Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2024-005020
(PA/53397/22 and IA/08462/22)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 2nd of July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

MV (ANGOLA)
Appellant
AND

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Meredith, Counsel instructed by Birnberg Pierce Ltd
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 20 June 2025

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him, any of his witnesses or any member of his family. This direction applies to, amongst others, both the Appellant and the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Angola born in 2002. He has been granted discretionary leave to remain in the United Kingdom on human rights grounds, but asserts in this appeal that he is entitled to recognition as a refugee.

Case History and Basis of Claim
2. The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 2 June 2019 along with his younger sister. He was 16; she was 10. They sought protection. On the 2 August 2022 the Appellant’s sister was recognised as a refugee and granted five years’ leave to remain. The Appellant himself was refused.
3. The Appellant’s sister was, due to her young age, never interviewed. Her grant of asylum was based entirely on the facts narrated by the Appellant in support of both their claims. In the decision letter dated the 10th August 2022 the Secretary of State describes that account as internally consistent, detailed and supported by the country background information. All material facts are accepted. They are as follows:
• The children were born in Luanda and grew up with their mother, stepfather and 2 younger half-sisters.
• Their mother was a secretary for a General in the Angolan Army and his stepfather was also employed by the military, as a driver.
• One day in 2014 the Appellant returned home to find his mother being raped by her boss in their family home. He tried to help his mother and was as a result so badly beaten by the General that he required hospital treatment.
• When the Appellant’s stepfather himself returned home and heard what had happened he armed himself and went out to find the General. He came home a few days later, collected some belongings and left. The Appellant does not know what transpired in those few days his stepfather was away from home. He has not seen him since.
• Shortly after these events soldiers came to the house while the family were out at church and burned it down.
• The Appellant, his mother and sisters were taken in by neighbours. After some weeks their Pastor suggested that they travel to Huambo, another city in Angola, where they could be accommodated by another church.
• The family were driven to Huambo by a member of their congregation in Luanda.
• On arrival at the church in Huambo they found it to be a large compound consisting of a central church buildings and many congregants living in tents. The Appellant’s mother was required to register there. He remembers that she gave the details of an uncle living in London as their next of kin.
• The church was run by a man known as Prophet Kalupeteca, who told his followers that the end of the world was upon them and advised them to sell their homes and possessions and retreat to the mountains.
• This church, known as ‘Light of the World’, was designated a dangerous cult by the Angolan government. On the 16th April 2015 armed police and soldiers stormed the compound with the aim of arresting Prophet Kalupeteca. Armed church members fought back and in the resulting fighting, hundreds of tents were burned, and a large number of civilians killed. The estimated number of dead vary but some human rights groups contend that as many as 1000 church adherents were killed. What is not in dispute is that the Appellant and his sister survived, but the fate of their mother and half-sisters remains unknown. The Appellant and his sister had been away from their tent when the assault began, and after the fighting subsided they were unable to find the rest of the family. It is assumed that they were all killed, or possibly taken into custody along with other survivors.
• At the date of the assault on the compound the Appellant was 13; his little sister was only 7. They survived as best they could, on charity and scavenging on the streets.
• After some time they met with two Pastors who had been associated with Prophet Kalupeteca. These Pastors assisted them, providing them with food and basic accommodation until in 2019 they managed to obtain passports for the children and brought them to the UK where they instructed them to seek protection.
• Perhaps unsurprisingly, given this painful and traumatic personal history, the Appellant now suffers from various mental health disorders including depression, anxiety and PTSD.
4. The question for the First-tier Tribunal, and now this Tribunal, is whether on those facts the Appellant can properly be recognised as a refugee. That question breaks down into two parts: is there is a current risk of serious harm, and is it for a Convention reason?

Matters in Issue and the First-tier Tribunal Decision
5. Although apparently no one can be sure, it is assumed that the Appellant’s sister was granted refugee status on the basis of her young age: see LQ (Age: immutable characteristic) Afghanistan [2008] UKAIT 00005. In the Appellant’s case the decision was not taken until some three years after the claim had been made, and by that time, he was over 18. Protection was therefore refused on the ground that he could no longer be said to be a member of the particular social group ‘children’, and it does not appear that the Appellant ever took issue with that logic. Instead Ms Meredith, who appeared on his behalf before the First-tier Tribunal, submitted that his appeal fell to be allowed under any one or more of the following alternative heads of claim:
i) Member of a particular social group ‘young person’ (LQ supra, AA (unattended children) Afghanistan [2012] UKUT 16 (IAC))
ii) Member of a particular social group, his own ‘family’ (see EH (Blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348)
iii) Member of a particular social group, person suffering from mental ill-health (DH (Particular Social Group: Mental Health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223 (IAC))
iv) Imputed political opinion/religious belief by association with the ‘Light of the World’ church.
These were the Convention reasons, submitted Ms Meredith, and the real risk of harm accumulated from each.
6. The First-tier Tribunal decision is dated the 4th July 2024. The Tribunal discounts (at its [51] to [58]) any risk to the Appellant for reasons of his association with the ‘Light of the World’ church, since on the objective material produced by the Respondent, it no longer exists as an entity; on the Appellant’s case the Pastors who assisted him and his sister were able to reside in Angola without difficulty in the years following the massacre, and the authorities in Angola would have no means of knowing that he was ever a resident at the compound in Huambo. He was never himself a member of the church. As to the Appellant’s mental health, addressed at [33] to [44], the Tribunal accepted the (unchallenged) diagnoses of anxiety, depression and PTSD but was not minded to accept the prognosis of Consultant Psychiatrist Dr Galathappie that forced return would precipitate a “significant deterioration” in the Appellant’s mental health resulting in a “high risk” of impulsive self-harm or even suicide. Addressing any risk that might result from those diagnoses at its [59]-[62] the Tribunal concludes that it had not been shown that the Appellant would be unable to get treatment in Angola. Although Ms Meredith does not appear to have relied on any feared risk of harm at the hands of the General, the Tribunal for good measure dismisses this as a risk on the basis that the Appellant does not know who he was, and has never sought any redress for the crimes committed against his family (see [48] to [50]. The appeal was thereby dismissed.

Error of Law: Discussion and Findings
7. Permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted in unrestricted terms on the 24 October 2024 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chowdhury. The matter first came before me on the 17 January 2025 when the Respondent was represented by Senior Presenting Officer Mr Wain, and the Appellant by Ms Meredith.
8. The central complaint made by Ms Meredith is that the Tribunal failed to consider, or make sustainable findings on, arguments put on behalf of the Appellant, as summarised at my [6](i)-(iii) above.
9. By my written decision dated the 18 March 2025 I found this criticism to be made out. Other than an oblique criticism of the Respondent at its [30], the First-tier Tribunal’s decision does not address at all the argument made by Ms Meredith that the Appellant remains at risk in Angola as a person rendered particularly vulnerable by virtue of his young age, traumatic life events and the mental health consequences thereof. These intersecting factors were in themselves all capable of giving rise to some degree of harm, as she submits, but that risk was considerably heightened when one considers their cumulative effect. By way of illustration, in her submissions Ms Meredith asked me to consider the situation should the Appellant come to the attention of the Angolan authorities because he is a young person on the street. The ordinary 23 year-old may be able to withstand the pressure of such a situation, and to satisfactorily answer questions put to him about how he came to be there. This young man is not however an ordinary 23 year-old. He is someone who has endured extraordinary levels of trauma at the hands of the Angolan authorities; his childhood was brutally interrupted by those events; as a result his mental health remains precarious, even after some years of treatment in the safety of this country. Ms Meredith questions whether, in such a situation, the Appellant could be relied upon to maintain his composure and not reveal his underlying mental health issues; and/or could he be relied upon to keep quiet about having been at that compound in Huambo? A revelation either way could, on the basis of the country background material, significantly raise the risk of harm. I accept that these were arguments put to the First-tier Tribunal, and that the decision does not adequately address them, if at all. I am satisfied that the submissions were sufficiently meritorious to warrant consideration: it follows that the failure to address them is an error.
10. The next ground is framed as a reasons challenge. Several points are made under this head but I think I need deal with only one: that relating to the finding that the Appellant has not established a real risk of harm on account of his association with the Light of the World church.
11. The Tribunal had before it expert evidence on the Light of the World from a Dr Armundsen, a political scientist based in Norway. Dr Armundsen has published several papers and written chapters in books on Angola in recent years. At its [46] the Tribunal accepted that she is a suitably qualified expert to comment on the situation in Angola. In her report she comments on the Respondent’s conclusion that following the assault on the Huambo compound and the arrest of Prophet Kalupeteka, the Light of the World sect is defunct. Dr Armundsen agrees that the sect no longer exists as an organisation, but cautions that this does not mean that the Angolan authorities have lost interest in its erstwhile members. The events of 2015 have to be placed in context. The raid on the compound was not an isolated incident. It was part of a continuum of repression against revivalist religious movements, which are, in their ability to organise on a mass scale, perceived as a threat to the state. This is why the Light of the World was “singled out for complete destruction”. In the years since the assault on the compound there have been various reports of continued action against it and its members, most recently dating from the suppression of a ‘riot’ in 2023. The Tribunal appears to accept all of that, but concludes that there would not be any risk to the Appellant as a result of continued enmity towards the sect. That is because, the Tribunal reasons, there is nothing to suggest that the authorities would know that the Appellant was there. He was not a member of the sect himself, there is no evidence that his name would appear on any records in association with it, and he was just a child at the time.
12. Ms Meredith took issue with that reasoning for two reasons. The first is the point already dealt with above, which is that the Appellant is particularly vulnerable, and that he cannot realistically be expected to withstand questioning – either on return or simply on the street - without revealing his presence in Huambo. The second concerns the likelihood of his name already being known to the Angolan authorities. At its [58] the Tribunal records the Appellant’s evidence that when his family arrived at the compound his mother was required to register there, and give his uncle’s name as a contact. Of this evidence the decision says this:
“On a holistic view and on the lower standard of proof, I am not satisfied that there was a list of members of the sect or that such a list fell into the Angolan government’s hands. Even if the government retrieved such a list, it seems to me that only the leaders of the sect were persecuted by way of prosecution following the massacre”
13. Ms Meredith submits, in respect of the first of these findings, that it is unsupported by reasons. I have to agree. This was a case in which the entirety of the Appellant’s evidence was accepted as being true. Part of that evidence was that his mother had registered the family on arrival at the church. It follows that there certainly was some kind of a register. It is further uncontested that this church was subject to a full-scale military assault by the Angolan security services because it was perceived to be a threat to the state. Dr Armundsen describes the Angolan government as “authoritarian” and that it seeks to suppress this kind of religious group because they are well organised. We know that many of the survivors of the assault were arrested and indeed prosecuted. It seems to me in those circumstances that it is at least arguable that there is a reasonable likelihood that the soldiers would have specifically looked for, and retrieved, any such record. I am unclear as to why the Tribunal concludes otherwise. In respect of the second sentence, Ms Meredith submits that this is at odds with the country background material, which indicates that many adherents were rounded up and taken into detention; in any event, she submits, prosecution was in some way the least of the harms visited upon members of this church, many of whom were killed or injured, or subsequently ‘disappeared’.
14. For those reasons I found that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal must be set aside. In respect of the first ground I accept that submissions advanced on the Appellant’s behalf were not considered. In respect of the second I accept that the conclusions are not adequately reasoned or supported by the evidence.

Disposal
15. My written decision on ‘error of law’, as set out above, was not made available to the parties until 18 March 2025. As I explained, there had been a significant delay in the promulgation of the decision, for which I offered the parties my apologies. The reason for the delay was that shortly after the initial hearing in January I was signed off work for an extended period on medical grounds. Given the delay I considered it to be appropriate to give the parties the option of reconvening the hearing should they wish to make further submissions on disposal, and at the end of this decision I give directions to that effect. Those representing the Appellant indicated that they did not think a further hearing was necessary. Mr Wain for the Secretary of State however indicated, by way of email dated the 23rd April 2025, that the Secretary of State wished to make further oral submissions. There then followed a further delay until a suitable date could be found.
16. When the hearing was reconvened on the 20 June 2025 the Secretary of State was represented by Dr Ibisi, who indicated that she took a different view from her colleague. She did not wish to make any further oral submissions, and simply relied on the Secretary of State’s case as it had already been advanced: it was her position that it was not reasonably likely that the Appellant could come to the adverse attention of the Angolan authorities.
17. Ms Meredith took the opportunity to update me on a development in the Appellant’s personal circumstances. One of his younger sisters, previously missing after the raid on the Huambo compound, has now arrived in the UK. Like her sister before her she was considered too young to be interviewed (she was 16). She was granted refugee status, again on the basis of the Appellant’s evidence.
18. It is unfortunate that there has been yet further delay in this matter which did not in the end require any further oral submissions. I am quite satisfied that the Appellant is entitled to be recognised as a refugee for the reasons advanced by Ms Meredith, and set out above. As to the two questions posed at my §4, I find as follows.
19. There is a current risk of harm to the Appellant because I accept that it is reasonably likely that his name, and those of his family members, would have been entered into the register kept by the Light of the World sect, and given what Dr Armundsen says about the state’s interest in that group, it makes sense that efforts would have been made to gain control of that list after the compound was overwhelmed. I am further satisfied that the adverse interest in the group will not have sufficiently waned to obviate the risk to perceived members or associates of the group. If I am wrong about that I am satisfied that the Appellant is also at risk of coming into contact with the authorities simply by being a homeless young man - as he will be – on the streets. It is in my view only a matter of time before he comes into contact with the police and could be associated with the Light of the World in the manner discussed at my §9 above. The Appellant has already suffered persecution (the loss of his family) and this is to be regarded as a serious indication that the risk if well-founded. This is a sect “singled out for complete destruction” and I am not satisfied that there are good reasons to consider that such harm would not be repeated.
20. In respect of whether there would be a Convention ground for this harm, any one of the alternative heads of claim set out at my §5 would do. Whilst the recent recognition of a second sister as a refugee arguably pushes (ii) (member of a particular social group, viz his own ‘family’: see EH (Blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348) to the fore, it seems to me that ultimately it is this family’s past – and now immutable – association with the Light of the World sect which places them all at risk. If I had to pick one of Ms Meredith’s 4 options it would therefore be (iv): imputed political opinion/religious belief by association with the ‘Light of the World’ church.

Decisions
21. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
22. There is an anonymity order in this ongoing protection appeal in which the Appellant is a vulnerable witness.
23. The appeal is allowed on protection (refugee) grounds.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
28 June 2025