Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004909

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54995/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

30th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. E. Stuart-King, instructed by BHT (Sussex)
For the Respondent: Ms. L. Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is accepted to be a citizen of Egypt, born in Egypt in June 2005. He left Egypt in December 2020, at the age of fifteen, and arrived in the United Kingdom on 3 November 2021. His asylum claim was recorded on the following day.
2. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim on 21 July 2023 and the appellant appealed. In a decision dated 17 July 2024, the First-tier Tribunal found that the appellant was credible and that the account of why and how he had fled Egypt was reasonably likely to be true. However, the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the appellant would not be at risk on return to Egypt. In a decision dated 8 January 2025, the Upper Tribunal set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, and the appeal then came before us for a new decision to be made.
3. It is now accepted that the appellant told the truth about why he fled Egypt: his older brother killed a man in a dispute over an unpaid debt, and the appellant’s father decided that all the men in their family were at risk of being killed by the victim’s family in retaliation.
4. The issue before this tribunal is whether the appellant would be a real risk of serious harm if he returned to Egypt now. The respondent says that there is no evidence that the other family would be interested in harming the appellant, and that even if they were, the appellant could seek the help of the police or relocate elsewhere in Egypt. The appellant disagrees, relying on what his family has told him about events since he left, as well as on a series of expert reports.
5. It is also accepted that the appellant has been a victim of forced labour, both in Egypt and in Libya. One further issue before us is whether this history puts him at risk of re-trafficking or other serious harm on return.
6. Finally, the appellant says he fears being harmed by the friend of his father’s who helped arrange his travel first to Libya and then to Europe, and to whom he is still indebted for part of the costs of the journey.
The undisputed aspects of the appellant’s claim
7. The full details of the asylum’s claim are set out in the Upper Tribunal decision of 8 January 2025, which is included as an annex below. In summary, the First-tier Tribunal accepted the following aspects of the appellant’s account. The appellant is the youngest of three brothers and has one older, married sister. The appellant’s older brother MA had had a long-running dispute about a debt with a man named RD. In December 2020, the appellant’s two older brothers and his father confronted RD and his brother MD over the debt; the appellant was not present. The conflict escalated, and the appellant’s brother MA struck and severely injured MD. When the appellant’s father found out the next day that MD had died, he decided that all the men in the family must flee the country to avoid being targeted in a blood feud.
8. It does not appear to be disputed that the appellant’s father is now in Albania, MA in Belgium and his other brother AA is in Libya.
9. It is specifically accepted that the appellant’s father and brothers were later convicted of manslaughter in absentia. MA was sentenced to ten years in prison and the father and AA to three.
10. The respondent has also accepted that the appellant fled first to Libya and then to Europe, that his travel was arranged by a family friend named Mustafa, and that the appellant is in debt to Mustafa for the costs of the travel from Libya to Europe.
11. On 17 February 2025, the respondent’s Single Competent Authority (“SCA”) decided that the appellant was a victim of modern slavery and had been subjected to the following types of exploitation:
“Forced Labour – working in a café and fishing boat – Egypt approx. 2015 – approx. 2020
“Forced Labour – manual work – Libya, Zuwara, approx. 2020 to September 2021”
12. The SCA has not shared the reasoning underlying these findings, but we take the first finding as an acceptance of the appellant’s account of being verbally and physically abused by his father and forced to work in exploitative situations to support the family from around the age of 10.
13. It is unclear what aspects of the appellant’s experiences in Libya the SCA has accepted in making the second finding, however, as the SCA’s summary fundamentally misdescribes his account. The appellant has described two separate periods of working in exploitative conditions in Libya. The first was on a fishing boat in Tobruk, where he worked in degrading conditions but was paid, albeit very little. In his most recent statement, the appellant describes doing this work because his father had ordered him to. This continued for around seven months, which would cover most of the period from “approximately 2020 until September 2021” mentioned in the SCA decision. The second was in the course of his 15-day journey through Libya en route to Europe at the end of those seven months. Together with others who were hoping to reach Europe, the appellant was forced by his traffickers to do various manual jobs along the way, including farm labour, collecting garbage and cleaning. After arriving in Tobruk, the appellant was held in a warehouse for around two weeks with hundreds of other people. The conditions were inhuman and degrading, but it is not clear that the appellant was forced to work during this stage of the journey.
The aspects of the appellant’s account that have not been accepted
14. The appellant says that the D. family has continued to target his family. Around three months after he, his brothers and his father left Egypt, their family home was burned down. Then in October 2023, his mother was physically attacked by members of the D. family and required medical treatment for a laceration to her back. She continues to be verbally assaulted and threatened by them. They have told her that they will kill the appellant’s father, brothers or him if they return.
15. The appellant says that his father made one attempt to resolve the conflict, contacting the D. family from Albania via a third party and offering them money, but they refused. RD has also made threatening phone calls to the appellant’s brother MA.
16. The appellant fears that the D. family would be able to find him if he relocated anywhere in Egypt, because they are locally influential and have connections to people in the local and district government.
17. The appellant also fears Mustafa, although he described this problem at his interview as not “as big” as his problem with the Ds. He fears that Mustafa will force him into unpaid labour to work off the debt or even kidnap him and hold him to ransom. The appellant also says that Mustafa contacted him repeatedly to demand repayment between July 2021 and sometime in 2022, when he changed his phone number. Mustafa has also harassed both of the appellant’s parents for the money. Mustafa has repeatedly increased the amount owed, partly on the grounds of the delay in repayment and partly because he feels he can demand more money now that the appellant has reached the UK. The most recent demand was for £10,000.
The hearing of 12 May 2025
18. At the outset of the hearing, we confirmed that we had before us:
(i) the composite bundle prepared for the error of law hearing, which is 452 pages long and contains all of the parties’ evidence and submissions before the First-tier Tribunal, as well as the FTT decision and documents related to the appellant’s appeal to the tribunal;
(ii) the SCA’s “conclusive grounds” decision, dated 17 February 2025;
(iii) a supplementary appellant’s bundle, of 60 pages, uploaded on 29 April 2025;
(iv) Ms Stuart-King’s skeleton argument, dated 2 May 2025; and
(v) the error of law decision of the Upper Tribunal, dated 8 January 2025.
19. The appellant gave evidence in Arabic, with the assistance of an interpreter. He adopted his consolidated statement of 24 April 2025 and then was cross-examined. It had been agreed at the outset that the appellant would be treated as a vulnerable witness, and we are satisfied that Ms Clewley’s conduct of her cross-examination was entirely appropriate.
20. The appellant’s evidence is contained in the record of proceedings and it is not necessary to repeat it in full here. In summary, in response to questions from Ms Clewley the appellant stated that he knew the blood feud between his family and the D. family was still ongoing “because this is something that doesn’t end over there.” His father had tried to resolve the feud around three years ago, when he had tried to speak to the family and offer them money. They had refused. The appellant did not know if there had been any further attempts at reconciliation. The only action the police had taken was to prosecute the appellant’s father and brothers in absentia. His family home had been burnt down around three months after he and his father and brothers had left the country. His mother continued to be regularly “attacked” by a woman from the D. family, RD’s wife. This happened most recently last October. His mother has gone to the police, but they just “file a report” and “nothing else happens”. He did not think to ask his mother to get copies of those reports.
21. His maternal uncle is also regularly attacked by members of the D. family; when asked to clarify what he meant, he said that they “threaten and verbally abuse him” because the appellant’s mother lives with him. His father’s brothers had not been targeted, because everyone knew that his father is estranged from them.
22. The appellant said that he would not be able to relocate safely anywhere else in Egypt because the Ds had connections in the police and the authorities. Ms Clewley asked him why they had not used those connections to convict him in absentia as well, and the appellant replied that the Ds “don’t care about all this. They just want to kill one of our family, the way one of their family was killed.”
23. He had last heard from Mustafa two-three years ago, but Mustafa is “always in contact” with his mother. Mustafa’s wife verbally abuses his mother, but his mother has not complained to the police about that. He does not know how he would be able to find work to pay off the debt to Mustafa if returned to Egypt, and he would not feel safe from Mustafa if he relocated. Someone might see him and recognise him, and the police would be unable to offer him “24 hours protection”.
24. The appellant answered further questions about his mental health. He said he had recently begun another course of 12 sessions of therapy but was not taking any medication. For around the past year, he had had less motivation to attend college because he did not want to be around people.
25. We then heard submissions from both representatives, which we have taken into account in making our decision. We will address those submissions where relevant in our findings below.
26. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision, which we now give with our reasons.
The issues before us
27. At the outset of the hearing before us, we confirmed with Ms Stuart-King and Ms Clewley that the issues that remain to be determined are:
(i) Is the blood feud between the appellant’s family and the D. family still ongoing?
(ii) If so, would the appellant be targeted by the D. family on return?
(iii) Would the appellant be at risk of serious harm from Mustafa on return because of his unpaid debt to him?
(iv) Would state protection be available against any risk of serious harm from the D. family or from Mustafa?
(v) If not, would internal relocation be safe and not unduly harsh?
(vi) Would the appellant be at risk of being forced back into modern slavery, either by Mustafa, or more generally?
28. The appellant also says that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Egypt, but Ms Stuart-King helpfully clarified at the outset of the appeal that this claim rises and falls with his protection claim. He does not say that there would be very serious obstacles to his reintegration in his home area, if he were safe there.
29. The appellant’s representatives have repeatedly sought to persuade the Tribunal that it is necessary to make a finding about whether the appellant’s relationship to Mustafa constitutes a form of “debt bondage”. We are not persuaded that anything in these proceedings turns on the precise legal definition given to the relationship between Mustafa and the appellant. The issues for this Tribunal to determine are whether the appellant’s removal would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under either the Refugee Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights.
Findings
The credibility of the appellant’s account
30. The appellant claimed asylum prior to 28 June 2022, which means that we are required to determine whether his account is reasonably likely to be true. As noted above, the appellant’s account of the events leading to his departure from Egypt was accepted by the First-tier Tribunal, to the relevant lower standard of proof, while the respondent has accepted his account of being a victim of forced labour in both Egypt and Libya to the higher civil standard.
31. For the reasons set out below, we find to the relevant lower standard of proof that the rest of the appellant’s account is reasonably likely to be true.
The appellant’s evidence before us
32. We found the appellant credible in his evidence before us. His answers were clear, internally consistent and consistent with his written statements. He did not exaggerate or embellish his account, clarifying that his mother had not been attacked by anyone in the D. family since last October and that the “attacks” on his maternal uncle and on his mother by Mustafa’s wife were verbal assaults only. He did not suggest that Mustafa had any particular influence that would allow him to locate him elsewhere in Egypt, saying only that he would be afraid that someone would see him. Similarly, he said that the police would not be able to offer him “24 hours protection” against Mustafa. As Ms Clewley rightly pointed out in her submissions, this falls far short of the legal standard for showing that state protection would be insufficient. We consider that this indicates that the appellant was expressing the genuine basis of fear without thinking about whether this supported his protection claim, and that this bolstered his credibility.
33. We also take into account that the appellant has taken reasonable steps to corroborate his claim by obtaining court documents (which are accepted to be authentic), a medical record confirming an attack on his mother in October 2023, recent photographs of what he says is his ruined family home, and two statements from his mother taken by his solicitor over the telephone in October 2023 and March 2025. The medical record is broadly consistent with the appellant’s and his mother’s accounts (although we note some lack of clarity about how serious her injuries were) and, considering it in the round together with all the other evidence, we put some weight on it. The statements from the appellant’s mother can be given only limited weight, as she was obviously unable to be cross-examined. Nonetheless, we put some weight on them as at least demonstrating the appellant’s efforts to obtain corroborating evidence. We put some limited weight on the photographs for the same reason, although we accept that they cannot, taken alone, confirm that this was the appellant’s home or that it was set on fire by the D. family.
The expert evidence
34. As part of a structured approach to credibility, we must take into account the appellant’s age and state of health and the cultural context in which the events he describes occurred. This requires us to assess the reliability of the appellant’s expert evidence.
35. With regard to his mental health, the appellant has submitted two reports by Alice Rogers, CPsychol AFBPS, dated 30 October 2023 and 17 April 2025. Ms Rogers has over 20 years of relevant experience and a range of professional qualifications and memberships. Each report was based on a three hour face-to-face meeting with the appellant, as well as on consideration of all relevant documents, including the appellant’s GP records. Ms Rogers’ conclusions include:
(i) The appellant meets the criteria for a diagnosis of a Depressive Episode at a moderate level and of Generalised Anxiety Disorder;
(ii) He has symptoms of PTSD;
(iii) He has a “pervasive sense of worthlessness” that undermines his relationships, partly because it makes him argumentative and irritable;
(iv) His girlfriend is an important protective factor;
(v) His mental health difficulties limit his ability to function normally; and
(vi) Returning to Egypt would be likely to have a significant adverse impact on his mental health, due to the loss of current protective factors and the impact of his fears (whether objectively well-founded or not) on his symptoms. This would lead to a significant decrease in his ability to function and “lead a normal life”.
36. Ms Clewley urged us to put less weight on these reports because of their inconsistency with a recent letter from the welfare advisor at his college. Specifically, in her October 2023 report, Ms Rogers described the appellant as struggling with his attendance and concentration at college, but in a letter of 25 April 2025, his college welfare advisor described him as having begun an ESOL course in September 2022 “as a dedicated student with a positive attitude” and having “experienced a significant change in his outlook recently”. This clearly suggested that his struggles with attendance and concentration had only begun considerably after October 2023.
37. We decline to put less weight on Ms Rogers’ reports for this reason. We accept the force of Ms Stuart-King’s submission that the welfare advisor was describing an extended period of time – from September 2022 to the present - and as she was not called as a witness, there was no opportunity for her to clarify her view of the appellant’s attitude in October 2023 specifically. Moreover, all of the sources concur that the appellant’s mental health fluctuates in response to a range of factors, including the stresses of participating in the asylum process and the varying intensity of his fears of return at different points, such as when his claim was refused or his appeal dismissed.
38. Moreover, we have read Ms Rogers’ reports with care, and we are impressed by their level of individual detail and careful reasoning. Ms Rogers has considered whether the appellant was feigning his symptoms and gives detailed reasons for concluding that he was not. We also note that the report is balanced (for example, identifying what could be considered negative behaviours by the appellant, such as his irritability and argumentativeness with friends) and that the findings are nuanced (there is, for example, no suggestion that the appellant is at real risk of self-harm).
39. The reliability of Ms Rogers’ earlier report is further corroborated by a letter from Samantha Reidie, his treating psychotherapist at the Refugee Council, which appears to have been written in late 2023. She reported:
“As part of the initial assessment, we worked through a young person’s mental wellbeing scale (YP CORE), on which he scored 30 which is in the most Severe category of distress and he expressed symptoms of PTSD. Further, [he] indicated additional difficulties related to poor sleep due to nightmares and intrusive thoughts.
“[He] also shared that other issues such as his immigration status, fear of returning home and the uncertainty of his future were causing his anxiety.
“[His] difficulties are consistent with experiencing traumatic events and with symptoms of PTSD.”
40. We therefore accept Ms Rogers’ diagnosis and prognosis. For the purposes of the assessment of credibility, we consider that this report points towards the appellant’s fears being genuinely held. We also consider that his anxiety explains what could be considered to be exaggerations in his evidence, such as describing verbal assaults as “attacks” or asserting that the Ds must have connections throughout Egypt because they are influential locally.
41. The country evidence before us consists primarily of the four expert reports of Ms Alison Pargeter, dated 1 November 2023, 10 February 2024, 14 June 2024 and 17 April 2025. Ms Pargeter is an analyst and consultant specialising in political and security issues in North Africa and the Middle East, and a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London. Her expert evidence has repeatedly been given considerable weight by this tribunal.
42. We have read Ms Pargeter’s four reports in their entirety. We find them detailed, well-reasoned, and careful. Ms Pargeter clearly identifies the sources on which she relies and notes where the evidence is limited or inconclusive. Nor does she simply endorse the appellant’s fears; most significantly, she proceeds on the basis that the appellant would be able to evade the D. family if he relocated and notes the limited evidence of Egyptian men being trafficked within Egypt.
43. Moreover, Ms Pargeter’s expertise has not been challenged by the respondent; in the respondent’s review of 12 May 2024, the respondent expressed her agreement with Ms Pargeter’s opinion that women and children are not targeted in blood feuds and noted but did not disagree with Ms Pargeter’s opinion that blood feuds, although more common in Upper Egypt, can happen anywhere in the country. The only aspect of Ms Pargeter’s report that Ms Clewley challenged before us was her view that there is insufficient support and protection available to victims of trafficking in Egypt. She noted Ms Pargeter’s acknowledgment that she is not an expert on trafficking and submitted that the excerpt from the 2023 US State Department Trafficking in Persons report included in the respondent’s review pointed towards a finding that protection would be available. Since the hearing, we have reviewed not only the excerpt from the 2023 report that Ms Clewley relied on but the report in its entirety. We consider that Ms Pargeter’s analysis of the US State Department’s report is balanced and accurate. Moreover, in her most recent report, Ms Pargeter has had the benefit of the 2024 US State Department report and she again records both its optimistic and its pessimistic findings before reiterating her previous conclusion.
44. The limited additional country evidence before us is consistent with Ms Pargeter’s reports. We therefore accept Ms Pargeter’s evidence and conclusions.
45. We find that Ms Pargeter’s expert reports corroborate the appellant’s account. Not only does she specifically find the account plausible (see [1.19] of the 1 November 2023 report), but she directly contradicts the respondent’s reasons for doubting that the feud is continuing. Ms Clewley submitted that a “significant amount of time” has passed since the killing of MD, that if the D. family wanted to harm the appellant’s family, they would have harmed his mother, his sister or his uncles, and that the convictions of the appellant’s father and brothers should have concluded the conflict. Alternatively, if the D. family wanted to harm the appellant, they would have instigated criminal charges against him as well.
46. None of these submissions are persuasive, once the country context is taken into account. In the first place, even if it is right to assume that anger over a family’s member’s killing normally fades after four years (which is doubtful), Ms Pargeter specifically confirms that blood feuds can persist for many years (see [1.4-1.5] and [1.17] of the 1 November 2023 report). Secondly, she confirms at [1.2] of the same report that
“it is usual for the revenge to take the form of the victim’s family seeking out and killing the perpetrator of the crime. If the perpetrator has escaped, then the wronged family or tribe will often seek to kill another male member of the perpetrator’s family instead.”
Moreover, the target may be specifically selected from among the men of the family, because he is considered either “equal in age and position” to the victim being avenged or to be “the best youth from the murderer’s family”. In this context, the appellant’s account is not undermined by the fact that the Ds have not taken further action against his mother, his sister, or his mother’s relatives, nor against paternal relatives from whom his father is estranged. Finally, Ms Pargeter explains that criminal prosecutions do not play a role in ending blood feuds; families who believe in blood feuds prefer to vindicate their “honour” by exacting revenge themselves: [1.6].
47. The appellant has also relied on an expert report by Christine Beddoe, who describes herself as a “specialist advisor on human trafficking and child exploitation”, and has considerable experience as an expert advisor and author with a range of UK NGOs and Parliamentary committees. Much of the report addresses why the appellant’s treatment at the hands of his father and his exploiters in Libya meets the definition of human trafficking, and the importance to victims of trafficking of receiving a conclusive grounds decision. With the respondent’s conclusive grounds decision of 17 February 2025, these issues have been resolved in the appellant’s favour. With regard to whether the appellant would have access to sufficient protection on return, Ms Beddoes relies on Ms Pargeter’s report. For these reasons, we mean no disrespect to Ms Beddoes’ expertise in concluding that the report is no longer of significant relevance in these proceedings.
Section 8 of the Asylum (Treatments of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004
48. We are required by Section 8(4) of the Asylum (Treatments of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 to take into account the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in Italy or France as damaging his credibility. However, the extent to which it actually does damage his credibility is a matter for us to decide, taking into account all relevant circumstances. We consider that the appellant’s credibility was not damaged by his failure to claim asylum in Italy or France, because he was a child of 15-16 years old at the time and, as is now accepted, had recently been subjected to modern slavery. Under those circumstances, it would not be right to draw adverse inferences from his decision to travel onward when he was confronted with difficult reception conditions in Italy and France.
Conclusion as to the threats to the appellant from the D. family and Mustafa
49. For all of the reasons given above, we accept the appellant’s account of the current threats to him in Egypt, and we find that if he returned to his home town, the D. family would seek to kill him.
50. Having accepted the appellant’s general credibility, we further find that Mustafa is continuing to demand repayment of the money he loaned him in order to travel from Libya to Europe in 2020, and that he has increased the amount of the debt both because of the delay in repayment and out of a perception that the appellant must have more money because he has been living in the UK. We also accept that the appellant genuinely fears that Mustafa would subject him to serious harm in order to force him to repay the debt.
51. We further accept that the appellant genuinely fears that if he returned to Egypt, he would be unable to escape the threats from either the Ds or Mustafa because the police would not protect him and, one way or another, he would be located if he tried to relocate within Egypt.
Findings on risk on return
52. The next question before us is whether the appellant’s genuinely held fears are well-founded. We deal with the fears of the Ds first.
53. We find on the basis of the independent country evidence that the appellant would not be able to obtain state protection against the threat of a revenge killing by the Ds. Ms Pargeter is clear that in cases of blood feuds, the role of the police is to help facilitate reconciliation where families are open to it. As she summarised at [5.1] of her most recent report:
“the police would normally investigate the matter and if they believed there was a serious risk of the dispute escalating and turning into a blood feud, they would try to direct the two families to engage in a reconciliation process. Failing that, the police would most likely advise [the appellant] to leave the area in order to avoid harm.”
54. Having accepted the appellant’s account, we accept that the Ds have already rejected the appellant father’s offer of reconciliation. This rejection is entirely consistent with what Ms Pargeter said in her first report about how a reconciliation process proceeds:
“1.15. They are normally held in the presence of security officials, who try to bring feuding families together after a killing to forge reconciliation. These sessions follow certain rules and procedures. As one mediator describes, when people are killed in a dispute between families, “the perpetrator’s family usually leave the area for at least one month in order to let things calm down. After that, several people [third parties] will go to the other family to consult with them in order to avoid more blood being spilled and to ensure the situation doesn’t develop into something bigger ….. They choose the house of a family that works as an intermediary and who tries to find a solution to satisfy the injured party.” The mediator goes on to describe how in the first instance, senior members of the two families must sit together to agree upon whether the death was accidental or deliberate, and they proceed to work out an agreement.
“1.16. In some of these sessions, it is ruled that the family who committed the killing must move away to a different area and any family that does not comply risks a legal penalty. In other instances, the dispute is settled through an agreement for the perpetrator’s family to pay compensation to the wronged family in order to end the matter. Everything is then written down and handed to the police who give their consent. In some cases, once the agreement is decided, there is a special ritual in which the killer must put on a shroud and walk several kilometres from his family to the wronged family to symbolise that he is considered dead and can only be revived with the blessing of the wronged family. The security services are normally present at such rituals to prevent any flare ups or trouble.”
55. This describes a serious ritual, involving senior members of both families, and in which the offending family must solemnly accept its responsibility and seek forgiveness. Against this background, it is reasonably likely that the Ds would have refused to reconcile on the basis of an offer of money made by the appellant’s father from Albania, because rather than taking responsibility and putting themselves at the Ds’ mercy, he and all of his sons had fled abroad. It is also reasonably likely that, as the appellant fears, the Ds would not reconcile with him if he returned to Egypt alone; he is neither the perpetrator nor a senior member of his family. And, finally, given his father’s and brothers’ convictions in absentia we consider it unlikely that they would return to Egypt to participate in such a process.
56. We therefore find that the appellant would be unable to access state protection against the Ds in his home area, but would instead be advised by the police to relocate.
57. In light of this finding, we do not need to reach the question of whether the appellant would also be at real risk from Mustafa in his home area.
58. As noted above, we accept that the appellant genuinely believes that the Ds’ local prominence means that they would be able to find him anywhere in Egypt. We find, however, that the evidence before us is insufficient to establish that this is reasonably likely. Ms Pargeter’s report is silent on the issue, and the appellant’s skeleton argument merely asserts that the appellant would be at risk of persecution in Cairo because it “is only approximately 155 miles from his home area”. Without some actual evidence on the point, the Ds’ ability to locate the appellant anywhere in Egypt is simply not made out.
59. We find, however, that the particular combination of the appellant’s vulnerabilities and the current economic and social conditions in Egypt mean that internal relocation would be unduly harsh. The appellant is a young man who fled home as a child of 15 and has no experience of independent living. In Libya, he was a victim of modern slavery, in Italy, where he lived for 1.5 months, he was in a migrant camp, and since arriving in the UK, he has been supported by Children’s Services. The work experience he has had has left him with significant mental health challenges rather than valuable skills. Those mental health issues have obvious implications for his ability to find work, forge new social connections and live independently, including his “pervasive sense of worthlessness”, irritability and argumentativeness, as well as his depression and anxiety more generally.
60. On return to Egypt, the appellant’s mental health is likely to deteriorate, because he would lose the support of his girlfriend and Children’s Services and, in addition, be living with a genuinely held fear of being tracked down by the Ds or Mustafa. We have accepted the expert opinion of Ms Rogers for the reasons given above, and it is her view that the appellant’s symptoms would worsen to the point where his ability to function on a day-to-day basis would be “significantly impaired”. These vulnerabilities then need to be considered in the economic and social context described by Ms Pargeter in her most recent report. This includes high youth unemployment, a housing crisis that has been made worse by the large influx of refugees from Gaza and Sudan, and a social welfare system that expects support to be provided primarily by the family. We accept Ms Pargeter’s opinion that the appellant would not qualify for any social benefits, and that he would not be considered a victim of trafficking (notwithstanding the SCA decision, which she had seen) because he was trafficked outside of Egypt and in the context of irregular migration to Europe. Ms Pargeter has also set out in considerable detail in both her 2023 and 2025 reports why appropriate mental health care would be inaccessible.
61. For these reasons, we find that internal relocation would be unduly harsh and that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in Egypt.
62. The appellant’s representatives have pursued a claim that the appellant would be at risk of forced labour if returned to Egypt, in violation of article 4 ECHR. We find that that claim is not made out on the evidence before us. In accordance with para. 339K of the immigration rules, we take into account that the appellant was a victim of forced labour in the past, but we also consider that there is good reason to consider that this will not be repeated. In the first place, in Egypt and in Tobruz, it was the appellant’s father who coerced the appellant into exploitation. The appellant’s father is no longer in Egypt, the appellant is an adult, and he has cut off contact with his father. The forced labour that the appellant was subjected to between Tobruz and Zuwara was in connection with his trafficking into Europe. We take judicial notice of the fact that forced labour and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment are endemic along the Libya-Europe trafficking route. Although Mustafa helped pay for and arrange this trafficking, there is nothing to indicate that Mustafa in particular was directly responsible for or profited from the appellant’s forced labour in Libya. Finally, we note that Ms Pargeter’s report records that there is little evidence of adult men in Egypt being victims of trafficking.
63. This is not in anyway to minimise the genuineness of the appellant’s fear that he will be harmed by Mustafa in some way if her returns to Egypt. As with his other genuinely held fears, we find that, in the context of his existing mental health challenges, these fears would undermine his day-to-day functioning and contribute to the undue harshness of internal relocation.
Conclusion
64. We find that there is a real risk that the appellant would be subjected to serious harm from the D. family in retaliation for the killing of MD by his brother. It is reasonably likely that the D. family would be unwilling to engage in formal reconciliation with the appellant, and that therefore state protection would be unavailable. Given the combination of the appellant’s vulnerabilities and the current social and economic situation in Egypt, internal relocation would be unduly harsh.
65. Because the harm the appellant fears arises from his membership of his family, it is for reason for his membership of a particular social group: Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K [2006] UKHL 46 [19].
66. We therefore find that the appellant has been a refugee since he left Egypt in late 2020 and that his removal form the United Kingdom would violate the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
67. We further find that the combination of the risk in his home area and the impact on him of internal relocation would constitute very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Egypt, such that he meets the requirements of para. PL 5.1.(b) of Appendix Private Life.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds, with reference to articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR.
The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds because the appellant is a refugee.
The appeal is dismissed on article 4 grounds.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 May 2025

TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD

No fee was paid or is payable and there can be no fee award.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 May 2025

ANNEX
(Error of law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004909

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54995/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………
Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: E. King, instructed by BHT (Sussex)
For the Respondent: A. Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 January 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission on all grounds against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Manuell dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claims.
2. On 7 November 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Stephen Smith made an anonymity order in this case in accordance with the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, because the appellant is a victim of modern slavery.
3. The appellant is accepted to be a national of Egypt, born in Egypt in 2005. He left Egypt in December 2020, at the age of fifteen, and arrived in the United Kingdom on 3 November 2021. His asylum claim was recorded on the following day.
4. On 10 November 2022, East Sussex County Council referred the appellant into the NRM, and on 16 November 2022, a positive reasonable grounds decision was made. It does not appear that there has been any conclusive grounds decision.
5. On 27 January 2023, the appellant completed an Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children Statement of Evidence (SEF) form and accompanying statement, and he was interviewed by the respondent about his claim on 16 March 2023.
The appellant’s claim
6. The appellant said that he was the youngest of four children and had lived in Egypt with his parents, two older brothers, M and A, and a married older sister, who was living with the family because her husband was working in Italy. He described being forced to work long hours in abusive conditions from the age of ten or 12, first in a café and then on a boat. He was beaten by his employers and by his father, and often missed school because he was working. His father also regularly beat his mother. He left school at the age of 15, without having obtained any qualifications.
7. The appellant said that he was forced to flee Egypt by the threat of a blood feud, arising out of a debt owed to his brother M by RD. In December 2020, M, A and their father had confronted RD and his brother MD over the debt. The conflict escalated, and the appellant’s brother M hit MD over the head the head with a stick. The next day, the family learned that the MD had died, and the appellant’s father decided that all the men in the family must flee the country to avoid being targeted in a blood feud.
8. The appellant was told that he should flee to Europe with his brother A. Their travel from Egypt to Libya was arranged by his father’s friend Mustafa, and paid for out of funds raised by selling their sister’s jewellery. They then lived in Tobruk, Libya for seven months, working in extremely difficult conditions. The appellant decided to continue on to Europe, at a cost of 50,000 EGP. He paid 22,000 himself out of what he had earned working in Tobruk, was given 13,000 EGP by his brother, and he borrowed the rest from Mustafa.
9. Mustafa then arranged the appellant’s onward travel through Libya and to Europe. In the course of this travel, the appellant spent 10-15 days performing forced labour as a cleaner and 10-15 days locked in a warehouse in inhuman and degrading conditions. He then travelled to Italy and ultimately to the UK.
10. The appellant says that A has remained in Libya, M is in Belgium, and his father is in Albania. His father and brothers were convicted of manslaughter in absentia, and M was sentenced to 10 years in prison and A and his father to three years. His mother has told him that the D. family view the sentences as too lenient and have threatened to kill any of them if they return to Egypt. She also says that they have burned down the family home and that one member of the family physically attacked her in October 2023, causing her serious injuries. His father says that his attempts to negotiate have failed, and M says he has received threats from RD even after leaving Egypt.
11. Mustafa has contacted the appellant and the appellant’s father and has harassed the appellant’s mother in person, demanding money. He has increased the amount of the claimed debt, partly because he had not been repaid.
12. The appellant says that he fears that if he returns to Egypt, he will either be killed by the D. family or abducted and forced to work to pay off his debt to Mustafa.
The reasons for refusal
13. In the refusal decision of 21 July 2023, the respondent accepted the appellant’s age and nationality but did not accept that he had fled Egypt in fear of a blood feud, citing the abstract of an undated report published on a Virtual Library based in the US, which asserted that only four provinces in Egypt “suffer from feud”; these did not include the appellant’s province. In addition, the same abstract said that children were excluded from blood feuds, and the appellant was a child and therefore would not have been targeted. The appellant’s credibility had been damaged by his failure to claim asylum in Italy or France. Moreover, various sources stated that there was sufficiency of protection available against blood feuds, and internal relocation would be safe and reasonable.
14. In a supplementary decision issued on 12 January 2024 following directions from the First-tier Tribunal, the respondent rejected the appellant’s account of having been forced to work as a child by his father but did accept that he had been a victim of modern slavery while travelling through Libya. However, the people who had enslaved the appellant in Libya would not pursue him on his return to Egypt, as they had allowed him to leave for Europe. The respondent also rejected the appellant’s account of being indebted to Mustafa on plausibility grounds. Even if he were indebted to him, he could repay the debt with funds available through the Voluntary Returns Service.
The expert evidence
15. The appellant submitted several hundred pages of evidence in support of his appeal. Most important for the purposes of this appeal are the reports of three experts, Dr Alice Rogers, Alison Pargeter and Christine Beddoe.
16. Ms Rogers is a psychologist. She met with the appellant face-to-face on 20 October 2023 and completed her report on 30 October 2023. She summarised her opinion as follows at [3.1-3.3]:
(i) The appellant had some symptoms of PTSD, including nightmares and intrusive memories, but his symptoms of avoidance and hyperarousal were not at the level that would justify a full diagnosis of PTSD;
(ii) The appellant had “depressive symptoms, including low mood, feelings of hopelessness, negative thought patterns, and poor sleep and concentration. He is showing social withdrawal and his general functioning is impaired. He struggles to make simple decisions and his motivation is very low. Energy levels are low, and he is showing less ability than previously to engage with college, and struggling to keep his room clean or make food, and has stopped previously enjoyed activities such as going to the gym.”
(iii) He met the criteria for a depressive episode, as described in ICD 11. At [7.1.5-7.1.6], she specified that his symptoms were sufficient to reach a diagnosis of moderate depression.
(iv) His symptoms “have developed in the context of having symptoms of PTSD, separation from, and worry about, his mother, and also in the context of the negative decision about his asylum claim. He reports increased hopelessness and withdrawal from activity in this context. He reports being afraid that he would be killed if he is returned to Egypt and believing that this would be inescapable in the context of the blood feud that he reports.”
17. At 7.2.2, Ms Rogers responded to her instructions to address the appellant’s “ability to cope with a possible return to Egypt.” She wrote:
“Were he returned to an area where he was frightened of being murdered, his symptoms would be expected to increase and his capacity to function generally, which is already reduced, would be expected to decrease further. Were he living in a situation in which he believed himself to be in mortal danger, symptom increase would be expected. These symptom increases and general functioning decreases would be expected whether or not he is accurate in his perception, because the perception of danger and belief that he would be in danger that would drive the psychological symptoms. This would lead to further psychological fragility and difficulty with coping generally.”
18. Ms Pargeter is an analyst and consultant specialising in political and security issues in North Africa and the Middle East, and a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London. She wrote three expert reports. The first, dated 1 November 2023, commented on the plausibility of the appellant’s account of his family’s involvement in a blood feud, the risk of his being targeted in this feud if he returned to Egypt, the availability of state protection against blood feuds and trafficking, “the practicalities in terms of employment, accommodation, etc” of internal relocation and the availability of mental health treatment in Egypt. An addendum report dated 10 February 2024 responded to the supplementary decision letter of 12 January 2024 and addressed the support and protection offered to victims of trafficking and modern slavery in Egypt and the likelihood of the appellant being re-trafficked or subjected to forced labour on return. A final report of 14 June 2024 sought to rebut the respondent’s position, taken in the respondent’s review, that blood feuds did not occur outside Upper Egypt.
19. Ms Beddoe, finally, describes herself as a “specialist advisor on human trafficking and child exploitation”, and sets out details of her experience as an expert advisor and author with a range of UK NGOs and Parliamentary committees. Her report addressed a range of issues, including which aspects of the appellant’s account met the legal definition of trafficking, the need for a Conclusive Grounds finding, and the risk of re-trafficking on return. She expressed the opinion that the appellant’s treatment by Mustafa met the legal definition of trafficking and that the appellant would be at risk of re-trafficking in Egypt because of a range of factors. These included his history of working in exploitative situations, his current mental ill health (with reference to Dr Roger’s report), his lack of skills training and employment experience in the UK, and his inability to access support in Egypt due to risks in his home area from the blood feud, from Mustafa and from “family abuse” (she seemed not to be aware that the appellant’s father was in Albania). She endorsed Dr Pargeter’s conclusions on the lack of state protection against trafficking, and summarised a 2023 US State Department report as concluding that “the State is failing to provide trafficking support, accommodation, and protection, particularly to young male victims.” The appellant in particular “would not get trafficking support in Egypt because it is an inadequate offering, and he has not been formally recognised as a victim there.”
20. The appellant also relied on a letter from Samantha Reidie, his treating psychotherapist at the Refugee Council, which described her assessment based on two counselling session “to date”. The report was undated, but the counselling sessions were said to have started on 17 November 2023. She reported:
“As part of the initial assessment, we worked through a young person’s mental wellbeing scale (YP CORE), on which he scored 30 which is in the most Severe category of distress and he expressed symptoms of PTSD. Further, [he] indicated additional difficulties related to poor sleep due to nightmares and intrusive thoughts.
“[He] also shared that other issues such as his immigration status, fear of returning home and the uncertainty of his future were causing his anxiety.
“[His] difficulties are consistent with experiencing traumatic events and with symptoms of PTSD.”
The Judge’s decision
21. At [7]-[17] and [19]-[28], the Judge sets out the appellant’s account as given in his written statements and oral evidence. He then summarises the evidence of the appellant’s witness [29] and the submissions of both representatives [30]-[31].
22. The Judge’s “Findings and Decision” are set out at length from [32]-[49]. They are difficult to summarise, as the Judge gave multiple reasons for his key findings. Put as briefly as possible, they are:
(i) The appellant’s account of his involvement in a blood feud was internally consistent, plausible, consistent with Ms Pargeter’s report on the existence of blood feuds throughout Egypt, and corroborated by court documents that an unchallenged expert had considered “highly likely” to be authentic. There was “ample evidence” to support this part of his account [33].
(ii) It was “less than reasonably likely” that arson attack on the family home and the assault on the appellant’s mother in October 2023 were part of the ongoing feud, because it was inconsistent with aspects of the expert report about how blood feuds are conducted and implausible in light of the delay in these attacks and the prosecutions of the appellant’s brothers and father, and there was no corroborative evidence [35]-[36].
(iii) Nothing in the appellant’s account suggested that state protection would not be available to him: he had played no part in “the events which resulted in manslaughter”, he was not wanted by the authorities, and the state had prosecuted “the family members who on the Appellant’s account were the main culprits. […] the blood feud was known to the state, as were the (potential) participants and those at risk.” [37] The state “has not stood by”[38]. Moreover, having acted in this case, the state would have to act again if a blood feud did develop: “Although the D. family may not be satisfied with the sentences, “the authorities will be bound to act if the state’s authority is challenged.” Sufficiency of protection would be available. [39]
(iv) Internal relocation would be safe, as evidenced in part by the fact that the police advise parties to a blood feud leave their home area [40].
(v) Internal relocation would be reasonable. The appellant had considerable work experience, including in catering, cleaning and fishing. He was “fit, healthy and personable.” He had been able to save money from his past employment and therefore “clearly has the ability to manage money as well as to fend for himself.” [40]
(vi) The psychological reports of Ms Rogers and Ms Reidie “noted the Appellant’s anxiety, depression and cultural dislocation.” However, he was not currently receiving any counselling or prescribed any medication. “In the tribunal’s view many of the Appellant’s symptoms (which are mild in any event) are explained by his absence from his family, i.e., his mother and sister, his cultural dislocation and the uncertainty about his future which has continued for several years.” [41]
(vii) In any event, “the country background evidence shows that there is mental health provision in Egypt which would be accessible to the Appellant if he needed it. In Egypt, as is often said about mental health provision in the United Kingdom, there are insufficient practitioners and facilities in the face of rising need. Nonetheless, adequate provision exists. The tribunal so finds.” [42]
(viii) The appellant’s fear of Mustafa was unfounded. He had “kept his side of the bargain” by facilitating the appellant’s trip to Europe, and the appellant would be able to pay off his debt to him with funds from the Voluntary Return Scheme. In addition, Mustafa would be unable to enforce to debt through legal means as there was “no written evidence of the loan or of its terms”” and it was for an “illegal purpose”. The appellant was not in “debt bondage” to Mustafa as he was not obliged to work for him and he had “incurred the debt with the blessing of his family”. The appellant could seek protection of the authorities if Mustafa behaved improperly and the Judge did not accept that Mustafa had harassed the appellant’s mother, as it would be obvious that “she has no money” [43].
(ix) Ms Beddoe’s report was “too pessimistic and of little assistance”. The forced labour the appellant had suffered as a child “cannot be repeated” now that he was an adult. “In any event, [it] was in the context of local cultural norms and pressing family need, not unusual in large and poor families anywhere.” The appellant remained close to his mother and “It was obviously not the Appellant’s fault that his family could not afford to let him continue his education.” The appellant’s considerable life experience and his unwillingness to trust people made it unlikely that he would “fall prey to traffickers”. [44]
(x) Moreover, the anti-trafficking measures in Egypt “are numerous and follow international norms. The scale of the problem is large. The tribunal finds that while there is consensus that there is scope for further improvement, it must be recognised that Egypt is a relatively poor country with a large population and has made significant progress. Anti-trafficking measures improve by a process of development. The tribunal finds that the anti-trafficking measures in place in Egypt are adequate to prevent the Appellant’s being re-trafficked, whether the tribunal is right or wrong about the Appellant’s own ability to resist trafficking overtures. “ [45]
(xi) For all of these reasons, the appellant’s claimed fear of return to Egypt was “likely to be genuinely held” but was “misinformed and subjective […and] not objectively well-founded.”
23. The Judge concluded that the appellant was not a refugee, not entitled to humanitarian protection and would not be at risk of violations of his ECHR rights in return to Egypt and he dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
Grounds of appeal
24. The appellant was granted permission to appeal on six grounds, one of which was divided into parts (a) and (b):
(i) Ground One: The FTT failed to make findings on a material issue, namely whether the appellant had been trafficked by Mustafa;
(ii) Ground Two: The FTT failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting Ms Beddoe’s report;
(iii) Ground Three: The FTT erred in its treatment of the medical evidence, both in misdescribing the extent and the causes of the appellant’s current mental ill health and ignoring the expert opinion about the likely effect of returning to Egypt on his mental health;
(iv) Ground Four: The FTT’s assessment of the risk of re-trafficking was flawed because:
a. it was infected by the errors with regard to Ms Beddoe’s report and the appellant’s mental health;
b. the Judge failed to apply an objective standard of sufficiency of State protection, instead finding protection sufficient with reference to the country’s poverty, large population size and level of “development”; and
c. he entirely failed to engage with the expert evidence on sufficiency of protection from trafficking.
(v) Ground Five (a): The Judge’s reasons for finding that there was no ongoing risk from the blood feud were not open to him on the evidence before him. Moreover, if the Judge did not believe the mother’s evidence of having been attacked by a member of the D. family, he should have said so in terms.
(vi) Also under the heading of Ground Five (a), the appellant argued that the Judge’s treatment of the manslaughter conviction as evidence of state action against blood feuds was irrational, for several reasons: this killing was not pursuant to a blood feud, the expert evidence was that the police normally rely on reconciliation sessions or advise those at risk from blood feuds to leave the area, and there was no basis to conclude from the prosecutions that the D. family would put themselves at risk if they pursued a blood feud.
(vii) Ground Five (b): The Judge’s reasons for finding that there would be sufficient protection against a blood feud were based on irrational inferences from the fact of the manslaughter prosecutions (as already stated) and failed to engage with the expert evidence.
(viii) Ground six: The Judge’s findings on internal relocation were infected by the errors with regard to the appellant’s mental health, the expert evidence on re-trafficking and on the lack of mental health care, and failed to take into account a number of specific facts going to the appellant’s vulnerability, including his history of abuse and exploitation, the lack of family support on return, and his ongoing receipt of support in the UK.
25. On 16 December 2024, the respondent uploaded a Rule 24 response. Although it was dated 21 December 2020 and bore a different appellant’s reference numbers at the top, it is clear from the content that it relates to this appeal. The respondent noted – entirely correctly – that the grounds of appeal were prolix, overlapping and not entirely clear. It then responded to the first five grounds, by stating concisely in each case that the Judge gave adequate reasons for his findings and the grounds of appeal were simply disagreements. Ground six was said to be parasitical on the other grounds.
26. On the following day, Ms King submitted a skeleton argument. This attempted to restate the grounds in more concise terms and identified the specific evidence that it was said the Judge had overlooked or misconstrued.
The hearing
27. At the outset of the hearing, both representatives informed me that they had not had prior sight of the Rule 24 response. After looking at it briefly, they both then confirmed that they were ready to proceed. I then heard submissions from first Ms King and then Ms Ahmed, followed by a reply from Ms King. I am grateful to both representatives for their submissions over the course of a lengthy hearing. As Ms Ahmed rightly pointed out, Ms King’s arguments at times departed significantly from the grounds. For example, with regard to Ground One, she argued, inter alia, that it was simply wrong in principle to suggest that a victim of trafficking should use their reintegration loan to pay off their trafficker. I do not intend to express any personal criticism of Ms King; neither the Judge’s decision nor the grounds (which she did not draft) were always easily to follow and a number of her new submissions were made in response to my requests for clarification. Nonetheless, I have taken care in making my decision not to put weight on arguments that, in my view, went beyond the appellant’s initial grounds.
Ground One
28. I am not persuaded that Ground One is made out and that the Judge erred by failing to make a finding as to whether or not the appellant’s relationship with Mustafa was one of “trafficking”. The Judge was required to decide whether the appellant’s return to Egypt would be inconsistent with the Refugee Convention or with the UK’s obligations under the ECHR, including under Article 4. However, nothing required him to make a specific finding as to whether the appellant’s treatment by Mustafa in the past met the legal definition of trafficking. He was only required to make a finding about whether the appellant would be at risk of re-trafficking or other serious harm from Mustafa (or others) in the future. This was the fear that the appellant himself expressed in his statement, and this was the issue that the appellant’s skeleton argument below identified as arising out of the appellant’s previous treatment by Mustafa.
29. Ms King acknowledges this in her skeleton argument by linking Ground One and Ground Two; in other words, the failure to make a finding about whether the appellant had been trafficked by Mustafa was not a freestanding error, but part of the erroneous assessment of the risk of trafficking in the future. I am not persuaded, however, that the Judge was required to make a formal finding about whether the appellant’s relationship with Mustafa constituted “trafficking” in order to make a sustainable finding about whether he would be at risk of harm from Mustafa in the future. Moreover, his reasons for finding that there was no risk from Mustafa in the future are set out in detail at [43], and there is no challenge to these reasons in the grounds.
Ground Two
30. Ground Two is not made out. The Judge has given his reasons for finding Ms Beddoe’s report unduly pessimistic. Those reasons are given in the rest of the paragraph. To focus, as the grounds and Ms King’s submissions did, on the single sentence describing the report as “pessimistic and unhelpful” as if that were the extent of his reasoning is to take that sentence out of context.
Ground Three
31. Ground Three is made out. Having read the medical evidence carefully, and with the benefit of both parties’ submissions, I am satisfied that the Judge significantly misstates the contents of the reports.
32. First, neither Ms Rogers nor Ms Reidie describe the appellant’s symptoms as “mild”. Ms Rogers describes them as “severe” [6.1.23]- [6.1.25], [7.1.6] –[7.1.7]; and refers to, inter alia, “considerable psychological distress” [7.1.3], “fairly high levels of social withdrawal” [7.1.4], “extensive feelings of worthlessness and hopelessness” and “significant distress and significant impairment” [7.1.6]. Only his symptoms of hyperarousal are described as “mild” [7.1.3] Ms Reidie also describes his symptoms as “severe”.
33. Secondly, there is nothing in either report that suggests that “many” of the appellant’s symptoms are due to his absence from his family, his “cultural dislocation” or his uncertain immigration status. There are three references in Ms Roger’s report to the appellant missing his mother [3.3], [6.1.14], [7.1.4], but where she attributes the appellant’s symptoms to specific causes, it is consistently to a combination of factors. These include missing his mother, but also worry about his mother’s safety, memories of abuse by his father, his experiences in Libya, and, most consistently, his fears of being killed in a blood feud if returned to Egypt. See, e.g.: [3.3], [6.1.5], [6.1.10], [6.1.11], [6.1.16], [6.1.20]. At 6.1.6, for example, Ms Rogers records the appellant as saying “what is affecting him most is what happened with his family in Egypt, “I don’t want to die for something I didn’t do.”” [emphasis added]
34. Neither report refers to “cultural dislocation” at all, let alone to it being a key source of “many” of his symptoms. There is a single reference in Ms Roger’s report to the appellant’s few friends being from a similar background, but she also reports that he says that “he can connect with people from other groups” [6.1.3] Where social isolation is mentioned, it is attributed by Ms Rogers to the appellant generally not being up to seeing people [6.1.3], a general lack of trust in others [6.1.3], difficulty concentrating [6.1.4] and irritability [6.1.11].
35. In short, the “tribunal’s view” of the extent and the causes of the appellant’s mental ill health has no basis in the medical evidence before the Tribunal, but the Judge neither gives reasons for rejecting that evidence nor identifies the evidentiary basis of his alternative view.
36. This is clearly material, because the Judge expresses his view of the true extent and causes of the appellant’s mental ill health as part of his reasoning about the likely lack of adverse consequences of his return to Egypt (alongside the fact that the appellant was not receiving counselling or medication in the UK and that there was mental health care available in Egypt) [41]. It also allows him to ignore entirely Ms Roger’s view of what those consequences would be, as set out at [16] of this decision.
Ground Four
37. Ground Four is made out. In part, this is because of the Judge’s errors in assessing the appellant’s mental health, which is generally potentially relevant to their vulnerability to exploitation (See, e.g. HD (Trafficked women) Nigeria CG [2016] UKUT 00454 (IAC) [Headnote 4]; TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) [119]). Moreover, the Judge specifically relies on his view of what the appellant will have learned from his “experience of life” as part of his reasons for rejecting Ms Beddoe’s conclusions, such that his view of the appellant as healthier and more resilient than the medical evidence would indicate may have played a role in his reasons for rejecting Ms Beddoe’s conclusions.
38. I am also persuaded that the Judge did apply a sliding scale for sufficiency of protection depending on a country’s poverty and level of development; he says so in terms.
39. I can find no support for such a sliding scale in the jurisprudence on sufficiency of protection. This is in clear contrast to the long line of cases considering whether the reasonableness of the conditions of internal relocation should be assessed by reference to the standards prevailing in the country of origin. Moreover, I consider that such a sliding scale test would be fundamentally inconsistent with the reasoning in Horvath [2000] UKHL 37, which is the cornerstone of UK jurisprudence and is relied on by the Judge at [39]. In that decision, Lord Hope explains the role of the “principle of surrogacy” in the refugee analysis as follows:
“The primary duty to provide the protection lies with the home state. It is its duty to establish and to operate a system of protection against the persecution of its own nationals. If that system is lacking the protection of the international community is available as a substitute. But the application of the surrogacy principle rests upon the assumption that, just as the substitute cannot achieve complete protection against isolated and random attacks, so also complete protection against such attacks is not to be expected of the home state. The standard to be applied is therefore not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of protection in the home state. Rather it is a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty which the state owes to all its own nationals. […] it is axiomatic that we live in an imperfect world. Certain levels of ill-treatment may still occur even if steps to prevent this are taken by the state to which we look for our protection.”
40. The discussion here proceeds on the basis that the country of refuge is obligated to step into the shoes of the country of origin – to act as its “surrogate” – when protection falls below a certain standard. There is no suggestion that the standard should be defined differently in the two countries in question, whether because of levels of development or any other difference between them.
41. Lord Clyde uses a similar language of equivalence between the two states in question:
“Another state is to provide a surrogate protection where protection is not available in the home state. The Convention assumes that every state has the obligation to protect its own nationals. But it recognises that circumstances may occur where that protection may be inadequate. The purpose of the Convention is to secure that a refugee may in the surrogate state enjoy the rights and freedoms to which all are entitled without discrimination and which he cannot enjoy in his own state.”
42. Finally, if the standard of protection was variable depending on a state’s resources, the description of a right to surrogate protection arising where a home state is “unable” to provide it(as referred to repeatedly by Lord Clyde, drawing on the work of Prof. Goodwin-Gill and others) would need to be surrounded by qualifications as to the differing levels of inability that are permissible in different states. But it is not.
43. This is a material error, because it is the reason the Judge gives for finding that current protections are “adequate”, in spite of what he describes as “a consensus that there is scope for further improvement”. In fact, what the sources he cites say is that protection has been recently declining (not improving), and is “inadequate” and “insufficient”.
Ground Five
44. Ground Five is also made out. Some of the appellant’s points are plainly disagreements with the Judge’s view that it is implausible that the appellant’s former home was burnt down and his mother assaulted in connection with the feared blood feud. Ms King suggested the Judge had given insufficient reasons for what was essentially an implausibility finding, but his was not a bare implausibility finding: it was based on the timeline of the conflict between the families and the expert evidence of how blood feuds are usually conducted.
45. However, some of the reasons the Judge gave for finding the link between the attacks and the blood feud implausible are based on assumptions about how the Egyptian state views blood feuds (as a “challenge to the state’s authority”) and how seriously it would therefore take the continuation of a blood feud after a criminal prosecution. This, in turn, would have discouraged any further violence by the D. family (“As there had been manslaughter convictions, the D. family would place themselves in a dangerous position if they attempted to take the law into their own hands.” [36]).
46. Although it is trite that First-tier Tribunal judges are not required to set out every step in their reasoning or to identify all of the evidence on which they base their conclusions, there is simply nothing in the expert evidence before the First-tier Tribunal that suggests that the Egyptian state views blood feuds as a challenge to its authority or that, for this reason or any other reason, it is more likely to act if there has been a prosecution. On the contrary, Ms Pargeter describes the Egyptian police as often actively encouraging and supervising customary mediation sessions [1.15-1.16] and suggests that would likely be their first step if the appellant sought their protection after he returned to Egypt. If that failed, the police would likely advise the appellant to leave the area [3.1], as the Judge acknowledges at [40].
47. Rather than seeing blood feuds as a challenge to state authority, the expert evidence is thus that the state is willing to lend its authority to the facilitate the resolution of such feuds through customary, non-state procedures. Nor is there any suggestion in the expert evidence that the state would react any differently if there had been a prosecution. The Judge appears to have fallen into the error, deprecated in Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 [25], HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 [27-30] and elsewhere, of predicting the behaviour of foreign actors based on his own assumptions, rather than on country evidence.
48. Because the Judge had found that the appellant had fled Egypt in order to escape a potential blood feud, errors about whether it is plausible that the feared feud would continue and whether state protection would be adequate are clearly material.
Ground Six
49. Ground Six is also made out. The Judge’s description of the appellant as “fit and healthy” is plainly inconsistent with the medical evidence about his mental health. It also borders on the perverse to suggest that the appellant would benefit in future from his experience as a cleaner, when this experience was gained in the context of what the respondent accepts was modern slavery, and when the medical evidence is that rather than having developed valuable employment skills from this experience, it contributes to his symptoms of PTSD.
50. The appellant challenges the Judge’s conclusion that mental health care would be available to the appellant, finally, in the context of the challenge to his assessment of the reasonableness of internal relocation. As Ms Ahmed accepted at the hearing, the finding that adequate mental health care “exists” in Egypt is plainly inconsistent with the evidence before the Judge. Ms Pargeter’s report paints a dire picture of the availability and quality of mental health care in Egypt, in considerable detail and across nine pages. As was confirmed at the hearing before me, there was no other evidence concerning mental health care in Egypt before the Judge that could have pointed to a different conclusion. The inadequacy of mental health care in the UK might conceivably have been relevant to an Article 3 health claim or an Article 8 balancing test, but it cannot make the mental health care in Egypt adequate when the only evidence before the Judge was that it was not.
51. For these reasons, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge involved the making of material errors of law requiring it to be set aside.
Notice of Decision
52. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law with regard to events in Egypt since the appellant’s departure and the various risks the appellant might face on return. These errors require the setting aside the Judge’s conclusions on whether his return would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention or under Articles 2, 3, 4 or 8 ECHR, and on whether the appellant is entitled to Humanitarian Protection.
53. There has been no challenge to the Judge’s credibility findings or to his acceptance of the appellant’s account of the events that led to his departure from Egypt and of the criminal prosecution of his brothers and father. Those finding are therefore preserved.
54. I have taken into account the guidance set out in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, and the general principle is that the case will be retained within the Upper Tribunal for the remaking of the decision. I consider that neither of the exceptions to this general principle set out in paragraph 7(2)(a) and (b) of the relevant Practice Statement apply in this case. There is no challenge to the fairness of the proceedings below, and the need for further fact-finding is limited. It is therefore appropriate for the appeal to be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
Directions
1) The appeal is adjourned to be re-made in the Upper Tribunal at a face-to-face hearing, on a date to be fixed, with a time estimate of three hours.
2) If any party wishes to adduce any further evidence, this must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 10 working days before the next hearing, accompanied by an application made pursuant to rule 15(2A) of the Tribunals Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
3) Any skeleton arguments must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 5 working days before the next hearing.
4) If the appellant or any other witness wishes to give oral evidence, they must provide a witness statement capable of standing as evidence in chief, to be served in accordance with direction [2] above, and must state if an interpreter is required, and if so in which language.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 January 2025