconsistent statements, that party has a forensic problem as to whether to confront them or focus attention elsewhere. Fairness may in some such circumstances require the inconsistencies to be put to the witness but that will not usually be the case. Usually the tribunal can remain silent, especially if the party is represented, and see how the case unfolds (at [5]).”
47. The appellant was legally represented who must have been aware of the content of the documentation and expert reports provided to the First-tier Tribunal and it is not for the judge to assist pro-actively the appellant in preparing his materials, which is what the submission of Ms Patyna amounted to.
Ground 2
48. In relation to ground 2, from our reasoning above, it is patently clear that the judge took into account the fact that the appellant was a vulnerable witness, which was recorded at [5] and that the report of Dr Galappathie was considered throughout the assessment of the evidence. It is not incumbent on the judge at every juncture to record that s/he is dealing with a vulnerable witness and the judge gave ample and copious reasons for finding, on the lower standard of proof, that there were deficiencies in the evidence sufficient to find that the appellant was not credible and nor was his wife.
Ground 3
49. In relation to ground 3, we find no erroneous approach to credibility generally. The statements by the appellant’s mother, as the judge observed, were identical to those of the statement given by the appellant’s father and for sound reasoning, not least that there were mistakes and obvious mistakes in the statements that the judge was entitled to comment upon. Weight afforded to the evidence is generally a matter for the judge and Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 confirms at 2 ii) that ‘An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it. The decision is comprehensive and the judge has addressed the key issues and evidence.
50. Again in relation to the appellant’s own statement, the judge recorded that the appellant had stated he had gone through his interview record with his previous solicitor and noticed many mistakes. However, as the judge identified and gave sound reasoning at [15] including that neither the appellant nor his representatives had set out what the “many mistakes were in the interview” and nor had they identified interpretation as a reason.
51. We have already dealt with the point that the judge did not accept for good reason that the appellant’s home would be attacked by Polisario following his departure from his job and the country.
52. From a reading of the decision as a whole, it was not that the judge treated the evidence from a ‘personal’ interpretation of events but couched the reasoning in a cogent and logical approach and pointed out the inherent difficulties with the evidence.
53. Overall the approach to credibility was sound.
Ground 4
54. Turning to ground 4, as it was quite clear during the appeal and noted by the judge at [8], that the appellant did not pursue a freestanding claim under Article 8 ECHR, the challenge on the best interests of the children is not sustainable.
55. That said, Ms Patyna rightly in our view, referenced CAO which reiterates the point that ‘the duty to consider the best interests of children in the immigration context must be substantively complied with by the Secretary of State and other relevant officials’, and decided not to pursue this ground further. Having made clear before the FtT that Article 8 was not relied upon it is not open to the appellant without more to challenge the decision on the best interests of the children.
Notice of Decision
56. As such we find no material error in the decision and the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand.

Helen Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29th August 2025