Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004883

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58714/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 25th of March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CLARKE

Between

RS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Ferguson of Counsel, instructed by Freemans Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 4 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This order is made on account of the fact that the appellant’s claim is for international protection.

DECISION AND REASONS
SUMMARY
1. The issue before the Upper Tribunal in this case is whether the appellant would be at risk of persecution as a Coptic Christian in Egypt. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that he would be at risk of persecution and allow his appeal under the Refugee Convention. In reaching that finding, we have taken into account that the appellant was previously the subject of an acid attack in Alexandria when he was proselytising his faith; that he continues to proselytise in the UK; and that he would continue to do so in Egypt. We conclude that he would be in danger in Cairo, as he was in Alexandria, on account of his devout commitment to the Christian faith.
INTRODUCTION
2. The Appellant appeals against the Respondent’s decision (“RFRL”) dated 13 October 2023 refusing his protection claim. In an error of law decision dated 15 January 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell set aside the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Abdar dated 3 September 2024, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal. The Appellant’s appeal now comes before us to be remade pursuant to s.12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
THE APPELLANT’S CLAIM
3. The Appellant is an Egyptian national of Coptic Christian faith, who was born and raised in Alexandria.
4. It is the Appellant’s case that in 2011, he began proselytising and “spreading the word” through Facebook whilst at Alexandria University.
5. The Appellant claims that on 17 July 2015, he and his friend FO were giving out dates and Christian literature after Iftar during Ramadan when a group of five men ordered them to leave the area. The Appellant believes that these men were Salafists. When the Appellant and FO did not leave, an argument ensued and one of the men threw acid over the Appellant, resulting in burns to the Appellant’s back and arms which required hospital treatment.
6. The Appellant claims that when he was taken to hospital, FO was taken to a police station by the Salafists and detained under Egypt’s blasphemy laws. The Appellant claims that after he subsequently fled Egypt, FO’s family told the Appellant that FO had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.
7. The Appellant claims that whilst he was in hospital, his father reported the acid attack to the Police and the Police attended the hospital to take the Appellant’s statement. The Appellant claims that his father then found a threatening letter underneath his car, which he took to the Police, however the Police told the Appellant’s father that to progress the case the security services would need to intervene. The Appellant’s father therefore withdrew the case out of fear.
8. After A was released from hospital, he claims that he was too afraid to go home and went to stay with relatives in Minya. On 14 August 2015, the Appellant travelled to Libya, then to Italy by small boat, before travelling overland to France and entering the UK on 9 September 2015. The Appellant claims that he had not intended to claim asylum in the UK and made three attempts to travel to Canada, where his brother is recognised as a refugee. The Appellant was arrested in October 2017 as an illegal entrant and on 7 November 2017 he claimed asylum in the UK.
ERROR OF LAW DECISION, 15 JANUARY 2025
9. In an error of law decision dated 15 January 2025, UTJ Blundell set aside the FTT decision of Judge Abdar, upholding only the Appellant’s second ground which argued that the FTIJ had failed to make findings on Appellant’s behaviour on return, pursuant to the third question in the HJ Iran [2010] UKSC 31 test at [82].
10. For the purposes of remaking the decision on the Appellant’s appeal, UTJ Blundell made the following relevant findings in his error of law decision:
[15] “The first matter for the judge to consider was the question posed by HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31; [2011] AC 596, RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38; [2013] 1 AC 152 and WA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 302: how would the Appellant behave in the event that he returned to Egypt, or would the Appellant’s behaviour be likely to attract the adverse attention of extremists? In particular, the question on the facts of this appeal was whether the appellant would proselytise on return.”
[16] “I do not consider his analysis to contain a clear answer to that question.”
[17] “The second necessary part of the enquiry was paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, which replicates the commonsense proposition considered in Demirkaya v SSHD [1999] Imm AR 498, that previous persecution might provide evidence to establish present fear. As I have already noted, the appellant is a man who has already suffered a serious attack as a result of his proselytising activities in Egypt, and that was to be taken as a serious indication of future risk unless there is good reason for concluding otherwise. The judge also overlooked that aspect of the enquiry.”
[18] “[…….] I therefore set aside the Judge’s analysis of risk, as contained in paragraphs [30 – 32], [….] the Judge’s primary findings of fact [are] preserved. The findings that he is a Coptic Christian who was attacked with acid by Salafists as a result of his activities during Ramadan will therefore be preserved, and it will be for the Upper Tribunal to remake the decision on the appeal. The principal question which it will need to confront concerns the Appellant’s likely behaviour on return to Egypt.”

PRESERVED FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL FINDINGS
11. In the light of paragraphs [30] – [32] of FTIJ Abdar’s decision, dated 3 September 2024, being set aside, the following findings of fact are preserved:
[14] The Appellant’s identity and nationality are not disputed. The Appellant was born in Alexandria and is an Egyptian. The Appellant’s father died in February 2020, his two older brothers work in Dubai and his mother and other brother live in Canada.
[15] The Appellant was schooled in Egypt and has a degree in hotel management from Alexandria University. The Appellant worked as a marketing co-ordinator and he visited the UK in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2015, before returning to Egypt on 7 April 2015.
[16] The Respondent accepts that the Appellant is a Coptic Christian.
[23] “I am persuaded to find the Appellant’s evidence of being attacked by Islamists for proselytising during Ramadan to be credible [….] I find that the Appellant was a victim of a corrosive acid attack.”
[28] “The Appellant candidly and reliably accepts that the Appellant will not be identified and targeted by the Salafists as a result of the incident in July 2015. I am also satisfied that there is no outstanding risk of prosecution or persecution of the Appellant by the state for the events in Egypt”.
[29] “The Appellant has continued to practice Christianity in the UK, as confirmed by The Reverend Sameh Metry, Priest in charge of Living Water Arabic Church in Bayswater, London.”
[35] “The Appellant has no family in the UK and only has extended family in Egypt”
[42] “The Appellant has been suffering from anxiety and depression.”
THE LAW
12. Before outlining the oral evidence and the parties' competing legal submissions, we set out the essential legal framework for the issues arising in these proceedings.
The Refugee Convention
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a "refugee" as any person who:
"…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."
MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at [49]
“[…] The requirement that an applicant's fear of persecution should be well-founded means that there has to be demonstrated "a reasonable degree of likelihood" that he will be persecuted for a Convention reason if returned to his own country: see R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958, at 994 (Lord Keith of Kinkel).”
HJ Iran [2010] UKSC 31 at [82]
“When an applicant applies for asylum on the ground of a well-founded fear of persecution because he is gay, the tribunal must first ask itself whether it is satisfied on the evidence that he is gay, or that he would be treated as gay by potential persecutors in his country of nationality.
If so, the tribunal must then ask itself whether it is satisfied on the available evidence that gay people who lived openly would be liable to persecution in the applicant's country of nationality.
If so, the tribunal must go on to consider what the individual applicant would do if he were returned to that country.
If the applicant would in fact live openly and thereby be exposed to a real risk of persecution, then he has a well-founded fear of persecution - even if he could avoid the risk by living "discreetly".
If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that the applicant would in fact live discreetly and so avoid persecution, it must go on to ask itself why he would do so.
If the tribunal concludes that the applicant would choose to live discreetly simply because that was how he himself would wish to live, or because of social pressures, e g, not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his friends, then his application should be rejected. Social pressures of that kind do not amount to persecution and the Convention does not offer protection against them. Such a person has no well-founded fear of persecution because, for reasons that have nothing to do with any fear of persecution, he himself chooses to adopt a way of life which means that he is not in fact liable to be persecuted because he is gay.
If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that a material reason for the applicant living discreetly on his return would be a fear of the persecution which would follow if he were to live openly as a gay man, then, other things being equal, his application should be accepted. Such a person has a well-founded fear of persecution. To reject his application on the ground that he could avoid the persecution by living discreetly would be to defeat the very right which the Convention exists to protect – his right to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution. By admitting him to asylum and allowing him to live freely and openly as a gay man without fear of persecution, the receiving state gives effect to that right by affording the applicant a surrogate for the protection from persecution which his country of nationality should have afforded him.”
Article 3 of the ECHR provides:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
Vilvarajah v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 248 at [103]
"[…..] expulsion by a Contracting State of an asylum seeker may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country to which he was returned".
KV [2019] UKSC 10 at [25]
"The conclusion about credibility always rests with the decision-maker following a critical survey of all the evidence… Indeed, in an asylum case in which the question is only whether there is a real possibility that the account given is true, not even the decision-maker is required to arrive at an overall belief in its truth; the inquiry is into credibility only of a partial character."
13. We should note in connection with the directions above that this is a case in which the claim for asylum was made before ss. [31] –[36] of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 came into force, and that the standard of proof which applies is consequently unaffected by those provisions.
UT CONTINUANCE HEARING, 4 March 2025
14. At the start of the hearing, we confirmed that the parties had before them, a consolidated Upper Tribunal bundle of 390 pages, a skeleton argument settled by Ms Ferguson of Counsel dated 25 February 2025, and the “Egypt: Christians” CPIN v.5 dated December 2023 (the “CPIN”).
15. Mr Wain further indicated that he would be relying on MH (review; slip rule; church witnesses) Iran [2020] UKUT 00125 (IAC) at headnote [4] and paragraph [35].
16. Notwithstanding the FTT findings at [42], we were not invited to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness.
ORAL EVIDENCE
17. At the outset of the hearing, we ensured that the Appellant and the Arabic interpreter understood each other and explained the proceedings to the Appellant. Ms Ferguson confirmed that only the Appellant would be called to give evidence.
18. Ms Ferguson then invited the Appellant to adopt his statements dated 20 February 2025 and 5 February 2024 in addition to a third undated statement. Mr Wain raised the fact that a further WS was also contained at CB [285]. The Appellant then proceeded to adopt this further statement but stated that it was conducted over the phone, and he had not signed it. Ms Ferguson confirmed that she had no questions in Chief for the Appellant.
19. In summary, the relevant parts of the Appellant’s oral evidence are as follows:
20. The Appellant claimed that his proselytising in the UK consisted of handing out Christian literature and entering into discussions in the street over a 10-year period. In addition, the Appellant claimed that he had also created a website in 2022 called ChristianFromEgypt.com. Mr Wain put to the Appellant that if he was as committed as he suggested, there would be more photographic evidence than the post- September 2024 photographs in the CB, which were obtained only after the Appellant lost his appeal at the FTT. In reply, the Appellant said that he had no other photographic evidence, that he had produced Church letters before the FTT evidencing his evangelism and he had obtained the photographs “because I thought it was important”.
21. Mr Wain put to the Appellant that his name did not appear on the FromEgypt.com pages at CB [70] – [74], which were largely in Arabic. The documents at CB [70] – [74] were placed before the Appellant for comment, at which point the interpreter proceeded to translate the pages as follows, “My name is Ramez Shokralla, my aim is to help spread the word as it is contained in the Holy Book”. Mr Wain made no objection to the interpreter’s assistance and instead put to the Appellant that the website had been recently manufactured because this evidence was not placed before the FTT in September 2024. The Appellant replied that the site was created in 2022.
22. In response to further questions from Mr Wain, the Appellant confirmed that he had been attending the Living Waters Arabic Church in the UK since 2018. It was put to the Appellant that the Church letter of Rev. M dated 25 January 2024, as before the FTT at CB [88], did not state that the Appellant had been handing out Christian literature. These things, Mr Wain suggested, were only mentioned in the recent letters of Rev. M, dated 14 February 2025 at CB [68], and Minister S, dated 16 February 2025 at CB [69], upon the Appellant’s request. In reply, the Appellant stated that he asked the Church representatives to provide new letters because the letters before the FTT were not clear as to what evangelism meant. The Appellant confirmed that Minister S could be seen in the photographs of the Appellant proselytising at CB [25] – [67].
23. Mr Wain then asked the Appellant to explain why the Church representatives were not providing oral evidence today. In response the Appellant stated that Rev. M was going to come but he was travelling. The Appellant in response to further questions from Mr Wain stated that his remaining relatives in Egypt consisted of maternal aunts and cousins and that they were all Coptic Christians.
24. There was no re-examination.
SUBMISSIONS
25. For the Respondent, Mr Wain relied upon the RFRL and confirmed that whilst it was accepted that the Appellant was a Coptic Christian, it was not accepted that he proselytised in the UK.
26. Mr Wain drew our attention to the guidance in MS (Coptic Christians) Egypt CG [2013] UKUT 00611 (IAC) and argued that Coptic Christians per se are only at risk in the Muslim areas identified at headnote [2] and the Appellant did not fall into the risk categories identified at headnote [3], because he would not proselytise on return.
27. Mr Wain invited us to find that the Appellant had not genuinely proselytised in the UK. First, because the photographic evidence was obtained only after the Appellant lost at the FTT and second, because of the lack of detail of the Appellant’s activities in the Church letters before the FTT. Mr Wain argued that the Appellant had asked the Church representatives to provide the additional detail of proselytising in the recent Church letters at CB [68] and [69] and therefore these new letters took matters no further.
28. In terms of the Appellant’s website, “FromEgypt.com”, Mr Wain argued that the produced screen shots were easy to manipulate, as confirmed in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), and were therefore of little evidential value.
29. We asked Mr Wain to clarify, in the light of his submissions, whether he was accepting a general risk from Muslims triggered by proselytising in Egypt. In response Mr Wain first drew our attention to CPIN 9.1.3 and 9.1.4 as evidence of the Egyptian government’s positive links to the Coptic Church. Mr Wain then clarified that the Respondent’s case was of a specific risk from Salafists when proselytising; the risk, he said, was “not as high from any Muslim” if we were to accept that the Appellant would proselytise on return.
30. In response to a suggestion from Judge Blundell that the Respondent’s submissions did not go as far as to suggest that the Appellant could proselytise without fear, Mr Wain suggested that the Appellant could internally relocate. We asked Mr Wain, in the light of the RFRL’s singular identification of Cairo as an area of internal relocation, whether the Respondent was arguing that the Appellant could proselytise in Cairo without risk. In response Mr Wain argued that MS at [157] confirms that sectarian violence occurs in Upper Egypt.
31. We put to Mr Wain that it appeared to us that MS “looked backwards” in its risk assessment. Whilst MS identified “those accused of proselytising” as falling within a risk category, it did not appear to engage with (for reasons arising on its facts) the forward-looking HJ Iran and RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38 questions concerning behaviour on return. In response Mr Wain confirmed his position that sectarian violence is restricted to Upper Egypt and “even if the Appellant proselytises on return, Cairo is a safe location to internally relocate to”. Mr Wain therefore invited us to dismiss the appeal.
32. In response, Ms Ferguson for the Appellant invited us to find that the Appellant’s claimed proselytising activities in the UK were credible. In relation to the photographic evidence, it was argued that this was not evidence designed to bolster the Appellant’s claim because there had been no previous reason to record the Appellant’s activities. In terms of the detail in the more recent Church letters, all that the Appellant had done was to ask Rev. M to explain his previous reference to evangelism.
33. Ms Ferguson confirmed that there was no evidence before the Tribunal confirming that Rev. M was travelling or on business but argued that nonetheless he had provided two letters.
34. In terms of the Appellant’s FromEgypt.com website, Ms Ferguson argued that the screenshots were consistent with the Appellant’s account, and she was not arguing that any risk arose specifically from the website’s existence.
35. Ms Ferguson confirmed that it was not the Appellant’s case that the same Salafists would attack him again but rather the risk arose from extremists generally.
36. Ms Ferguson reminded us of rule 339K and the principle that past persecution is probative of risk on return. We asked Ms Ferguson to address us on the geographical risk when proselytising in Egypt, in the light of R’s submission that violence is restricted to Upper Egypt and the submission that the Appellant can relocate to Cairo. In response Ms Ferguson argued that because the past persecution happened in Alexandria, this was evidence that areas outside Upper Egypt were not as tolerant as suggested.
37. We asked Ms Ferguson if she could take us to any evidence that demonstrated that those proselytising in Cairo were targeted. At this point we rose for 20 minutes to allow Ms. Ferguson time to review the evidence.
38. When we returned, Ms Ferguson took us to the following evidence and argued:
CB [222], a Canadian Refugee Board document (RIR) dated 31 July 2012,
• Demonstrated that “Christians live dispersed throughout Egypt, but mostly in Upper Egypt in the south of the country, and parts of Cairo and Alexandria”.
• Paragraph [3] of the RIR, confirmed an increase in violence against Copts and their Churches when the SCAF took power in February 2011.
• Eight bullet points on page 2 of the RIR, identified incidents of violence against Christians from 2010 – 2011, including an attack on a Church in Cairo in 2012.
• Paragraph [6] of the RIR, evidenced a 2011 Coptic demonstration in Cairo following the destruction of a Church in Aswan, which led to the deaths of between 24 – 28 people.
CB [232], Australian Government Egyptian Country Advice report, dated 26 September 2011,
• Records that “on 1 February 2009 police arrested two citizens at the Cairo International Book Fair for distributing Bibles”.
• At page [4], is reference to a 2011 report of an Egyptian blogger activist being deported upon arrival at Cairo airport and a 2010 report of the disappearance of a leader of the Democratic Front Party at Cairo airport after his passport was checked.
CB [345], 18 August 2022 online article by Jayson Casper
• Reported that 41 worshipers were killed in a fire at a Coptic Church in Cairo.
39. However, as Ms Ferguson appropriately conceded, this report was quite opaque in terms of how the fire started.
CPIN at [8.2.1], USSD Religious Freedom report dated 2022,
• States that ‘the penal code, while not addressing blasphemy by name, states [in article 98(f)] that “disdaining and disrespecting” any of the “heavenly religions” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) is punishable by six months’ to five years’;
• At [8.2.4], the same report continues, “that blasphemy article 98(f) ‘does not conform with constitutional standards for drafting penal legislation, because its vague formulation can be interpreted in multiple ways that can be contradictory to the law’s original objectives…’”.
CPIN at [9.2], “State Policies and Initiatives”,
• Ms Ferguson argued that this evidenced a difference between the Egyptian State’s policy of promoting religious tolerance and the implementation of such policies.
CPIN at [9.4.4], Amnesty International report dated 2022
• States that, “‘Authorities continued to discriminate against Christians in law and practice, and prosecuted Christians demanding their right to worship.’ The AI report did not, however, state how many prosecutions took place or describe the nature of the discrimination.”
CPIN at [9.4.8], 2023 USCIRF annual report,
• States that ‘the Egyptian criminal justice system remained the locus of systematic and ongoing religious freedom violations.’”.
CPIN at [9.6], “Prosecution Under Blasphemy Laws”
• At [9.6.2], a 2019 DFAT report states that, “the EIPR and others Mid-term UPR Report noted: ‘Defamation of religion’ continues to be a charge widely used to prosecute citizens who have not committed any criminal act. The charge is used…in prosecuting Christians…’”
• At [9.6.3], a 2022 AI Egypt report states that, “‘Members of religious minorities, atheists and others not espousing state-sanctioned religious beliefs were prosecuted and imprisoned on “defamation of religion” and other bogus charges’”.
• At [9.6.6], a 2023 USCIRF update states that, “Commenting on article 98(f), the 2023 MRG culture report stated: ‘The contradictions and gaps in this loosely worded article are manifested in the selective application of the article on certain religions and sects. The danger is that this type of legislation could gravely reduce the ability of religious minorities to express themselves freely in public’”.
• At [9.6.7], the same report continues, “‘Egypt has also continued to detain and charge individuals under the Egyptian cybercrimes law (175/2018)… The law contains several broad provisions that the government can use to censor the expression of religious beliefs, targeting both non-Muslim and Muslim religious minorities… The government has threatened legal experts attempting to study the law to understand its limitations.’”.
• At [9.6.9], a 2023 USCIRF update reports that, “‘in 2023, courts invoked both counterterrorism and blasphemy laws to renew the detention of Nour Fayez Ibrahim Gerges, who had created a Facebook group to assist people wishing to convert to Christianity, and Abdulbaqi Saeed Abdo, a Yemeni asylum-seeker whose apparent basis for detention – publicizing his conversion to Christianity”; ‘In September [2022], an appeals court in Cairo upheld a five-year prison sentence against Marco Girgis, a Copt, on charges including breach of 98(f) “exploiting religion in promoting extremist ideas, contempt of Islam, and transgression of the values of the Egyptian family” for allegedly sharing sexually explicit digital material””.
40. Ms Ferguson argued that the Appellant’s friend, FO, had himself been prosecuted under Egypt’s blasphemy laws; as evidenced at CB [93] by a newspaper article dated 22 July 2015, which recounts the testimony of a friend of FO who visited him at a police station where he had been detained after distributing dates during Iftar. The report does not however mention any sentence being passed upon FO.
41. In response to Mr Wain’s submission that the Appellant could internally relocate to Cairo, Ms Ferguson argued that Cairo was no different to Alexandria in terms of risk but in any event, relocation to Cairo was not “reasonable”. In this regard, reliance was placed upon the “Relocation to Cairo and Alexandria” section of the CPIN at [12.3.1], which references a 2022 IRBC response quoting an interview with a post-doctoral research associate:
‘Coptic Christians who are resettled by the government to escape sectarian violence in Upper Egypt tend to relocate to other villages where they have family and that, to [the research associate’s] knowledge, such individuals are “never resettled” in Cairo or Alexandria (Postdoctoral Research Associate 11 Apr. 2022). The same source added that while Upper Egypt is connected by rail to Cairo and Alexandria, the ability to travel to these cities “depends” on a family's circumstances and resources (Postdoctoral Research Associate 11 Apr. 2022).’
‘The Professor further stated that, for Coptic Christians, resettlement in Cairo or Alexandria is "feasible but not easy"
42. Having heard submissions from Mr Wain and Ms Ferguson, we indicated that we would reserve our decision and provide that in writing with our reasons. We now set out our reasoning and decision as follows.
DISCUSSION and FINDINGS
Question 1: How will the Appellant behave on return?
43. We have no hesitation in finding a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would proselytise on return to Egypt for the following reasons:
44. First, there is a preserved finding that the Appellant previously proselytised in Alexandria and that this resulted in an acid attack.
45. Second, there is a preserved finding that the Appellant continued to practice his Christian faith in the UK.
46. Third, the Appellant has consistently explained that proselytising is a fundamental aspect of his Christian faith, “I am a Christian religion missionary, because I am in a Muslim society spreading the Christian religion proselytising” (at AIR [35]), whilst confirming at AIR [80] that he would continue to practice his faith on return. We find that the Appellant has at no point resiled from this position (see the Appellant WS at CB [23], paragraphs [3] – [5]).
47. Fourth, the Living Water letters from Rev. M (at CB [68] dated 14 February 2025 and CB [88] dated 25 January 2024) are consistent. Both letters confirm the Appellant as an active evangelist. We reject Mr Wain’s submission that the Appellant attempted to bolster his case by asking Rev. M to provide detail of the Appellant’s evangelism in his recent letter. Whilst the Appellant accepts that he did ask Rev. M to provide detail, both letters are nonetheless consistent in evidencing the Appellant’s evangelism. Rev. M’s evidence is further corroborated by Minister S’s Living Water letter at CB [69], whom the Appellant confirmed had appeared with him in the photographs at CB [25] – [68] handing out Christian literature in the street. Whilst we acknowledge that these photographs post-date the Appellant’s dismissed FTT appeal, we accept the Appellant’s explanation in the round that he had no other photographic evidence and put these photographs in at this stage of the litigation “because I thought it was important”.
48. We accept Mr Wain’s submission that the weight which we should attach to the letters from the Living Waters Church is potentially reduced because no one from the Church attended to give oral evidence before us. We nevertheless attach some weight to those letters, which chime with our assessment of the Appellant, who came across as a devout Christian and a man who was devoted to “spreading the word” despite the scars he continues to bear as a result of the attack he suffered in Alexandria.
49. In terms of the evidence of the Appellant’s website, FromEgypt.com, we accept Mr Wain’s submission that the screenshot evidence could easily have been manipulated in the light of the reasoning in XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC). However, we find that speculation as to whether the Appellant’s website is a fabrication, does not dissuade us from finding that the Appellant would proselytise on return, in the light of the other evidence set out above. His website is another manifestation of his commitment to his faith, and we do not consider it to have been created so as to improve the prospects of his asylum claim.
50. Having regard to the lower standard of proof, we find it reasonably likely that the Appellant would proselytise on return as claimed. That is what he did in Egypt in the past. It is what he has done in the UK. We find that he would continue to do so on return.
Question 2: Risk on Return
51. The second question we must ask ourselves is multi-faceted. First, taking into account paragraph 339K and Demirkaya v SSHD [1999] Imm AR 498, is it reasonably likely that the Appellant would be at risk in his home area on account of his Coptic Christian identity, in the light of our finding that the Appellant would proselytise on return? Second, is there sufficiency of protection? Third, is there a viable internal relocation area which is not “unduly harsh”?
Country Guidance and the Respondent’s Policy Position
52. We begin this discussion by reminding ourselves that “decision makers and tribunal judges are required to take country guidance determinations into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, are adduced”. (SG (Iraq) [2012] EWCA Civ 940 at [47]; SSHD v PG [2025] EWCA Civ 133).
53. The extant country guidance in MS (Coptic Christians) Egypt CG [2013] UKUT 00611 (IAC) states:
Country guidance
1. Notwithstanding that there is inadequate state protection of Coptic Christians in Egypt, they are not at a general risk of persecution or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3, ECHR.
2. However, on current evidence there are some areas where Coptic Christians will face a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment contrary to Article 3. In general, these will be (a) areas outside the large cities; (b) where radical Islamists have a strong foothold; and (c) there have been recent attacks on Coptic Christians or their Churches, businesses or properties.
3. On the evidence before the Upper Tribunal, the following are particular risk categories in the sense that those falling within them will generally be able to show a real risk of persecution or treatment contrary to Article 3, at least in their home area:
(i) converts to Coptic Christianity;
(ii) persons who are involved in construction or reconstruction/repair of Churches that have been the target for an attack or attacks;
(iii) those accused of proselytising where the accusation is serious and not casual;
(iv) those accused of being physically or emotionally involved with a Muslim woman, where the accusation is made seriously and not casually.
4. Coptic Christian women in Egypt are not in general at real risk of persecution or ill-treatment, although they face difficulties additional to other women, in the form of sometimes being the target of disappearances, forced abduction and forced conversion.
5. However, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, Coptic Christian women in Egypt aged between 14-25 years who lack a male protector, may be at such risk.
6. If a claimant is able to establish that in their home area they fall within one or more of the risk categories identified in 3 (i)-(iv) above or that they come from an area where the local Coptic population faces a real risk of persecution, it will not necessarily follow that they qualify as refugees or as beneficiaries of subsidiary protection or Article 3 ECHR protection. That will depend on whether they can show they would not have a viable internal relocation alternative. In such cases there will be need for a fact-specific assessment but, in general terms, resettlement in an area where Islamists are not strong would appear to be a viable option.
7. None of the above necessarily precludes a Coptic Christian in Egypt from being able to establish a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment in the particular circumstances of their case, e.g. if such an individual has been the target of attacks because he or she is a Coptic Christian
54. We consider it important to point out that there is a distinction to be drawn between headnotes [2] and [3]. Headnote [2] concerns a generalised risk to Copts per se within specific geographical locations, as explained with reference to the evidence of the country expert (Mr Marshall), at [137],
“Miss Benitez has urged us to accept Mr Marshall's position that it is unhelpful to consider whether Copts are persecuted in particular parts of Egypt because they are persecuted throughout Egypt. Given that we have not accepted that there is persecution of Copts in Egypt as a whole, we need to clarify whether we accept nevertheless that there is persecution of Copts in particular parts of the country. In our judgement, it is highly likely that in respect of certain areas of the country Coptic Christians will face a real risk of persecution. On the available evidence they do not face such risk in the large cities but rather in certain areas outside them and in locations where radical Islamists have a strong foothold and where there have been recent attacks on Coptic Christians (or attempts to bring blasphemy charges against some of them) or their Churches or business or properties.”
55. In terms of the guidance in headnote [3], it is evident at [140] – [150] of MS that specific risk categories are not so geographically limited,
“140. This case was identified to address the issue of risk to Coptic Christians generally, but in the light of our negative conclusion on it, and the observations made by Mr Marshall about particular categories of Copts which he considered were at enhanced risk, we sought submissions from the parties as to whether, if we found Copts in general were not at risk, we should nevertheless find particular categories at risk. We remind ourselves that Mr Marshall's treatment of this issue arose in the context of a written question from the respondent as to his view as to whether particular groups of Coptic Christians may be targeted, arrested, imprisoned and physically attacked by government agents. His written response was that government agents had targeted converts, people who work with them, those accused of proselytising, those accused of being sexually or romantically involved with a Muslim woman, those who are outspoken about their religion and those who work visibly in the community, or are involved in Church construction or repair [……]
146. We would accept that "those accused of proselytising" is likely to be a risk category if the accusations are shown to be made in a serious, rather than a casual, manner. Whilst the numbers of Copts charged with blasphemy is relatively small, it is clear that once accused in this way there are both ineffective protection and a heightened risk of laws against blasphemy being used as instruments of persecution.”
56. We note that whilst Mr Wain sought to persuade us that sectarian violence was restricted to Upper Egypt, it is evident that this submission was in fact predicated upon MS at [157]. Neither party invited us to depart from MS. It was not suggested that there were strong grounds supported by cogent evidence for doing so, despite the relative antiquity of the decision.
57. The Respondent’s policy position, as contained within the Executive Summary at page [4] of the CPIN, is we find, consistent with the guidance in MS,
“In general, Christians are not at risk of persecution from state or non-state actors. However, Christians with a particular profile – including Muslim converts to Christianity, those who proselytise, those involved in Church construction or reconstruction/repair of Churches that were previously attacked and those who engage in a relationship with a Muslim woman – will generally be able to show a real risk of persecution, particularly from non-state actors. In addition, Christians living in Upper Egypt, rural areas and some poor urban areas, and Christian women aged 14 to 25 years old without a male protector, may be at risk of persecution.”
“[…] the number of reported attacks by radical Islamists and anti-Christian mobs has decreased in the last 10 years.”
“Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state they will not, in general, be able to obtain protection from the authorities. Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from non-state actors, in general the state is unlikely to be willing and able to provide protection. Internal relocation is not viable where the state is the persecutor. Internal relocation is generally viable if the fear is of persecution from a societal actor, but this will depend on the facts of the case.”
58. Whilst the policy statement at [3.1.14] of the CPIN recognises the historical evidential context of the evidence presented in MS, nonetheless the policy statement expressly invokes the guidance in MS and concedes in terms of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, at [4.1.4] and [5.1.5], that strong grounds and cogent evidence do not exist to warrant departure.
Evidential Difficulties
59. Notwithstanding the Country Guidance as set out above, we raised with the representatives our concern as to the paucity of contemporaneous evidence concerning attacks on Christians in Alexandria and Cairo, in the light of the vintage of MS.
60. In this regard, we found Ms Ferguson’s valiant effort to identify current evidence of Salafist attacks in Cairo unhelpful. As we set out above, the evidence of violence against Copts identified by Ms. Ferguson, predates the case of MS and the 2013 coup when President al -Sisi came to power. The 2022 report of a Church fire in Cairo was, as conceded by Ms Ferguson, opaque in its reported causation.
61. We were not addressed on why there was such a paucity of evidence before us. We therefore take into account the expert evidence of Mr Marshall in MS at [30],
“Mr Marshall explains that there is no uniform system of reporting attacks on Copts or other religious minorities, which makes it difficult to document religious persecution, but he is confident that attacks on Copts from extremists and security forces have continued since Mubarak's resignation "and have markedly increased".
62. Drawing these strands together, we make the following findings in the light of the MS guidance:

Is the Appellant at risk in Home Area?
63. Given our finding that the Appellant would continue to proselytise upon return, we find that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be at risk in his home area of Alexandria.
64. The principle derived from Demirkaya v SSHD [1999] Imm AR 498, as translated into paragraph 339K, states,
“339K. The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person's well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.”
65. It is accepted that the Appellant’s previous proselyting in Alexandria led to him being assaulted with acid, and as we have found, the Appellant would continue to proselytise on return.
66. Whilst the guidance in MS is essentially backward looking - in that "those accused of proselytising are likely to fall into a risk category” (MS [146]) - and the Appellant’s claim is not predicated upon a fear of the same attackers - we find that the Appellant will nonetheless fall within the proselytising risk category as identified at headnote [3(iii)].
67. This is because the Appellant’s intention to proselytise on return concerns the same behaviour which led to the original persecution, in circumstances where MS confirms no geographical restriction to such risk.
68. We are reinforced in our view of risk in the Appellant’s home area by the unchallenged evidence that FO was also detained under Egypt’s blasphemy laws whilst proselytising with the Appellant, as evidenced by the newspaper article dated 22 July 2015 at CB [93]. This we find, is consistent with the contemporaneous extracts of the CPIN at [9.6] (“Prosecution Under Blasphemy Laws”), as relied upon by Ms Ferguson.
69. We therefore find no good reason to consider that the Appellant’s past persecution will not be repeated.
Can the Appellant internally relocate to Cairo?
70. We note that MS at headnote [6] confirms that, “If a claimant is able to establish that in their home area they fall within one or more of the risk categories identified in 3 (i)-(iv) above or that they come from an area where the local Coptic population faces a real risk of persecution, it will not necessarily follow that they qualify as refugees or as beneficiaries of subsidiary protection or Article 3 ECHR protection. That will depend on whether they can show they would not have a viable internal relocation alternative”.
71. The difficulty applying this internal relocation guidance strictly to the Appellant’s case, is that MS does not consider the HJ Iran question of the Appellant’s behaviour on return, which is the focus of this appeal. As confirmed at [140] of MS, the original question before the UT was one of a generalised risk to Copts. Having found no generalised risk, the UT went on to consider specific risk categories in the light of questions that the SSHD put to the expert witness. HJ Iran did not therefore arise on the facts of MS.
72. As we set out above, MS confirms no geographical restriction to the risk categories at headnote [3]. We find that when this guidance is factored into the question of risk arising from intended behaviour on return, the inevitable conclusion is that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would also be at risk in Cairo whilst proselytising. Put another way, we do not consider that internal relocation to Cairo provides a good reason for concluding that the persecution which previously occurred in Alexandria would not be repeated.
73. As we found when considering risk in the Appellant’s home area, the Appellant’s intended proselytising on return will be the same as his previous proselytising which led to the acid attack. In the light of MS, the situation in Cairo is therefore analogous to Alexandria. We also note that paragraph 10.1.20 of the CPIN confirms that local communities and Islamist groups observe Christians and make sure they “do not disrespect Islamic principles by evangelizing or causing problems in other ways”. The pressure is said to be “less in urban places” but it is not suggested that it is confined to rural areas or the north. The country guidance and the background material therefore speak with one voice about the specific risk to those who proselytise the Christian faith.
74. We therefore find that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant will be at risk in Cairo. Mr Wain did not attempt to submit that there would be a sufficiency of protection from any such risk.
CONCLUSIONS
75. For the reasons above we find that removal of the Appellant would breach the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The Appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds.

D. Clarke

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 March 2025