UI-2024-004811
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004811
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61413/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
16th June 2025
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GILL
Between
OMA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Alban, Seren Legal Practice
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House via CVP on 18 March 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against a decision by First-tier Tribunal Judge Murray (‘the judge’), heard on 28 August 2024 and promulgated on 5th September 2024. The judge dismissed appellant’s appeal on protection, Article 3 and Article 8 grounds.
2. Permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Biba on 17 October 2024 and was not restricted to any grounds.
Background
3. In short summary, the underlying appeal relates to the appellant’s claim that during the course of his employment in Iraq he installed internet in a house where he saw guns, bullets and car batteries. He called the security services who arrested the men from the house. The appellant then started to receive threatening calls. As a result, he had to leave his house and relocate his family. Subsequently, his wife was informed that their house was raided by men who broke the doors and windows and tried to burn it down.
4. In addition, the appellant claims that he would be at risk due to his father’s former involvement with the Ba’athist party.
5. The appellant had made an earlier claim which was originally granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 20 June 2010 on humanitarian protection grounds. Subsequently, the decision was appealed, and the Upper Tribunal found an error of law, remade and dismissed the appeal. A copy of the 2010 decision was not before me. It was agreed by both parties that this appeal could proceed without the 2010 decision being provided, as it bore very limited relevance to the grounds of the current appeal, the appellant had returned to Iraq since that determination, and it was accepted that the appellant’s father had links to the Ba’athist party. I was satisfied that I did not require a copy of the 2010 decision to decide this appeal, as it had been summarised in the judge’s decision and the Devaseelan principles had been applied at [17]-[21]. Furthermore, the current appeal did not raise any grounds of appeal in this respect.
Grounds of Appeal
6. The Grounds of Appeal can be summarised as follows:
i. Ground 1 – the judge erred at [43] in finding that the appellant can use the CSID or seek a replacement INID shortly after arrival in Iraq. The judge failed to consider that in order to apply for a new INID the appellant would have to travel to his local CSA office, in circumstances where it was accepted that the appellant would be at risk in his home area.
ii. Ground 2 - the judge erred at [43] in finding that return will be to Erbil. This finding goes against the country guidance case of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (‘SMO2’) at paragraph 7.
iii. Ground 3 – the judge erred at [44] when looking at the reasonableness of relocation and applying the Country Guidance case of SMO2.
iv. Ground 4 – the judge erred at [42] in finding “there is no evidence before me showing that they would operate in Erbil or be able to locate the Appellant there”. The judge failed to make an assessment of the facts or provide any reasons for reaching their finding.
Discussion
7. I was provided, by the appellant, with a composite bundle consisting of 291 pages. Mr Mullen confirmed that no rule 24 response had been submitted by the respondent.
8. I heard submissions from both parties and have referred to the relevant evidence and submissions (oral and written) in my discussion below.
Ground 1
9. Ms Alban stated, although all grounds were being argued, Ground 1 was the appellant’s strongest. She submitted the judge found the appellant would be at risk in his home area in Diyala and therefore erred in law in failing to consider the risk to the appellant in having to return to his home area to apply for the Iraqi National Identity Document (‘INID’). Ms Alban argued there was evidence, in the bundle before the judge, which demonstrated that the Civil Status Identity Document (‘CSID’) had been replaced by the INID. However, the appellant would be unable to obtain an INID as this would require him to return to the area of persecution. Ms Alban submitted that the judge’s failure to adequately consider the impact of not being able to obtain an INID was a material error in law. Ms Alban explained that the appellant’s skeleton argument (ASA), which was before the FtT, asserted in error that the appellant would need to travel to Sulaymaniyah (rather than Diyala) to apply for an INID at [16] of the ASA.
10. Mr Mullen, on behalf of the respondent, submitted the arguments advanced by the appellant proceed on the misconception that the appellant would be required to return to the area of persecution. The judge had not erred in making findings that the appellant would be able to use his CSID card to return and relocate, as supported by the Country Guidance in SMO2. In any event, Mr Mullen submitted, even if the appellant was required to obtain an INID he would need to return to Sulaymaniyah, and not Diyala, to obtain one and therefore would not be at risk. There was therefore no error of law in the judge’s findings.
11. I have considered the Judge’s decision with care and exercised appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with it. I am guided by the Court of Appeal’s approach to challenging a finding of fact: see Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 (05 April 2022) at [2].
12. At [5] of the decision the judge summarises the respondent’s position, namely that the appellant could relocate to Erbil, Amedi or Dahuk, and that return could be to any airport in federal Iraq [6].
13. At [42], [43] and [44] the judge considers with regards to Erbil “whether [the appellant] would be at risk of persecution, whether he could get there safely in view of the need for a CSID, INID and whether it is reasonable for him to remain there.” The judge goes on to consider the “CPIN on Documentation”, “submissions and evidence in relation to the replacement of the CSID with an INID”, and SMO2. Having considered the evidence and the submissions, the judge makes the finding that the appellant could be returned and relocate to Erbil and that there is “no evidence however, to show that returnees from abroad would not be able to use their CSID or seek a replacement INID shortly after arrival in Iraq” (emphasis added). In reaching this decision the judge considered the appellant’s oral evidence, during which he stated his family had his CSID and that his family had not received any threats. Accordingly, the judge found that the appellant’s CSID could be sent or delivered to the appellant by his family. The judge clearly states that they have taken into account the submissions and evidence in relation to the replacement of the CSID with the INID.
14. The Country Guidance case of SMO2 and “CPIN: internal relocation, civil documentation and returns. Iraq, October 2023 version 14.0” (‘CPIN 2023’), which refers to SMO2, state that the INID replaces the CSID, however CSIDs remain valid identification documents allowing access to healthcare, education, freedom of movement within the country, the state justice system, social welfare and humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, that CSIDs can still be used to pass through checkpoints. Therefore, having found that the appellant had a CSID which could be returned to him, the judge has properly applied the Country Guidance case of SMO2 and background evidence in reaching their decision.
15. Furthermore, in the detailed decision there is no reference to issues being identified or ventilated regarding the appellant needing to return to Diyala, rather than Sulaymaniyah, to obtain an INID, or to there being an error in the ASA to this effect. The ASA refers to news articles submitted by the appellant to demonstrate that the “CSID document will become invalid”, provides social media notification “made by Sulaymaniyah government” (emphasis added) and submits “the CSID document is no longer valid and as such could not be used to pass through checkpoints. The appellant can only obtain the INID by travelling in person to Sulaymaniyah to make the application…” (emphasis added). Therefore, the information before the judge indicated that Sulaymaniyah was the relevant area for the appellant to apply for an INID. Accordingly, I am not persuaded by Ms Alban’s submissions that the judge erred in failing to consider whether the appellant would need to return to Diyala, where he was at risk, to obtain an INID. Additionally, as stated above the judge applied, to the facts of this appellant’s case, the country guidance case of SMO2 and CPIN 2023, which state that CSIDs remain valid and can be used to pass through checkpoints.
16. I am therefore satisfied, having considered the evidence and submissions that were before the judge, there was no error of law in the judge’s findings with regards to Ground 1.
Ground 2
17. Ms Alban submitted that the judge failed to apply the Country Guidance case of SMO2 at paragraph 7, which states return of former residents of the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) will be to the IKR and all other Iraqis will be to Baghdad. She submitted that the appellant was from outside the IKR, therefore removal would be to Baghdad and that there was an error in the ASA in stating that the appellant was from Sulaymaniyah.
18. Mr Mullen submitted that the judge had adequately applied the case of SMO2 to the appellant’s case. The ASA states the “appellant is from Sulaymaniyah therefore return will be to the IKR” and therefore there was no error of law in respect of ground 2. I agree with Mr Mullen’s submissions. There is no reference in the judge’s detailed decision to any errors in the ASA being identified at the FtT. I am therefore satisfied that the judge adequately applied the country guidance case of SMO2 to the facts and submissions as presented to the judge. I do not identify any error of law in respect of Ground 2.
Ground 3
19. Ms Alban submitted that the judge erred at [44] when looking at the reasonableness of relocation and failed to adequately consider the case of SMO2 with regards to how the appellant would show he had come directly from the UK when his laissez passer would be taken from him on arrival and when considering his father’s links to the Ba’ath party in the context of discrimination when seeking housing and employment.
20. Mr Mullen submitted that the judge had adequately considered the case of SMO2 when considering the reasonableness of relocation.
21. I bear in mind that judicial restraint should be exercised when the reasons a tribunal gives for its decision are being examined. The judge is not required to set out every step in their reasoning (Jones v First Tier Tribunal & Anor (Rev 1) [2013] UKSC 19 (17 April 2013), [2013] 2 AC 48.)
22. The judge at [44] considers the reasonableness of relocation to Erbil with adequate reasons, specifically referencing and applying the case of SMO2. As well as referencing the judge’s earlier finding that the appellant would not be at risk due to his father’s membership of the Ba’ath party. The judge also considers the appellant’s ability to find employment. Furthermore, SMO2 at [31] states that Iraqi national returnees of Kurdish origin are likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK. As stated previously the decision when read as a whole, along with the ASA, indicates that the information before the judge was that the appellant was an Iraqi national of Kurdish origin, with no suggestion that this was an issue in dispute. Accordingly, I do not identify any errors of law in respect of Ground 3.
Ground 4
23. Ms Alban submitted that the judge erred at [42] in finding “there is no evidence before me showing that they would operate in Erbil or be able to locate the Appellant there”. She submitted that the appellant in his witness statement at [7] stated that he believed they would be able to find him anywhere in Iraq as they have power and influence. Ms Alban argued the judge failed to make an assessment of the facts or provide any reasons for reaching their finding.
24. Mr Mullen submitted that it is difficult to see how the appellant’s persecutors would learn about his return and be able to trace him to Erbil. There was no suggestion that the appellant’s persecutors had access to locating people. Therefore, the judge’s findings are adequately reasoned.
25. At [41] the judge finds that the appellant cannot be protected in his home area. When considering relocation the judge at [42] reasons that Erbil is in a different governorate to his home area and is a considerable distance away and “there is no evidence before me show (sic) that they would operate in Erbil or be able to locate the Appellant there”. Earlier in the decision the judge had considered and accepted the appellant’s account that the authorities did not know who had been threatening the appellant. There was no suggestion made that the appellant’s persecutors had the ability to locate him. I therefore find that the judge reached a conclusion that was adequately reasoned and the submissions advanced by Ms Alban amount to no more than a disagreement with the assessment of facts. I identify no error of law in respect of Ground 4.
Notice of Decision
26. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands.
27. The appellant’s appeal is therefore dismissed.
A. Gill
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
9 June 2025