Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004950

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68349/2023
LP/03032/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

NINETTE POLIQUIT MOAJE
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION LIFTED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr H. Broachwalla, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms N. Kerr, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

The anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal and continued by the Upper Tribunal is lifted.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This decision is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) decision dated 20 December 2024 but set aside in part by the Upper Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 27 January 2025. The decision of 27 January 2025 is included as an annex below.

The anonymity order
2. The First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) made an anonymity order in this appeal as a precautionary measure, because the appellant had made a claim for international protection. The FTT then dismissed the appeal on all grounds, and the appellant was granted permission to appeal on article 8 grounds only. On 14 March 2025, I therefore made the following direction:
“Because the appellant’s protection claim has been finally determined, the Tribunal is minded to lift the anonymity order that was put in place by the First-tier Tribunal as a precautionary measure. If the appellant believes that anonymity remains appropriate, she is to renew her application for anonymity no later than 14 days before the hearing. In the event that the appellant does not renew her application, anonymity will be lifted.”
3. The appellant did not make a renewed application for anonymity and at the hearing before me Mr Broachwalla accepted that anonymity was no longer required.
4. However, the appellant’s witness, Mr GC, previously made an asylum claim in his own right, in which the FTT made a separate anonymity order.
Background
5. The appellant is a citizen of the Philippines, born in the Philippines in 1975. She entered the UK on a visit visa in September 2007 and she has remained in the UK ever since. On 25 June 2020, she claimed asylum on the basis that she was at risk of serious harm from her ex-partner if she returned to the Philippines. The respondent refused the that protection claim on 12 December 2023. She accepted that the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence in the Philippines in the past but found that she would not be at real risk of domestic violence on return because she could seek protection from the authorities or relocate within the Philippines. The FTT agreed, and the appellant was not granted permission to appeal that aspect of the FTT’s decision.
6. The appellant also sought permission to stay in the UK on the grounds of her private and family life, as protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. By the time of her asylum interview in November 2023, she had lived in the UK for 16 years, and she had provided evidence of the friendships she had formed here. She also said that she was in a committed partnership with Mr GC, who was also a citizen of the Philippines with a pending asylum claim. She said that they had met in 2016, when they had been introduced by a mutual friend. They started living together in that year, but they did not become partners until July 2020. The appellant also relied on her need for continuing medical treatment; NHS records showed that she had been diagnosed with a molar pregnancy in July 2023. She said she had lost touch with her friends in the Philippines, although she was still regularly in contact with her daughter (born in 1996) and her mother, and more occasionally with a brother.
7. The respondent found that the appellant was not entitled to leave to remain on article 8 grounds. There would not be significant obstacles to her reintegration in the Philippines, because she was still in contact with her adult daughter, her mother and her brother. She would have access to £3000 from the Voluntary Returns Service, and the Philippines was a “developing country”. She and Mr C did not meet the definition of “partners” under Appendix FM because they had not lived together for two years by the date of her asylum claim. Nor did he meet the immigration status requirements to act as a sponsor. In the article 8 balancing test, the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration control weighed heavily against the appellant, and little weight could be put on the private life she had established here, because her immigration status had at all times been precarious at best.
8. The FTT dismissed the appellant’s article 8 appeal, but for the reasons set out in the error of law decision below, I set aside that aspect of the FTT’s decision with no findings preserved.
9. The appeal was listed for a remaking hearing on 14 March 2025. This hearing was adjourned due to the absence of a Tagalog interpreter for Mr C. A second hearing was listed for 13 August 2025, but was adjourned at the appellant’s request after her legal representative suffered a sudden bereavement.
10. At the hearing of 13 March 2024, the appellant adduced updating medical evidence, but the likely impact on the appellant of the various medical conditions they disclosed was not apparent to a lay reader, and there was no statement from the appellant explaining this. The respondent also produced the appeal determination in Mr C’s appeal, dated 15 June 2023 (PA/54384/2021).
11. On 14 March 2025, I issued directions instructing the parties to submit any further evidence on which they wished to rely no later than 14 days before the renewed remaking hearing. Neither side submitted any further evidence.
The hearing
12. At the hearing of 10 November 2025, I had before me:
(i) A 287-page bundle prepared by the Upper Tribunal, containing the FTT’s decision, my decision of 27 January 2025, various documents from the error of law proceedings before the UT, the appellant’s skeleton arguments and appeal bundles before the FTT, and the respondent’s bundle and review before the FTT;
(ii) Mr Broachwalla’s skeleton argument of 14 March 2025; and
(iii) The determination in Mr C’s appeal.
13. Mr Broachwalla also relied on NHS records showing that the appellant had undergone a hysterectomy on 24 April 2025. Although these records had not been filed with the Tribunal in accordance with directions, Ms Kerr accepted that the records were reliable.
14. There had been no updating statement from the appellant or Mr C, but Ms Kerr did not object to their giving oral evidence. Mr Broachwalla asked for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness, but he was unable to identify any evidence indicating that this was required. I nonetheless reminded Ms Kerr that she should treat the appellant with respect throughout her cross-examination, and she did so.
15. I then heard evidence from the appellant. She adopted her witness statement of 22 March 2024 and then explained that at the time of her hysterectomy, she had been diagnosed with Stage 1 cancer. When Mr Broachwalla asked her how she was affected by this condition, she said the cancer diagnosis had caused significant stress and that she would require check-ups every three months for the next five years. She continues to suffer some numbness and pain. She said that she would not be fit to work if she returned to the Philippines now and that she would not be able to afford medication and treatment. Her family could not help her, because her mother also had cancer and her family were poor. She and Mr C would be forced to separate if they returned to the Philippines, because they would be sued.
16. On cross-examination, the appellant clarified that the period between check-ups would increase from three, to four, to six months. She had not been formally signed off work because she had lost her permission to work, but she intended to return to work in April 2026. Her consultant had not advised her to restrict her daily life activities.
17. Ms Kerr then asked the appellant why she said she would be unfit to work in the Philippines, if she intended to return to work in the UK in April 2026. She clarified that she would be unable to find employment due to age discrimination. She was “unsure” whether free health care was available in the Philippines; she had been paying for her mother’s cancer treatment. Her daughter was not working because she was a full-time parent. She was supported by her husband.
18. Ms Kerr then asked the appellant a series of questions about her relationship with Mr C. She confirmed that they had been introduced by mutual friends in 2016 and had started living together in the same year. They did not become partners in 2020, when he looked after her when she had COVID. She did not remember when she had learned that he had claimed asylum.
19. Mr C adopted his witness statement of 22 March 2024 and was then cross-examined. He did not remember when he had found out that she had no status in the UK, when he had told her that he was married, or when she had told him that she had a daughter and ex-partner in the Philippines. Ms Kerr referred him to his witness statement, in which he had said that the appellant had not found out that he had a daughter in the Philippines until December 2022. She asked him why he had not told her this, and he answered that he thought she might not understand and did not want to hurt her. He was no longer in touch with his daughter because her mother had blocked him.
20. I then heard submissions from the parties, which I have taken into account in making my decision.
The issues before me
21. The only issue before me is whether the appellant’s removal from the UK would be disproportionate under article 8.
22. In a skeleton argument dated 13 March 2024, Mr Broachwalla set out the factors that the appellant relies on:
(i) Her length of residence in the UK; this is now 18 years;
(ii) Her integration into the UK, as attested to by letters of support from two British citizens resident in the UK;
(iii) The “support and assistance” she provides her friends in the UK by cleaning their homes and cooking for them, as described in her 2024 appeal statement;
(iv) Her work history in the UK; she had been granted permission to work in September 2021 and had been working as a waitress and was planning to start a hospitality business;
(v) Her fluency in English;
(vi) Her health issues;
(vii) The lack of family support in the Philippines: her mother had been diagnosed with cancer and was being looked after by her youngest brother, who was unemployed; her daughter and other siblings lived in the same area as her ex-partner (with regard to the daughter, this appears to be incorrect);
(viii) The age discrimination that would limit her work opportunities on return to the Philippines;
(ix) The risk that the appellant would be charged with the criminal offence of concubinage because Mr De la Cruz is married, as set out in an expert report; and
(x) She would be returning to a country where she suffered years of abuse and where domestic violence remains widespread.
23. The respondent did not file a skeleton argument.
Legal framework
24. The appellant appeals under section 84(1)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) on the grounds that her removal from the UK would be inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under article 8 ECHR and, therefore, with section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. She says that there would be very significant obstacles to her reintegration in the Philippines, such that she is eligible for a grant of leave to remain under Para. PL 5.1(b) of the Immigration Rules. She bears the burden of proof of establishing this, and the standard of proof is the balance of the probabilities.
25. If the appellant does meet the requirements of the Rules, her appeal will fall to be allowed, because in this case the respondent does not point to any additional adverse factors weighing against a grant of leave to remain. See: TZ (Pakistan) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109.
26. If the appellant does not meet the Rules, it will be necessary to identify all relevant factors that weigh both for and against a grant of leave and then to strike a fair balance between them. Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11 at [60]. This requires taking into account the considerations set out at section 117B of the 2002 Act and the guidance of senior UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights. In general, where a personal does not meet the Rules and they have established a family or private life in the UK at a time when their immigration status was precarious, they will need to make out a very strong or compelling claim to outweigh the public interest in their removal. Id at [59].
Findings of fact
27. I begin by setting out the unchallenged findings of the FTT:
(i) The appellant was in an abusive relationship with her ex-partner, and he has threatened to kill her;
(ii) If he located her on return to the Philippines and threatened her, the appellant could seek protection from her barangay (local government) or the police;
(iii) Alternatively, she could relocate within the Philippines; her daughter lives in Manila, which is 16 hours’ travel from the town in which the appellant lived with her ex-partner.
28. There was no specific challenge to the FTT’s finding that the appellant would be able to find employment in the Philippines, but the appellant has provided evidence that her health situation has changed, such that I consider it necessary to make an up-to-date finding on this issue.
29. I find that the following facts are either uncontested or established by the appellant’s unchallenged oral or documentary evidence:
(i) The appellant has lived in the UK continuously for over 18 years;
(ii) She has never held lawful status; although she entered with entry clearance as a visitor, her intention was not to leave the UK after a short visit;
(iii) She has formed some friendships in the UK; however, they offered limited support for her appeal. Only two wrote very brief statements of support, and none attended either appeal hearing;
(iv) She was granted permission to work in the UK in September 2021, and thereafter she worked as a waitress and also registered a business at Companies House;
(v) She was diagnosed with Stage 1 cancer in April 2024 and underwent a hysterectomy. She will require regular check-ups every three-six months until 2029 and continues to suffer some pain and numbness. She has not been told by her consultant that she is unfit for work or advised to limit her daily life activities. She expects to be fit to return to work in April 2026, although se accepts that does not at present have permission to do so;
(vi) She is fluent in English;
(vii) The appellant remains in contact with her mother, her daughter and her youngest brother in the Philippines. Her mother has liver cancer and is cared for by the brother. According to a letter the mother wrote in March 2024, the appellant and two of her sisters had agreed to pay for her medication, but in the end it was paid for entirely by the appellant;
(viii) The appellant’s daughter is married and a full-time parent. She is supported by her husband;
(ix) According to the appellant’s mother’s statement of March 2024, the appellant supported her youngest brother throughout his studies and he has graduated from college; he was unemployed at that time because he was caring for her; and
(x) As of March 2024, the appellant was also in touch with a nephew in the Philippines. He wrote a letter in support of her appeal in which he expressed his gratitude for her financial support, which had enabled him to graduate from college and obtain a “decent job”.
30. The appellant says that she is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with Mr C. With some hesitation, I accept this, on the balance of the probabilities. Several factors weigh in favour of this finding. The appellant’s and Mr C’s account of the history of their relationship has been consistent: they were introduced through mutual friends in 2016 and began living together, but it was not until Mr C cared for the appellant when she had COVID in 2020 that they became partners. There has been no challenge to the reliability of the documentary evidence that they are, at the very least, cohabiting. The medical evidence offers some corroboration that the appellant was in a relationship with someone at the relevant time.
31. I do not find the genuineness of their relationship to be significantly undermined by the appellant’s lack of knowledge about Mr C’s wife and daughter; past relationships and family ties can be a difficult subject even between genuine couples and in addition the daughter in question was born as the result of an extra-martial affair. On the other hand, it is troubling that there is no personal evidence of their relationship other than a handful of undated photographs submitted in 2024. There are, for example, no records of any messages they have exchanged. There are no letters of support from friends.
32. Ultimately, my decision to accept that the couple are in a genuine relationship rests in part on a considerations of fairness. The respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the relationship in the refusal decision or the respondent’s review. In fact, although in the context of the appellant’s history of domestic violence, the respondent stated in the review that the appellant’s “credibility is not in dispute”. It was not challenged in the context of Mr C’s protection claim. At the hearing before me, Ms Kerr cross-examined the appellant about Mr C only briefly, asking a few simply questions about the chronology of the relationship. The appellant’s answers were entirely consistent with what she had said previously. In other words, no serious concerns about the genuineness about the relationship have ever been put to the appellant for her to answer. Ms Kerr’s cross-examination of Mr C was more persistent, but this is no substitute for putting her concerns about the genuineness of the relationship directly to the appellant.
33. I therefore accept for the purposes of my decision that Mr C and the appellant are partners.
34. The appellant says that she and Mr C would be unable to continue their relationship in the Philippines because they would be “sued”. She relies on an expert report by Mary Kristine Reyes-Chu, an attorney in the Philippines. Ms Kerr confirmed at the hearing before me that the respondent did not challenge the reliability of that report. Ms Reyes-Chu expressed the opinion that the neither the appellant nor Mr C would be at risk of prosecution for adultery, because she was never married to her former partner. However, they could face legal sanctions for the offence of concubinage, as defined at article 334 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. This is defined as:
(i) keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling;
(ii) sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman who is not his wife; or
(iii) cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife in any other place.
35. If convicted, Mr C could be sentenced to anywhere from six months to four years in prison, while the appellant could be sentenced to destierro, or banishment. This would prohibit her from living with Mr C. She would also be given a criminal record.
36. However, according to article 344 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, any prosecution for the offence of concubinage must be brought against both parties, and it can only be brought upon a complaint by the offended spouse, that is, by Mr C’s wife.
37. The issue of whether Mr C’s wife or her family would take legal action against him was considered at his appeal hearing. As both parties accepted, the principles first set out in Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00702 apply. This is because on this particular issue, “there is a material overlap of evidence”(Ocampo v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1276 [25]), and both appeals involve the same factual matrix (AA (Somalia) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 1040 [69]). I therefore take the findings in that appeal, so far as relevant, as an authoritative assessment of the facts at the time. These findings “should be followed unless there is a very good reason not to do so.” AL (Albania) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 950 [25]. At the same time, I am not constrained by them and I continue to have a duty to determine all relevant issues for myself on the evidence before me: LD (Algeria) v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 80 at [30].
38. I consider the following findings of the FTT in Mr C’s appeal to be relevant to the issues before me:
(i) The appellant’s account of having been threatened and harmed by his ex-wife’s family had been vague and materially inconsistent;
(ii) The corroborating evidence adduced by Mr C was not reliable; this consisted of a police report and statements from his father and his son;
(iii) There “may well be lingering animosity following the breakdown of the marriage”, but Mr C did not genuinely fear violence at the hands of his ex-wife’s family;
(iv) There was no evidence that Mr C’s wife’s family would know he if he returned to the Philippines and settled away from his former home; and
(v) It was entirely speculative that they might take legal action against him for adultery or concubinage in the future, particularly in light of the fact that they would be unlikely to know he had returned to the Philippines.
39. Neither the appellant nor Mr C has provided any further evidence that would justify departing from these findings. I also note that by Mr C’s account at his appeal, his marriage to his first wife had broken down in 2006, when he had an extramarital affair and fathered a child. Yet he did not say that his wife or his family had brought any legal complaint against him at that time.
40. As the appellant appeals on article 8 grounds only, she bears the burden of establishing the facts on which she relies to the civil standard of “more likely than not”. Based on the FTT’s previous findings, the fact that no criminal complaint was brough at the time of Mr C’s previous affair, and the lack of any further evidence on this issue, I find that the appellant has not shown that it is more likely than not that Mr C’s family will bring a legal complaint against her and Mr C for concubinage if they return to the Philippines together.
41. I find that the appellant retains strong personal ties to the Philippines and to Filipino culture. Her partner is Filipino, and one of her two supporting witnesses was born in the Philippines. She is in regular contact with her mother, her daughter and at least one of her seven siblings, and she was in touch with her nephew in 2024.
42. I find that she would be likely to have access to some family support on return to the Philippines. Her nephew describes himself as a “working professional” with a “decent job” and has expressed strong feelings of gratitude towards her. Her mother says that she supported other grandchildren through college as well, and her youngest brother has also graduated from college. There is no evidence that these other relatives would be unable to offer her any support. Although her brother was not working in 2024, that was said to be because of his mother’s care needs at the time. Her daughter is not working and is supported financially by her husband, but there is nothing to suggest that she could not offer the appellant at least emotional support on her return.
43. I find that the appellant has not established that she would be unable to find employment on return to the Philippines. She expects to be well enough to return to work by April next year. She has work experience both in the Philippines and the UK, and she is enterprising enough to have started to establish her own business in the two years in which she had permission to work in the UK. She fears that she would suffer from age discrimination on return to the Philippines, but when asked to set out the basis of these fears, she described a preference that sales assistants be young and “sexy”. This may well be true. It may also be true for waitresses, a profession the appellant pursued in the UK while she had permission to work. I find, however that this fear is too limited a basis to establish that the appellant would be unable to find work in the Philippines in spite of her education, work experience, fluency in English and Tagalog, industriousness and family support.
44. I further find that the appellant has not established that she would be unable to access any necessary medical care in the Philippines. The medical records show that she has suffered from painful and probably distressing gynaecological conditions in recent years, and the Stage 1 cancer diagnosis is likely to have been frightening. Although I do not minimise the seriousness of the diagnosis, the appellant’s evidence is that she now requires limited medical care. Nor has she provided any evidence that should she require care in the future, it would be unavailable or unaffordable in the Philippines.
45. Finally, although I do not minimise the seriousness of the abuse the appellant was subjected to by her ex-partner before she left the Philippines 18 years ago, the FTT found that there was no real risk that the abuse would continue.
Applying the law to the facts
46. I find that there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in the Philippines, taking into account the findings above at [29](vii) and [41]-[45]. She therefore does not meet the requirements of Para. PL 5.1(b).
47. Turning to article 8 outside the Rules, I begin with the five questions set out in Razgar [2004] UKHL 27. The appellant has established a family life in the UK, where she has been cohabiting with her partner since 2016, and as partners since mid-2020. She has also established a private life in the UK in her 18 years of residence. Although the evidence of that private life is limited, it includes friendships and employment. I assume for the purposes of my decision that removing the appellant from the UK would have consequences of sufficient gravity to engage the protection of article 8, although this may not in fact be the case. For the reasons set out immediately below, the appellant’s removal may not disrupt their family life because there is nothing preventing Mr C from returning to the Philippines. Indeed, he is under legal obligation do so. The private life interests related to her work have already been disrupted by the cancellation of her permission to work following the refusal of her asylum claim. As to her friendships, the evidence of these is so limited that it is difficult to determine how they would be affected by her removal.
48. The decision to remove the appellant is clearly in accordance with the law, as she does not meet any of the Immigration Rules, and the Rules express the respondent’s view of what is necessary to protect the economic well-being of the country.
49. Turning to whether the appellant’s removal would be disproportionate, I adopt a balance sheet approach.
50. Weighing against the appellant is that she does not meet the Immigration Rules. This is a factor to which I am required to attach considerable weight. See: Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11 at [47].
51. Applying section 117B to the findings I have made above, I find that there is little to outweigh the public interest in effective immigration control identified at section 117B(1). Her fluency in English and her obvious capacity for economic independence are neutral factors. Little weight can be put on her family life with Mr C, because it was developed when they were both in the UK without leave. Moreover, Mr C is also a citizen of the Philippines and his own asylum and human rights claim has failed. There is nothing to prevent his return to the Philippines with the appellant, and I have found above that the appellant has not established that they would be unable to continue there relationship there. Little weight can be put on the appellant’s private life in the UK because her status has at all times been unlawful. Although little weight does not mean no weight, the appellant has offered no evidence that there are particularly strong features to that private life that would justify placing it on the weightier end of what “little weight” can mean: See: Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58 at [49]-[50].
52. For the reasons set out above at [41]-[45], I find that none of the circumstance the appellant would face on return to the Philippines would be particularly harsh. Even considering those circumstances cumulatively and taking them together with the adverse consequences of being required to leave the UK, I find that the high standard of unjustifiably harsh consequences is not reached. In order to succeed outside the Rules, the appellant would have had to show that hers is a very compelling case. For the reasons give above, I find that she has not done so.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
5 December 2025

ANNEX
(Error of law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004950

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68349/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

NPM
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. H. Broachwalla, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms. N. McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 January 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify her. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Wyman (“the Judge”) dismissing her protection and human rights claim.
2. The appellant was granted anonymity by the First-tier Tribunal because she had made a claim for international protection. The Judge dismissed her appeal protection appeal, and the appellant has not been granted permission to appeal that aspect of his decision. This would tend to indicate that the public interest in open justice now outweighs the values protected by the anonymity order, namely the UK’s obligations towards people in need of international protection and the need to protect the confidentiality of the asylum process. However, as neither party has sought to address the Tribunal about whether the anonymity order should be lifted, I have decided that it should be left in place at present.
3. The appellant is a citizen of the Philippines, born in the Philippines in 1975. She entered the UK on a visit visa in September 2007 and she has remained in the UK ever since. On 25 June 2020, she claimed asylum on the basis that she was at risk of serious harm from her ex-partner if she returned to the Philippines. She said that he had become verbally and mentally abusive and violent to her after their daughter was born in 1996, and had stolen her money to spend on his addictions to drugs, alcohol and gambling. In 2007, she left her daughter at her sister’s house and fled the country to escape him. Her ex-partner has repeatedly threatened that if appellant found another partner in the UK, he would kill her. The appellant did form a new relationship in the UK, with Mr D, who is also a citizen of the Philippines. The couple say they met in 2016 and have been cohabiting since 2020. The appellant says that she now fears that her ex-partner will kill her if she returns.
4. The respondent interviewed the appellant about her protection claim on 2 November 2023, and on 12 December 2023, she refused it. She accepted that the appellant’s ex-partner had threatened to kill her as she claimed, and in the respondent’s review she confirmed that there was no reason to reject the appellant’s claim of having been a victim of domestic violence. The respondent found, however, that state protection and internal relocation would be available. With regard to the appellant’s family and private life, the respondent noted that the appellant and her current partner had been living together for less than two years when she claimed asylum, such that they did not meet the definition of partners under Appendix FM, and that he was not a British citizen and did not meet any of the immigration status requirements to qualify as a sponsoring partner. There were not very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in the Philippines, and there were no exceptional circumstances.
5. The appellant appealed, submitting two bundles of evidence. These included, inter alia, a skeleton argument, witness statements from the appellant and Mr D, pictures of the couple together, a tenancy agreement and council tax bills addressed to them, and an expert report from an attorney in the Philippines.
6. In the appellant’s skeleton argument, her representatives at the time identified the “issues in the appeal” as:
“a. Whether the A’s claim of being subject to domestic violence is credible?
b. Whether the A’s claim falls to be considered under the Convention?
c. Whether there is sufficiency of protection?
d. Whether internal relocation is an option for the A?
e. Whether there would be very significant obstacles to the A’s reintegration into the Philippines?”
7. The skeleton argument nonetheless concluded with a section entitled “Proportionality”, which began, “If the Tribunal finds that A does not meet the requirements of the Rules, it must determine for itself how a fair balance should be struck between the public and individual interests, applying a proportionality test”. The appellant relied on GM (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1630 and addressed the considerations listed at Section 117B.
8. The appellant’s representatives also requested that the respondent’s consent to the consideration of the “new matter” of whether the appellant would be at risk of imprisonment for adultery based on the fact that Mr D was legally married to another woman in the Philippines.
9. In the respondent’s review, the respondent confirmed that the credibility of the appellant’s account of domestic abuse was not challenged. She expressed the view that as the appellant had raised her relationship with Mr D at her substantive interview and it had been considered in the refusal decision, it was not a new matter. The appellant’s new country evidence was considered, and the refusal decision was maintained. The respondent also noted that in the ASA, the appellant’s representatives had omitted Article 8 from their schedule of issues but had argued that removal would violate the appellant’s rights under Article 8, and she gave reasons for maintaining the refusal on Article 8 grounds.
10. The appeal then came before the Judge for hearing on 14 August 2024, and in an undated decision, he dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
The Judge’s decision
11. After a brief summary of the appellant’s immigration history and of the appeal proceedings, the Judge set out that the respondent accepted that the appellant was a citizen of the Philippines and that she had been in an abusive relationship with her previous partner. He noted that “the overall credibility of the appellant’s account was accepted, as clarified in the Respondent’s Review” [14](b).
12. The Judge set out the issues in dispute at [15]. These were the same as listed in the appellant’s skeleton argument, with the exception of whether the appellant’s claim of being subjected to domestic violence was credible. He did not identify Article 8 proportionality as an issue in the appeal.
13. At [16], the Judge set out the legal framework relevant to the appellant’s protection claim. He then considered the country evidence before him, which included the respondent’s CPIN, the expert report and two additional country reports. He then gave his reasons for finding that in the Philippines neither women in general nor women who had been victims of domestic violence constituted a Particular Social Group (PSG) [34], that, “Domestic violence cannot be persecution for a convention reason because if it were refugee receiving state would also be refugee-producing states” [35], that sufficient protection against domestic violence would be available to the appellant [37]-[43], and that internal relocation would be both safe and reasonable [44]-[50]. At [51]-[52], he made formal findings on the basis of these facts that the appellant was not a refugee and did not qualify for Humanitarian Protection.
14. The Judge then turned to the question of whether “the appellant should be granted leave due to her family and private life under Rule 276.”
15. I set out the Judge’s consideration of the appellant’s relationship with Mr D in full, as it was the focus on much of the discussion at the hearing before me:
55. “The appellant has stated that she is in a long-term relationship with Mr [D], a Filipino national. According to her, she met Mr [D] in 2016 and they started co-habiting in 2020. Evidence of co-habitation has been provided in the bundle.
56. Mr [D] did not attend the hearing but did provide a witness statement. Counsel explained that Mr [D] was working today. No explanation was given as to why Mr [D] could not take the day off work, especially given that the appellant has had notice of the date of the hearing for some time.
57. Ms NPM stated that she is not married to Mr [D] as he is still married to a woman in the Philippines with whom he has children. She was asked if he had started divorce proceedings from within the UK and stated that she did not know. Nor did she know the whereabouts of his wife. She explained that he too is an asylum seeker whose initial application was refused, and he is waiting for a hearing date for his appeal.
58. I find it concerning that the appellant does not know basic information regarding Mr [D] given that she claimed to have been in a relationship together for four years.
59. Ms NPM commented in her statement that if they both return to the Philippines then she could be accused of adultery. However, she is not married to [her former partner] and so she has not committed adultery. Whilst divorce may not be available in the Philippines, it is of course possible to apply for a divorce in the UK and Mr [D] is entitled to issue a divorce petition from the UK even if the marriage took place abroad.
60. I therefore dismiss any application for leave to remain on the grounds of any family life in the UK.”
16. The Judge continued by noting that the appellant had no family in the UK “(save Mr [D])”, but had a large extended family in the Philippines. He accepted that “she may have various friends and colleagues in the UK” [61]. He further noted that she had been living in the UK for 17 years, but this was not 20 years. Nor were there very significant obstacles to her reintegration in the Philippines because she had family there, spoke Tagalog, had spent her formative years there and would still be familiar with Filipino society and culture [62]. For these reasons, he found that her “application on the basis of her private life under paragraph 276 is refused.”[63]
17. The next section of the decision was entitled “Consideration of exceptional circumstances”. It consisted of a single paragraph:
“Nor do I find that there are any exceptional circumstances under paragraph GEN 3.2 of Appendix FM that are applicable that would render refusal a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for her.”
18. Under the heading of “Discretionary leave” the Judge noted that the appellant was not making an Article 3 health claim.
19. The Judge dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
The grounds of appeal
20. When the appellant applied for permission to appeal, she no longer had legal representation, and she drafted the grounds herself. In a decision dated 6 November 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman carefully considered her grounds before granting permission on two grounds only, Grounds G and H.
21. Ground G was entitled “The Tribunal failed to consider and appreciate the evidences fully and adequately due to substantial changes in appellant’s personal circumstance, and the strength of her connections in the UK.” Under that heading, the appellant pointed to four factors that she said had not been properly considered:
(i) She had lived in the UK for 17 years;
(ii) Her ex-partner was “still very much alive and active in the Philippines with growing state of fortune and influence.”;
(iii) She was fully integrated into British society and active in her local community; and
(iv) She had established a permanent relationship with her partner. Mr [D] and friends in the UK “whom she considers her second family”.
22. Ground H was entitled “The removal of the appellant from the UK would infringe the rights afforded to the appellant under Article 8 of the ECHR”. The appellant cited the text of Article 8 and some leading Article 8 caselaw on both family and private life but did not identify how the Judge had erred.
23. Judge Hoffman found that these grounds were arguable because it was clear that the Judge had considered the appellant’s family life under Para. 276ADE, although that paragraph is only concerned with private life, and had considered GEN.3.1. even though the appellant had not made any application under Appendix FM. He had failed to carry out “a proper Razgar-compliant assessment of Article 8 proportionality outside of the Rules.”
24. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response. She argued that:
(i) The Judge had considered the evidence of the appellant’s relationship with Mr [D] and had given adequate reasons for refusing to “accept and attach weight” to it;
(ii) Any error in failing to consider the relationship was in any event not material, because the relationship did not meet the Rules and Section 117B of the 2002 Act required little weight to be put on the relationship.
(iii) The Judge had considered the appellant’s length of residence in the UK, and he was required by Section 117B to put little weight on it. He had also considered all of the factors relevant to reintegration within his consideration of the internal relocation question. These include the potential threat from the appellant’s ex-partner, her work experience and employment prospects on return, and the family support that would be available to her.
25. With regard to Ground H, the respondent argued that even if the assessment was not structed in accordance with Razgar, all relevant factors had been considered.
The hearing
26. The appellant obtained representation shortly before the hearing, and on the morning of the hearing, Mr Broachwalla uploaded a skeleton argument. Ms McKenzie agreed to allow the appellant to rely on it, and took a short time to read it before the hearing began. I also had before me a 321-page bundle created by the Tribunal.
27. I am grateful to both representatives for their thoughtful submissions, which I have taken into account in making my decision.
Discussion
28. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I have reminded myself of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. See Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114].
The appellant’s protection claim
29. The appellant has not been granted permission to appeal against the refusal of her protection claim, and Mr Broachwalla did not ask me to go behind that decision. Nonetheless, I find it necessary to highlight a significant legal error made by Judge, albeit one that was not, in this appeal, material.
30. At [35], the Judge found that, “[d]omestic violence cannot be persecution for a convention reason because if it were refugee receiving state would also be refugee-producing states”. This is plainly inconsistent with 25 years of UK caselaw recognising that domestic violence can give rise to a claim for protection under the Refugee Convention, beginning with Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another, Ex Parte Shah, R v. [1999] UKHL 20 (“Shah and Islam”). More generally, the Judge here determined whether a Convention reason was present by comparing circumstances in “refugee receiving states” and those in “refugee-producing states”. I cannot identify the legal basis for this approach or the evidentiary basis for the comparison that was made.
31. However, as reflected in Judge Hoffman’s decision to grant permission on limited grounds only, the Judge’s ultimate conclusion at [51] and [52] that the appellant was not at risk of serious harm was reasonably open to him on the evidence before him. His misunderstanding of whether that harm could have founded a refugee claim was therefore not material.
Article 8
32. The Judge’s decision does not contain any reference to the legal framework for Article 8 appeals or the role that the Immigration Rules play within that framework. It is trite that, as reiterated recently in Ullah at [26](v), “judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so.” In this case, however, I consider it clear that the Judge did not apply the relevant authorities.
33. It is clear that the Judge misdescribed the task before him when he purported at [60] to “dismiss” the appellant’s “application for leave to remain on the grounds of any family life in the UK” and to decide at [63] that “the appellant[‘]s application on the basis of her private life under paragraph 276 is refused.” It is trite that it is not the role of a First-tier Tribunal Judge to decide applications under the Immigration Rules, but rather (where relevant) to make findings about whether an appellant meets the Rules as one essential element of an Article 8 assessment. If the Rules are not met, a Judge is still required to consider whether requiring a person to leave the UK would be a disproportionate interference with their Article 8 rights, “considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case.” Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11 [47].
34. Nor was the Judge’s misdescription of the task before him merely a poor choice of words. His assessment of the appellant’s family and private life claims began and ended with considering whether she met the Rules. He described “Rule 276” as the framework for deciding “if the appellant should be granted leave due to her family and private life” at [53], and after concluding that her “application” on this basis should be dismissed or refused, he concluded his Article 8 consideration by finding that para. GEN 3.2 of Appendix FM was not met either. There is no indication that he considered proportionality outside the Rules at any point.
35. This overarching error was compounded by several other errors. Para 276 is clearly not the proper framework for beginning the consideration of whether the appellant’s removal would be a disproportionate interference with her family life with Mr D. Para. 276 has nothing to say about family life. Moreover, as the appellant said that Mr D was a citizen of the Philippines without leave to remain, there was never any question of meeting the family life Rules. What was required was reasoned findings about the couple’s family life for the purposes of an Article 8 assessment outside the Rules.
36. Moreover, I consider that the Judge’s findings about the appellant’s relationship with Mr D are not adequately reasoned. The Judge notes that there is evidence that they are cohabiting [55], expresses several concerns about the relationship at [56] and [57], and then finds that they could continue their relationship in the Philippines at [59]. Against a background where the respondent had accepted the appellant’s general credibility and had not previously questioned the genuineness of her relationship, if the Judge did not accept that the relationship was genuine and subsisting (as the respondent suggests in the Rule 24 response), he needed to say so clearly.
37. The Judge also erred in his consideration of the prospects of the couple continuing their relationship in the Philippines by failing to take into account the expert evidence that the appellant could face criminal sanctions (including being banned from cohabiting with Mr D) because he is married and cannot get divorced in the Philippines. The fact that she is not married and that he could obtain a divorce if he remained in the UK is not an answer to this concern. Although the Judge was not required to refer to every argument made on the appellant’s behalf, this is a fear that she raised squarely in her statement and that was described precisely in the expert report. It was a significant enough consideration that it was an error to overlook it when considering whether the couple could continue their relationship in the Philippines.
38. As to the Judge’s findings with regard to the appellant’s private life, I agree with Ms McKenzie that the Judge took into account all relevant factors when deciding that there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in the Philippines, and that it is not material that some are discussed at greater length within his discussion of internal relocation than under the heading of Para. 276. His finding that there would not be very significant obstacles to her integration was therefore open to him on the evidence before him.
39. The Judge has also identified the factors that are relevant to an Article 8 private life consideration outside the rules, such as the appellant’s length of residence and the social connections she is likely to have built in the UK during that time. In spite of her length of residence, her ties to her community, her knowledge of English and the business she has established (it appears that she has been granted the right to work), moreover, a finding that her removal would not be a disproportionate interference with her private life would have been reasonably open to him if he had considered these factors within the framework of Section 117B and relevant caselaw.
40. The clear and material error, however, is that the Judge made two successive findings, one about whether the appellant should be granted leave to remain on the basis of her family life and one about whether she should be granted leave to remain on the basis of her private life. He never brought all of the factors weighing for and against the appellant together, as he was required to do. I agree with Mr Broachwalla that given, inter alia, the appellant’s length of residence, her accepted history of domestic violence, the risk of her being prohibited from cohabiting with her partner in the Philippines identified in the expert report (absent a clear finding that the relationship is not genuine or that the risk identified by the expert is too speculative) it cannot be said that the balance would have inevitably been resolved against her.

Notice of Decision
The Judge’s decision to dismiss the Article 8 aspects of the appellant’s appeal involved the making of a material error of law and is set aside.
The appellant was not granted permission to appeal the Judge’s decision to dismiss her refugee and Humanitarian Protection claims, and that aspect of his decision stands.
Directions
1) The appeal is adjourned to be re-made in the Upper Tribunal at a face-to-face hearing, on a date to be fixed, with a time estimate of three hours.
2) The appellant is to write to the Tribunal no later than 5 working days before the next hearing confirming whether she considers an anonymity order is still required and, if so, on what grounds.
3) If any party wishes to adduce any further evidence, this must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 10 working days before the next hearing, accompanied by an application made pursuant to rule 15 (2A) of the Tribunals Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
4) Any skeleton arguments must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 5 working days before the next hearing.
5) If the appellant or any other witness wishes to give oral evidence, they must provide a witness statement capable of standing as evidence in chief, to be served in accordance with direction [2] above, and must state if an interpreter is required, and if so in which language.
E. Ruddick

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 January 2025