Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004932

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00025/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

OSOO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Slatter, Counsel instructed by Paul John & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. By a decision issued on 17 February 2025, the Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. I now remake the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Introduction
2. The appellant is a citizen of Nigeria who has been in the UK since October 2005. She had leave until February 2011. However, since that date, she has been in the UK without leave.
3. In 2019 the appellant applied for asylum on the basis that she is bisexual and faces a risk in Nigeria as a consequence. On 5 December 2023 the respondent refused her application. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The First-tier Tribunal made adverse credibility findings and did not believe the appellant was telling the truth about being bisexual. The Upper Tribunal upheld this aspect of the First-tier Tribunal decision.
4. The First-tier Tribunal also considered whether removing the appellant from the UK would violate Article 8 ECHR. The First-tier Tribunal found that:
(a) the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Nigeria and therefore the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules were not met; and
(b) removing the appellant to Nigeria would not be a disproportionate interference with the private life she had established in the UK.
5. The Upper Tribunal upheld the First-tier Tribunal’s finding on very significant obstacles under paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) but found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in its assessment of proportionality under Article 8 ECHR.
6. The remaking of the appeal is limited to the issue of proportionality under Article 8.
Evidence
7. The appellant relied on a recent witness statement dated 24 May 2025 and gave oral evidence. Her evidence, in summary, is that whilst in the UK she has studied, obtained qualifications, volunteered and been active in her church. She also states that she lives with a close friend, who I will refer to as G, and G’s 16 year old son, who I will refer to as A.
8. The appellant states that she has a very close and mutually supportive friendship with G and is extremely close (like a second mother) to A, who she tutors and supports. G is a single parent, and the appellant states that she plays an essential and significant role in A’s life. Neither G nor A attended the hearing. The appellant stated that G was unable to attend because of work commitments and A could not attend because of a GCSE exam.
9. G provided a short statement, where she states that she supports the appellant. She also states the following in respect of the appellant:
“She provides support to me and my son [A] (16 years old) as I am a single parent. She supports A with his school work during the week and runs classes where she teaches him during the weekend. We dub this as Aunty S’s classes and I have seen the profound effect it has on him as he has improved a lot in his school work.”
10. Also included in the evidence are documents confirming qualifications and volunteering, as well as cards sent to the appellant by A.

Submissions
11. Ms Tariq argued that the appellant would not face significant obstacles integrating in Nigeria as she (i) was already 28 when she came to the UK and therefore has spent much of her life in Nigeria; and (ii) is educated and has skills that can be used in Nigeria.
12. Ms Tariq accepted that the appellant has developed a private life in the UK but submitted that this was established when she was either in the UK with a precarious immigration status (2005 to 2011) or unlawfully (2011 onwards). She noted that the appellant’s relationship with G and A began when she was in the UK unlawfully.
13. Ms Tariq acknowledged that the appellant plays an important role in A’s life, but submitted that she is not a parent and does not have any roles that G (or someone G pays for) could not take on.
14. She also argued that given the length of time the appellant has been in the UK the evidence of her private life was relatively limited.
15. She noted that the appellant, in her oral evidence, referred to suffering from anxiety but that there was an absence of any medical records or other evidence about her mental health.
16. Mr Slatter acknowledged that the appellant’s private life was established when she was in the UK with either a precarious or unlawful immigration status, but argued that the “little weight” provisions in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 can be overridden because of particularly strong features of her private life. He identified three such features. The first is her relationship with A, which he characterised as being “almost family life”. Mr Slatter submitted that A’s best interests need to be taken into account as a primary consideration, and this strongly weighs in the appellant’s favour.
17. Second, he submitted that whilst in the UK the appellant has attained qualifications, volunteered with her church, and developed skills, in particular a diploma in specialist support teaching, that means she will contribute to the economy if she is permitted to work.
18. Third, he highlighted that the appellant has been in the UK for almost twenty years.
Analysis
19. It is not in dispute that the appellant has a private life in the UK. This has been established over a period of almost twenty years and includes her involvement with her church and community, voluntary work and education, as well as her close friendship with G and A.
20. As the appellant has a private life engaging Article 8, the issue to be resolved is whether interfering with that private life, by removing her from the UK, is proportionate. In order to address this, I have adopted a “balance sheet approach”, as recommended in Hesham Ali v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, where I have incorporated the relevant considerations set out in section 117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
21. Weighing against the appellant is that the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest: see Section 117B(1) of the 2002 Act. I attach significant weight to this consideration because the appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and has remained in the UK without leave for over a decade.
22. There are no other public interest considerations weighing against the appellant. I note, in particular, that the appellant speaks English and, because of her education and qualifications, is unlikely to be a burden on the taxpayer. The considerations identified in sections 117B(2) and (3) of the 2002 Act do not therefore weigh against the appellant.
23. On the other side of the scales, weighing in the appellant’s favour, are the following:
(a) The appellant has a close relationship with A, who is 16. I am required to consider A’s best interest, and treat this as a primary consideration. In my view, A benefits from having the appellant in his life, because she provides him with emotional support and assistance with his education. However, A is a 16 year old living with his mother. There is no evidence before me to indicate that A’s mother is unable or unwilling to support A, or that she is dependent on the appellant to support A. The evidence does not indicate that A will suffer significant detriment as a consequence of the appellant’s removal. Therefore, whilst it is in A’s best interests for the appellant to remain in the UK, and this is a primary consideration, I only give this consideration limited weight in the assessment.
(b) The appellant has developed a significant and varied private life in the UK, including friendships, church involvement, and volunteering. However, her private life was established when her immigration status was either precarious or unlawful and in these circumstances sections 117B(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act require that only little weight should be given to it. It is well-established that the “little weight provisions” can be “overridden” in exceptional circumstances: see Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58. The evidence before me, however, does not come close to establishing exceptional circumstances of the type envisioned in Rhuppiah. The appellant has engaged with life in the UK and has developed close relationships (including with a minor). This is unsurprising given how long she has lived in the UK and there is nothing exceptional about it.
(c) The appellant has been in the UK for a substantial period of time: almost twenty years. This is significant, not only because twenty years is a very substantial part of her life, but because the Immigration Rules recognise that 20 years of residence at the date of an application is a basis for an application for leave. This is a factor to which I give some weight in the proportionality assessment.
(d) The appellant would face challenges returning to Nigeria, as she has lived outside of the country for a significant period of time and does not have family or other support. Although she would not face very significant obstacles to integration, for the reasons found by the FtT, the challenges she would face are nonetheless a relevant consideration that I factor into the assessment and to which I give some weight.
24. There are a range of factors weighing in the appellant’s favour. This includes that it is in A’s best interests for her to remain in the UK, that she has developed a meaningful private life in the UK over a very long period of time, and that she is likely to face real challenges returning to Nigeria. I have considered all of the factors weighing in the appellant’s favour cumulatively. However, they fall significantly short of the weight that I attach to the public interest in effective immigration controls. This public interest weighs heavily against the appellant because (i) she does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules; and (ii) she stayed in the UK for over a decade without a lawful basis – conduct that undermines the integrity of, and the public’s confidence in, Immigration Law. Accordingly, I find that removal of the appellant from the UK would not represent a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for her private life.
Notice of Decision
25. The Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. I now remake that decision by dismissing the appellant’s appeal.

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 June 2025