Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004886,
UI-2024-004889, UI-2024-004891,
UI-2024-004892, UI-2024-004893,
UI-2024-004894, UI-2024-004896

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00567/2024,
PA/00568/2024, PA/00569/2024,
PA/00570/2024, PA/00571/2024,
PA/00572/2024, PA/00573/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21st of March 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANTHONY

Between

(1) AA
(2) BB
(3) CC
(4) DD
(5) EE
(6) FF
(7) GG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Selvakumaran (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 18 February 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the names or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. On the 17 July 2024, First-tier Tribunal Judge Groom (“the Judge”) dismissed the linked appeals of the appellants on asylum and human rights grounds (“the decision”). The appellants now have permission to appeal against that decision.
2. We have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellants claim to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Pakistan. In reaching this decision, we are mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but we are satisfied, taking the appellants’ case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the right of the public to know of their identities.
Background
3. The appellants are nationals of Pakistan. The first appellant entered the UK on 7 October 2021 by plane via Doha on a student visa. The second to sixth appellants entered the UK in January 2022 to join him. The Family asylum claim was made on 18 March 2022. The seventh appellant was born in the UK in June 2023.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The appellants applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Permission was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge I Boyes on 18 September 2024. The appellants renewed their application for permission to the Upper Tribunal.
5. In a decision dated 12 November 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Neville granted permission to appeal on the following terms:
1. It is unclear which set of grounds is intended to accompany the application, and which accompanied the application for permission to appeal made to the First-tier Tribunal. There is no trace of the documents said to have been posted to (I infer) the First-tier Tribunal. I have taken both the document with 5 numbered headings and the document with 13 numbered paragraphs as together constituting the grounds of appeal.
2. Paragraphs 6-10 of the latter document assert discrete errors in the Judge’s approach to the evidence. While mindful of the high burden in showing a legal error in fact-finding, I consider that paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 narrowly cross the threshold of arguability such as to merit full consideration by the Upper Tribunal.
3. Taking those three paragraphs: first, it is unclear whether the inconsistency was ever put to the appellant for comment; second, as explained in the grounds, ‘speculation’ as to the origin of the call is inapt given the context was fear of the Pakistani authorities; and third, given the apparent acceptance that the first appellant has >100,000 followers on TikTok and 2.3 million likes across his posts, the Judge was arguably required to consider whether his overall profile contributed to risk on return.
4. It is arguable that those errors, if established and when taken together, are material. I do not limit the scope of permission.”
Upper Tribunal Hearing
6. The first appellant was present and was assisted by an Urdu court interpreter. Ms Selvakumaran clarified that she would be relying on the second set of grounds, namely the grounds which consisted of 13 paragraphs. Ms Selvakumaran accepted that those grounds were more particularised and that it would be more appropriate to focus on those grounds as a framework for the discussion. Ms Selvakumaran also informed the panel that she had provided a skeleton argument, sent to the Upper Tribunal the day before the hearing. The panel had not had sight of the document sent by Ms Selvakumaran. We stood the matter down for the document to be sent to the panel for consideration.
7. On resuming the hearing, Ms Selvakumaran addressed the panel on the matters set out in her skeleton argument which can be categorised as follows: a) the first appellant’s online profile (Facebook and TikTok); b) delay in leaving Pakistan; c) threatening phone calls; d) delay in claiming asylum. We heard submissions in response from Ms Simbi. Ms Selvakumaran then addressed us on matters arising from Ms Simbi’s submissions.
8. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision. We do not propose to rehearse the oral submissions made here, but will consider and address these as part of our analysis set out below.
Analysis and Conclusions
First Appellant’s Online Profile (Facebook and TikTok)
9. Paragraph 10 of the appellants’ grounds argue that in paragraph 22 of the decision, the Judge misdirected herself by not attaching full weight to the social media evidence which attracted 2.7 million likes. It is argued that even if any particular posts did not attract as many likes as his overall page, this did not undermine the fact that the first appellant is active on social media, that he had posted against the agency and that appropriate weight should be attached to both the Facebook and TikTok evidence.
10. Ms Selvakumaran argued that the Judge ought to have considered the first appellant’s profile in line with BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC). While Ms Selvakumaran conceded that BA relates to returns to Iran, it was nonetheless argued that its guidance is of general application. Ms Selvakumaran argued that the Judge was required to consider whether the first appellant’s overall profile contributed to his risk on return. It was argued that the nature of the first appellant’s sur place activity combined with his high-level profile, would lead to an "identification risk" and would constitute a "factor triggering inquiry/action on return" as per the ratio in BA.
11. Secondly, Ms Selvakumaran argued that XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG) [2002] UKUT 00023, referred to by the Judge at paragraph 23 of the decision is limited to Facebook metadata. It is argued that there is no objective evidence which demonstrates that the same process is available on TikTok or whether or not it is possible for the first appellant to download his entire profile from TikTok. It is argued that the first appellant’s evidence was that his Facebook profile was limited to members of the Bar, not the public, and so it was arguably immaterial that the ‘Download your information’ data for Facebook was not provided to the First-tier Tribunal. It is further argued that the absence of such evidence from TikTok does not undermine the first appellant’s claim.
12. Ms Simbi conceded that there is no information as to whether TikTok permitted the first appellant to download his entire profile. However, Ms Simbi argued that even though the first appellant claims that his political activity is conducted on TikTok, he has only provided snippets of information. Placing reliance on XX, Ms Simbi argued that production of a small part of a social media account may be of very limited evidential value in a protection claim, when such a wealth of wider information has not been disclosed. Ms Simbi argued that it is the first appellant’s case that consideration should have been given to all of his TikTok posts, yet not all posts were produced. It is argued that the evidence was simply not before the Judge. Therefore, it was unfair to criticise the Judge regarding matters of weight, when the evidence was not provided in full format. Ms Simbi argued that the conclusion reached by the Judge was one that was open to her. Furthermore and in the alternative, Ms Simbi argued that the first appellant has not produced any posts which he claimed created adverse attention for him. Even if he did provide all TikTok posts, it is argued that this would not have taken the Judge any further as there was nothing to indicate that these posts had attracted adverse attention which would place him at risk.
13. We are not persuaded by the submissions as to a material error of law made by Ms Selvakumaran on behalf of the appellants. In our view, the alleged errors disclose a failure to read the decision and reasons as a whole.
14. We have carefully considered paragraph 22 and 23 of the Judge’s findings. We accept Ms Selvakumaran’s submission that it is immaterial that the ‘Download your information’ data for Facebook was not provided because the first appellant’s Facebook profile was limited to members of the Bar, not the public. However, the Judge’s focus in paragraph 23 was not on the first appellant’s failure to provide that data but on his provision of only limited evidence from his Facebook profile. In any event, the Judge expressly took into account the appellant’s evidence on the audience of his Facebook activities (as well as the lack of evidence of adverse attention to those activities) when concluding that, even on the first appellant’s evidence, no risks on return arose from his Facebook activity. Consequently, we find the Judge correctly understood the first appellant’s evidence on this issue and reached a permissible conclusion that no risk arose from the Facebook activity.
15. Turning to the TikTok evidence, we do not accept Ms Selvakumaran’s submission that the Judge erroneously required the appellant’s full TikTok profile to have been provided. Whilst we accept the submission of both Ms Simbi and Ms Selvakumaran that there is simply no information as to whether TikTok permits the first appellant to download his entire profile, we find that it was not the first appellant’s failure to do so which, in itself, informed the Judge’s findings of fact.
16. We find the crux of the Judge’s reasoning on this issue is essentially twofold. Firstly, the first appellant himself accepted that he had not provided all of his posts from his TikTok account. We find there was simply no explanation before the Judge as to why he did not do so. Given relevant evidence was not placed before the Judge, we find there is simply no basis for criticising the Judge regarding matters of weight which in our view were properly open to her to make. We agree with Ms Simbi that the production of a small part of a social media account may be of very limited evidential value in a protection claim, when a wealth of wider information had not been disclosed.
17. Secondly, the Judge noted the first appellant did not state in evidence that any of the TikTok posts had attracted adverse attention. We find the Judge was entitled to place weight on the evidence she heard and considered. We find the conclusions she reached on the TikTok posts were rationally open to her.
18. In relation to the submission that the Judge erred in failing to take into account the first appellant’s high profile, we find it is clear from paragraph 22 and 23 of the Judge’s decision that the Judge had taken into account the first appellant’s evidence that he had over 100,000 followers and that his posts had attracted 2.7 million likes. We find the Judge was also entitled to consider and place weight on the fact that many of the posts produced before the Judge did not appear to have many or any likes or comments. We find the Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that the first appellant did not have a high-level profile that had attracted adverse attention.
19. The onus is on the first appellant to demonstrate that the profile he asserts he has would place him at adverse attention. All in all, the judge was entitled to consider that the first appellant had not produced any posts which he claimed created adverse attention for him. We agree with Ms Simbi that the evidence of his alleged high profile was simply not before the Judge and furthermore, there was nothing to indicate that any of the posts had attracted adverse attention and which would place him at risk. We find it was open to the Judge to conclude on the evidence before her that there was nothing to suggest the first appellant had attracted adverse attention as a result of his social media activity.
20. We disagree with Ms Selvakumaran that the nature of the first appellant’s sur place activity combined with his high-level profile, would lead to an "identification risk" and would constitute a "factor triggering inquiry/action on return" as per the ratio in BA. Firstly, we find that is a point not advanced in the grounds prepared on behalf of the appellants. Secondly, the evidence before the Judge simply did not point to such a conclusion. We find the conclusions reached by the Judge were rationally open to her.
21. We find the challenge in respect of the Facebook and TikTok evidence is effectively a perversity challenge, namely that the Judge had made perverse or irrational findings on a matter that was material to the outcome. For the reasons set out above, we find that the conclusions reached by the Judge were rationally open her for reasons we have given.
Delay in Leaving Pakistan
22. Paragraph 7 of the appellants’ grounds argue that the Judge misdirected herself when finding the first appellant’s evidence inconsistent. The grounds argue that the fact of arranging a student visa and then taking an available seat on a flight were essentially two separate matters. It is argued that the Judge misdirected herself whilst considering these matters to be related.
23. Ms Selvakumaran stated in her oral submissions that it is unclear whether this inconsistency was put to the first appellant. However, Ms Selvakumaran conceded that she did not have the transcript or record of proceedings to underpin her submission that these points were not put to the first appellant. We find this is not a matter raised in the grounds before the Tribunal. Secondly, if this was a point the appellants had wished to advance, it was incumbent on them to obtain the relevant evidence, such as a recording or transcript of the proceedings before the Judge. None have been placed before us. We conclude there is simply nothing to indicate from the decision or any other evidence that these matters were not put to the first appellant.
24. As to whether it was unreasonable or perverse for the Judge to find there was an internal inconsistency in the first appellant’s evidence, we find from the reasoning set out in paragraph 16 of the decision that it was not unreasonable for the Judge to read this aspect of the first appellant’s evidence as contradictory. The first appellant’s evidence was that he applied for a visa and that it took six months for it to be issued, after which he got on a flight immediately. We find the Judge’s findings at paragraph 16 of the decision were essentially that if the first appellant was genuinely fearful regarding the situation in Pakistan, he would not seek to arrange a student visa which would take so long to arrange. We find it was open to the Judge to conclude that this was internally inconsistent with the first appellant’s evidence that he left Pakistan immediately because a seat became available on a plane. We find the credibility findings made by the Judge on this matter were properly open to her to make. Having read the whole of paragraph 16, we find there is nothing the indicate this was a perverse or irrational finding.
Threatening Phone Calls
25. It is argued at paragraph 9 of the appellants’ grounds that the Judge erred at paragraph 19 of the decision by attaching little weight to the fact that the first appellant received calls which he believed to be from the Pakistani authorities. Ms Selvakumaran relies on the observation of Upper Tribunal Judge Neville when granting permission, namely that ‘speculation’ as to the origin of the call is inapt given the context was fear of the Pakistani authorities.
26. We have carefully considered paragraph 19. We are not persuaded by Ms Selvakumaran’s submissions. In our view, the errors asserted in the grounds reflect a failure to read the decision and reasons as a whole.
27. Firstly, we find the Judge does not say the identity of the caller was speculative. We find the Judge simply remarked that the location of the caller was speculative. That finding was permissible given the first appellant’s evidence that he did not know where the caller was based. We find the Judge did not accept the first appellant’s evidence as to his belief regarding the location of the caller. Having considered the whole of paragraph 19, we find this was a finding open to her, in particular in the context of her rejection of the remainder of the first appellant’s account.
28. Secondly, it is argued on behalf of the appellants that it was unreasonable for the Judge to attach little weight to the call log because the first appellant had not approached the authorities in the UK about such a threat being made to him. Ms Simbi accepted it might be perverse to hold it against the first appellant for not reporting the matter to the police. However, Ms Simbi argues that paragraph 19 would have to be read as a whole. We agree. Given the first appellant’s account was not accepted by the Judge, we find that the Judge was accordingly entitled to reject the call log as evidence supporting the first appellant’s account. In any event, the Judge had found the appellant’s claimed belief that the caller was from Pakistan to be speculative. Consequently, we find it open to the judge to take into account his failure to report the call to the police. It was in any event merely a minor factor within the context of a case where the core elements of the first appellant’s claim had been rejected in its entirety. In short, it was open to the Judge to attach little weight to the call log and the first appellant’s evidence that he had been threatened.
Delay in Claiming Asylum
29. Paragraph 8 of the appellants’ grounds argue that the Judge materially erred at paragraph 17 by omitting to consider the explanation of the first appellant that he had plans to return to Pakistan and that those plans changed when his home in Pakistan was raided for the second time on 26 February 2022 and his mother was hurt. It is argued that the Judge materially erred in finding there was an inconsistency without taking into account the explanation advanced by the first appellant.
30. Having considered paragraph 17 and 18, we find the grounds amount to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings. Firstly, we find that it is clear the Judge did take the first appellant’s explanation into account but ultimately rejected his account. Ms Selvakumaran makes the submission that to “attach little weight” is not the same as a rejection of the account. We disagree. We find that, on a fair and full reading of the decision, it is clear that the Judge was not expressing a belief in the first appellant’s account. We find it is clear from the Judge’s expression of the lack of documentary evidence that the Judge did not believe the photographs provided evidenced the raid on the first appellant’s home in 2022. We find there is nothing perverse about the finding given the first appellant has family and other individuals in Pakistan who could have assisted him with obtaining relevant evidence. Given the lack of documentary evidence as detailed by the Judge at paragraph 18, we find it was a finding which was open to the Judge to make.
31. Having rejected the first appellant’s account of the raid on his home in 2022, we find it was open to the Judge to find the first appellant’s claim to have intended to return to Pakistan to be inconsistent, especially when viewed through the lens of his own evidence that his home had been raided in 2020 and his colleague tortured. We find it was open to the Judge to find there was a material discrepancy in the first appellant’s evidence that he had left Pakistan because it was unsafe yet he delayed in claiming asylum. This challenge is effectively a perversity challenge. However, for the reasons set out above, we find that the conclusions reached by the Judge were rationally open to the Judge for reasons we have given.
32. Overall, the submissions advanced on the appellants’ behalf amount to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions. We find that there was no material error of law in the decision challenged.
Notice of Decision
33. The appeal is dismissed.
34. The making of the previous decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision stands unchanged.

Farin Anthony

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 March 2025