Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-004975

First-tier Tribunal No: DC/50215/2022
LD/00026/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

ABDULLAH HUSSEIN ABDULLAH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Holmes, counsel instructed by Arden Law
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 14 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals against the decision, dated 28 August 2024, of Resident Judge Holmes (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal against the decision to deprive the appellant of his British citizenship.
Background
2. The broad procedural backdrop and immigration history is not in dispute between the parties. In appealing against the decision to deprive him of his British citizenship, the appellant disputed that he had acted dishonestly in providing his personal details about where and when he was born in Iraq for the purposes of making a protection claim upon his arrival in the UK in 2002. While his protection claim was refused, he was granted Exceptional Leave to Remain (‘ELR’). In addition to challenging the allegation of dishonesty, the appellant argued that any dishonesty was not material to the ultimate grant of indefinite leave to remain which underpinned his ability to apply for naturalisation as a British citizen. He was granted citizenship in 2009 having asserted in the course of his application that he was of good character.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. The appellant appealed against the deprivation decision. The appeal was heard by the judge on 27 August 2024. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the decision:
• At [7], the judge summarised the central points taken the appellant in the skeleton argument lodged on his behalf. This included, at [7(iii)], the submission that the difference in when and where the appellant was born in Iraq would have been “of no consequence”.
• At [13], the judge listed the leading authorities which set out the legal principles which applied to the resolution of such proceedings at that time.
• At [15(i)], the judge noted that his task, in respect to the condition precedent, was to assess the lawfulness of the respondent’s decision by applying public law principles.
• The judge considered whether he was bound to follow a primary fact-finding approach given what was said by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201. For the reasons provided between [17] and [22], the conclusion was reached that the Supreme Court judgment in Begum v SSHD [2021] UKSC 7 must operate to guide his approach to the appeal and that Ullah was limited to its own facts. At [23], it was explained that even if he had been required to decide the primary facts for himself, he would have had “no hesitation” in finding the condition precedent to be made out.
• At the outset of the section headed “decision”, the judge noted that while he must adopt a public law vantage point in his assessment of the initial parts of the deprivation decision, the Article 8 dimension of the appeal meant that he must also resolve primary facts for himself. [24]
• At [26]-[27], it was found that the appellant had not been truthful about the information he had gleaned from a CSID card issued in Sulaymaniyah which he must have held in the past. It was decided that he had always known when and where he was born. This, in turn, meant that the foundation of his asylum was “a fiction”.
• The appellant was found to have provided an untruthful account in his denial of any connection to Sulaymaniyah. [28] & [32]-[34]
• Tension in the appellant’s evidence, and against country background information, was noted in respect to the appellant’s previous accounts about the official records kept of his birth. [29]–[30]
• The judge observed that the false date and place of birth were central parts of the original protection claim and meant that the respondent could not return him to Iraq. [32]
• The appellant admitted during the hearing that he had used forged documents in support of the applications he made on behalf of his daughters for British passports. This dishonesty was found to have been motivated by a continuing intention to conceal his true place and date of birth. [35]
• The judge reached overall conclusions as to the facts at [36]-[38]:
In the circumstances I am satisfied that the Appellant’s uncorroborated evidence must be considered with significant caution. He is clearly a man who is prepared to resort to deception, and to the use of forged documents when he perceives it to be in his interests to do so. Having heard his oral evidence it is clear to me that his denials of deliberate deception over his date and place of birth in his dealings with the Respondent must be rejected as untrue. I also reject as untrue his claim to be unable to live in the KRG in safety. The original account in support of his 2002 claim to asylum was a fiction, and this is another, which I am satisfied is designed by him to obstruct his removal from the UK now that his true identity and ability to live within the KRG and to be removed to the KRG, has been uncovered. As Mr Mullarkey put it, he is a proven and persistent liar.
It is perfectly clear that the Appellant has, during the same period of time, used one identity whilst he was in Iraq, and a different identity whilst in the UK and in his dealings with the Respondent. He has been prepared to create and to rely upon forgeries to seek to hide the truth from the Respondent.
Standing back to look at the evidence in the round, I am satisfied that the Appellant was born in Suleymanyeh, grew up there, and then migrated to the UK where he entered illegally and made a fictitious claim to be unable to return to Iraq in safety. I am not satisfied that he has ever lived in Kirkuk. Living in Suleymanyeh with his family I am satisfied that he has always been able to access his genuine Iraqi identity documents, and that he has always known what they contain.
• At [45]-[47], the judge addressed his mind to public law considerations. He concluded that there was nothing irrational about the decision taken in respect to the condition precedent or in relation to the false assertions of good character in the context of the naturalisation application.
• The judge rejected the suggestion that any dishonesty was inconsequential. He said this about the causation question between [48] and [54]:
Before me Mr Hussein suggested that the Appellant could not have known that he was gaining a benefit by falsely claiming to have come from Kirkuk rather than Suleymanyeh, and that deception in this respect was of no consequence. That rather begs the question of why the Appellant would lie about his place of birth unless he did know that it was of consequence. As set out above, I would have reached exactly the same conclusion as the Respondent did – the lie was deliberate, and it was because returns were not taking place to the areas controlled by the Ba’ath regime, but they were, or at the least there was a risk that they would be to the KRG. The Respondent’s conclusion was not idle speculation as suggested.
In any event, as Popplewell J explained in Rushiti it does not assist a man to claim that he gained nothing from his dishonesty. It is his acts of dishonesty that is the key, when considering whether or not he is of “good character” at any given date. The Appellant did not answer honestly the questions and declarations raised of him in the naturalisation application, and claimed “good character” rather than admitting what he had done and inviting the Respondent to forgive or excuse that conduct, and then to make a grant of citizenship in any event.
In any event there is no viable causation argument available to him. The Appellant gained ILR on the basis of the lie that he was born in Kirkuk, had lived nowhere else, and that it was Kirkuk, rather than Suleymanyeh that was his “home area”. Had he told the truth about this then he would not have been granted ELR in 2002, and would not have gained ILR, because it was always safe for him to return to Suleymanyeh. Moreover, the grant of ILR is not the same as the grant of naturalisation, and the one does not automatically follow the other. Naturalisation is the subject of its own discrete application by the Appellant, and the application form for naturalisation makes it perfectly clear that honesty is required in making it, and in making the declarations required by it. As rehearsed in Onuzi it is for the Respondent to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether her own conclusions upon an individual’s past dishonesty are relevant to the “good character” test, and whether they would be likely to have made a material difference to the assessment of “good character” had the decision maker been made aware of them at the time the naturalisation application was under consideration.
There was no break in the chain of causation here, because there was never a full disclosure by the Appellant of the true position in the course of the naturalisation application.
I am satisfied that the decision in Sleiman is one that is confined to its own facts, and the unique way in which the parties to that appeal chose to present their respective arguments before the Upper Tribunal, and I note that this was also the view of the Court of Appeal in Shyti.
Having chosen to make an application for naturalisation, the Appellant was obliged to answer honestly the questions raised of him in that application. It was entirely open to the Respondent to conclude that he did not do so, and that instead, he had wrongly asserted his good character, at Section 3.13, and then made what he knew to be the dishonest declaration of truth at Section 7.
In all the circumstances I am satisfied that the Respondent’s conclusion that the Appellant did not meet the “good character” test at the date of his applications for naturalisation is a lawful one. It follows that there is no viable public law challenge to the conclusion that the condition precedent is made out, since naturalisation would not have been granted (indeed it could not lawfully have been granted) to one who did not meet the “good character” test.
• The Secretary of State was found to have lawfully exercised her discretion to deprive the appellant of his citizenship for the reasons given between [55] and [56]. The decision was found not to be a breach of the appellant or his family’s Article 8 human rights ([57]-[66]).
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds, settled by counsel on 23 October 2024:
i. That the Judge has, contrary to authority, engaged in assessment of the primary facts to aid his resolution of the appeal.
ii. The Judge has failed to resolve material arguments advanced by the Appellant on the ‘materiality’ of any alleged deception.
5. In a decision dated 26 November 2024, Upper Tribunal Judge Frances granted permission for both grounds to be argued. The following observation was made in granting permission:
It is arguable the judge adopted the wrong approach to the evidence in conducting a merits based assessment rather than a public law review.
6. On 17 January 2025, the Court of Appeal promulgated its judgment in Chaudhry v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 16. The law was clarified on the approach to be taken to appeals of this nature such that the precedent fact now falls to be assessed by a judge as a primary fact-finder as opposed to merely assessing the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s deprivation decision in this regard. It was held that the causation question should continue to be assessed on a public law basis. This clarification of the law prompted an application, dated 9 April 2025, to amend the first ground of appeal to read:
i. That the Judge has, contrary to authority, applied ‘public law principles’ to his resolution of the factual disputes in the appeal;
7. The respondent responded to directions issued by the tribunal. Due to an administrative error, two separate responses were served. The note drafted by Mr Terrell, dated 7 July 2025, was relied upon for the purposes of the hearing. In this note, the application to amend the grounds was resisted on the basis that it was unarguable considering Chaudhry. However, Mr Holmes pointed to the final paragraph of the rule 24 notice drafted by Mr Diwnycz, dated 30 June 2025, in which he did not oppose the application to amend the grounds but emphasised that the judge’s decision did not involve a material error.
8. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
9. As alluded to above, Chaudhry clarified the approach which should be adopted by judges in this chamber when deciding an appeal against a deprivation decision taken under s.40(3) of the British Nationality Act 1981. A matter of days ago, a presidential panel in Laci (Deprivation; fraud; procedure) [2025] UKUT 00230 (IAC) considered the practical effect of Chaudhry and gave guidance, at [36], as to how judges should approach their decision-making task:
The position in relation to the correct approach to appeals against decisions depriving a person of their British citizenship using section 40(3) of the 1981 Act following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chaudhry can therefore be summarised as follows:
First, in cases where it is disputed, the First-tier Tribunal is required to find as a fact whether there has been fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact, which is the statutory precondition for the making of a deprivation order under s40(3) (‘the precedent fact issue’);
Second, if the statutory precondition is met by proof of the precedent facts, the First-tier Tribunal is required to review on public law grounds whether the citizenship was obtained by the impermissible means (‘the causation issue’);
Third, the First-tier Tribunal is required to review on public law grounds the Secretary of State’s exercise of her discretion to make a deprivation order (‘the discretion issue’);
Lastly, the First-tier Tribunal must consider whether the Secretary of State has acted in breach of other relevant legal obligations, including section 6 Human Rights Act 1998. The First-tier Tribunal is required to resolve that question for itself whilst giving due weight to the findings, evaluations and policies of the Secretary of State.
10. When applying these principles to the appeal before them, and in finding that there was a material error, the panel found it to be of importance that the judge had “confined himself” to an assessment of the lawfulness of the decision in deciding the precedent fact. The materiality of the error of law was assessed at [39]:
We conclude that the First-tier Tribunal’s error was material, for two principal reasons. First, it is clear from the reasoning at paragraphs 40-50 of the decision (cited above) that the judge confined himself to considering merely whether the Respondent’s decision was reasonable, and when assessing the Appellant’s evidence, again his touchstone was whether it “undermined” the Respondent’s decision. Although the judge recognised that a different decision could have been made on the evidence before the Respondent, he did not at any stage direct his mind to how he himself would find on the point. It cannot therefore be said that, had the judge not considered himself restricted by Chimi to a public law review of the deception issue, he would have reached the same conclusion.
11. A further recent and reported decision of the Upper Tribunal, Onuzi (good character requirement: Sleiman considered) [2024] UKUT 00144 (IAC) provides further assistance in how the causation question should be approached on a public law footing. As can be seen above, Chaudhry and Laci maintained the position that this issue should be approached from the standpoint of assessing the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s decision. It is only necessary to refer to the general principles set out in the headnote:
Each case is fact sensitive. In the absence of a statutory definition of ‘good character’, the starting point is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether a person is of good character for the purpose of granting citizenship under section 6(1) and Schedule 1 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (‘BNA 1981’).
Any negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character is likely to be directly material to the assessment of the statutory requirement, whether it played a role in the application for naturalisation itself or took place before the application.
In the majority of cases where negative behaviour that might cast doubt on whether a person is of good character has been dishonestly concealed from the Secretary of State, the fact that the negative behaviour might not have been directly relevant to an earlier grant of leave is unlikely to make any material difference to the assessment under section 40(3) BNA 1981. It is for the Secretary of State to decide, subject to general principles of administrative law, whether the negative behaviour might have made a material difference to the assessment of good character under section 6(1) BNA 1981 had the information been known at the time.
The omission of a fact that might have cast doubt on whether a person is of good character when they applied for naturalisation is likely to be material to the question of whether a person ‘obtained’ citizenship by the dishonest concealment of a material fact for the purpose of section 40(3) BNA 1981.
The concept of a chain of causation being broken is only likely to be relevant in cases where there was full disclosure and the Secretary of State exercised discretion to grant leave to remain or naturalisation while in full possession of the facts.
The decision in Sleiman was based on limited argument and should be read in the full context of the statutory scheme and other relevant case law.
The application to amend the grounds of appeal
12. The first matter to be considered is whether I should permit the appellant to amend his original first ground of appeal under the applicable provisions of the Procedure Tribunal Rules. There was no dispute between the parties that the tribunal has the power to permit an amendment under rule 5(3) and that the discretion to allow such an amendment is to be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly. I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to permit the first ground to be amended. Firstly, while the respondent relied on the written note of Mr Terrell in resisting the application, I find it to be instructive that the rule 24 notice of 30 June 2025 did not suggest that the first ground ought to stand as originally drafted notwithstanding the significant change in the understanding of the law which came subsequently in the shape of the judgment in Chaudhry. Secondly, the essence of the legal challenge is much the same as that originally pleaded in that the complaint is that the judge adopted a twin-pronged approach of which one did not reflect the law. The clarification of the law has caused the appellant to switch prongs, but the underlying substance of the complaint is much the same such that it is difficult to see any prejudice which might eventuate to the respondent. The original ground attracted permission and it seems to me that it would be wrong to refuse the amendment on the strength of bare arguability when the central thrust of the submission is largely unchanged in the sense that the argument continued to be that the dual approach adopted by the judge encompassed an unlawful analytical approach. Accordingly, I permit the appellant to amend his first ground of appeal. I turn now to consider the merits of the two grounds of appeal.
Ground 1, as amended
13. In granting the application to amend the grounds of appeal, I noted that the essence of the legal challenge is not significantly different to how this ground was originally framed because the complaint remains that the judge wrongly introduced an unlawful analytical approach to his decision-making even if he also assessed the condition precedent in accordance with the law. However, even though the original first ground has been amended, the underlying arguments in support of the argument as it then stood are worth considering because they tend to shed light on the extent to which the judge was said to have assessed the evidence and facts for himself as a primary fact-finder (see [7] of the original grounds). This carries obvious significance in an appeal where it is now suggested that the judge unlawfully decided this critical question by using a public law lens. The original ground one included the following submission, at [5]:
The Appellant is therefore surprised to see that the lion’s share of the Judge’s decision (see §24 – §38) is devoted to his resolution of primary facts, and his reaching his own (adverse) conclusions on the evidence. This appears to include evidence, such as the Appellant’s oral evidence, which post-dates the Respondent’s decision.
14. The difficulty for the appellant is that it is tolerably clear that his original grounds went beyond the argument that the judge adopted a twin-pronged approach by finding facts for himself and evaluating the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s decision. It was forcefully argued in the original grounds that the judge primarily decided the precedent fact issue by reaching his own factual conclusions untethered to the deprivation decision. The problem is that this is now fully in accordance with the approach described in Chaudhry and Laci. If that primary analysis was garnished by a public law assessment of the lawfulness of the deprivation decision, it is difficult to see how the substance, or “lion’s share”, of the decision is in any way unlawful. The addition of a public law analysis does not operate to unpick or undermine the strength of reasoning which went to the fact-finding analysis which was originally the target of a hard-edged lawfulness challenge on the principled basis that the judge should simply never have embarked on such an exercise. I reject the argument Mr Holmes advanced at the hearing that the public law analysis may have functioned to infect the assessment of the evidence as a primary fact-finder.
15. If I am wrong that the addition of a public law lens to the primary fact-finding analysis was not an error of law, I am entirely satisfied that any error was not material to the overall outcome because it could scarcely be clearer that the overall outcome would not have been any different. I am fortified in this view by the approach taken in Laci where the senior panel stressed the importance of the judge “confining himself” to an approach later found to be unlawful. The position is diametrically different in the present matter because the judge manifestly considered the position as a primary fact-finder, which can now be seen to be entirely lawful, and on a public law footing, which, had it stood alone, would have amounted to an error of law. If there was an error of law here, I have no hesitation in concluding that it was immaterial.
Ground 2
16. An essential part of any decision to deprive a person of their British citizenship under s.40(3) of the 1981 Act is that the Secretary of State must be “satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of […]” the dishonest conduct which forms the bedrock of the condition precedent. This is the part of the legal scheme which is referred to as the “causation question” in the authorities. The caselaw is clear that this issue must be assessed by the judge considering the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s decision on causation.
17. The appellant argued that the judge failed to resolve the centrepiece of his argument that the respondent’s decision was unlawful on this front because there was an “evidential chasm” where there should have been evidence of the reasons why the appellant was initially granted ELR. The ELR decision later led to the grant of Indefinite Leave to Remain which, in turn, enabled him to later apply for naturalisation. When this gap in the evidence is seen against paragraphs 55.7.3-4 of chapter 55 of the applicable policy guidance to caseworkers, it was said to be clear that the decision-maker had failed to follow published policy and that this was a classic breed of public law error (see R (Lumba) v SSHD [2012] 1 A.C. 245).
18. A fair and natural reading of [47]-[48] of the FTT decision does not support the proposition that the judge failed to resolve this issue. The judge manifestly engaged with the point which was argued and found that the overall evidential picture available to the respondent strongly supported the proposition that the lies told by the appellant about the important matter of where he was from in Iraq must have played an instrumental role in the grant of ELR which was in keeping with the broad practice adopted at that time. It is misconceived to suggest that the judge was required to construct a chain of causative reasoning as though he were deciding causation as a distinct factual question for himself. In this regard, he was deciding whether the respondent’s decision was lawful and he was entitled to conclude that the respondent’s analysis of the overall evidential picture was such that the decision that lies told by the appellant about where he was from caused him to be granted ELR at precisely the time when the respondent was, broadly, deciding these kind of cases in this way. The judge was not bound to accept the appellant’s contention that gaps in the records, such as any minute to explain why ELR was granted, must mean that causation was not established. That is to seek to put the judge into the position of a primary decision-maker on this question which can only be answered by assessing the lawfulness of the Secretary of State’s decision on the matter. I am satisfied that the judge did not fall into legal error in how he assessed whether the lies told by the appellant were causative of his grant of ELR.
19. Even if I had concluded that the judge was in error in how he addressed the above dimension of the causation question, another dimension renders any error entirely immaterial. Onuzi confronted much the same argument advanced before me. As can be seen from the headnote copied above where, as here, the Secretary of State has relied on any false assertions of good character in applying for citizenship, this may function as an entirely separate and distinct basis on which causation may be considered to be lawfully established by the respondent irrespective of whether there is credible argument that the initial grant of leave was unrelated to any dishonesty. Simply put, the judge was more than entitled in law to find, as he did at [49] to [54], that the respondent lawfully concluded that the appellant deceived the respondent about matters of considerable importance over a lengthy period of time. On any sensible analysis, this cannot be reconciled with the assertions that he was a man of good character when he applied for citizenship. As can be seen from [23]–[24] of Onuzi, it is a legal requirement that a person naturalised as a British citizen is of good character. It is difficult to see how a rational conclusion could be reached that a man who had lied about when and where he was born in Iraq in the context of a claim for international protection, and thereafter maintained those lies over many years of dealings with the respondent, could be sensibly described as a man of good character. This alone was a lawful basis on which to conclude that the respondent’s decision withstood scrutiny under public law principles.
20. In his grounds, the appellant did not challenge the judge’s findings going to the ‘good character’ causative nexus between the dishonesty and the grant of citizenship. When I raised the point during the hearing, Mr Holmes suggested that it remained of importance to assess the importance of any lies told as this would inevitably have a bearing on whether he could be regarded as not being of good character such that the naturalisation application would have been rejected at source. The problem for the appellant is that this is precisely what the respondent did in the deprivation decision and is precisely what was found by the judge to be an entirely lawful basis for concluding that causation had been established on this discrete basis. The appellant may wish to argue now that any dishonesty found to exist on his part were ‘white lies’, but the focus must remain on the lawfulness of how the decision-maker assessed the seriousness of those lies.
21. I reject the argument that the causation analyses going to whether the lies led to the grant of ELR, and the lies being irreconcilable with the assertions of good character, were in some way intertwined. These were two entirely separate bridges to the same destination. Even if one bridge collapsed, the other continued to function as a lawful basis on which the causative chain of reasoning remained lawfully intact.
22. For the reasons I have expressed above, I am fully satisfied that the decision did not involve material errors of law on the causation question.
Notice of Decision
The decision did not involve a material error of law. It follows that the appeal against the judge’s decision is dismissed. The decision to dismiss the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s deprivation decision stands undisturbed.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 July 2025