Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004874

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53746/2023
LP/04435/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27th of June 2025

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

LX
(ANONYMITY ORDER Continued)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms P. Young, Counsel instructed by Wimbledon Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 2 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of China and who was born in 1988, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Shiner (“the Judge”) dated 14 July 2024. In his decision the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim dated 8 June 2023.
Background
2. The Appellant’s claim was that he was at a real risk on return to China because he had been kidnapped by a criminal gang called the 14K gang and that his family in China had also been threatened by that gang from whom the gang had also been attempting to extort money. The Appellant had said that his family home in China had been raided by the police. The Appellant also claimed he had been the victim of modern slavery and was at risk of being re-trafficked. The Appellant’s solicitors had highlighted that there had been a decision by the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) that there were reasonable grounds that the Appellant had been the victim of modern slavery.
3. The Appellant had relied on a psychiatric report by Dr Hashimi, Consultant Psychiatrist which stated that he had symptoms of depressive disorder of moderate intensity. The Appellant asked therefore that he be treated as a vulnerable witness in accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010, “Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance”.
4. At the hearing before the Judge, the Appellant had also relied on a report by Professor Aguillar, a country expert.
5. The Judge had noted the Appellant’s immigration history which included that the Appellant had arrived in the United Kingdom in 2009. Some 10 years later the Appellant was arrested by immigration officers. The Appellant then claimed asylum. The Respondent undertook a substantive interview with the Appellant on 21 April 2023. On 8 June 2023 the Respondent made a decision to reject the Appellant’s asylum and human rights claim.
Permission to Appeal
6. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal are lengthy and can be summarised as follows. Ground 1 contends that the Judge misdirected himself in respect of the medical evidence. Ground 2 contends that the Judge had not considered the independent evidence, for example, in respect of the kidnapping and the conclusive grounds NRM decision. This ground also contends there were material errors in the assessment of the evidence relating to a bank account and that Professor Aguilar’s country expert report was not correctly considered, especially in light of the decision in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC).
7. Permission to appeal had been refused by the First-tier Tribunal but was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville by way of a decision dated 14 November 2024. In granting permission to appeal, the learned Upper Tribunal Judge stated that, “I grant permission on a Robinson obvious grounds, being that it was arguably an error of law for the Judge not to seek further representations from the parties upon receipt of the positive Conclusive Grounds after the hearing.” Upper Tribunal Judge Neville cautioned that although he was granting permission on all grounds because of the need to consider the evidence as a whole, “I find the first ground difficult to reconcile with what the Judge actually held at [41]; the same criticism applies to much of what is said in the second grounds which in any event ought to have been divided by reference to the individual errors identified”.
The Hearing Before Us
8. At the hearing before us, Ms Yong sought permission to rely on Amended Grounds of Appeal dated 25 March 2025. We indicated that we were prepared to consider the Amended Grounds on a de bene esse basis whereby we would consider them on provisional basis, pending a final decision.
9. The Appellant’s Amended Grounds contend:
(1) The Judge erred in failing to properly consider the positive conclusive grounds decision and without seeking further representations;
(2) The conclusive grounds decision was a relevant material consideration which could only be departed from with cogent evidence and reasons. A ‘proper’ analysis was required which the Judge had failed to undertake; and
(3) In view of the positive conclusive grounds decision which had come to light following the completion of the hearing further representations including in respect of Article 4 EHCR could have been raised in line with the decision in MS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 9; [2020] I WLR 1373.
10. We heard detailed oral submissions from Ms Yong, who had also relied on a skeleton argument dated 25 March 2025.
11. We had also heard detailed oral submissions from Mr Wain. He had also relied on a Respondent’s Rule 24 response dated 19 November 2024. We refer to the oral and written submissions where relevant when considering our decision.
Analysis and Consideration
The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) Ground of Appeal
12. The Respondent submits that the learned Upper Tribunal Judge granting permission to appeal failed to follow the guidance in AZ (error of law: jurisdiction, PTA practice) (Iran) [2018] UKUT 45 in not identifying whether Ground 1 relating to the NRM decision had a strong prospect of success or if it related to an issue of general importance which the Upper Tribunal needs to address. The Respondent submitted that it was not sufficient for the ground to be merely arguable.
13. In AZ, reference was first made to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R v Secretary of State for the home Department ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929 whereby,
“62. … the Court of Appeal was concerned with an application for judicial review of a refusal by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal of permission to appeal against a decision of a special adjudicator. The court said:-
"38. It is …. necessary for us to identify the circumstances in which it might be appropriate for the Tribunal to grant leave to appeal on the basis of an argument not advanced before the special adjudicator, or for a High Court judge to grant leave to apply for judicial review of a refusal of leave by the Tribunal in relation to a point not taken in the Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal.
39. Because the rules place an onus on the asylum-seeker to state his grounds of appeal, we consider that it would be wrong to say that merely arguability should be the criterion to be applied for the grant of leave in such circumstances. A higher hurdle is required. The appellate authorities should of course focus primarily on the arguments adduced before them, whether these are to be found in the oral argument before the special adjudicator or, so far as the Tribunal is concerned, in the written grounds of appeal on which leave to appeal is sought. They are not required to engage in a search for new points. If there is readily discernible an obvious point of Convention law which favours the applicant although he has not taken it, then the special adjudicator should apply it in his favour, but he should feel under no obligation to prolong the hearing by asking the parties for submissions on points which they have not taken but which could be properly categorised as merely "arguable" as opposed to "obvious". Similarly, if when the Tribunal reads the Special Adjudicator's decision there is an obvious point of Convention law favourable to the asylum-seeker which does not appear in the decision, it should grant leave to appeal. If it does not do so, there will be a danger that this country will be in breach of its obligations under the Convention. When we refer to an obvious point, we mean a point which has a strong prospect of success if it is argued. Nothing less will do. It follows that leave to apply for judicial review of a refusal by the Tribunal to grant leave to appeal should be granted if the judge is of the opinion that it is properly arguable that a point not raised in the Grounds of Appeal to the Tribunal had a strong prospect of success if leave to appeal were to be granted."
14. The Upper Tribunal in AZ explained further that therefore,
“69. In conclusion, we consider that any judge who is considering whether to grant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal must not grant permission on a ground which does not feature in the grounds accompanying the application, unless the judge is satisfied that the ground he or she has identified is one which has a strong prospect of success for the original appellant; or for the Secretary of State, where the ground relates to a decision which, if undisturbed, would breach the United Kingdom's international treaty obligations; or (possibly) if the ground relates to an issue of general importance, which the Upper Tribunal needs to address.”
15. The references in the Upper Tribunal’s grant of permission as being ‘arguable’ is standard terminology which then requires the matter to be considered further thereafter. We are satisfied that is what the grant of permission was seeking to refer. We are persuaded however that, through an abundance of caution, that we ought to conclude that it is arguable that the wrong test was applied by the Upper Tribunal when granting permission to appeal to those aspects which were referring to the Robinson obvious ground of appeal. The Upper Tribunal granted permission on all grounds in any event so the appeal can still therefore lawfully be considered by us.
16. It is of relevance though that the Appellant seeks permission to amend his grounds of appeal to include the NRM ground of appeal (and indeed to refine his other rather lengthy grounds of appeal) in any event. We conclude that it is in the interests of justice to grant the Appellant permission to amend his grounds of appeal, which are now set out in the draft dated 25 March 2025 and which we have referred to above. We do so on the basis that it is in the interests of justice to do so when bearing in mind that the Respondent has known since 14 November 2024 (the date of the grant permission to appeal by the Upper Tribunal) that the NRM ground of appeal was to be considered by the Upper Tribunal. In addition, in any event the Respondent has been able to argue the ground fully both in her written Rule 24 response and orally before us at the hearing. There is little if any prejudice to the Respondent in permitting the Appellant’s amendments to his grounds of appeal.
17. We therefore consider the NRM ground of appeal. It is appropriate to consider that ground first because if it succeeds, it will lead to the appeal as a whole succeeding.
18. It is necessary to consider what occurred leading to the Judge having the conclusive grounds decision before him. The hearing before the Judge took place on 25 June 2024. The Judge had reserved his decision. Following the hearing, and before the decision was promulgated, the Appellant had filed a copy of the conclusive grounds decision.
19. As is made clear at paragraph 20 of the Judge’s decision, he had considered whether or not to invite further submissions concerning this further evidence, but he had decided against doing so because (1) there was no application made by the Appellant (or indeed the Respondent) to comment on the conclusive grounds decision, (2) the Judge had heard detailed submissions from the Appellant’s counsel at the hearing in respect of the (‘lesser’) reasonable grounds decision and (3) he would take the evidence into account in making his findings. The Judge therefore decided that he would admit the late conclusive grounds decision evidence and said he could do so fairly without having to invite the parties to make further submissions.
20. In assessing whether or not the Judge ought to have sought further submissions, we conclude that it was incumbent upon the Appellant’s solicitors to make any further submissions that they had sought to do so at the time that they had provided the conclusive grounds decision to the Judge.
21. There was no procedural irregularity or other error of law in the Judge’s approach. We are fortified in this view because at paragraph 20, the Judge made clear that he was taking into account the conclusive grounds decision. Additionally at paragraph 43 the Judge had again stated that he had taken into account the conclusive grounds decision which had been made in favour of the Appellant “…and to a higher standard, balance of probabilities”. The Judge correctly identified though that, “Nonetheless, I must have regard to all of the evidence before me much of which was tested in cross examination.” Then at paragraph 51 the Judge once again referred to having had regard to the NRM decision.
22. As Mr Wain submitted on behalf of the Respondent, had the Judge not factored in the conclusive grounds decision in his decision making, then that would have been a material error of law. Here, however, the Judge admitted the new evidence, namely the conclusive grounds decision which had come into existence only after the hearing. Importantly, the Judge had then correctly considered the conclusive grounds decision alongside all of the other evidence and the submissions when coming to his final decision.
23. We further agree with Mr Wain that despite having the opportunity to do so, the Appellant’s solicitors did not provide any further submissions when they provided the new evidence to Judge and nor did they ask for a resumed hearing. The Judge considered whether he ought to do so of his volition but concluded with lawful reasoning why that was not necessary in view of the substantial evidence and submissions which had already been made. We are unable to discern any procedural irregularity, unfairness or any other material error in the Judge’s approach. We therefore dismiss this ground of appeal.
24. Even if we are wrong about that, in any event, as Mr Wain correctly submitted that, in MS (Pakistan) Lady Hale, giving the judgment on behalf of the Supreme Court, made clear that,
“11…it is now common ground that the tribunal is in no way bound by the decision reached under the NRM, nor does it have to look for public law reasons why that decision was flawed. This is an important matter. As the AIRE Centre and ECPAT UK point out, had the tribunal been bound by such decisions, it could have had a profoundly chilling effect upon the willingness of victims to engage with the NRM mechanism for fear that it would prejudice their prospects of a successful immigration appeal.”
25. The Supreme Court stressed that it was for the Tribunal to make its decision pursuant to section 82 of Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Here, the Judge made clear that was precisely what he was doing at paragraph 8 of his decision. He said he would take into account the conclusive grounds decision at paragraphs 20, 43 and 51. The Judge was clearly considering all of the evidence in the round, and he had also had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and had firmly in mind the conclusive grounds decision. The Judge therefore undertook what was required of him in accordance with MS (Pakistan).
26. MS (Pakistan) also stated as follows and which therefore fortifies our view,
“The Upper Tribunal, in the case before us, made the same point:
“… this Tribunal is better equipped than the Authority to make pertinent findings. The decisions of the Authority were the product of a paper exercise, entailing no live evidence. In contrast, we have the distinct advantage of having heard the appellant’s viva voce evidence and, further, we have received evidence not available to the Authority. Linked to this is the Secretary of State’s submission, with which we concur, that the appellant’s credibility is central to the disposal of this appeal.” (para 46)”
27. Therefore, we do not agree with Ms Yong’s skeleton argument or with her oral submissions that the Judge did not ‘substantiate with cogent reasons and analysis’ why he had rejected the Appellant’s claim. Nor are we able to agree with Ms Yong that the Judge said the opposite at paragraph 43 of his decision because he clearly said he had to have regard to all of the evidence and to which he had referred at length in his decision.
28. We are unable to agree with Ms Yong that the conclusive grounds decision was “such that the proper course of action was to seek representations…”. The reason we do not agree with her is because the Appellant’s solicitors could have provided written submissions when they submitted the conclusive grounds decision to the Judge after the hearing. It was not for the Judge to second guess that the Appellant may have wished to make further submissions. The Appellant had been represented by experienced and competent solicitors and counsel. We conclude that it is not for a Judge to look even beyond that legal representation to second guess whether the approach by the professional representatives was correct. Indeed, there might be all sorts of tactical, ethical and other reasons, unknown to the Judge why the solicitors had taken the approach that they did. Therefore, we are clear that there was no procedural impropriety or unfairness. As we have said, in any event, the Judge did take into account the complete background when assessing credibility, including the conclusive grounds decision.
29. We note too that, even now, there has been no real identification of what it is said that could possibly have been said by way of further written or submissions, even if they were to have been made to the Judge by the Appellant. Therefore, we are satisfied that even if submissions had been sought by the Judge, it appears clear that there was nothing that could have been said to the First-tier Tribunal Judge which was different to what had already been said .
30. The reality is that the Appellant’s only argument was that after the hearing, he had received a positive conclusive grounds decision and he wanted the Judge to therefore consider his evidence in the light of this new finding made by the competent authority that had been the victim of trafficking to the balance of probabilities standard. That, as the Judge made clear, was precisely what he had done and he was assessing the evidence with that in mind. Even if there was a procedural error, which there was not, this is one of those relatively rare cases in which even with procedural irregularity the error was not a material error because the Appellant has no answer to what he would or could have said differently to the Judge with written or other submissions.
The Remaining Grounds of Appeal
31. Before considering the Appellant’s other grounds in detail, it is necessary to highlight first the following matters from the Judge’s decision:
(1) The Appellant’s vulnerability was specifically considered (for example at paragraph 24 of the decision. He did so again at paragraphs 48 and 49);
(2) At paragraph 39, the Judge accepted the evidence of Dr Hashimi’s diagnosis that the Appellant has a depressive disorder of moderate intensity;
(3) At paragraph 38, the Judge reminded himself and then applied the law in respect of assessing evidence and the Appellant’s claim holistically with a broad evaluative judgment. Amongst other caselaw, the Judge referred at paragraph 38 of his decision to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216; [2023] Imm. A.R. 713. We need not cite it in full but Singh LJ’s judgment at paragraphs 49 to 67 is well known. The Judge applied the law again at paragraph 51 of his decision;
(4) At paragraphs 41 and 42, the Judge accepted the evidence of Dr Sommerland’s scarring report, as far as it was able to go; and
(5) At paragraph 50 the Judge took into account the expert report of Professor Aquilar and accepted that the 14K gang is of great influence not only in China but also in the UK and that they operate in London, Manchester and other cities. The Judge also accepted that the Chinese police are subject to corruption.
32. It is with those matters in mind that the Appellant’s remaining grounds of appeal have to be assessed. Whilst the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, as identified when permission was granted on the papers are not set out in an individualised way, they can be summarised as follows.
33. Firstly, it is contended that the Judge’s assessment of the medical evidence was misconceived and that there “…had not been consideration of all of Dr Sommerland’s clinical findings”. We reject this batch of the grounds of appeal because the Judge specifically referred to the 4 scars at paragraph 41 of his decision. Those included the scar to the left forehead, the nasal deviation, a right wrist scar and a lump on the left side of the back. As we have said, the Judge accepted Dr Sommerland’s conclusions at paragraph 42 of his decision that there were the injuries/scars, but that Dr Sommerland’s report did not assist with dating them. The Judge plainly had considered the whole of the scarring evidence and he had considered it in the round to the lower standard of proof.
34. Secondly, it is contended that in respect of the ‘kidnapping incident’ the Judge had not considered the evidence in respect of his circumstances at the time “…as he had been traumatised as the victim of ill treatment who no longer had any contact with the witnesses to the incident”.
35. We reject this ground of appeal because the Judge specifically stated, for example at paragraph 43, that there were consistencies in the Appellant’s account but the Judge concluded with extensive reasoning at paragraph 44 why the Appellant being kidnapped in a Karaoke Bar in London was highly improbable including because it was an open venue, that the Appellant was not known before being attacked and with no record of the police being contacted by him or with support from the 5 or 6 friends the Appellant was with. Again, noting the Judge was well aware that corroboration cannot be sought because the Judge had correctly referred to and applied MAH (Egypt). The Judge clearly did take into account the Appellant’s mental health condition, because he has said he had done so. In reality, the Appellant is merely seeking to re-argue his appeal with this ground of appeal and the others.
36. Similarly, and regrettably, paragraph 20 of the Appellant’s grounds (and other similar discursive paragraphs) wrongly contend that, “There was however no consideration of Dr Hashimi’s clinical findings, in particular Dr Hashimi diagnosed the A with Depressive Disorder of moderate intensity”. The grounds of appeal are wrong because the Judge specifically had taken into account the Dr Hashimi’s evidence at paragraph 39 of his decision. Indeed, even the grounds of appeal inconsistently accept that he did.
37. Thirdly, the grounds of appeal do not improve with reference to the ‘bank book’ or to Professor Aguilar’s report. The grounds are merely a disagreement with the Judge’s finding in respect of the bank book. The Judge was plainly entitled to make the findings that he did having had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and his counsel. The Judge plainly did take into account Professor’s Aguilar’s report and indeed had accepted it at paragraph 50 of his decision.
38. The grounds are repetitive in nature and become inconsistent with other parts pleaded previously, but even with the able oral submissions, we were not able to decipher from Ms Yong that there is any material error of law established in her grounds of appeal.
The Amended Grounds of Appeal
39. The Amended Grounds of Appeal dated 25 March 2025, whether taken alongside the skeleton argument dated 25 March 2025 or individually do not evince any separate or different arguable error of law. The Judge found several aspects in favour of the Appellant, but also many others which he did not, including the fact that he was an intelligent person living in the UK but waited 9 years in making his claim for asylum of those events he was now relying on. This was the Judge’s task. He clearly considered the evidence in the round, accepting some parts but rejecting other parts.
40. The Judge had considered the CPIN and background evidence in some detail with detailed reference and then application of it. The Appellant’s new argument that TD and AD provides him with a remedy is misconceived because the Judge had already rejected the Appellant’s evidence, but in any event the Judge had considered the Appellant’s claim around the actual CPIN, background material and the country expert report.
41. Importantly, in any event the Judge had said at paragraph 52 that in the alternative even if he was wrong in respect of his findings, he still did not accept that the Appellant’s parents had been visited by the police or the 14K gang. The Judge concluded at paragraph 54 that the Appellant would be able to return to his parents, whom he had described himself as being wealthy. These were clearly findings open to the Judge.
42. The law is well settled that we must respect the decision of the expert First-tier Tribunal, especially since it had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and his counsel. The law has been re-stated once again in the very recent decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 (9 June 2025). Arnold LJ with whom and Singh and King LJJ agreed said,
“The role of an appellate court or tribunal
29. There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen's summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72] :
"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead."”
43. We note too that the Judge had comprehensively dealt with Article 8 ECHR and dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds at paragraphs 56 to 73 of his decision with the citation and application of the correct law to the facts.
44. Finally, Ms Yong had referred in her skeleton argument to paragraph 35 of the Supreme Court’s judgment in MS (Pakistan) which states in respect of Article 4 of the European Convention Against Trafficking (ECAT),
“However, it is clear that there has not yet been an effective investigation of the breach of article 4. The police took no further action after passing him on to the social services department. It is not the task of the NRM to investigate possible criminal offences, although the competent authority may notify the police if it considers that offences have been committed: Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hoang Anh Minh [2016] EWCA Civ 565; [2016] Imm AR 1272. The authorities are under a positive obligation to rectify that failure. And it is clear that an effective investigation cannot take place if the appellant is removed to Pakistan: the UT rightly held that “it is inconceivable that an effective police investigation and any ensuing prosecution could be conducted without the full assistance and co-operation of the appellant. Realistically this will not be feasible if he is removed to Pakistan” (para 64).”
45. Ms Yong additionally referred in her skeleton argument to Guidance on Temporary permission to stay considerations for victims of human trafficking or slavery”. Ms Yong did not refer though to paragraph 34 of MS (Pakistan) which makes clear that,
“The UT having decided that the appellant was indeed a victim of trafficking, it is necessary to decide whether his removal from the UK would amount to a breach of any of the positive obligations in article 4 of the ECHR.”
46. In the instant appeal before us, the Judge had comprehensively rejected the Appellant’s claim that he was the victim of trafficking. Therefore, there is nothing to investigate and for which the Appellant would be required to remain in the UK in respect of that investigation.
47. In any event, as MS (Pakistan) makes clear, Article 4 of ECAT has not been incorporated into UK law. Lady Hale explained clearly at paragraph 20 that,
“ECAT as such has not been incorporated into UK law. Its obligations have been implemented by a variety of measures. The NRM is designed to fulfil the obligations in articles 10, 12 and 13; immigration rules have been modified in the light of article 14; and various criminal offences are created by the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The NRM does not, however, give private law rights to individuals. There is no right of appeal against an adverse decision or against a failure to provide the expected assistance. The only remedy lies in judicial review. However, the Secretary of State has consistently accepted that the NRM should comply with ECAT.”
48. Ms Yong’s amended grounds and skeleton argument contend that further representations would have been made in respect of Article 4 ECHR. That is of no consequence though because as is clear at paragraph 34 of MS (Pakistan) those matters were only relevant in that case because it was concluded by the Upper Tribunal that MS was the victim of trafficking,
“The UT having decided that the appellant was indeed a victim of trafficking, it is necessary to decide whether his removal from the UK would amount to a breach of any of the positive obligations in article 4 of the ECHR.”
49. Importantly, in the instant appeal before us, whilst the Appellant had a positive conclusive grounds decision, the Judge had comprehensively considered the matter for himself and had concluded that the Appellant was not the victim of trafficking. Therefore, the Tribunal had not accepted that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking. Therefore, no material error of law arises in the Judge’s decision whether on procedural, fairness or any other grounds.
50. There appears to be some confusion in the Appellant’s written and oral submissions in respect of the differing roles for consideration of Article 4 of ECAT (as opposed to the ECHR) with public law duties because we are dealing in this instant appeal with a statutory appeal only and not with judicial review.
51. Therefore, despite the able submissions of Ms Yong, we conclude that neither the Appellant’s original nor his amended grounds of appeal evince any material error of law.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not contain a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds therefore stands.

11 June 2025

Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber